

EPISTEMOLOGY, LOGIC AND GRĀMMAR

(ANALYSIS OF SENTENCE-MEANING)



VOL. II

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**EPISTEMOLOGY,
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IN THE ANALYSIS
OF
SENTENCE-MEANING**

Vol. II

EPISTEMOLOGY, LOGIC AND GRAMMAR IN THE ANALYSIS OF SENTENCE-MEANING

Vol. II

V.P. BHATTA

Assistant Editor

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PREFACE TO THE SECOND VOLUME

Pāṇinis grammar, Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā are the three systems which deal with the analysis of sentence and its meaning in India. While Pāṇinis grammer analysed sentence and its meaning as a natural extension of its linguistic activity, Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā did the same as an epistemological exercise, intended to obtain the valid knowledge through words.

The advent of Kātyāyana, Patañjali, Kaiyaṭa, Bhartṛhari, and Nagesha in the grammatical system on the one hand, and the rise of the Prābhākara and the Bhātta Schools in the Mīmāṃsā system and that of NavyaNyāya in the Nyāya system on the other, brought a tremendous boost to the linguistic and epistemological activity in India, and thus contributed to the development of the science of linguistics and epistemology.

The latter grammarians, the Navya Naiyāyikas and the Bhāṭṭas have adopted the methodology of advanced linguistics, Navya Nyāya logic and epistemology respectively in the classification and analysis of the nature of various parts of speech, i.e., grammatical/semantical categories such as the noun, verb, *kāraṅgas* etc. ; and thus, epistemology, logic and grammer play a very crucial role in the analysis of sentence and its meaning in India.

While the classification and the definition of grammatical/semantical categories by the Indian grammarians are quite well known and are discussed to a great extent by scholars in east and west, the same (classifications and definitions) by the logicians and ritualists are virtually unknown and therefore, need to be discussed.

Also, the Individual thinkers in each of the three systems, namely, Patañjali, Bhartṛhari, Nagesha etc. in grammar, Gangesha, Gadādhara, Giridhara etc. in Nyāya, and Khaṇḍadeva, Maṇḍana Mishra etc. in the Bhāṭṭa School of Mīmāṃsā have taken up the analysis of sentence and its meanings on their own and not only brought forward the sharp theoretical differences amongst the three Indian systems, but also established their own theories of sentence and its meaning within each of the three systems.

Importance of the study of the Indian analysis of sentence and its meaning cannot be stressed too sufficiently in the context of Indian Philosophy of language. Indian epistemologists have proposed divergent theories not only about the noun-verb relationship but also about the syntactico-semantic relationship between two different nouns (*kāraḥ* or non-*kāraḥ*) and between other parts of speech. Thus, the Indian analysis has presented the most sophisticated theories of the sentence and its meaning comparable to the modern theories of syntax and semantics.

While the first volume of 'Epistemology, Logic and Grammar...' deals with the theory of sentence and its meaning (verbal cognition), meanings of verbal root and that of verbal ending, theory of *kāraḥ*, meaning of nominative and accusative cases etc., the second volume deals with the problems connected with the *karma kāraḥ* such as secondary objects, passivity, transitivity, the adverbs, the division of the objects, the non-*kāraḥ* etc.

I would like to express my deep gratitude and indebtedness to my teachers Prof. N.S. Ramanujatatacharya, Vice-Chancellor, K.S. Vidyapeetha, TIRUPATI, Prof. Ramabhadra-chārya and Arcaka Venkannacharya, both retired Professors, Maharaja Sanskrit College, Mysore. If I am to present the Navya Nyāya theories of grammatical/semantical categories rightly, the credit goes to my teachers; however, the responsibility for the theoretical as well as the methodological mistakes, which the readers may find at times, lies entirely with this author.

I would like to thank my friend and one time colleague Dr. Shiv Kumar of CASS, University of Pune, for his useful

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V.P. Bhatta

CHAPTER XIII

AVOIDANCE OF THE INCORRECT STATEMENTS SUCH AS

'svam gacchati' etc.

Introduction : Accusative case endings are enjoined after the nouns that are expressive of the objects. (*karmaṇi dvitīyā* p. ii.3.2). And an entity is considered to be the object provided that it is intended to be the abode of the effect (*kartur īpsitātām karma* p. i.4.49). For instance, consider the noun '*grāma*' (village) in the statement 'Caitra goes to the village' '*caitro grāmam gacchati*'. Here, the accusative case ending '*am*' is found occurring after the noun '*grāma*' since the same expressess the object 'village'; and the village is the object because it is intended to be the abode of the effect, namely, contact produced from the action of going. However, since the effect such as contact produced from the action of going is binary and occurs in both an object such as the village and a non-object such as Caitra in the context of 'Caitra goes to the village' (*caitro grāmam gacchati*), the accusative case ending cannot be prevented from occurring after the noun (*svam*) expressive of the non-object such as Caitra himself just as the same cannot be prevented from occurring after the noun (*grāma*) expressive of the object such as the village. And consequently, the incorrect statements such as 'Caitra goes to himself' (*caitraḥ svam gacchati*), like the correct statements such as 'Caitra goes to the village' (*caitraḥ grāmam gacchati*) can be imposed when it is intended that Caitra is the agent of going i.e. that Caitra is the abode of the action of going conducive to the contact which is occurrent in both the village and Caitra himself.

Problem : In order to avoid the imposition of such incorrect statements as 'Caitra goes to himself' (*caitraḥ svam gacchati*), epistemologists, especially logicians, ritualists and grammarians have proposed various theories. The theories proposed can be roughly classified into three main categories : (i) those based on the assumption of distinct meanings or syntactico-semantic relations, (ii) those based on grammatical or linguistic conventions and (iii) those based on economy of assumption. For instance, Gadādhara's theory that the inherence in something different from the accusative-stem-meaning is the meaning of the accusative case ending and also Jagadīśa's theory that the possession of the counter positiveness of the absence of the action occurring in the abode of the effect is a relation of the root-meaning are based on the assumption of distinct meanings or syntactico-semantic relations; whereas, Kaundabhatta's theory that the name 'object' is prevented by the convention that 'whatever is later and without any other occasion for application takes precedence over the earlier name, is based on the assumption of a grammatical convention; and the ritualists theory that the objectness is an indivisible property and such a property is co-extensive in its occurrence with the abode of the effect produced from the action that is inherent in something different from its own locus' is based on the economy of assumptions. In the following pages, we shall give a brief account of all these fascinating theories and also that of some individual thinkers and try to ascertain how each one of them avoid the imposition of the incorrect statements such as '*caitraḥ svam gacchati*' etc.

Jagadīśa's theory

Jagadīśa is the chief advocate of the theory that a separate relation be admitted to avoid the incorrect statement '*caitraḥ svam gacchati*' etc. According to him, accusative case refers to the effect produced by the verbal action. And verbal root refers to the verbal action such as going. Here, the accusative case-meaning, namely, the effect, is related to the action through the relations of producing and the possession of the counter positiveness conditioned by the absence occurring in

its (i.e. accusative meaning's) locus '*svaśrayapratīyogikatva*'. For instance, consider the statement 'Caitra goes to the village' (*caitro grāmam gacchati*). Here, the accusative case ending, namely, '*am*', refers to the effect such as contact; and the verbal root, namely, '*gam*', refers to the action of going. The accusative case meaning, i.e. the contact, is related to the root-meaning, i.e. the action of going, through the relation of producing (the action of going produces the contact) and also through the possession of the counterpositiveness conditioned by the absence of the action of going occurring in the abode of the contact (the action of going is absent in the locus of the contact, i.e. the village). Thus, the cognition is that Caitra is the abode of the action of going which both produces the contact and possesses the counterpositiveness, of the absence of the action of going occurring in the locus of the contact, which in turn, occurs in the village. In this theory, the incorrect statement such as 'Caitra goes to himself' (*caitrah svam gacchati*) is not possible to impose; for, Caitra cannot be claimed to be the abode of the action of going, which possesses the counterpositiveness conditioned by its absence, occurring in the locus of the contact (i.e. Caitra, being also the agent of going, actually possesses only the action of going and so he cannot have the action of going, which is the counterpositive of an absence, occurring in himself).

Jagadīśa states that in passive statements, such as 'the village is gone to by Caitra' (*caitreṇa grāmo gamyate*) the conjugational ending such as '*te*' refers to the effect 'contact' etc. And the verbal root-meaning, namely, the action of going etc. is related to the effect through both being produced and also being the counterpositive of the absence occurring in its (i.e. actions) own abode. Thus, the cognition is that the village is the abode of the effect 'contact' which is both produced and is occurring in its (i.e. action's) own abode, namely, the agent 'Caitra' in the passive statement. This suggestion effectively prevents the imposition of the incorrect passive statement such as 'Caitra is gone to Caitra himself' (*caitreṇa caitrah gamyate*); for, Caitra cannot be said to be the abode of the effect 'contact' which is the counterpositive of the absence occurring in its (action's) own abode, namely, the agent 'Caitra'.

Observation: It can be observed now that Jagadīśa's theory perceives a separate relation such as the possession of the counter-positiveness conditioned by the absence of the action of going etc. as a separate relation of the meaning of the accusative case to avoid the incorrect statement such as '*caitraḥ svam gacchati*' etc. This theory is based on the Prācyā convention that the accusative refers to only the effect such as contact and the verbal root refers to the action. Also, this theory is economical in the sense that the possession of the counter-positiveness is perceived to be only a syntactico-semantic relation and not a separate meaning; and hence does not involve the heaviness in the assumption of the assembly of causes that prevents the perception at the time of the production of the verbal cognition from the accusative statement.

Gadādhara's theory

Gadādhara is the chief exponent of the theory that a separate meaning be admitted for the accusative case (in the active and for the conjugational ending in the passive construction) to overcome the difficulty of making the incorrect statement such as 'Caitra goes to himself' (*caitraḥ svam gacchati*). He proposes that, like the effect such as contact, the inherence in something different from the accusative stem-meaning '*para-samavetaiva*' should also be accepted as the accusative meaning. And the accusative stem-meaning, such as the village, relates to the difference, i.e. mutual absence, a part of the total meaning of the accusative case, through the counterpositiveness; whereas the same (accusative case-meaning) relates to the action, expressed by the verbal root, through occurrence. Thus, the cognition produced from the statement '*caitraḥ grāmam gacchati*' is that Caitra is the abode of the action of going, which is both inherent in something different from the village and producing the effect contact occurring in the village. In this theory, the imposition of the incorrect statement '*caitraḥ svam gacchati*' is not possible because the action of going, which produces the contact in Caitra, is indeed found inherent in Caitra himself and therefore, cannot be claimed to be inherent in something different from Caitra himself, namely, the accusative stem-meaning.

It should be noted here that this theory visualizes the

relation of the accusative stem-meaning to the difference, a part of the meanings of the accusative case through the counterpositiveness. And such a relationship contradicts the well established syntactico-semantic convention that 'meaning of a word relates to the total meaning of another word and not to a part of the meaning of another word'. However, we can allow such a relationship by restricting the application of such a syntactico-semantic convention. Thus, Gadādhara permits such a relationship of the accusative stem-meaning to part of the accusative meaning.

Also, it should be noted that this theory avoids the incorrect statement such as 'the wrestler goes (i.e. fights with) himself' (*mallah svam gacchati*) when actually two wrestlers fight each other and, due to their fighting, both the wrestlers possess the contact with each other. This is so because, the first wrestler cannot be claimed to be the abode of the action of going (i.e. fighting), which is inherent in somebody different from the wrestler, the accusative-stem-meaning, despite the same producing the contact in the wrestler.

Difficulty

However, really speaking, accepting inherence in something different from the accusative stem-meaning '*parasamavetva*', as one of the accusative case-meanings is not going to solve the difficulty. For, Caitra can be said to possess the difference (i.e. mutual absence) of both a pot and Caitra himself. And consequently, the action of going, when occurs in Caitra, can be claimed to be inherent in something (i.e. pot) different from himself, i.e. the accusative stem-meaning, namely, Caitra. Therefore, the accusative stem-meaning can relate to the difference, the part of the accusative case-meaning, and the same (accusative case-meaning) can further relate to the action of going, occurring in Caitra, and thus, the incorrect statement 'Caitra' goes to himself' stands unprevented. In view of this difficulty, Gadādhara declares that considering the inherence in something different from the accusative stem-meaning is pointless and resorts to an alternative theory.

Alternative Theory

Gadādhara, as an alternative, proposes that the accusative refers to the delimitership of the counterpositiveness conditioned by the mutual absence, which is related to the root-meaning 'action' '*dhātvārtha kriyānvayi bhedapratiyogitāvacchedakatyam*'. And the accusative stem-meaning relates to the difference (i.e. the mutual absence) through the relation of the superstratumness. Thus, the cognition, in 'Caitra goes to the village' (*caitra grāmam gacchati*), is that Caitra is the abode of the action of going, which has the delimitership of the counterpositiveness conditioned by the mutual absence such as 'the village is not the possessor of the action of going producing the contact'.

This alternative theory effectively avoids the incorrect statement '*caitraḥ svam gacchati*' etc. For, Caitra, though is the abode of the action of going that produces the contact with the village, cannot be claimed to be the abode of the action of going that has the delimitership of the counterpositiveness conditioned by the mutual absence such as 'Caitra himself is not the possessor of the action of going' (i.e. Caitra cannot be claimed to be different from the one who possesses the action of going).

Difficulty in the alternative theory

When a bird goes to, i.e. rests on, the ground, the statement 'bird goes to the ground' (*vihago bhūmim gacchati*) is made. And this can be explained because the bird is indeed the abode of the action of going which possesses the delimitership of the counterpositiveness conditioned by the mutual absence such as the ground is not the possessor of going that produces the effect 'contact'. However, the action of going, occurring in the bird which produces the contact with the ground, can very well be claimed to be the delimiter of the counterpositiveness conditioned by the mutual absence such as the bird is not the (other) bird, the possessor of another action of going'. Consequently, since the bird does possess the action of going which can be the delimiter of the counterpositive of the mutual absence, the incorrect statement 'bird goes to the bird' (*vihago vihagam*

gacchati) cannot be avoided in the alternative theory suggested by Gadādhara.

Avoidance of Difficulty

In view of this difficulty, Gadādhara accepts that the accusative meaning such as the contact, occurring in the bird, is related to the action of going through both the producership and the delimitership of the counterpositiveness conditioned by the mutual absence occurring in the abode of itself (i.e. the accusative meaning) '*svāśraya niṣṭha bheda pratiyogitāvachhedakatva*'. When the action of going occurs in the bird, the same cannot be claimed to be the delimiter of the counterpositiveness conditioned by the mutual absence such as the bird is not the possessor of the action of going. Thus, the incorrect statement such as 'bird goes to the bird' (*viḥago viḥagam gacchati*) cannot be imposed.

Observation

It can be observed now that Gadādhara has presented two different theories. Of the two, the first one, namely, that the inherence in something different from the accusative stem-meaning '*parasamvetātva*' should be accepted as one of the meanings of the accusative case ending is the Navya logicians view. It clearly betrays the Navya methodology that a new meaning can be visualized to overcome an epistemological problem. Such a theory visualizes that the incorrect statement such as '*caitraḥ svam gacchati*,' which perceives the agent of the action to be the object as well, can be overcome provided that the action, found occurring in the agent, is qualified as inherent in something different from the accusative stem-meaning, namely, the object. For, since, in such incorrect statements, object and the agent are one and the same, the action, occurring in the agent, would not become inherent in something different from the accusative-stem-meaning, namely, the object; and therefore, the agent would be the abode of only the action that is found occurring in the object as well; and thus, the grammatical convention that agent and object are different in nature and agent is one who is the abode of the action and the object is that which is the abode of the effect produced by the action gets violated.

It should be noted that the Navya logicians theory is based on the grammatical principle that the agent is one who is independent in his actions, i.e. one who possesses the action all by himself and does not share it with the object or any other *kāraka*. Navyas try to avoid the incorrect statement by pointing out that, when incorrect statement such as '*caitraḥ svam gacchati*' is made, the same violates the grammatical convention that the agent should possess an action that is his own and not found elsewhere.

The second of the two theories presented by Gadādhara, namely, that the accusative refers to the delimitership of the counter-positiveness conditioned by the mutual absence, is actually a modification of the first theory; but includes the delimitership of the counterpositiveness in the meaning of the accusative. Therefore, both the theories have the same technical difficulty; that Caitra (or bird) can have the mutual absence (difference) of himself (or of itself) because Caitra (or bird) is not same as Caitra (or bird) and a pot. Thus, even when the action is occurring in Caitra (or bird) alone, the same (action) can be technically claimed to be occurring in something different from himself (or itself). To overcome this difficulty, Gadādhara resorts to the new methodology that the delimitership of the counterpositiveness conditioned by the mutual absence is merely a syntactico-semantic relation; and the effect, which is now the accusative meaning, is related to the action through such a relation. This theory has the advantage over the original Navya theories since the action, occurring in the agent (bird etc.) cannot be claimed to be the delimiter of the counterpositiveness conditioned by the mutual absence such as bird is not the possessor of the action of going.

Gokulanātha's theory

For the purpose of avoiding the incorrect statement '*caitraḥ svam gacchati*' etc., Gokulanatha proposes as follows : The accusative case¹ refers to both the mutual absence and the superstratumness. And the accusative stem-meaning, such as the

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1. Earlier scholars like Bhavānanda and Gadādhara also have supported this theory, however, Gokulanatha is the first

village, relates to the mutual absence through the relation of counterpositiveness, delimited by the individuality of individual counterpositives; whereas the same stem-meaning relates to the superstratumness through the occurrence. Thus, Caitra is the abode of the action of going which is both occurring in the locus of the mutual absence that conditions the counterpositiveness of the village and also produces the contact in the village. Here, since the counterpositiveness, delimited by the delimiting property of the counterpositiveness, in general, is the relation of only the counterpositive to the mutual absence, when referred to by the negative particle 'na' etc., the counterpositive, namely, the village etc., can relate to the mutual absence when referred to by the accusative through even the counterpositiveness, delimited by the individuality of the individual counterpositives.

Also, here the convention is that whatever accusative stem-meaning relates to the superstratumness, one of the two accusative case-meanings, the same (accusative stem-meaning) relates to the mutual absence, the other accusative case-meaning. Consequently, despite the action of going occurring in the locus of the mutual absence conditioning the counterpositiveness of some other person, (i.e. Maitra), the person (i.e. Caitra) cannot be claimed to possess the mutual absence such as 'the person (i.e. Caitra) is not the abode of the action of going' provided that the same person does go to the village. Therefore, the action of going, occurring in the person (i.e. Caitra), can very well be negated to possess the delimitership of the counterpositiveness conditioned by the mutual absence such as 'the person (i.e. Caitra) is not the abode of the action of going'. Thus, when Caitra goes to the village and not to himself, the statement such as 'Caitra goes to the village and not to the person' (*caitra grāmam gacchati na manuṣyam*) cannot be prevented by claiming that some other person (i.e. Maitra) can be related to the mutual absence through the relation of the counter-positiveness; and so the action of going becomes only the possessor of the delimitership of the counter-positiveness conditioned by the mutual absence such as 'the person (i.e.

scholar to emphatically propose that mutual absence is the accusative-meaning.

Maitra) is not the abode of the action of going'.

Gokulanātha proposes further that, in negative statements such as 'Caitra does not go to the person i.e. himself' (*caitra na manusyam gacchati*), the negative particle *na* makes one cognize that the assembly of all the individual absences of the delimiterships of the individual counterpositiveness(es), conditioned by the mutual absence(s), such as 'the persons are different from those who are the abode of the action of going', is related to the action of going. Consequently, since the action of going, occurring in Caitra, can be stated to possess the absence of the, delimiterships of such counter-positivenesses, the statement 'Caitra does not go to the person' becomes tenable.

However, suppose it is held that the assembly of all the individual absences of the delimiterships is impossible for any body, to cognize, then the absence of the persons, in general, (referred to by the negative particle '*na*' plus the accusative stem '*manusya*') should be accepted to be relating to the action of going through the relation of the delimitership of the counter-positiveness, conditioned by the mutual absence of actions such as going and also through the relation of the production of the effect 'contact' occurring in the person, namely, Caitra himself.

Giridhara's new method

Giridhara proposes a new method for avoiding the untenability of the statement such as 'Caitra does not go to the person' (*caitra na manusyam gacchati*). According to him, the accusative meaning, namely, the mutual absence is related to the action of going through the relation of the qualification which, in turn, is delimited by the relation of the delimitership of the counterpositiveness as well as that of the production of the effect 'contact' occurring in the same locus as that of itself i.e. mutual absence. Consequently, since the mutual absence, occurring in some other person (i.e. Maitra), is not related to the action of going through the said relation of qualification (i.e. since the absence of the mutual absence, in general, conditioning counterpositiveness delimited by such a qualification is possible to be related to the action of going), the statement 'Caitra does not go to the person' becomes tenable. This new method has an advantage over the theory proposed by Gokulanātha. For,

according to logical conventions, no relation, which is not occurrence-exacting, can ever be considered to be the delimiting relation of the counterpositiveness conditioned by an absence; and since the relation of the delimitership of the counter-positiveness, conditioned by the mutual absence, is not an occurrence-exacting relation, the absence of the persons, in general, the counter-positiveness of which is delimited by the relation of the delimitership of the counterpositiveness, conditioned by the mutual absence, a non-occurrence exacting relation, cannot be claimed to be related to the action of going.

According to the new method proposed by Giridhara, however, the accusative meaning, namely, the mutual absence, is related to the action of going through the relation of qualification, and since the relation of qualification is an occurrence-exacting relation, no violation of the logical convention of any sort can occur in such a relationship. It should be noted that, in this theory, the mutual absence, one of the two meanings of the accusative case, can be left out without being cognized if the relation of the same with the verbal root-meaning 'action' is contradictory. For instance, consider the statement 'you know yourself through yourself' (*ātmānam ātmanā vetsi*). Here, since the action of knowing occurs in the self, the agent, who is also the object, the mutual absence such as 'the self is not the possessor of the action of knowing' cannot be related to the action of knowing through the relation of qualification delimited by the delimitership of the counterpositiveness. Therefore, while cognizing the total sentence-meaning of the statement, one cognizes only the fact that the superstratumness, the other meaning of the accusative case, is related to the contentness, the effect, through the self linking relation. Thus, according to this theory, even the statement, wherein the agent and the object are identical, becomes tenable.

Observation

It should be noted here that Giridharas theory is essentially a modification of the Navyas theory.

Giridhara has modified this theory in such a way that it effectively prevents the making of the incorrect statement '*caitraḥ svam gacchati*' etc. Also, it explains the tenability of the

negative statement such as '*caitraḥ na manuṣyam gacchati*' etc. Again, this theory allows, the statements such as '*ātmānam ātmanā vetsyi*' etc. Thus, this theory can be claimed to answer effectively all the difficulties encountered in making accusative statements.

However, a major flaw in this theory, which is common to the original Navya theory as well, is that it assumes an additional sense such as the mutual absence, which has no sanction by any grammatical convention, for the accusative case. Also, in such a theory, the assembly of causes, that prevents the perception of the abode of the action of going, will have to be additionally assumed to consist of the reference to the mutual absence; and hence involves the heaviness of assumption. This flaw is overcome to some extent in the suggestion made by Giridhara himself in an alternative theory. According to this theory, the accusative refers to only the superstratumness and such a meaning is related to the effect 'contact' through the self-linking relation delimited by the inherence qualified by the community of locus of the mutual absence of the abode of the action of going. This alternative theory is also as efficient as the theory considering the mutual absence as the accusative meaning; for, this theory too incorporates within itself the element of the mutual absence of the abode of the action of going etc. However, since, here the mutual absence appears as only a syntactical semantical, relation, the flaw of additional assumption of such a meaning is avoided.

Grammatician Theory

Grammarians, especially Kaṇḍabhaṭṭa, and others hold that the incorrect statement such as '*Caitra goes to himself*' (*caitraḥ syam gacchati*) can be avoided by the rule¹ "whatever is enumerated after '*kaḍārāḥ karmadhāraye*', have only one single name applicable to them" (*ā kaḍārād ekā samjñā* p. i.4.1). According to this rule, when nominative case ending occurs,

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1. According to this rule, whatever name is later and has no other occasion for application, takes precedence over the earlier which has other occasions for application ('*yā parā anavakāśā...*').

due to the name 'agent', after the word '*caitra*', no other case ending, due to any other name such as the 'object', is grammatically feasible after the word '*caitra*'. Thus, the incorrect statement, wherein the same word '*caitra*' has both the nominative and the accusative endings occurring after it, cannot be imposed.

It should be noted here that grammarians such as Kaundabhaṭṭa hold that only the 'name object' (*karma samjñā*), and not the possession of the effect, is the determinating factor for the use of the accusative case ending after a nominal stem. That is to say that simply possessing the effect does not help the assumption of the accusative case ending; but rather, the understanding of the fact that something is the object is what helps the assumption of the accusative case. And since, in *caitraḥ grāmam gacchati*, the name 'object' is prevented by the later name 'agent' through the rule '*ā kaḥārād ekā samjñā*', the same (name 'object') cannot be taken to facilitate the accusative case ending (*am*) after the word '*caitra*'. According, to the grammarians, the name 'object' must be accepted to be the determining factor for the use of the accusative case ending. Otherwise, the incorrect statement such as 'he has Kṛṣṇa cook the rice gruel' (*pācayati kṛṣṇam odanam*), wherein the accusative case ending occurs after the word '*kṛṣṇa*' expressing the agent), can be imposed in the place of 'he has the rice cooked by Kṛṣṇa' (*pācayaty odanam kṛṣṇena*). Kṛṣṇa, since he is the abode of the effect, namely, the cooking produced by the causative activity, can be insisted to take the accusative case ending.

Grammarians, propose also that the verbal cognition, in such incorrect statements, can be avoided by the epistemological convention the reference to the abode of the effect, as being the non-abode of the action, forms the cause of the verbal cognition wherein the effect is related to the action as the qualifier. And, in the incorrect statement, the effect 'contact' is related to the action of going as the qualifier; and therefore, a reference to the abode of the effect i.e. Caitra, as being the non-abode of the action of going, is absolutely necessary. However, since, in the statement, Caitra is both the agent as well as the object, he is referred to as the abode of the effect who is also the abode of the action of going; and thus, due to the lack of

the required reference itself, the cognition in the incorrect statement can be avoided.

Grammarian's Refutation of parasamavetatva

Grammarians vehemently oppose the logicians theory that the inherence in something different from the accusative stem-meaning '*parasamavetatva*' can be considered to be the accusative case-meaning on the ground that there exists no convention sanctioning the denotation of the accusative case ending in such a meaning. According to them, no meaning, in which denotation is not sanctioned, can be accepted as a legitimate; meaning; and further, they refute the argument of the logicians "that since the inherence in something different from the accusative-stem-meaning is efficient, i.e. avoids the incorrect statement (*caitraḥ svam gacchati* etc.), the same should be conceded as the meaning of the accusative case" on the ground that such incorrect statements are avoided best by the rule (*ākāḍārād ekā samjñā* p.i.4.1).

Grammarians oppose logicians theory of the inherence in something different from the accusative stem-meaning on further grounds as well. According to them, suppose such an inherence is conceded to be the accusative meaning, then the incorrect statement such as 'to rice grains are cooked by themselves' (*taṇḍulam pacyate svayameva*), wherein the word *taṇḍulam* has an accusative case ending, can also be imposed like the quasi-passive (*karmakartari*) statement 'rice grains are cooked by themselves' (*taṇḍulaḥ pacyate svayam eva*). This is so because, the rice grains (*taṇḍula*), since they possess the fire-contact produced by the cooking which is inherent in something different from the rice grains, the accusative stem-meaning, can be considered to be the object of cooking, and hence can very well have the accusative case ending.

Refutation of grammarians theory

Logicians point out that, in the theory of the grammarians that the incorrect statement such as '*caitraḥ svam gacchati*' is avoided by the rule '*ākāḍārād ekā samjñā*', the correct statements such as 'he knows himself through himself' (*ātmanam ātmanā vetsyi*) would also get avoided. For, according to such a

theory, whatever name is later and has no other occasion for application, takes precedence over the earlier name which has some other occasion for application; and since the name 'agent', which is later and has no other occasion for application, takes precedence over the name 'object' which is earlier and has other occasion for application, the accusative case ending resulting from the name 'object' gets prevented after the word 'ātman'. Therefore, it is untenable to consider that the later and occasionless name takes precedence over the earlier name having some other occasion. Consequently, the logicians theory that 'either the inherence in some different from the accusative stem-meaning or the difference is the accusative meaning and such a meaning is related to the verbal action' is the only viable proposition. The objection, however, that the grammatical rule '*karmaṇi dvitīyā*' (p. ii.3.2) does not sanction the difference etc. as the accusative meaning can be overcome by interpreting the rule that the accusative is used when the nominal stem is intended to refer to the meaning expected to relate to the difference and also to the superstratumness.

It should be noted here that, according to Gadādhara, the accusative case ending, denoting the objectness, is to be used after a nominal stem provided that the objectness is intended to be the qualificand of the accusative stem-meaning; and the instrumental case ending denoting, the agentness, is to be used after a nominal base provided that the agentness is intended to be the qualificand of the instrumental stem-meaning. Consequently, the incorrect statement such as 'to rice grains are cooked by themselves' (*taṇḍulam pacyate svayameva*), wherein the accusative case is used after the nominal stem '*taṇḍula*', cannot be imposed in place of 'rice grains are cooked by themselves' '*taṇḍulaḥ pacyate svayameva*' since the objectness, namely, the fire contact, produced by the cooking inherent in something different from the rice grains, is cognized to be the qualifier of the rice grains, the nominal stem-meaning, i.e. it is not cognized to be the qualificand of the nominal stem-meaning (here the cognition is that the rice grains are the abode of the action of cooking producing the fire-contact occurring in the rice grains themselves).

Nāgeśa's theory

Nāgeśa, as a grammarian, firmly oppose the theory that the mutual absence should be considered to be the accusative meaning to avoid the incorrect statement such as 'Caitra goes to himself' (*caitraḥ svam gacchati*). According to him, only the substratum(ness) is the accusative meaning. And the incorrect statement can be avoided by assuming a convention that the reference to the action (of going etc.), which is the delimiter of the counterpositiveness conditioned by the mutual absence occurring in the accusative stem-meaning, is the cause, of the cognition, wherein the effect (contact etc.), qualified by the substratum(ness), the accusative case-meaning, is perceived to be the qualifier of the root-meaning i.e. the action. This can be explained as follows. In the statement 'Caitra goes to himself' (*caitraḥ svam gacchati*), according to him, only the substratum(ness) is the accusative-meaning. And Caitra, the accusative stem-meaning, cannot be claimed to have either the mutual absence of himself or the mutual absence of the abode of the action of going. Consequently, the action of going occurring in Caitra, does not become the delimiter of the counterpositiveness conditioned by the mutual absence such as 'Caitra is not the abode of the action of going'. Therefore, since the reference to such an action of going is lacking, the cognition, (wherein the effect 'contact', qualified by the substratum(ness), referred to by the accusative-case, is perceived to be the qualifier of the action of going, the root-meaning) cannot be imposed. Thus, the incorrect statement such as 'Caitra goes to himself' (*caitraḥ svam gacchati*), stands automatically avoided when intended to produce the cognition of the action of going qualified by such an effect.

Observation

It can be observed now as follows : Nāgeśa, following the grammatical convention, accepts only the substratum(ness) to be the accusative meaning. However, he avoids the incorrect statement by assuming a special cause and effect relationship between the reference to the qualified action of going and also the cognition. However, since, the cognition of the action of going etc., as qualified by the effect such as 'contact', is produc-

ed even without the sequence of the accusative and its reference to the substratum(ness), the assumption of such a special cause and effect relationship cannot be justified.

Also, in such an assumption of the relationship, the action, is perceived as being the delimiter of the counter-positiveness conditioned by the mutual absence occurring in the accusative stem-meaning. However, since no denotation can be established for the verbal root in the action of going as the being the delimiter, the reference to the action of going as the being the delimiter is impossible to acquire.

Ritualists theory

Ritualists, especially *Khaṇḍadeva* and others propose that the accusative case should be accepted to refer to the objectness which is an indivisible property and is co-extensive in its occurrence with the possession of the effect produced by the action inherent in something different from the accusative stem-meaning. According to them, such a theory avoids the incorrect statement such as 'Caitra goes to himself' (*caitraḥ svam gacchati*) on the ground that Caitra is not the possessor of the effect 'contact' produced by the action of going inherent in something different from the accusative stem-meaning, namely, Caitra himself; and therefore, cannot be claimed to be the abode of the objectness co-extensive in its occurrence with such a possession of the effect.

Ritualist's Refutation of logicians theory

Ritualists reject the logicians theory that the mutual absence (or difference) should be accepted as one of the two meanings of the accusative case (the other being the superstratumness). They point out that the incorrect statement such as 'Caitra goes to himself' (*caitraḥ svam gacchati*) can be avoided by considering the inherence as the meaning of the accusative case as well. This can be explained as follows : The accusative refers to the inherence. The accusative stem-meaning, such as the village, is related to the inherence through the relation of the occurrence in the locus of the mutual absence conditioning the counterpositiveness of itself (i.e. the village). The cognition, therefore, in 'Caitra goes to the village'; is that Caitra is the

abode of the action of going delimited by the inherence occurring in the locus of the mutual absence conditioning the counterpositiveness of the village itself.

In the incorrect statement, however, Caitra, the accusative stem-meaning, cannot be related to the inherence through such a relation since the inherence does not occur in the locus of the mutual absence conditioning the counterpositiveness of Caitra. Thus, due to the impossibility of such a relationship, the incorrect statement with the intention of producing the cognition of the inherence gets automatically avoided. Now, since considering the inherence as the accusative case-meaning is as efficient as considering the mutual absence as the meaning of the accusative case, in preventing the incorrect statement, there cannot be any determining factor as to whether the mutual absence or the inherence should be accepted as the accusative case-meaning to avoid the incorrect statement. Thus, in comparison, the ritualists theory that the objectness which is an indivisible property, has the economy of assumption and so is preferable.

Observation

It can be observed now that the ritualists theory that the objectness which is co-extensive, in its occurrence, with the possession of the effect, is certainly as efficient as logicians theory of considering the mutual absence as the accusative-meaning in avoiding the incorrect statement '*caitrah svam gacchati*' etc. However, since the objectness has to be perceived, in this theory, as co-extensive, in its occurrence, with the possession of the effect produced by the action inherent in something different from the accusative stem-meaning, the so called economy in the assumption of a single indivisible property, namely, the objectness, as the accusative meaning, becomes pointless. Therefore, it is better to assume the denotation of the accusative in the mutual absence instead of pretending to have the denotation of the accusative in only the objectness.

Conclusion

Since the non-objects such as Caitra etc. too possess the effect 'contact' produced by the action of going, the accusative

case ending (*am*) can be insisted to be used after the word expressing the non-object (i.e. '*caitra*') like after the word expressing the object i.e. '*grāma*' in the context of 'Caitra goes to the village' (*caitrah grāmam gacchati*); and hence the incorrect statements such as 'Caitra goes to himself' (*caitrah svam gacchati*) can be imposed. Among the various theories proposed to avoid the imposition of such incorrect statements, Jagadīśa's theory envisages that the accusative meaning, namely, the effect, be related to the action of going etc., through the relation of producing as well as the possession of the counterpositiveness conditioned by the absence of the action occurring in the locus of the effect. This theory is based on the Prācya's convention and assumes only a special syntactico-semantic relation of the effect to the action. It does not involve the assumption of any new sense to the accusative case and hence does not violate any grammatical convention.

Navyas proposal that inherence in something different from the accusative stem-meaning should be accepted as one of the two meanings of the accusative case, is probably the most fascinating theory among all the theories proposed for solving the incorrect statement. Almost all the epistemologists have borrowed this proposal in one way or the other to overcome the imposition of the incorrect statement. The central idea behind such a proposal is that when the action of going etc. is qualified to be inherent in something different from the meaning of the accusative stem, namely, the actual object, the objects become devoid of the inherence of the action of going; and hence the non-objects, especially the agents such as Caitra, who have only the inherence of the action of going, can be avoided from the name 'object' and so the incorrect statement which involves the accusative case ending after the word expressing the agent also gets prevented.

However, the main objection to such a theory has been that the non-objects (i.e. the agent such as Caitra) can be claimed to have the mutual absence of themselves since the same non-object(s) is (are) different from the non-objects and an additional entity such as pot. And consequently, even the action of going, which occurs in the non-objects, become inherent in something different from the accusative stem-mean-

ing, namely, the object. In view of such a difficulty, Gadādhara has finally resorted to the theory that the accusative should be accepted to refer to the effect 'contact' etc. and such an effect is related to the action of going through the relation of the delimitership of the counterpositiveness conditioned by the mutual absence.

It should be noted here that this objection is only technical; and therefore, need not be given so much weightage as to necessitate the discarding of the Navya theory. The Navya theory as proposed by Gadādhara is the most innovative one and effectively avoids the imposition of the incorrect statement such as 'Caitra goes to himself' (*caitrah svam gacchati*).

Both Gokulanātha and Giridhara have followed the theory of the Navyas in avoiding the incorrect statement. Gokulanātha's proposal that the accusative case should be accepted to denote the superstratumness and the mutual absence and the accusative stem-meaning is related to the mutual absence through the relation of counterpositiveness is only a modification of the Navya's theory. However, Gokulanātha's suggestion that the absence of the persons, in general, referred to by the negative particle 'na' plus the accusative stem 'manuṣya', is related to the action of going through the delimitership of the counter-positiveness in the negative statement such as 'Caitra does not go to the person' (*caitro na manuṣyam gacchati*) violates the established convention that 'the stem-meaning is not directly related to the root-meaning'. Also, the same suggestion contradicts the convention that non-occurrence exacting relation can be the delimiting relation of the counterpositiveness (here the delimitership is a non-occurrence-exacting relation and hence cannot be the delimiting relation of the counterpositiveness). In view of this difficulty, Giridhara suggests that one of the two accusative case-meanings, namely, the mutual absence, itself is related to the root-meaning (i.e. the action of going etc.) through the relation of the qualification which, in turn, is delimited by the relations of the delimitership of the counterpositiveness as well as the production of the effect. Now, since the relation of qualification is an occurrence-exacting relation, such a difficulty is overcome.

Now, provided that scholars are not averse to accept an

additional sense (in the form of the mutual absence) for the accusative case, Giridharas theory is probably the best among all the theories suggested for the avoidance of the incorrect statement as it effectively answers all the epistemological difficulties, namely, the avoidance of the incorrect statement '*caitrah svam gacchati*', and making of the correct statements such as '*caitrah na manuṣyam gacchati*' and '*ātmānam ātmanā vetsi*' etc. Also, this theory is uniform in suggesting that the two accusative meanings are related to the action of going etc. in all the instances.

Really speaking, Nageśa's theory that "the reference to the action (of going etc.), which is the delimiter of the counterpositiveness, conditioned by the mutual absence occurring in the accusative stem-meaning, is the cause, of the cognition wherein the effect (contact etc.), qualified by the accusative meaning (substratumness), is perceived to be the qualifier of the root-meaning, (i.e. the action of going)" is a flawless one. It, like the Navya's theory, avoids the incorrect statement because the action of going in such a statement cannot be claimed to be the delimiter of the counterpositiveness, conditioned by the mutual absence such as "Caitra is not the abode of the action of going." Also, the objection that 'the reference to the action of going etc., as not being the delimiter of the counterpositiveness, conditioned by the mutual absence, cannot be obtained since no denotation for verbal roots in such a sense is sanctioned by the convention is not a serious one. Such an assumption can be sanctioned due to the necessity like the Navyas assumption of the denotation for the accusative in the sense of the mutual absence. Thus, Nageśa's proposal can be accepted as an alternative to the Navya's theory of avoiding the incorrect statement.

The grammarians especially Kaṇḍabhaṭṭa etc. have shown an independent attitude in solving the difficulty of avoiding the incorrect statement. Their theory, namely, that the incorrect statement '*caitrah svam gacchati*' is avoided by the '*ā kadārād ekā samjñā*', is based on a special grammatical convention that 'whatever name is later and without any occasion for application takes precedence over the earlier name'; and, despite such a convention having a certain difficulty in allowing

the statement '*ātmānam ātmanā vetsi*' etc. (due to '*ātman*' being both the agent and the object), the same is least influenced by any of the logicians theories. Thus, by presenting such a theory, grammarians have demonstrated that the incorrect-statement can be avoided without assuming either an additional sense for the accusative case or any special syntactico-semantical relation.

Finally, as regards the ritualists theory: The main objective of this theory is the achievement of the economy of assumption. By holding that "the accusative case refers to the objectness which is an indivisible property and co-extensive in its occurrence with the possession of the effect inherent in something different from the accusative stem-meaning", they intended to achieve the economy of assumption because, in this theory, the accusative case needs to refer to only the objectness. However, it should be pointed out here that the ritualists too need to cognize the possession of the effect inherent in something different from the accusative stem-meaning, as an indentifying element of the objectness. Thus, since the reference to such a possession is in any case necessary at least indirectly, the acceptance of the denotation in an indivisible property in the form of the objectness does not serve the intended purpose.

CHAPTER XIV

THEORY OF TRANSITIVITY

(*sakarmakatva vicārah*)

Introduction

Verbal roots, which have been enumerated by Pāṇini as those that are of the type of 'bhū' (to be) etc., can be classified into two broad groups : namely, transitive (*sakarmaka*) and intransitive (*akarmaka*). However, the most important point to note here is that Sanskrit uses the term '*sakarmaka*' 'object expectant' for transitive and '*akarmaka*' 'non-object expectant' for intransitive roots. Pāṇini himself has used the terms '*sakarmaka*' and '*akarmaka*' and thus implies that the notion of transitivity or intransitivity depends largely on the roots being able to take an object or not.

Traditionally, the verbal root which expresses it's meaning as syntactico-semantically related to an object (*karmānṛvita svārtha bodhaka*), is considered to be transitive and the verbal root which expresses it meaning as syntactico-semantically unrelated to an object (*karmānanṛvita svārtha bodhaka*), is considered to be intransitive. Thus, the root '*pac*' (to cook) is transitive because it expresses the action of cooking which can be related to an object such as rice grains (*taṇḍula*) in 'he cooks rice grains' (*taṇḍulam pacati*); whereas the root '*spanā*' (to quiver or to move) is intransitive because it expresses the motion which cannot be related to an object such as a village (*grāma*) in 'he moves' (*spandate*). Further, transitive roots are divided into two kinds : those that express an action related to a single object i.e., single accusative (*ekakarmaka*) and those that express an action related to two objects, i.e., double accusative (*dvikarmaka*).

For instance, the root 'gam'¹ (to go) is single accusative since the same expresses the action of going which is related to the single object 'village' in 'he goes to the village' (*grāmam gacchati*); whereas the root 'duh' (to milk) is double accusative since the same expresses the action of milking which is related to the double objects 'milk' and also 'cow' 'in he milks the cow the milk' (*gām dogdhi payaḥ*).

Also, the double accusative is again divided into two kinds: those that express a single action related to two distinct objects (*karmadvayānavita vyāpārārthaka*) and those that express two separate actions related to two distinct objects (*karmadvayānvita vyāpāradvayārthaka*). For, instance, the root 'duh' (to milk) is a double accusative which expresses a single action of milking related to two objects, namely, the 'milk' and also the 'cow' in 'he milks the cow the milk' (*gām dogdhi payaḥ*); whereas the causative² root *yāpay* (to lead) is a double accusative which expresses the actions of causing and going i.e. leading (or driving) relate to two objects, namely, the 'goat' and also the 'village' in 'he leads the goat to the village' (*ajām grāmam yāpapati*).

The intransitive root, which expresses an action not related to an action, or technically speaking, which expresses an action not delimited by an effect (*phalānavacahinna vyāpārārthaka*) is

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1. The root *gam* (to go) was originally intransitive and it expressed an action of going which had the village etc. as its goal. However, later on in the language, the root 'gam' gained currency as transitive and the goal of going was considered as its object.
 2. It shall be noted that the causative roots, despite expressing a single action such as going, are considered 'double accusative', expressive of two separate actions, since the causative affix (*nic*) expresses the second action, namely, 'causing'. Also it should be noted that causatives are not transitive by nature at all but the transitivity is imposed on them since the causative affix in them always expresses an action 'causing' which makes even intransitives into transitives.

of³ four kinds : i) those that express a distinct sense (of existence etc.) (*arthāntaravācaka*), (ii) those that express an action delimited by the locus of its effect (*phalaśrayā vacchinna vyāpār-ārthaka*), (iii) those that do not express an action having syntactico-semantic expectancy for an object (*avivakṣita karmaka*) and (iv) those that are well known to be intransitive (*prasiddha*). For instance, the root 'bhū' (to exist) is intransitive because it expresses the sense of existence (*bhū sattāyām vāci*) distinct from the experience (*anubhava*) etc. in 'pot exists' (*ghaṭo bhavati*). The root 'śabdāy' (to sound) is intransitive because it expresses the action of sounding delimited by the locus of the effect such as producing the sound in 'Caitra sounds' (*caiṭraḥ śabdāyati*). The root 'adhigam' (to understand) is intransitive because it does not express an action having the syntactico-semantic expectancy for an object such as sense of the science (*śāstrārtha*) (i.e. because it expects the *śāstrārtha* to be the agent) in 'sense of the science understands' (*adhigacchatī śāstrārthaḥ*). The root 'spand' (to move) is intransitive because it is well known to be intransitive in 'it moves' (*spandate*) etc.

Problem

The accusative case endings are enjoined after the nominal bases that are associated with the transitive roots, i.e. only the transitive roots condition the use of the accusative case endings after the nominal bases expressing grammatical object. However, scholars hold divergent views regarding the way of defining the transitivity. Jagadīśa defines the transitivity using a syntactical criterion and holds that transitivity depends on the ability of the roots to have their infinitives syntactically expecting an accusative word. Also, Khaṇḍadeva adopts the syntactical criterion to define the transitivity. Nevertheless, majority of the epistemologists adopt a semantical or an epistemological approach to define the transitivity. While Prācya grammarians adopt a semantical approach to define the transitivity and state that transitive roots are those that refer to actions that are related to the meanings expressed by the words called 'gram-

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3. *dhātor arthāntare vṛtteḥ dhātvarthenopasamgrahāt prasiddher avivakṣātaḥ karṇṇokarmikā kriyā, Vākyapadīya.*

mathematical objects', Prācya logicians observe that the roots referring to actions that are related to effects are transitive. On the other hand, the Navyas adopt an epistemological approach to define the transitivity. Navya grammarians, thus, opine that roots, that refer to an effect occurring in a locus other than that of the actions, are transitive. And Navya logicians such as Gadādhara hold that the roots referring to an action delimited by effects that, in turn, are not delimited by the locus, are transitive. Finally, Giridhara, a very late Navya logician, incorporates both syntactical and semantical aspects of the transitivity into his definition and proposes a theory which is a happy amalgamation of both the essential characteristics of the transitivity. In the following pages, we shall discuss these various theories of the transitivity and also present a critical examination of the same.

Theories based on syntactical principle—Jagadīśa's theory

According to Jagadīśa, verbal roots refer to mere actions such as cooking etc. And only conjugational and accusative endings refer to effects such as becoming soft etc. Therefore, roots can be considered to be transitive on the basis of whether infinitives of such roots have a syntactical expectancy for an 'object' or not. Thus, Jagadīśa defines the transitivity as the syntactical expectancy of roots in their infinitive forms for an accusative object (*dvitīyāsākāṅkṣa tumantatvam*). For instance, consider the root 'gam' (to go) in the infinitive form 'gantum' (*icchati*) '(he desires) to go'. Here, the root 'gam', in its infinitive form 'gantum' (he desires) to go, expects syntactically an accusative object such as 'grāmam' which fulfills the expectancy for 'what does one go to' and hence can be considered to be transitive.

It should be noted here that this definition of the transitivity easily covers even the roots referring to knowledge or understanding such as 'jñā'⁴ (to know). This is so because, the root 'jñā' etc. too syntactically expect, in their infinitive forms

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4. Epistemologists are divided in their opinion as to whether roots referring to knowledge or understanding such as 'jñā' (to know) are transitive or not. While some, headed by

such as 'jñātum' (he desires) to know', accusative objects such as 'ghaṭam' (pot) which fulfills the expectancy for 'what does one' desire to know; and hence can be considered to be transitive.

Also, it should be noted that according to Jagadīśa, grammatical objects in association with the roots referring to remembrance (*smaraṇa*) such as 'smṛ' (to remember), too are ruled to have optionally accusative or genitive case endings. And hence, the roots 'smṛ' (to remember) etc. can be regarded to be transitive since they, in their infinitive forms, such as 'smartum' (he desires to remember) can be said to have syntactical expectancy for an accusative object such as 'mātaram' (mother). Thus, the objection that "since the rule '*adhig arthadayeṣām karmaṇi*' (p. ii.3.52) enjoins genitive case endings after the words expressing the objects in association with the roots 'smṛ' etc., the same roots 'smṛ' etc. could not be considered transitive" gets automatically refuted.

Observation

Jagadīśa is the first logician to have adopted the syntactical criterion to define the transitivity. His analysis that 'a root is transitive provided that the same has, in its infinitive form, syntactical expectancy for an accusative object' clearly demonstrates his syntactical approach that the transitivity is determined on the basis of whether the root has a syntactical expectancy for an accusative object or not. Also, such an approach facilitates the most natural explanation of the transitivity since the accusative case endings are enjoined only after the nominal bases expressing an object that are associated with the transitive roots.

Nevertheless, it should be noted that while such an analysis covers satisfactorily the transitive roots referring to knowledge or understanding such as 'jñā' (to know), the same fails to cover the transitive roots referring to remembrance such as 'smṛ' (to remember) in the examples such as 'he remembers his mother' (*mātuḥ smarati*) since the same has no expectancy for

Jagadīśa and others consider such roots as transitive, others, headed by Raghunatha, rule out such roots as transitive.

an accusative object (the object has a genitive ending in such cases).

Khaṇḍadevas theory

Khaṇḍadeva proposes probably the simplest and yet most accurate and comprehensive definition of the transitivity based on the syntactical principle. According to him, the transitivity is the state of the root that has a syntactical expectancy for a grammatical object qualified by the lack of non-expectancy (*avivakṣā viraha viśiṣṭa karmasākāṅkṣa dhātutvam*). And the syntactical expectancy means the expectancy for a particular sequence of words such as the accusative 'grāmam' etc. Thus, for instance, the root 'gam' (to go) is transitive since the same has the syntactical expectancy for a grammatical object i.e. *grāmam* coupled with the lack of non-expectancy for the same.

Here, since the syntactical expectancy is meant to be the particular sequence of accusative words and not any sequence of accusative words, only the particular sequence of accusative words such as 'grāmam' (with respect to *gacchati*) and 'ghaṭam' (with respect to *karoti*) fulfils the syntactical expectancy and not merely the sequence of words 'grāmaḥ karmatvam' and 'ghaṭaḥ karmatvam'. Thus, the incorrect usage such as 'grāmaḥ karmatvam gacchati' and 'ghaṭaḥ karmatvam karoti' could not be imposed with the intention of cognizing the action of going to the village and the action of making the pot respectively.

Also, despite the roots 'kr' (to do) and 'yam' (to exert) meaning the same, only the former is regarded to be the transitive and not the latter; this is so because, only the root 'kr' has the syntactical expectancy for an accusative word, whereas the root 'yam' does not have any expectancy for the accusative word.

In the definition, the syntactical expectancy for the grammatical object (*ākāṅkṣā*) is qualified as 'lacking in the non-expectancy (*avivakṣāvirahaviśiṣṭa*)'. This is done so with a view to facilitate the intransitive use of transitive roots while not expecting an object and also to facilitate the transitive use of intransitive roots while expecting an object. Thus, while the naturally transitive roots such as 'pac' (to cook) can be explained to be intransitive in the non-accusative usage 'pacati' (he

cooks), the naturally intransitive roots such as 'ās' (to be) can be explained to be transitive in the accusative usage 'māsam āste' (he stays for a month).

Observation

Khaṇḍadeva's theory of transitivity is the simplest and yet very accurate since it regards the transitivity as the syntactical expectancy of roots for the accusatives. It covers all the instances of transitive roots such as 'gam' (to go) and excludes all the non-instances of intransitive roots such as *yam* (to exert). Also, this theory is most significant since it recognises the natural distinction between the transitivity and the intransitivity; that is : transitivity and also intransitivity are relative properties and even a transitive root, if not expecting an accusative object, is intransitive; whereas even an intransitive root, if it is expecting an accusative object, becomes transitive.

Theories based on semantical principle—Prācya grammarians theory

Prācya grammarians have adopted a semantical criterion in analysing the transitivity of roots. According to them, roots are transitive provided that they refer to actions that are competent to have semantical relations with 'objects'. Also, roots are intransitive provided that they refer to actions that are not semantically competent to have relations with 'objects'. Thus, they define transitive roots as those that refer to the actions that are related to the meaning expressed by the words called 'objects' (*vyākaraṇa*⁵ *sāstriya karma saṃjñākārthānvayyarthakaḥ*) and intransitive roots as those that refer to the actions that are not related to the meaning expressed by the words called 'objects' (*vyākaraṇa sāstriya karma saṃjñākārthānanvayyarthakaḥ*). For instance, consider the root 'pac' (to cook) in 'Caitra cooks rice grains' (*caitrah taṇḍulam pacati*) and the root 'bhū' (to exist) in 'pot exists' (*ghaṭo bhavati*). Here, in the first instance, the root 'pac' is transitive since the same refers to the action of cooking which is related to the rice grains, expressed by the word 'taṇḍula' called 'object'. Also, in the second

instance, the root 'bhū' is intransitive since the same refers to the action of existing which is not related to any meaning expressed by the word called 'object'.

Observation

This theory is the most basic one and recognises the fact that transitivity of roots depends on the reference to the actions which are competent to be related to the grammatical object. In transitive usages, the transitive roots are invariably used with objects and hence refer to the meanings that have semantical relations with the objects. Prāya grammarians are guided by the principle that only the semantical competency of roots to refer to such actions as cooking etc., which produce an effect, and hence are related to the objects, determines the transitivity.

This approach may be considered semantical because these epistemologists have regarded the semantical competency of the actions, referred to by the roots, to relate to the grammatical object as the determining factor of the transitivity.

Prāya logicians theory

Prāya logicians too have adopted a semantical approach in defining the transitivity. According to them, roots refer to an action such as going. And the affixes such as accusative and conjugational endings refer to an effect such as contact. Consequently, roots are to be considered as transitive provided that they refer to the actions that are related semantically to effects (*phalānvitavyāpārābodhakah*). For instance, consider the root 'gam' (to go). The root refers to the action of going and such an action is related to the effect 'contact'. Thus, since the root 'gam' refers to the action of going, related to the effect 'contact', the same is transitive. This theory is based on the semantical fact that the transitivity means the reference of roots to actions which are competent to be related to effects. That is to say, that, in the analysis of sentence-meaning, i.e. verbal cognition, actions, referred to by transitive roots such as 'gam' (to go) are related to effects such as contact as transitive actions produce the effects; whereas actions referred to by intransitive roots such as 'bhū' (to be) are not related to any effect as intransitive actions do not produce any effect at all. And hence, only

such a reference to an action which is competent to be related to an effect should be regarded as the conditioning factor of the transitivity.

However, the most important point to observe, in this theory, is that, according to Prācya logicians, roots refer to mere actions (and not to efforts); and therefore, actions referred to by roots are what determine the transitivity of the roots.

The difference, between the Prācya grammarians and also the Prācya logicians, however, is that while the former have perceived the transitivity as the semantical competency of the actions referred to by roots to have relations with objects in general, the later have specified the same as the semantical competency of the actions to be related with the effects which determine things as grammatical object.

Nagesha's theory

Nagesha was greatly influenced by Patañjalis theory that accusative case endings denote the syntactico-semantical relations between the object *kāraka* and also the action (*kriyā kārakayor abhisambandhasya dvitīyā vācikā*). And therefore, he interprets the same accusative case ending as denoting the possessor of the power of objectness (*karmatva śaktimatvam*). Consequently, Nagesha holds that the transitivity is the reference to the meaning i.e. the action which is related to the possessor of the power of objectness (*karmatva śaktimad arthānvayyārtha⁶ katvam*). For instance, the root 'gam' (to go) in 'grāmam gacchati' (he goes to the village) is transitive because the same refers to the action of going which is related to the possessor of the power of objectness, the accusative meaning, through conditioning.

Observation

Nagesha's theory of the transitivity too can be included under the theories based on semantical principle. Since he has concluded that the possessor of the power of objectness constitutes the accusative-meaning, he has proposed that the transitivity means the reference of the root to an action that can be

related to the possessor of the power of the objectness i.e. the object. Also, this theory is, actually, in conformity with the semantical principle that the transitivity depends on the semantical competency of the root meaning i.e. action to have a relation with the object. Thus, despite using a different terminology, he adheres to the same semantical principle that the transitivity means the reference to action competent to relate to the object.

Theories based on epistemological principle—Navya theory

Navyas⁷ have adopted epistemological approach to define transitivity. However, according to them, transitive roots refer to both actions and their effects. And effects are perceived as the delimiting properties of actions. Consequently, they consider the transitivity as the reference of roots to actions delimited by effects, the delimiters of root-meanings (*dhātvarthatā vacchedaka phalāvacchīna vyāpāra vācakatvam*). For instance, consider the root 'gam' (to go) in 'grāmam gacchati' (he goes to the village). Here the root 'gam' refers to both the action of going and the effect 'contact' and the same effect 'contact' is perceived to be the delimiter of the action of going. Thus, since the root refers to the action delimited by its effect, the same is transitive.

However, Navyas encounter an epistemological problem in their explanation of the transitivity. According to their definition, even roots like 'pat' (to fall down below) and 'hu' (to offer down below) would become transitive in 'vrkṣāt paṇam patati' (leaf falls from tree) 'agnau ghṛtam juhōti' (he offers ghee into fire). For, while the root 'pat' refers to the action of falling, delimited by the contact down below, the root 'hu' refers to the action of offering, delimited by the contact with fire. To avoid such a problem, they propose that the effect, the delimiting property of the root-meaning 'action', should itself be qualified as 'not-delimited' by its locus. Consequently, since the effect 'contact' is delimited by the region down below (*adhas saṁyogāvacchīna*) in the first instance, and the effect 'contact' is delimited by the locus 'fire' (*agnirūpa āśrayāvacchīna*) in the

second instance, the root 'pat' and 'hu' would not become transitive in such usages.

Nevertheless, some scholars hold that 'ground (*bhūmitala*) can be considered as the grammatical object of the action of falling and hence the statement 'leaf falls to the ground from the tree' (*vrkṣāt paṇam bhūmitalam patati*) is grammatically correct. Hence the root 'pat' (to fall down below) need not be intransitive and therefore, there is no need to qualify the effect as 'not-delimited by its locus' to avoid the transitivity for the root 'pat'. According to them, the rule '*dvitīyāśritātītapatita*' (p. ii.1.24) allowing an accusative compound such as '*narakam patitaḥ*' (fallen to the hell) is an indication to the fact that the root 'pat' is transitive and hence has the competency for having a grammatical object. Nevertheless, Gadādhara, does not subscribe to such a view. He states that supposing the root 'pat' is transitive, then the superstratumness (*ādheyatva*), referred to by the locative as well as the accusative case endings, would relate to the effect 'contact' in "*bhūmau patati*" and '*bhūmim patati*'; respectively; and hence the established convention that the locative, case is used when the superstratumness is to related to the action and the accusative case is used when the same superstratumness is to be related to the effect' gets violated.

Also, Navyas face another epistemological problem in their explanation of the transitivity. They cannot explain the transitive use of the root *jñā* (to know) etc. in the statements such as 'he knows pot' (*ghaṭam jñāāti*). For, according to their theory, the roots must refer to an action and also to an effect, which delimits, to qualify for the status of the transitivity; and the root *jñā* (to know) does not refer to any effect such as 'contact' which can delimit the action of knowing. Faced with this problem, Raghunatha and others have declared that the transitivity of the root *jñā* etc. in '*ghaṭam jñāāti*' etc. is merely conventional. However Jayarama⁸ and following him Gadādhara, have proposed that the roots '*jñā*' etc. have a secondary transitivity. According to them, accusative and other *karma-pratyas*, in such context, refer to the contentness (*viśayatva*), which is quite distinct from the qualificandness (*uddeśyatvāti-*

rikta viṣayatva). And since the roots 'jñā' etc. refer to the action that conditions such contentness, the same are transitive of the secondary kind.

Observation

Navyas theory of the transitivity is based on the epistemological principle that roots are to be considered transitive provided that they have a reference to both the action and the effect wherein the latter delimits the former. However, the basic difference between the theories based on the semantical principle and this one is that while the former regard semantical competency of the action, referred to by roots, to be the determining factor of the transitivity, the latter (i.e. present Navya theory) regards the reference to both the action and the effect to be the same. Of course, these two aspects constitute the two sides of the same fact; however, the approaches are different. Thus, while the root 'gam' (to go) is transitive due to its reference to both the action of going and the effect 'contact', the root 'spand' (to move) is intransitive due to its lack of ability to refer to both the action and an effect.

Now, as regards the problem of avoiding the transitivity for the root 'pat' (to fall): Navyas have overcome this difficulty by qualifying the effect, referred to by the root, 'as not delimited, in turn, by the locus'. However, as some Navyas, themselves, deliberate, the root 'pat' may be considered to be 'transitive' since the same refers to the action of falling and to an effect 'contact' produced by the action. Also, enjoining of the accusative compound with 'paiita' etc. indicates that Panini too considered the root 'pat' as transitive if capable of construing with the accusative word. And hence, the qualification of the effect as 'not delimited in turn, by locus' serves the purpose of excluding the root 'pat' from the category of transitives only in 'vrkṣāt parṇam patati' etc.

Now as regards the root 'jñā'. Despite the transitive forms 'jānāti' etc. being used with accusative words 'ghaṭam' etc., the root 'jñā' is unlike other transitive roots. The root refers to the action of knowing but the same does not produce any concrete effect such as contact. Thus, the criterion adopted by the Navyas, or for that matter, Prācyas, actually fails to cover such

roots. Nevertheless, even the action of knowing etc. can be said to produce an awareness regarding the matter concerned. Thus, some Navyas, like Gadādhara, have tried to cover such roots by stating that they have a secondary transitivity due to their reference to the action of knowing etc. which conditions the contentness of the objects. Thus, they have recognised and also appreciated the fact that roots like 'jñā' are transitive of a different kind.

Kauṇḍabhaṭṭas theory

Navya grammarians, mainly Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa⁹ and others, have adopted an epistemological approach to the definition of transitivity. Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa defines the transitivity as the reference to either the action not occurring in the same locus as that of the root-meaning 'effect' (*svārtha phala vyadhikaraṇa vyāpāra vācakatvam*) or to the effect not occurring in the same locus as that of the root-meaning 'action' (*svārtha vyāpāra vyadhikaraṇa phalavācakatvam*). The root 'pac' (to cook) is transitive because the same refers to an effect (i.e. becoming soft) which does not occur in the same locus (i.e. the agent 'Caitra') as that of the action of cooking, in 'Caitra cooks rice' (*caitraḥ pacati taṇḍulam*). According to this theory, the intransitive roots such as 'bhū' (to be) can be excluded from the category of transitives since the same do not refer to any action such as 'being which can be claimed to be not occurring in the same locus as that of its effect i.e. since the same do not refer to any effect that occurs in a different locus from that of the root-meaning 'action'.

Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa is against accepting transitive roots as referring to merely an effect and therefore argues that the transitivity cannot be defined as the reference to the effect that occurs in a locus other than that of the action producing it (*svārtha phala janaka vyāpāra vyadhikaraṇa phalavācakatvam*). For, in that case, the root 'kr' (to do) would become excluded from the category of transitive roots. According to him, the root 'kr' would become equal to 'yam' (to exert) in its reference since it refers to mere effect such as effort. This is in spite of the fact that in cases like 'ghaṭam karoti' (he makes a pot), the same

refers to an effect which occurs in a locus other than that of the action of mind-soul contact.

The author of Darpaṇa,¹⁰ while commenting, states that the effect, in the definition, should be qualified further as occurring in a locus not included in the category of the delimiter of what is referred to by the root. (*śakyatāvacchedaka koṭyapraviṣṭāśrayakatvam*). Consequently, since the effect 'holding the breath' occurs in the breath that is included in the category of the delimiter of what is referred to by the root (the root 'jiv' refers to the action conducive to the holding of the breath), the root 'jiv' (to live) would not become transitive. This is despite the action of living occurring in Devadatta etc. who is different from the breath, the locus of the effect 'holding'.

Observation

Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa's theory of transitivity is also based on the same epistemological principle that provided the basis for the Navyas theory i.e. transitive roots refer to both an effect and an action. However, the difference between the Navyas theory and that of *Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa* is that while the former perceives the effect to be the delimiting factor of the action, the latter does not perceive any such delimitership. On the other hand, *Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa*'s theory perceives the non-occurrence of the effect in the same locus as that of the action to be an important criterion. In this theory *Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa* is influenced by the difficulty that otherwise the incorrect statement such as '*caitrah svam*¹¹ *gacchati*' cannot be avoided.

According to *Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa*, 'the roots that refer to the effect not occurring in the same locus as that of the root-meaning' must be understood as the 'the roots that refer to an effect which occurs in a locus other than that of the action as well' (*vyāpārādhikaraṇamātrāvyṛtti*). Consequently, roots like '*pac*', (to cook) are transitive because the same refer to the effect of 'becoming soft' which occurs in the locus, i.e. rice

10. Darpaṇa, p. 68.

11. See chapter on the avoidance of the incorrect statements '*caitrah svam gacchati*'.

grains, that is other than that of the action of cooking. Also, the roots like 'gam' (to go) are transitive because the same refer to the effect of 'contact' which occurs in the locus, i.e., the village, that is other than that of the action of going. This is despite the effect 'contact' occurring in the person who is the locus of the action of going as well.

It could be observed now that Navya logicians and also Navya grammarians have regarded the transitivity of roots as the reference to both an effect and an action. They are guided, in their perception, by the fact that transitive verbs are used in language necessarily with an object; and the grammatical object is the abode of the effect. Thus, the transitive roots are competent in having an object means they are referring to an effect occurring in the object.

Ritualists theory

Kaundabhaṭṭa summarizes the theory of a section of ritualists as follows. In accordance with the epistemological principle that 'between the meaning of an affix and a base, the former constitutes the qualificand of the latter (*prakṛti pratyayārthayoḥ pratyayārthasya prādhānyam*), only the activity, which is the qualified of all the syntactico-semantic relations, must be held to be the meaning of the conjugational ending. And hence only an effect, which is produced by such an activity, is the root-meaning. Consequently, the transitivity means the reference to the effect which occurs in the locus different from that of the activity (*svayukta ākhyātārtha vyāpāravyadhikaraṇa phalavācakatvam*). For instance, the root 'gam' (to go) is transitive because the same refers to the effect 'contact' which occurs in the village different from the locus (i.e. the person) of the activity of going in 'he goes to the village' (*grāmam gacchati*).

A criticism of ritualists theory

Kaundabhaṭṭa, however, criticizes such a theory. According to him, such a theory is faulty since the same does not cover the transitive roots such as 'sup' (to sleep) in '*supyate rātriḥ*' (the night is slept in) etc. This is so because, the root 'sup' refers to the effect 'the body contact', which occurs in the same locus i.e., the person, as that of the activity producing it.

Also, according to Kaṇḍabhaṭṭa, the theory that the transitive roots refer to merely an effect is not tenable. For, in that case, the root 'gam' would have to be accepted to refer to merely the effect 'contact' and not to the action of going. And, consequently, the word 'gamana' would mean the effect 'contact' and hence whatever has the contact could be insisted to possess the 'gamana' as well. This would further lead to the incorrect usage such as 'village has the going' 'grāmo gamanavān' with the intention of cognising the fact that the village has the effect 'contact'.

Observation

Ritualists too follow the same epistemological principle that Kaṇḍabhaṭṭa follows i.e. transitivity means the reference to the effect which occurs in the locus different from that of the action. Consequently, the difficulty stated by Kaṇḍabhaṭṭa that "the ritualists theory does not cover the transitive roots such as 'sup' (to sleep) since the same refers to the 'body contact' which occurs in the same locus as that of the activity" is equally persistent in his own theory as well. However, the difference is that while the ritualists theory involves an additional difficulty, namely, imposition of the incorrect statement such as 'grāmmo gamanavān' since the roots are to refer to merely an effect such as 'contact' and not to any action such as going, Kaṇḍabhaṭṭa's theory is free from such difficulties since the same holds the roots as referring to both an effect and an action. Thus, in view of this additional difficulty, ritualists theory may be considered less preferable.

Theory Based on Syntactical and Semantical Theory

Giridharas theory

Giridhara can be stated to have adopted both syntactical and semantical approaches to define the transitivity. According to him, transitivity depends upon the reference of roots to certain specific meanings such as an action and an effect. Thus, he defines transitivity as the delimiting property that makes roots to have syntactical expectancy for an accusative object (*dvitīyā sākāṅkṣa prayojakatāvacchedaka dharmavatvam*).

What Giridhara means by such a definition is that roots are transitive provided that they have a property (i.e. reference to both an action and an effect wherein effect delimits action) and the same makes roots to have syntactical expectancy for an accusative object. For instance, consider the root 'gam' (to go) in 'grāmam gacchati' (he goes to the village). Here, the root 'gam' (to go) is transitive because the same possesses the property i.e. reference to the action of going and to the effect 'contact' (wherein the contact delimits the going) which makes the root 'gam' to have an expectancy for an accusative object such as 'grāmam' (village).

Further, Giridhara lays down the condition that the roots are transitive provided that the effect, referred to by the root, is not limited by the locus down below. He does so with the intention of not covering intransitive roots such as 'pat' (to fall down below) by the definition of transitivity. The root 'pat' (to fall down below) refers only to the action of falling which is limited by the contact which, in turn, is limited by the locus down below, and hence the same cannot be said to refer to an action which is limited by an effect 'contact' which, in turn, is not delimited by its locus down below.

According to Giridhara, the delimiting property, i.e. the reference, differs in each instance. While the delimiting property is the reference to the action of cooking and to the effect of becoming soft in the case of the root 'pac' (to cook), the same is the reference to mere action conducive to the origination of the happiness in the case of 'ram' (to delight). However, since in the case of 'rām' such a reference does not consist of any mutual absence that could be related to the accusative object, the same is intransitive.

Observation

Now, it could be observed that Giridhara has struck a right balance between syntactical and semantical approaches to define the transitivity.

He has incorporated the semantical principal by stating that reference to both an action and an effect is the delimiting property of the transitivity. Also, he has incorporated the syntactical principal by stating that the reference to both action and

effect makes roots to have a syntactical expectancy. By incorporating together both the aspects, which are actually two sides of the same transitivity, Giridhara has achieved a happy amalgamation of the two most essential characteristics of the transitivity.

Conclusion

Epistemologists have adopted basically two distinct approaches in the analysis of the transitivity : one that is based on syntactical principle and other that is based on semantical principle. Jagadīśa and Khaṇḍadeva have adopted syntactical approach. These scholars have analysed the transitivity as the syntactical expectancy for an accusative word or that for the grammatical object. Thus, Jagadīśa states that the transitivity is the syntactical expectancy of roots, in their infinitive forms, for accusative objects. This definition, albeit little cumbersome, recognises, for the first time, the fact that transitive roots (i.e. their infinitive forms) are invariably used with accusative objects; and therefore, the transitivity means the syntactical expectancy for an accusative object.

However, Khaṇḍadeva presents the simpler and yet very accurate definition of the transitivity based on syntactical approach. His definition that the transitivity is the state of being the root that has a syntactical expectancy for a grammatical object qualified by the lack of non-expectancy covers all the transitive roots such as '*gam*' (to go), which have syntactical expectancy for a grammatical object such as '*grāmam*' and excludes the intransitive roots such as '*yam*' (to exert), which do not have any expectancy for a grammatical object. His insertion of a qualification, namely, 'qualified by the lack of non-expectancy' is a brilliant idea since it allows the intransitive usages of naturally transitive roots and the transitive usage of naturally intransitive roots.

Prācya grammarians and also Prācya logicians have adopted a semantical approach to analyse the transitivity. In transitive usages, action, referred to by the root, is always related to the grammatical object and hence the action must be semantically competent to have relations with the grammatical object. Prācya grammarians, taking into consideration the fact that

transitive roots must refer to the action that are semantically competent to have relations with the object, state that the transitivity is the reference to the actions related to the grammatical object.

Prācya logicians also follow the same semantical criterion. However, while the grammarians define the transitivity as the reference to the actions that are related to the grammatical object, the logicians analyse the same as the reference to the actions that are related to the effect 'contact' etc. This is so because, in the analysis of verbal cognition, i.e. sentence meaning, 'the action is related to the grammatical object' must be understood as 'the same is directly related to the effect, that it produces'. Prācya logicians therefore, unlike Prācya grammarians, state specifically that the transitivity is dependent on the reference to the action that is related to the effect.

Nagesha too follows the same semantical criterion to define the transitivity. However, unlike Prācyas, he perceives the grammatical object to be the possessor of the power of objectness. And consequently, for him, transitivity means the reference to the action which is related to the possessor of the objectness. Thus, despite the difference in the perception of what constitutes the grammatical object, the accusative meaning, he can be stated to have adopted the semantical attitude towards the analysis of the transitivity.

Now as regards the semantical approach as such. In the analysis of sentence meaning, epistemologists have established that actions, referred to by transitive roots, condition the objectness, i.e. that the actions determine that such and such an entity constitutes the grammatical object because the same possesses the effect produced by the action itself. Thus actions have semantical relations with the objects means the same actions produce the effects in them. Prompted by this fact, Prācyas and Nagesha have adopted a semantical approach to the analysis of the transitivity.

Navyas have based their theory of the transitivity on the epistemological fact. They have analysed the transitivity as the reference of roots to both the actions and the effect wherein the latter delimits the former. According to them, since transitive verbs are used in language with grammatical objects, the same

transitive roots are competent in having grammatical objects. And transitive roots have grammatical objects means they are competent in referring to an action and also to an effect wherein the latter occurs in the object. Thus, they have perceived that the transitivity of roots amounts to their reference to both an action and to an effect.

The basic difference between the semantical approach of the Pracyas, and also the epistemological approach of the Navyas, is that while the former have regarded the semantical competency of the action, referred to by the roots, to have relations with the grammatical object, to be the transitivity, the latter have recognized the epistemological function of verbal roots, i.e. the reference to an action and an effect as the transitivity.

Navyas have a genuine difficulty in excluding the root 'pat' (to fall) from the category of transitive roots and including the root 'jñā' (to know) in the category of transitive roots; while the former does refer to both action and the effect contact, the latter does not refer to any effect at all. However, the difficulty could be partially overcome by recognizing that the root 'pat' (to fall), at least in accusative usages, is transitive; and also by accepting that the root 'jñā' (to know) refers to knowing which produces an awareness (technically contentness or *viśayatā*) as the effect. Theory of transitivity proposed by Kaṇḍabhaṭṭa does not essentially differ from that proposed by Navyas. However, the point to be noted is that while the Navyas have regarded the effect to be the delimiting factor of the action, Kaṇḍabhaṭṭa stipulates that the same effect must be occurring in a locus different from that of the action. This serves the purpose of excluding the root 'gam' (to go) etc. from the transitive category in the incorrect usages such as 'citraḥ svam gacchati' etc. as the effect 'contact' shares the same locus (i.e. Caitra) as that of the action 'going'. Thus, for this contribution, Kaṇḍabhaṭṭa's theory, though otherwise identical with the Navyas theory, deserves special attention.

On the other hand, the theory proposed by a section of ritualists, that the transitivity means the reference to the effect, which occurs in the locus different from that of the activity, is not much attractive. This is despite such a theory confirming

to the epistemological criterion. For, such a theory contradicts the established epistemological convention that roots refer to action as well.

The theory proposed by Giridhara combines both syntactical and semantical aspects. His proposal that the transitivity must be understood as the delimiting property, i.e. the reference to both action and effect, that makes roots to have syntactical expectancy for an accusative object is a happy amalgamation of both syntactical and semantical aspects. It incorporates the semantical aspects by stating that the reference to the action and effect is the delimiting property of the transitivity; also it incorporates the syntactical aspect by stating that the roots have syntactical expectancy for objects; and thus, makes use of both the aspects in defining the transitivity. And the transitivity cannot be stated to be merely either syntactical or semantical property; for, individually they represent only one side of the coin, whereas, they, combined together, represent the two sides completely. Thus, Giridhara, by combining together the two aspects, has presented a complete picture of the transitivity.

CHAPTER XV

THEORY OF PASSIVITY (*karmaṇi prayoga*) (WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO DOUBLE ACCUSATIVES)

Introduction

Like all languages, Sanskrit too, has both active (*kartari*) and passive (*karmaṇi*) usages (*prayoga*). Consider, for instance, the statement (i) '*caitra grāmam gacchati*' (Caitra goes to the village) and (ii) '*caitreṇa grāmo gamyate*' (village is gone to by Caitra). The first statement is an instance of active usage whereas the second is an instance of passive usage. In the first instance, the verb (i.e. predicate) '*gacchati*' expresses the fact that Caitra is the agent of going (i.e. Caitra performs the activity of going) and therefore, the conjugational ending (*ti*) agrees in number, person etc. with the word standing for the agent (*caitrah*); whereas, in the second instance, the verb '*gamyate*' expresses the fact that the village is the object of going (i.e. the village functions as the abode of the effect) and therefore, the conjugational ending (*te*) agrees in number etc. with the word standing for the object (*grāmah*). The active and passive usages can be defined as the usages wherein the conjugational endings etc. are used in the sense of the agent (*kartari*) and the object (*karmaṇi*). Thus, the basic difference between the active usage and the passive usage is the reference to the activity of the person or the thing represented by the grammatical agent and also the reference to the effect of the person or the thing represented by the grammatical object by the conjugational endings etc. occurring after the verbs. Besides

the single accusative (single object) constructions such as 'caitro grāmam gacchati', Sanskrit has double accusative (double object) statements wherein the grammatical objects, representing the persons or things, are double. Consider, for instance, the following constructions : (i) 'ajām grāmam nayati' (he leads the goat to the village), (ii) 'gām dogdhi payah' (he milks the milk (from) the cow) and (iii) 'gamayati yajñadattam grāmam' (he makes Yajñadatta go to the village). The corresponding passive constructions are : (i) 'ajā nīyate grāmam' (the goat is lead to the village), (ii) 'gauh payo duhyate' (the cow is milked the milk) and (iii) 'gamyate yajñadatto grāmam' Yajñadatta is made to go the village). Double accusative constructions can be said to consist of mostly three types of objects : (i) Prominent or primary objects (*pradhāna karma*) such as goat, which are the abode of the primary effect 'contact' etc; (ii) non-prominent or secondary objects (*apradhānakarma*) such as cow, which are originally some other *kāraṇas* such as *apādāna* etc. but have assumed the objecthood since *apādānatva* etc. are not intended and (iii) primitive agents such as Yajñadatta etc. which have assumed the objecthood in connection with the verbs expressing the going 'gati' etc. in causatives. Here, in the active constructions, the conjugational endings etc. express the activity of the person or the thing represented by the grammatical agents. And, in the passive constructions, the conjugational endings express the effect of the person or the thing represented by the grammatical objects, namely, the goat (*ajā*), the cow (*gau*) and Yajñadatta. However, while, in the first instance, the conjugational ending expresses the effect of the prominent i.e. primary object (goat), in the second instance, the same ending expresses the effect of the non prominent i.e. secondary object (cow), and in the third instance, the same ending expresses the effect of the primitive agent who has assumed the objecthood in causatives i.e. of Yajñadatta etc.

One of the two reasons for this phenomenon of conjugational endings expressing different objecthoods in different instances of passive double accusatives is that a particular conjugational ending can express only a particular objecthood of the two objects and not the objecthoods of both the objects. The second reason for such a phenomenon is that the conjugational

endings have an inherent capacity to express only one of the objecthood in passive double accusatives.

A linguistic fact that should be outlined here is that despite the conjugational endings etc. possessing an inherent capacity to express only a certain objecthood (i.e. the objecthood of the prominent object in regular double accusative usages, the objecthood of the non-prominent object in connection with the double accusative usages involving the roots *duh* (to milk) etc. and the objecthood of the primitive agent which assumes the objecthood in causatives), the same conjugational endings may express the objecthood of some other objects in passive of double accusatives provided that only one (prominent object) out of the two objects is actually used in the statements. For instance, consider the passive statements (i) '*ajā' niyate*' (goat is led), (ii) '*payah duhyate*' (milk is milked) and (iii) '*gamito girih'*' (the hill is made to be reached). In all the three above instances, only one (prominent or actual object) out of the two objects is used despite the verbal roots involved (i.e. '*nī*', '*duh*' and '*gamay*') being double accusatives i.e. being competent to take two objects. In the first instance, the passive conjugational ending, namely, '*te*' expresses the objecthood of the prominent object i.e. goat. In the second instance also, the passive conjugational ending, namely, '*te*' expresses the objecthood of only the prominent object i.e. milk. In the third instance, however, the passive derivational affixes, namely, '*ta*' expresses the objecthood of the actual object i.e. hill. Thus, it can be stated now that the conjugational endings etc., which are used in the sense of the objects, and which have a certain inherent capacity to express the objecthood of the prominent, non-prominent and primitive agent (turned) objects respectively in passive constructions involving regular double accusative roots such as '*nī*' (to lead), double accusatives listed under the roots '*duh*' (to milk) etc. and causatives '*gamay*' etc., refer to only the objecthood of the prominent objects and that of the actual objects provided that the speaker does not (intend to) use both the objects in a passive construction.

Also, another most important linguistic fact to note here is that the 'passivity' means the reference to the objecthood i.e. the reference to the effect of a person or a thing represented by

a grammatical object and 'activity' means the reference to the agenthood i.e. the reference to the action of a person or a thing represented by the grammatical agent. And also the passivity i.e. the reference by the conjugational endings is limited to either the objecthood or the agenthood depending upon whether the conjugational endings are ruled in the sense of the object or the agent. For instance, 'te' in 'grāmo gamyate' refers to only the objecthood of the (object) village since the ending 'te' is ruled in the sense of the object; whereas 'ti' in 'caitraḥ grāmam gacchati' refers to only the agenthood of the (agent) Caitra since the ending 'ti' is ruled in the sense of the agent. Thus, the incorrect usages 'caitraḥ grāmo gamyate' (Caitra and the village are gone to) etc., wherein the conjugational endings refer to both the objecthood of the village and the agenthood of Caitra, are not made. Further, the passivity, i.e. the reference to the objecthood, in passive double accusative usages, is limited to the objecthood of only one of the two objects. For instance, consider, 'ajā grāmam niyate' (the goat is led to the village). Here the conjugational ending 'te' refers to the objecthood of only the prominent object, namely, the goat; and therefore, the word standing for the goat (ajā) agrees in number, person etc. with the same conjugational ending. The conjugational ending (te), however, cannot refer to the objecthood of both the prominent and the non-prominent objects at one and the same time in a given usage. Therefore, the statements such as 'ajā grāmo niyate' (the goat and the village are led) are incorrect usages. Here, the conjugational ending (te) is used in the sense of the objecthood of both the prominent object (goat) and that of the non-prominent object (village) which cannot be sanctioned. Thus, only a passive statement, wherein the conjugational endings refer to the objecthood of either the prominent object or that of the non-prominent object or that of the primitive agent-turned object, is correct.

Patañjali's grammatical convention

As stated above, the conjugational endings, assigned in the sense of the objects, cannot be expected to express the objecthood of both the objects i.e. the prominent, non-prominent (or primitive agent) at one and the same time. Recognizing this

linguistic fact, Patañjali, has ruled that "the passive conjugational endings, assigned in the sense of the objects, are stated to occur in the sense of the prominent object in the case of the usage with the regular double accusative roots; they occur in the sense of the secondary objects in the case of the double accusative usages with the verbal roots such as 'duh' (to milk) and they occur in the sense of the objects, which are originally primitive agents in the non-causative or primitive constructions, in the case of usages with causative verbal roots." This rule restricts the reference by passive endings with respect to the prominent objects, in usages with the regular double accusatives, and to the non-prominent objects in usages with the verbs 'duh' (to milk) etc. and to the primitive agent-objects in usages with the causative verbs.

The prominent or primary object is defined generally to be what is the abode of the direct effect; the non-prominent or secondary object is defined generally to be what is the abode of the indirect effect, and the primitive agent-object, in the causative, is defined generally to be what is the abode of the primitive action. For instance, in the regular double accusative constructions such as 'he leads the goat to the village' (*ajām grāmam nayati*), the goat (*ajā*) is the prominent object since the same is the abode of the direct effect i.e. the operation leading to the contact (*samyogānukūlavypāra*); whereas the village (*grāmam*) is the secondary object since the same is the abode of the indirect object i.e. the contact. In the instance of double accusatives in association with the verb 'duh' etc. such as 'he milks milk from cow' (*gām dogdhi payaḥ*), the milk (*payas*) is the prominent object since the same is the abode of the direct object i.e. the flowing; whereas, the cow (*go*) is the non-prominent object since the same is the abode of the indirect i.e. the separation of the milk. In the instance of double accusatives in association with causatives such as 'he makes Yajñadatta go to the village' (*gamayati yajñadattam grāmam*), Yajñadatta is the primitive agent-object since the same is the abode of the primitive action i.e. the action of going; whereas the village is the

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1. *pradhānakarmaṇyākhyeye lāḍin āhur dvikarmaṇām apradhāne duhādīnām nyante kartuśca karmaṇaḥ*. Mahā Bhā, p. i.4.51.

non-prominent object since the same is the abode of the indirect effect, i.e. the contact. Now, according to the grammatical rule of Patañjali, since the conjugational endings etc. assigned in the sense of objects, express the objecthood of the prominent object, in usages with regular double accusative roots, the conjugational ending, namely, 'te' in '*ajā nīyate grāmam*' (the goat is led to the village) expressess the objecthood of the goat, the prominent object; and hence the word standing for the 'goat' (*ajā*) has the nominative case ending agreeing with the conjugational ending 'te' in number etc. and the word standing for the village has the accusative ending. And, since the conjugational endings etc. express the objecthood of the non-prominent object in usages with the verbs such as '*duh*' etc., the conjugational ending, namely 'te' in '*duhyate gauḥ payah*' (cow is milked milk) expresses the objecthood of the cow, the non-prominent object; and hence, the word standing for the cow (*gauḥ*) has the nominative ending agreeing with the conjugational ending (*te*) in number etc. and the word standing for the milk (*payah*) has the accusative ending. Again, since the conjugational endings etc. express the objecthood of the primitive agent-object in usages with the causative roots, the conjugational ending, namely 'te' in '*gamyate yojñadatto grāmam*' (Yajñadatta is made to go to the village) expresses the objecthood of Yajñadatta, the primitive agent-object; and hence the word standing for Yajñadatta (*yajnadattah*) has the nominative case endings agreeing in number etc. with the conjugational ending (*te*) and the word standing for the village (*grāmam*) has the accusative case ending.

Problem

However, epistemologists hold divergent views regarding the significance and the necessity of the rule envisaged by Patañjali. While Helaraja, strongly defends the necessity of the rule, and establishes *anityasambandha* (or non-permanent association) as the criterion for considering the objects as prominent; Jagadīśa totally rejects the rule that "conjugational endings etc., assigned in the sense of the objects, express the objecthood of the prominent objects in association with the double accusative verbs, and the same express the objecthood

of the non-prominent objects in association with the verbs such as 'duh' etc.; and the same endings express the objecthood of the primitive-agent-objects in association with causative verbs." According to him, like the *dravyakarmas* in double accusatives, the *akathita karmans* such as cow (*gau*) etc. in association with the verbs 'duh' etc. and also the primitive agent-objects in association with causative verbs can be considered to be the prominent objects only by adopting the criterion that the state of being the abode of the direct, i.e. primary effect determines the prominent objecthood. Therefore, he holds that a rule that conjugational endings express the prominent objecthood in double accusatives would suffice. However, Nagesha criticise Jagdiśa's theory on the ground that the double accusative roots such as 'duh' etc. refer to a single action of milking etc. and therefore, the cow etc. cannot be held to possess the primary effect of the operation leading to the releasing of the milk (if cow etc. cannot be considered to be the prominent object), and Bhaṭṭoji holds that passivity, i.e. reference to the objecthood of prominent and non-prominent objects depends on the inherent capacity of the double accusative roots to refer to double and single action respectively. Thus, in order to arrive at a definite conclusion, as to how the theories proposed tackle at the problem of passivity, we shall discuss the various theories in detail.

Helaraja's position

Helaraja² strongly defends the necessity of the grammatical rule established by Patañjali that the conjugational endings, enjoined in the sense of the objects, refer to the objecthood of the prominent objects in double accusatives. Nevertheless, he establishes a criterion for considering an object as prominent or non-prominent. According to such a criterion, an object is a prominent object provided that the same does not have a permanent relation with the action. For instance, consider the 'rice' in double accusative statement '*māsam odanam pacati*' (he cooks rice for a month). Here, the substance 'rice' is the prominent object since the same does not have a permanent

relation with cooking; whereas the time 'month' is a non-prominent object since the same has a permanent relation with cooking. Helaraja is guided by the fact that whatever is permanently connected with the action cannot be the prominent object whereas whatever is occasionally connected with the action is the prominent object. Thus, according to him, the grammatical rule of Patañjali, explains the reference to the objecthood of the prominent objects such as 'rice' in passive of double accusative statements such as '*māsam odanaḥ pacyate*' (rice is cooked for a month).

Also, according to Helaraja, the same rule facilitates the reference to the objecthood of the non-prominent object such as time in the absence of a prominent object in the passive statements such as '*māsaḥ āsyate*' (a moth is stayed for) since the absence of a prominent object like rice is a condition for the reference to the objecthood of a non-prominent object.

As regards the rule that the conjugational endings, enjoined in the sense of the objects, refer to the objecthood of the non-prominent objects such as 'cow' (*gau*) in association with the verbs '*duh*' (to milk), etc., Helaraja holds as follows : The milk, despite being the object most desired to be obtained by the agent through his actions of milking, is not resorted to as means at first; on the other hand, the cow, despite not being most desired to be obtained, is resorted to as means at first. Consequently, the cow, by being what is approached for as means becomes justified in being expressed by the conjugational endings etc. Thus, the rule explains the reference to the objecthood of the non-prominent object such as 'cow' (*gau*) in passive of double accusative statements such as '*gauḥ payo duhyate*' (cow is milked milk).

Nevertheless, a section of scholars strongly opposes the view that the rule 'conjugational endings refer to the objecthood of the non-prominent objects in association with the verbs such as '*duh*' (to milk) etc., is necessary to explain the reference to the objecthood of the cow etc. in '*gām dogdhi payah*' (he milks the milk from the cow) etc., their position can be explained as follows : The verbs such as '*duh*' (to milk) can be said to refer to the operation conducive to the operation leading to the releasing of the milk from the cow. In such a reference, the

cow, since it is the *kāraka* most desired to be obtained through the releasing of the milk, becomes only the prominent object. Consequently, the rule "conjugational endings, assigned in the sense of the object, refer to the objecthood of the prominent objects" can itself facilitate the statements such as '*gauh duhyate payah*' (cow is milked the milk) wherein conjugational ending occurs in the 'cow' etc.; and therefore the rule 'conjugational endings, refer to the objecthood of the non-prominent objects...', is not necessary.

Helaraja however, defends the rule on the following ground : Despite the verbal prominence of the cow etc. (i.e. despite the cow being the *kāraka* most desired to be obtained through the releasing of the milk), the milk is actually what is the most desired to be obtained through milking; and consequently, the rule "conjugational endings refer to the objecthood of the prominent objects" can explain the conjugational endings only in the sense of the milk etc. and not in the sense of the cow etc. And therefore, to explain the conjugational endings in the sense of the non-prominent objects such as cow and thus to facilitate the passive statements such as '*gauh payo duhyate*', the rule is necessary.

Now, as regards the rule that the conjugational endings etc. assigned in the sense of the objects, refer to the objecthood of the primitive agent-objects in association with causative verbs such as '*gamayati*' etc., Helaraja holds as follows : The primitive agents in causatives such as goat (*ajā*) are the *kāra*kas most desired to be obtained through the causative actions (such as making the goat to go), and consequently, become the most significant objects. Therefore, the rule explains the conjugational endings in the sense of the primitive agent-objects in causatives and thus facilitates the passive statements such as '*ajā gamyate grāmam*' (goat is made to go to the village).

Observation

It can be observed now that Helaraja strongly defends the grammatical rule established by Patañjali, regarding the passive conjugational endings occurring in the sense of the prominent objects etc. in double accusative usages. He can be said to have defended the rule on the following grounds : Double

accusative usages are of mainly three types : (i) those with the regular double accusative roots such as 'ni' (to lead), 'vah' (to carry) etc. which take a regular prominent object such as goat (*ajā*) and a regular non-prominent object such as village (*grāma*); (ii) those with the double accusative roots such as 'duh' (to milk) etc. which take a regular prominent object such as the 'milk' (*payas*) but a distinct or unique non-prominent object such as 'cow' (*go*); and (iii) those with the causative roots such as 'gamay' (to cause to go), 'yāpay' (to cause to lead) etc. which take a unique object such as primitive agent (turned) object (i.e. Devadatta etc.) and a regular prominent object such as village (*grāma*). Accordingly, since the types of double accusative verbal roots and also since the types of the prominent and non-prominent objects in the three types of accusative usages vary, no uniform or a general rule that can cover the reference to the objecthood in all the three types of the usages can be envisaged. Since, the first type of double accusative usages, which we can call 'regular' or 'normal', usage, consists of a regular prominent object and also a regular non-prominent object, the conjugational ending etc., assigned in the sense of the object, can be claimed justifiably to refer to the objecthood of the prominent object such as goat (*ajā*) which is actually intended. However, since the second type of double accusative usage consists of a regular prominent object such as milk and also a unique non-prominent object such as cow, the conjugational endings, assigned in the sense of object, should have to refer to only the objecthood of the non-prominent object such as cow which is resorted to at first and hence is more immediate than the prominent object (milk); also since the third type of the double accusative usage consists of a unique non-prominent object in the form of the primitive object (turned)-object (Devadatta etc.) and a regular prominent object such as village, the conjugational endings, assigned in the sense of the objects, must necessarily have to refer to only the objecthood of the non-prominent object which is actually "caused" and therefore, becomes the object. Thus, the grammatical rule establishing the conjugational endings in the sense of the objecthood of three different types of objects under three different circumstances is quite necessary.

Jagadīśa's position

Jagadīśa,³ however, totally rejects the grammatical rule established by Patañjali. According to him, such a rule is not necessary since the conjugational endings, assigned in the sense of the objects, must necessarily refer to the objecthood of the prominent object in any case, and therefore, the reference to the objecthood of the prominent object is secured. And, like the 'goat' (*ajā*) etc., which are prominent objects in association with the double accusative roots such as '*nī*' (to lead) etc. in '*ajām grāmam nayati*' (he leads the goat to the village), the cow (*go*) etc. too can be claimed to be prominent objects in association with the double accusative roots such as '*duh*' (to milk) etc. in '*gām dogdhi payah*' (he milks the cow milk). And also the primitive agent-object (i.e. Devadatta) etc. too can be claimed to be prominent objects in association with the causative roots such as '*gamayati*' (cause to go) etc. in '*devadattam grāmam gamayati*'. This is so because, prominent object is what is the abode of the direct effect, delimiting the root-meaning 'action'; and the cow (*go*) in '*gām dogdhi payah*' and the primitive agent-object (Devadatta) in '*devadattam grāmam gamayati*' are the abode of direct effects, namely the operation conducive to the separation (*vibhāgānukūla vyīpāra*), which delimits the root meaning operation conducive to the operation in turn conducive to the separation (*vibhāgānukūla vyāpārānukūlavīpāra*) and also the action of going (*gamana*), which delimits the causative root-meaning 'operation conducive to the action of going (*gamanānukūla vyāpāra*) respectively. Thus, since the objecthood of the cow in association with the roots '*duh*' referring to milking etc. and also the objecthood of Devadatta in association with the causative roots referring to the operation causing the action of going etc. can be covered by the general convention that "the conjugational endings etc., assigned in the sense of objects, refer to the objecthood of the prominent objects in double accusative usages", the special grammatical rule facilitating the reference to the objecthood of such objects as 'cow', 'Devadatta' etc. in association with the roots '*duh*' (to milk) and

the causative roots 'gamay' etc. is not necessary.

Observation

This opposition of Jagadīśa, with respect to the special grammatical rule established by Patañjali, is of paramount significance to the theory of passivity and is based on the analysis that 'cow' and 'Devadatta' etc. in association with the roots 'duh' and 'gamay' etc. are prominent objects. It is a matter of different conviction that between the cow and also the milk etc. in connection with the action of milking etc., only the cow is the prominent object since the same has the operation conducive to the releasing of the milk, which is the direct qualifier; whereas the milk is the non-prominent object since the same has the separation from the cow which is an indirect qualifier. Also, between the primitive agent (turned) object (such as Devadatta) and the village etc. in connection with the causative action of causing to go etc., only the primitive agent-object is the prominent object since the same has the action of going which is the direct qualifier; whereas the village is the non-prominent object since the same has the contact which is an indirect qualifier. Thus, only those *kāraṅkas*, which are the abode of the effects directly qualifying the root-meaning 'action', are the prominent objects and those *kāraṅkas*, which are the abode of the effects indirectly qualifying the root-meaning 'action', are non-prominent objects'. Here, what is most (i.e. ultimately) desired to be obtained through action is not the criterion for considering something as the object. Consequently, since the cow etc. in connection with 'duh' etc. and Devadatta etc. in connection with the causative 'gamay' etc. can be covered by the general rule that "the passive conjugational endings etc. refer to the objecthood of the prominent objects in double accusatives", the special rule established by Patañjali with respect to the cows etc. in connection with 'duh' etc. is not necessary.

A critique of Jagadīśa's theory

Nagesha, however, criticizes the theory proposed by

Jagadīśa. According to him, Jagadīśa would have to accept that the roots 'duh' (to milk) etc. refer always to double actions i.e. operation conducive to the operation, in turn, conducive to the releasing of milk etc. by visualizing that the cow releases the milk and the milkman causes the cow to release the milk. And, also he would have to accept that only those *kāraṅkas*, which are the abode of the direct effects such as the operation conducive to releasing (the milk), are the prominent objects and those *kāraṅkas*, which are the abode of the indirect effects such as the separation (of the milk) from the cow, are non-prominent objects; and therefore the general convention that "the passive conjugational endings etc., enjoined in the sense of the objects, refer to the objecthood of the prominent objects in double accusatives" itself covers the instance of the conjugational endings etc. in the sense of the cow etc. in '*gām payo dogdhi*' etc. Nevertheless, such a position is not tenable. For, the verbal roots 'duh' (to milk) etc. may sometimes refer to a single action of milking, i.e. to the action leading to the separation of the milk from the cow etc. And, under such circumstances, the cow etc. cannot be claimed to be the abode of the direct effect, namely, the operation conducive to the separation etc. On the contrary, the milk etc. become the abode of the effect, namely, the separation from the cow. Consequently, the 'milk' etc. become the prominent objects due to their possession of the effect and the cow etc. become only the non-prominent objects due to their non-possession of the effect. Thus, to explain the conjugational endings etc. in the non-prominent object, namely, cow etc. and to avoid the conjugational endings etc. in the prominent object, namely, the milk etc., in connection with 'duh' etc., the special rule that 'conjugational endings etc., assigned in the object, refer to the objecthood of the non-prominent object in connection with 'duh' etc. ...' is absolutely necessary; and therefore, Jagadīśa's theory is not tenable.

Implication of the criticism

This criticism of Jagadīśa's theory has the following implication. That the verbal roots such as 'duh' etc. can be said to refer to double actions such as the operation conducive to the operation, in turn, conducive to the releasing of the milk

etc. or to refer to a single action of milking i.e. to the action leading to the separation of the milk etc.; and when the roots refer to double actions the grammatical rule established by Patañjali is not necessary since the general convention that "the conjugational endings, enjoined in the sense of the objects, refer to the objecthood of the prominent objects in double accusatives" itself can cover the instance of the conjugational endings in the sense of the cow; and when the same roots refer to a single action, the special grammatical rule established by Patañjali that "the conjugational endings, enjoined in the sense of the objects, refer to the objecthood of the non-prominent object in connection with the roots 'duh' etc." is necessary since the general convention cannot cover the instance of cow. Nevertheless, it is quite clear that Jagadīśa meant that the roots 'duh' etc. do necessarily refer always to double actions and therefore, the special grammatical rule established by Patañjali is not necessary.

Bhaṭṭoji's position

According to Śabdaratna, Bhaṭṭoji's position is as follows: The passive conjugational endings occurring after the double accusative roots which refer to double actions refer to the objecthood of the prominent objects and those occurring after the roots referring to single action, refer to the objecthood of the non-prominent objects. According to Bhaṭṭoji, the double accusative roots can be classified squarely as those which refer to double actions and also those which refer to a single action. Accordingly, the conjugational endings, occurring after the double accusative roots that refer to the double actions, express the sense of the objecthood of the prominent object and the conjugational endings occurring after the double accusative roots that refer to a single action, express the sense of the objecthood of the non-prominent object. For instance, the double accusative root 'daṇḍ' (to fine) in 'gārgāḥ śatam daṇḍya-ntām' (Gargas should be fined hundred paṇas), refers to the double action i.e. the operation conducive to the operation, in turn, conducive to the giving (paṇas to oneself). And the Gargas, who are the abode of the primary effect, i.e. the operation conducive to the giving, are the prominent objects and the

hundred *paṇas*, which are the abode of secondary effect, i.e. the giving, are the non-prominent objects. Now, the conjugational ending '*tām*' occurring after the root '*dand*' refers to the objecthood of the prominent object (Gargas) and not to the objecthood of the non-prominent object (hundred *paṇas*) and therefore, only the word standing for the 'Gargas' occurs in the nominative case (and not the word standing for the hundred *paṇas*), in the passive statement. Similarly, other double accusative roots such as '*nī*' (to lead), '*vah*' (to carry) etc. in '*ajām grāmam nayati*' (he leads the goat to the village) etc. and also the causative double accusative roots such as '*gamay*' etc. in '*devadattam grāmam gamayati*' (he causes Devadatta to go to the village) etc. too refer to double actions and hence the conjugational endings occurring after such roots refer to the objecthood of the prominent objects and thus facilitate the nominative case endings for the words standing for the prominent objects in the passive. On the other hand, for instance the roots '*duh*' (to milk) etc. refer to only a single action of milking and therefore, the conjugational endings occurring after such roots as '*duh*' in passive usages '*gauh payo duhyate*' (the cow is milked the milk) refer to the objecthood of the non-prominent object such as cow and thus facilitate the nominative case ending after the word standing for the same object in passive usage. Thus, it can be established that the passive conjugational endings occurring after the double accusative roots, referring to double actions, refer to the objecthood of the prominent object, and those occurring after the double accusative roots referring to single action, refer to the objecthood of the non-prominent object.

Observation

This theory envisages that the passivity, i.e. reference to the objecthood of the prominent object and also to that of the non-prominent object depends upon the fact that whether the double accusative roots, after which the conjugational endings etc. occur, refer to double actions or not (i.e. refer to only single action). This theory therefore, adopts an independent attitude and connects the reference to the objecthood of the prominent object to the roots ability to refer to the double actions; while connecting the reference to the objecthood of the non-prominent object

to the root's inability to refer to the double actions. Thus, this theory too rejects the grammatical convention established by Patañjali regarding the passivity, i.e. reference to the objecthood by conjugational endings etc. in double accusatives. Nevertheless, the basic difference between Jagadiśa's theory and also this one is that while Jagadiśa considers that the roots 'duh' etc. refer to double actions, and therefore, the cow etc. are the prominent objects; Bhaṭṭoji holds that 'duh' etc. refer to only single action, and therefore, the cow etc. are the non-prominent objects.

Critical examination

Paniniyan grammar has perceived active usage as a usage wherein the verb, or any grammatical element functioning as predicate, is used in the sense of the agent (*kartari prayoga*) and passive usage as a usage wherein the verb, or any grammatical element functioning as predicate, is used in the sense of the object (*karmani prayoga*). Panini has ruled that the conjugational endings (or other grammatical elements) occurring after the verbal roots, refer to the grammatical agent and object in active and passive constructions respectively. Accordingly, "activity" means the reference of conjugational endings etc. to the action of a person or a thing represented by the grammatical agent and the agreement of the same endings etc. in case, number, person etc. with the word standing for the grammatical agent; and "passivity" means the reference of the conjugational endings etc. to the effect of a person or a thing represented by the grammatical object and the grammatical agreement of the same endings etc. in case, number, person etc. with the word standing for the grammatical object. Such an 'activity' is perfectly explained in active usages such as '*grāmam gacchati caitrah*' (Caitra goes to the village) since the conjugational ending, namely 'te', occurring after the verbal root 'gām' in 'gacchati', refers to the action (of going) of Caitra, represented by the grammatical agent and also since the grammatical agreement of the same ending 'te' in person etc. is found with the word 'caitrah'. And such a 'passivity' is perfectly explained in the passive usages such as '*caitreṇa gamyate grāmaḥ*' (the village is gone to by Caitra) since the conjugational ending 'te', occurring

after the verbal root 'gam' in 'gamyate', refers to the effect (contact) of the village, represented by the grammatical object and also since the grammatical agreement of the same ending 'te' in person, number, etc. is found with the word 'grāmah' standing for the object.

However, in addition to the single accusative (i.e. single object) active and passive statements, Sanskrit has double accusative (i.e. double object) active and passive statements. For instance, 'ajām grāmam nayati' (he leads the goat to the village) and *ajā grāmam nīyate* (the goat is led to the village) are double accusative active and passive statements respectively. Double accusative active statements offer no difficulty as far as the explanation of the 'activity' is concerned. For, the conjugational endings 'ti' etc. can still refer to the action of the agent Caitra etc. and agree in number etc. with the word standing for the same. Nevertheless, passive double accusative statements offer an epistemological difficulty as far as the explanation of the passivity is concerned. For, the question can arise as to which of the two effects belonging to the two objects do the conjugational endings refer to; and consequently, which of the two words standing for objects are in agreement with the conjugational endings etc. as the conjugational endings have an inherent capacity to express only one of the two objects. The difficulty may be claimed to have been overcome by stating that the conjugational endings etc. refer to the effect of the prominent object between the prominent and also non-prominent objects and thus explain the grammatical agreement of the word 'ajā' standing for the object (goat) in person etc. with the conjugational ending 'te' in the statement such as '*ajā grāmam nīyate*'.

However, this statement of explanation of passivity is not tenable. For, the double accusative usages are actually of three types : (i) those that consist of a prominent object and also a non-prominent i.e. actual object with regular double accusative verbal roots; (ii) those that consist of a prominent object and also a non-prominent, i.e., *akatihta* object in connection with double accusative roots listed under 'duh' (to milk) etc.; and (iii) those that consist of a primitive agent which has assumed the objecthood in causatives and also an actual object in connection with causative roots. And, while the the conjugational endings

etc. are found to have been expressing the effect, i.e. the objecthood of the prominent object in usages with regular double accusative roots, the same conjugational endings are found to express the effect, i.e. the objecthood of the non-prominent object in usages with the double accusative roots listed under '*duh*' etc. and the same conjugational endings are found to express the objecthood of the primitive agent which has assumed the objecthood in usages with causative roots. In view of such divergent expressions, Patañjali has stated the rule that the conjugational endings etc., assigned in the sense of the objects, are stated to occur in the sense of the prominent object in the case of the usage with the regular double accusative roots; they are stated to occur in the sense of the non-prominent objects in the case of the usage with the verbal roots such as '*duh*' (milk) etc. and they are stated to occur in the sense of the objects which are originally primitive agents in the case of the causative usages.

In framing this rule, Patañjali has recognized the linguistic and epistemological fact that all the three types of double accusative usages consist of totally different types of objects; and in each instance, speaker intends only a specific object, namely, the prominent, non-prominent or primitive agent-object respectively to be the most significant object and hence the conjugational endings etc. express the objecthood of only those objects in such usages. This rule explains satisfactorily the grammatical agreement of the word for the prominent object, i.e. '*ajā*' with the ending '*te*', in usages with regular double accusative roots such as '*ajā grāmam niyate*' (the goat is led to the village); the grammatical agreement of the word standing for the non-prominent, i.e. secondary object, viz. '*gauḥ*' with the ending '*te*' in usages with the roots listed under '*duh*' such as '*gauḥ duhyate payah*' (the cow is milked milk); and the grammatical agreement of the word standing for the primitive agent turned-object, i.e. '*devadattah*' with the conjugational ending '*te*' in usages with causative verbs such as '*devadattah gamyate grāmam*' (Devadatta is made to go to the village).

The grammatical rule suggested by Patañjali takes into account the fact that in the usages with regular double accusative roots such as '*nī*' (to lead) etc., i.e. in '*ajāṃ grāmam nayati*'

(he leads goat to the village), the goat, being the prominent object, i.e. being the abode of the 'contact' produced by the leading, becomes the most desired object. Thus, it is logical that the conjugational ending, in the corresponding passive usage, expresses only the objecthood of the same object. Also, in usages, with the double accusative roots listed under '*duh*' (to milk) etc., i.e. in '*gām dogdhi payah*' (he milks the milk from the cow), the secondary object cow, being the source of milk, which the agent desires most, is the most significant object. Thus, it is logical that the conjugational ending in the corresponding passive usage expresses only the objecthood of the same secondary object. Again in the usages with the causative roots such as '*gamayati*' (to cause to go), i.e. in '*devadattam grāmam gamayati*' (he causes Devadatta to go to village), the primitive agent (Devadatta) is what actually the causative agent wants to reach the village. Therefore, it is logical that the conjugational ending (*te*) in the corresponding passive usage, expresses the objecthood of only the same primitive agent. Reflecting this very view, Helaraja too has strongly defended the grammatical rule. According to him, since, the usages with regular double accusative verbs, consist of a regular prominent object, i.e. *drauya karma*, and a regular non-prominent object, i.e. *kāla-karma*, and between them, the prominent object is the most desired, the passive conjugational endings express the same prominent object. However, since the usages with double accusative verbs listed under '*duh*' etc. consist of a peculiar non-prominent object such as cow and a regular prominent object such as milk, and between them, the non-prominent object, being the source of the milk, is more immediate than the milk, the passive conjugational endings express the same non-prominent object. Also, since the usages, with the causative verbs, consist of a non-prominent object such as the primitive agent and a prominent object such as the village, and between them, the non-prominent object, being actually caused by the causative agent assumes more importance than the actual prominent object such as the village, the passive conjugational endings express the same primitive agent-object.

However, Jagadīśa's perception of what constitutes the prominent object in double accusative statements radically differs

from that of Patañjali, Helaraja etc. According to Jagadīśa, whatever is the abode of the effect directly qualifying the root meaning 'action' is the prominent object. Thus, a uniform rule such as "conjugational endings etc. express the objecthood of the prominent object in double accusative usages. is sufficient to cover the reference to the objecthood in all instances of double accusative usages. He holds that, like the goat (*ajā*) etc. in usages with regular double accusative verbs, the 'cow' (*gau*) etc. in usages with the verbs '*duh*' etc. and also the primitive agent such as Devadatta in causative usages, can be considered to be prominent objects. For, the cow, in connection with the action of milking, is the prominent object due to the possession of the direct effect, namely, the operation conducive to the relasing of the milk, and Devadatta, in connection with the causative action of making him go, is the prominent object due to his possession of the direct effect, namely, the action of going to the village. Thus, since the cow etc. in connection with '*duh*' etc. and primitive agent 'Devadatta' etc. in connection with causative verbs, can be considered to be the 'prominent objects due to their possession of the directly qualifying effects, the rule suggested by Patañjali that explains the conjugational endings etc. as referring to different objecthoods in different double accusative usages is not necessary. It should be observed now that this view of Jagadīśa is based on a totally different perception of what constitutes the prominent object and therefore his rejection of Patañjali's rule does not amount to the rejection of the linguistic fact that passive conjugational endings etc. have an inherent capacity to express such objecthood of different objects in different double accusative usages, but amounts to the rejection of the necessity of a separate rule.

Now, as regards Nageśa's criticism of Jagadīśa's view. Nageśa argues that the roots such as '*duh*' (to milk) etc. cannot refer always to double actions such as the operation leading to the releasing of the milk and also to the operation that leads to such an operation; and therefore, the cow etc. cannot be claimed to be the objects by possessing the operation leading to the releasing of the milk. Thus, according to Nageśa, Patañjali's rule is necessary to cover the reference to the objecthood of the 'cow'

etc. when the roots 'duh' etc. refer to only a single action of milking and hence the same 'cow' etc. cannot be considered to be the primary objects. Nevertheless, this criticism reflects only the eventuality of the roots 'duh' etc. referring, at times, to a single action of milking etc. and therefore, does not actually rule out the possibility of the roots 'duh' etc. referring to double actions; and thus the cow etc., being the abode of the actions, being prominent objects.

Now as regards Bhaṭṭoji's theory of passivity : His theory envisages that the passivity, i.e. reference to the objecthood of the prominent objects and that of non-prominent objects in double accusatives depends upon the capacity of the double accusative verbal roots to refer to the double and single actions. It lays down the principle that the passive conjugational endings etc. refer to the objecthood of the prominent object provided that the verbal roots, after which the conjugational endings etc. occur, have an inherent capacity to refer to the double actions and that the same passive conjugational ending etc. refer to the objecthood of the non-prominent object provided that the verbal roots, after which the same endings occur, have an inherent capacity to refer to only a single action. Thus, Bhaṭṭoji's theory provides an alternative explanation of the passivity with reference to double accusative usages by fixing a new criterion for determining which passive endings refer to the objecthood of prominent objects and also which endings refer to the objecthood of non-prominent objects; and for this reason, his theory is a welcome addition.

CHAPTER XVI

DIVISION OF GRAMMATICAL OBJECTS

(*Karmavibhāga*)

Introduction

Pānini can be stated to have visualized four types of grammatical objects (*karma*). As has been stated earlier, he rules (i) that the object is what the agent seeks most to obtain through his actions (*karturīpsitataman karma* (p. i.4.49), (ii) that the object is also whatever is connected likewise even if not sought to be obtained through his actions (*tathāyuktam cānīpsitam* (i.4.50), (iii) that the object is also what is not covered by the other *kārakas* (*akathitam ca kārake* (p. i.4.51), (iv) and in the case of verbal bases 'krudh', and 'druh', when preceded by preposition, the person against whom the feelings of anger etc. is directed is called object *kāraka* (*karma*) (*krudha druhor upasrṣṭayoh karma* i.4.38). According to the tradition of commentators, however, these rules have been formed in order to demarcate the four types of the grammatical objects, namely, (i) those that are positively desired to be associated with the action such as village (*grama*) in '*grāmam gācchati*' (he goes to the village), (ii) those that are not positively desired such as thieves (*caura*) in '*caurān paśyati*' (he sees the thieves), (iii) those that found to be used in double accusative constructions such as 'cow' (*gau*) in '*gām dogdhi payah*' (he milks the milk from the cow) and (iv) those (*kārakas*) which get the name '*karma*' under special circumstances by overruling some other names such as *sampradāna* in '*devadattam abhikrudhyati*' (he is annoyed at Devadatta) etc.

Bhartṛhari, states that the grammatical objects are mainly

of two types : (i) those that are sought to be obtained most (*īpsitatama*) and also those that are other than sought to be obtained most '*anīpsita*' (*tāccepsitatamam karma caturdhānyattu kalpitam*). According to him, Pāṇini's rule i.4.49 demarks the primary type of the grammatical objects whereas the rule i.4.50, i.4.51 and also i.4.38 etc. demark the secondary type of grammatical objects. Thus, the rule i.4.49 could be taken to specify what constitutes the essential characteristics of the primary objects while the remaining set of three rules to specify the essential characteristics of the secondary type of objects.

Problem

Epistemologists of India classify primary grammatical objects (*īpsitatamakarma*) into three sub-types, namely, (i) that which is to be reached (*prāpya*) such as village (*grāma*) in '*grāmam gacchati*' (he goes to the village); (ii) that which is to be manifested or brought about (*nirvartya*) such as pot (*ghaṭa*) in '*ghaṭam karoti*' (he makes a pot) and (iii) that which is to be produced (*vikārya*) such as 'mat' (*kaṭa*) in '*kāśān kaṭam karoti*'. (He makes *kaśa* grasses into the mat). Nevertheless, epistemologists differ among themselves as to what constitute such primary objects. Also, they classify secondary objects into four sub-types : namely, (i) that which is to be reached indifferently (*audāsīnyena yatprāpyam*) such as 'grass' (*trṇa*) in (*grāmam gracchan trṇam sprśati*), (He touches the grass while going to the village), (ii) that which is not sought to be obtained (*kartur anīpsitam*) such as 'poison' (*viṣa*) in '*viṣam bhuṅkte*', (He eats poison) (iii) that which is not covered by other *kāraka* designation, (*samjñāntaraṭh anākhyātam*) such as 'gau' (cow) in '*gām dogdhi payah*' (he milks the milk from cow), and (iv) that which is with other designations before (*anyapūrvaka*) such as Devadatta in '*devadattam abhikrudhyati*' (he is annoyed at Devadatta). However, epistemologists differ again as to what are the essential characteristics of such secondary objects. Therefore, in the following pages, we shall deal with these various types of primary as well as secondary objects and their essential characteristics.

*Classification of Primary objects into 'prāpya',
'nirvartya' and 'vikārya'*

Patañjali, following him Kaiyata, have classified the objects covered by the rule '*kartur īpsitatamam karma*' (p. i.4.49), into '*prāpya*' or what is to be reached, '*nirvartya*' or what is to be manifested or brought about and '*vikārya*' or what is to be produced. These classifications can be said to have formed the most basic divisions of the primary objects. Kaiyata, while dealing with the purpose of the suffix '*tama*', cites the example of '*grāmam gacchati*' (he goes to the village) as the area to be covered by the rule. He then states that the designation '*karman*', can be applicable to the village even without the suffix '*tama*'. According to him '*grāma*' (village) becomes the 'object' since the same is sought to be obtained through the action and hence is the object to be reached or obtained (*prāpya*).

Patañjali, while dealing with the justification of the status of *karman* for '*odana*' (rice) in '*odanam pacati*' (he cooks rice), states that '*odana*' (rice), which is meant to be '*taṇḍula*' (rice grains) by *tādarthyā* relation, is the object of cooking since the same is brought about by cooking rice grains, i.e. by making the rice grains soft. Also justifying the two types of statements, namely (i) '*taṇḍulān odanam pacati*' (he cooks rice grains into rice) and (ii) '*taṇḍulānām odanam pacati*' (he cooks the rice out of rice grains), Patañjali states that the first statement is made with the intention that he brings about the rice by cooking the rice grains (*taṇḍulān pacan odanam nirvartayati*), whereas the second statement is made with the intention that he brings about the rice which is a change or product of the rice grains (*taṇḍulavikāram odanam nirvartyati*). From this observation, it becomes clear that Patañjali envisaged '*odana*' (rice) to be both *nirvartyakarman* (the object to be brought about) and *vikāryakarma* (object to be produced) depending upon whether the same (rice) is perceived to be what is brought about (*nirvartita*) or produced (*vikṛta*) out of the rice grains. Thus, '*īpsitatama karma*', according to Patañjali and *kaiyata*, can be said to be of threefold, namely, '*Prāpya*', '*nirvartya*' and '*vikārya*'.

Description of *prāpyakarma*

According to Bhartṛhari², object to be reached (*prāpyakarma*), which is first of the three kinds of primary objects, is that wherein no distinction, i.e. effect is produced due to the action undertaken. Thus he states as follows :

“Such an object is stated to be *prāpya*, where in either by inference or perception no accomplishment of any distinction is understood due to the action undertaken” (*kriyā kṛta viśeṣāṇām siddhir yatra na gamyate darśanād anumānādvā tatprāpyam iti kathyate*). For instance, consider the statements ‘he sees the sun’ (*ādityam paśyati*) and ‘he reaches the city’ (*nagaram upasarpati*). In such instances, since no distinction, i.e. effect is perceived to have been produced in the sun and the city due to the action of seeing and reaching and also since the objects are to be merely associated with the actions, the same are the objects to be reached. It should be noted that in such instances, no attainment i.e. manifestation of the self (*ātmalābha*) is perceived in the objects unlike in the case of objects to be manifested or transformed (*nivartyakarma*). Also, it should be noted that, in such instances, the association with the action cannot be termed to be producing the distinction (*viśesa*). For, unlike in the objects to be produced etc., no change in the nature of the objects can be perceived in the case of the sun etc. after the association with the action. Again, the contact etc., which is produced in the city etc., after the association with the action, cannot be termed to be the ‘distinction’ in the real sense. For, since the city is of the infinite measure and contact, produced due to the association of the action of reaching, is of very minute quantity, the same becomes negligible i.e. is not fit to be considered as the effect that changes the nature of the object.

Now it can be explained that the object to be reached must be accepted as a separate category. For, in cases like ‘*ādityam paśyati*’, (he sees sun), no distinction, i.e. effect can actually be stated to have been produced out of seeing. Also, even suppose some distinction is produced by seeing in some instances since eyes belong to the genus of fire and fire

does produce some effect, then too it is quite unjustified to assume that a distinction is produced in each and every instance. Thus, object to be reached *prāpya karma*, which is devoid of any effect produced by the action, gets established to be a separate type of object.

According to Bhartṛhari, the *prāpya karma*, despite not possessing any effect produced, becomes the instrument in bringing about the action, i.e. *kāraka* due to its various functions such as occurring in proper place and possessing perceptibility etc. (so that the same can be preceived)

Observation

Bhartṛhari establishes the object to be reach (*prāpyakarma*) as one of the three types of primary objects. However, the characteristics of this type of object is that the same does not possess any distinction, i.e. effect (such as becoming soft). In such cases, the object such as sun merely comes in contact with the action of seeing etc. but does not acquire any effect due to the association of such an action.

Gadādhara's position

Gadādhara³ too accepts 'object to be reached' as a type of primary object. Nevertheless, he differs from Bhartṛhari in defining such an object. According to Gadādhara, object to be reached is either what is the possessor of the effect produced by the action associated with (*kriyājanya phalāśrayatvam*) or what becomes a content of the action undertaken (*kriyāviṣayatvam*). Thus, village (*grāma*), in '*grāmam gacchati*' (he goes to the village), is the object to be reached since the same possesses the effect 'contact' produced by going, and the pot (*ghaṭa*), in '*ghaṭam jānāti*' (he knows the pot), is the object to be reached since the same becomes the content of knowing.

Thus, it can be observed that Gadādhara and other logicians accept the classification, i.e. the object to be reached as a separate type of primary object; but differ from Bhartṛhari in

3. Vyutpattivāda, p. 336.

defining the (characteristics of the) same as the possessor of the effect 'contact' etc. produced by the action of going etc. And this is the most significant contribution on the part of the logicians since the same radically changes the essential characteristics of the object. Actually this theory is based on the perception that objects to be reached too have some kind of effect in them.

Darpanakāra's theory

Darpanakara, the commentator on Bhūṣaṇa, too holds that objects to be reached (*prāpya*) is the possessor of an effect. However, he qualifies the object further as 'not being the content of a cognition that the same object is the abode of the unique property caused by the action (*kriyā prayojya asādhāraṇadharmaprakāraka pratīvisayatānāśrayatvam*).

He does so on the ground that the object to be manifested or brought about (*nirvartya*) such as pot (*ghaṭa*) in '*ghaṭam karoti*' (he makes a pot) and the object to be produced (*vikārya*) such as 'mat' (*kaṭa*) in '*kāśān kaṭam karoti*' (he makes mat out of kasa grasses) would not become the object to be reached. In such cases, even the pot and the mat can be said to possess an effect such as origination and hence they need to be avoided the designation of *prāpyakarma*. However, once the *prāpya karma* is qualified as 'not being the possessor of the contentness...', the same (pot etc.) would not become the object to be reached because they are only the content of a cognition that the same are the abode of the unique property, i.e. origination caused by the action.

Observation

It may be observed now that grammarians too, while accepting the classification of the *prāpya karma* as a primary object, differ, however from Bhartṛhari in defining the essential characteristics of the same. They too side with the logicians in holding that the *prāpya karma* is the abode of an effect produced by the action. Nevertheless, it may be pointed out that, Bhartṛhari too, when he states that '*prāpyakarma*' is that wherein

no distinction is perceived as produced by the action associated with it, means to say that *prāpyakarma* is neither changed (or brought about) like the *nirvartyakarma* nor newly produced like the *vikāryakarma* and hence does not possess any distinct effect such as origination which makes the object totally a new or different from what it was originally. Thus, he does not mean to say that the same does not possess any effect at all.

Description of nirvartyakarma

According to Bhartṛhari⁴, object to be manifested or brought about (*nirvartya karma*) is either what is originated without existing before or what is merely manifested (i.e. revealed) existing in a subtle form. Hari states, therefore, that “when-ever original or primary matter (*prakṛti*) such as mud, either existing (or not existing), is not intended to be changing or abandoning its original form, the object derived from such a *prakṛti* is said to be “the object to be manifested or brought about.” And also whatever is originated without existing before or is manifested existing in subtle form, is called “the object to be manifested or brought about.” (*sati vā vidyamanā vā prakṛtiḥ pariṇāminī yasya nāśṛīyate tasya nirvartyatvam pracaksate. yadasad iāyate sadvā janmanā yat prakāśate tannirvartyam*).

For instance, the ‘pot’ and ‘ash’ in ‘he makes a pot’ (*ghaṭam karoti*) and ‘he makes ashes’ (*bhasma karoti*), are the objects to be manifested or brought about when their primary matters, i.e. the mud and the wood are not considered to be changing or transforming their original form.

Here, the primary matter (*prakṛti*), from which the object is derived, is stated to be either existing or not existing. This is in view of the fact that Sāṅkhyas hold the *prakṛti* to be ever existing whereas the Vaiśeṣikas consider the same to be not present during the origination of the object.

Observation

Bhartṛharis classification of the object to be manifested or brought about (*nirvartya karma*) is based on the conviction that one and the same object originated can be regarded as either

'manifested' (*nirvartya*) 'or' 'produced' (*vikārya*) under two different circumstances. That is to say that the primary matter, which is the inherent cause of the object to be originated, can be expected to function as the material cause of the object by transformation of its nature into the object to be originated or not. Thus, when the primary matter is expected to function as the material cause, the object originated is considered as the object produced (*vikārya karma*) out of the primary matter and when the same is not expected to function as the material cause, the object originated is considered simply the object manifested or brought about (*nirvartya karma*).

Gadādhara's explanation

Gadādhara⁵ too accepts the classification of the object to be manifested or brought about as a separate category of the primary object. Nevertheless, he holds that the object to be manifested or brought about (*nirvartya karma*), is strictly conventional (*pāribhāṣika*). According to him, such a name must be viewed to be strictly conventional since otherwise even the 'boiled rice' (*odana*) or 'garland' (*sraja*) would become object to be manifested or brought about (*nirvartya*) in statements such as 'he makes rice grains into boiled rice' (*taṇḍulān odanam karoti*) and 'he makes the flowers into the garland' (*kusumāni srajam karoti*) where the words expressing the material cause, namely, the 'rice grains' and the 'flowers' are used. This is so because the term 'object to be brought about' (*nirvartya*) can be etimologically explained to be covering even what is produced (*vikārya*) by deriving the same as what is brought about, i.e. what is originated or produced (*nirvartyate niṣpādyate iti nirvartyam*). Thus, such a name '*nirvartya*' should be understood as being conventionally used to denote only the object brought about such as 'mat' in the statement such as 'he makes a mat' (*kaṭam karoti*) wherein the words expressing the objects functioning as the material cause, i.e. *kāśa* grass etc. are not used.

Observation

Gadādhara is apprehensive of the fact that the terms 'object

to be manifested or brought about' (*nirvartya*) and 'object to be produced' (*vikārya*) are too close to each other and hence cannot etimologically convey two different types of objects. Consequently, he opines that the two terms should be held to be merely conventional in the sense of the object to be manifested or brought about and also in the sense of the object to be produced. Thus, according to him, the two terms stand conventionally for the same object under the two different circumstances, i.e. when the word expressing the material cause is used and also when the same is not used in the statement.

Darpaṇakāras explanation

The author of Darpaṇa too holds the term 'object to be brought about' (*nirvartya*) to be conventional. According to him, object to be brought about is what is originated and also what is referred to by the word not associated with a word expressing the material cause. For instance, the boiled rice, '*odana*' in 'he cooks boiled rice' (*odanam pacati*) is the *nirvartya karma* since the same is originated (out of the rice grains) and is referred to by the word '*odana*' not associated with the word *taṇḍula* expressing the rice grains. He holds this position on the ground that Bhartṛhari has stated the object to be originated to be the object to be produced' (*vikārya*) when the material cause is considered to be transforming into the object to be produced (*prakṛtestu vivakṣāyām vikāryam kaiścīd anyathā*).

Observation

Darpaṇakāra too holds the name '*nirvartya*' to be conventional. However, he bases his theory directly on Bhartṛhari that "when the material cause is not intended to be transforming into the object, the same is viewed to be the object to be produced". Thus, for Darpaṇakāra '*nirvartya*' signifies the 'object to be brought about' when the material cause is not intended to be transforming into the object to be produced.

Description of vikāryakarma

Object to be produced (*vikārya*) is same as the object to be manifested or brought about (*nirvartya*). However, when the material cause is intended to be transforming into the object

to be brought about, the same is known as the object to be produced (*vikārya*). For instance, consider 'he makes the *kāśa* grasses into the mat' (*kāśān kaṭam karoti*). Here, the *kāśa* grasses are intended to be transforming into the object to be brought about, i.e. mat and hence the same mat is known as the object to be produced (*vikārya*). Thus, Bhartṛhari states as follows :

'When the material cause is intended to be transforming into the object brought about, the same object to be brought about is said by some to be otherwise (i.e. *vikārya*). The object is shown to be, therefore, two fold as *nirvartya* and *vikārya* in the science' (*prakṛtes tu vivakṣāyām vikāryam kaiscid anyathā. nirvartyam ca vikāryam ca karmaśāstra prakirtitam*). According to Bhartṛhari, such an object to be produced is again established to be two fold as one produced from the destruction of the material cause such as ash from the destruction of wood and also as one produced from the origination of a special quality such as the modification, i.e. ornament from the gold... (*vikāryam ca karma dvedhā vyavasthitam. prakṛtyuccheda sambhūtam kincit kāṣṭhādi bhasmavat kincid guṇāntarotpadyā suvarṇādi vikāravat*).

Consider for instance, '*kāṣṭham bhasma karoti*' (he makes the wood into the ashes) and '*suvarṇam kuṇḍalam karoti*' (he makes the gold into the ring). Here, in the first instance, the object, namely, ash is produced from the destruction of the material cause such as the wood ; whereas, in the second instance, the object, namely, the ring is produced due to the origination of a special quality such as the setting or modification in the gold.

It should be noted here that, in the case of the ash, the same is *vikāryakarma* regardless of whether the material cause is intended to be used in the sentence or not since the ash is produced from the destruction of wood ; on the other hand, in the case of the ring, the same is *vikāryakarma* only when the material cause is used in the sentence since the ring is produced by originating merely a unique quality in the gold.

Observation

Bhartṛhari distinguishes the object as either *vikārya* or

nirvartya on the basis of whether or not the material cause is intended to be transforming into the object to be brought about. Thus, the 'mat' in '*kāśān kaṭam karoti*' is *vikārya* since the material cause, namely, *kāśa* grass are intended to be transforming into the mat and consequently the word referring to such grass is used ; whereas, the same mat in '*kaṭam karoti*' is *nirvartya* since the material cause is not intended to be transforming into the mat and consequently the word referring to such a grass is not used.

Nevertheless, he distinguishes further the *vikāryakarma* in to two kinds as one produced out of the destruction of the material cause and also as one produced by the origination of a peculiar quality in the material cause. This is a very valid distinction since it brings out the two significant aspects of the object to be produced namely, the destruction of the material cause and also the origination of a peculiar quality in the material case.

Gadādhara's position

Gadādhara⁶ holds that the term '*vikārya*' must be understood to include even the material cause (*prakṛti*). According to him, since the classification of the primary objects such as (i) *prāpya*, (ii) *nirvartya* and (iii) *vikārya* does not actually cover the material cause such as wood and gold as an object, the same would become the forth type of primary object unless held to have been covered by the term '*vikārya*',

The term '*vikārya*' etimologically cannot mean the material type of object. Nevertheless, by convention, the same can be taken to cover the material cause as well. Now, the object of the type of material cause can be defined as that which facilitates the modification (*vikāra*), i.e. either a destruction or origination of a new quality so that something can be produced out of such a material cause.

Thus, wood and gold, in 'he makes wood into the ash' and 'he makes gold into the ring' can be considered to be the object of the type of material cause since they facilitate the modification (*vikāra*), i.e. the destruction (of the wood) and origination of a unique quality in the gold respectively.

According to Gadādhara, the object to be produced is what

6. Vyutpattivāda, p. 338.

is accomplished through the action. For instance, the boiled rice, (*odana*) in 'he cooks rice grains into boiled rice' (*taṇḍulan odanam pacati*), is the object to be produced since the same is accomplished through the action of cooking.

Observation

Gadādhara holds that both the material cause and also the object to be produced should be covered by the term '*vikārya*'. According to him, the words expressing the material cause such as '*kāṣṭham*' and '*suvarṇam*' in '*kāṣṭham bhasma karoti*' and '*suvarṇam kuṇḍalam karoti*' have the accusative case endings; and therefore, they must be viewed to be some kind of objects. Nevertheless, since the material cause cannot be included in any of the three established types of objects, i.e. *prāpya*, *nirvartya* and *vikārya*, the same would become a fourth type of object. Thus, it would become imperative that one of the three terms be covering such a material cause as well. However, since material cause itself becomes the object to be produced by a modification (*vikāra*), i.e. by destruction or originating a unique quality, it is justified that the term '*vikārya*' be taken to cover even the material cause. However, Prakāśakāra holds quite the opposite view regarding what is '*nirvartya karma*' and what is '*vikārya karma*'. He states that the woods are the *vikārya karma* (object to be transformed) and the *bhasma* is the '*nirvartya karma*' (object to be brought about) since by transforming or destroying the woods, the ash is brought about. Similarly, gold is the *vikārya karma* and the ring is the *nirvartyakarma* since by originating a quality, in the gold, the ring has been brought about.

Darpaṇakāra's position

Darpaṇakāra states that *vikārya karma* is what has the origination or the qualified non-existence facilitating the action and also what has the apparent relationship of the material cause with the object to be produced (*pratīyamāna prakṛti vikṛtibhāvakatve sati kriyāniṣpādaka viśiṣṭāsātva utpatyanyatara phalavatvam*). This definition covers both material cause and the object to be produced. For instance, consider the woods and the ash in 'he makes wood into the ash'. Here, the woods are *vikārya karma* since the same have apparent relationship of material cause with

the object produced and also the qualified non-existence, i.e. destruction facilitating the making of the ash. And the ash is the *vikāryakarma* since the same has such a relationship as well as the origination.

Observation

Later grammarians such as Darpaṇakāra were greatly influenced by Gadādhara's theory that the term '*vikārya*' should be held to cover conventionally both the material cause (*prakṛti*) and the object to be produced (*vikṛti*). Darpaṇakāra does not state however, that the term covers conventionally both the types of objects. Nevertheless, he defines *vikārya karma* in such a way as to cover both types of objects. His definition that *vikārya karma* is what has either the origination or the qualified non-existence is a combination of two essential characteristics where the first one covers the object to be produced such as the ash and the second one covers the material cause such as the woods. Thus, it can be stated that later epistemologists take the term '*vikārya*' to cover both the material cause and the object to be produced unanimously.

Classification of Secondary Objects

Description of '*anīpsita*' object

The rule '*tathāyuktam cānīpsitam*' (p. i.4.50) assigns the name object to that which is likewise connected with the action even if it is '*anīpsita*' or not desired to be obtained through action.

According to Patañjali, the rule i.4.49 is meant to take care of objects which are positively desired, whereas the rule p. i.4.50 covers the objects which are disliked (*dveṣya*) or which are indifferent (*udāsīna*). This goal, he achieves by interpreting the '*nañ*' in '*anīpsita*' in the sense of '*paryudāsa*' (exclusion). Thus, the word '*anīpsita*' means other than what is desired to be obtained which can be either what is positively disliked or what is merely indifferent.

Traditionally, '*viṣam bhakṣayati*' (he eats poison) and '*caurān paśyati*' (he sees the thieves) are examples for '*dveṣya*' (hated or positively disliked); and '*grāmam gacchan vṛkṣamūlany*

upasarpati.' (while going to the village he reaches the roots of the tree) is the example for '*udāsina*' (indifferent). Here, the poison or the thieves are the hated or disliked type of objects because, the same are connected with the action of eating and seeing respectively even while not desired to be obtained through such actions. And the roots of the tree are the indifferent type of objects because, the same are connected with the action of reaching even while not desired to be obtained through such action.

Description of udāsīnakarma

Following the rule 'object is also whatever is likewise connected even if not sought to be obtained through 'action' (*tathāyuktam cānīpsitam* p. 1.4.50). Bhartṛhari assigns the name 'object' (*karma*) to two kinds of objects, namely, that which is reached indifferently (*audāsīnyena yat prāpyam*) such as grass (*tṛṇa*) in '*grāmam gacchan tṛṇam spṛśati*' (he touches grass while going to the village) etc. and that which is not sought to be obtained, i.e. not desired, (*accha kartur anīpsitam*) such as poison (*viṣa*) in '*viṣam bhuṅkte*' (he eats poison) etc. He states that, in such cases, the agent is not interested in touching the grass, nevertheless, he touches the grass by chance and therefore, grass becomes the object of his indifferent touching.

Observation

In taking the rule p. i.4.50 as assigning the name 'object' to two types of objects, namely, that which is indifferently reached (*audāsīnyena yat prāptam*) and also that which is not sought to be obtained (*yac ca kartur anīpsitam*), Bhartṛhari follows strictly traditional interpretation of the word '*anīpsita*' as a *paryudāsa* or exclusion in the sense of what is other than sought to be reached. By this interpretation, both what is indifferent and what is not sought to be obtained can be covered by the term. Thus, Bhartṛhari divides '*anīpsita*' object into two types such as 'indifferent' (*udāsina*) and 'not desired' (*dveṣya*) wherein the former is what is reached by chance.

Prabhā's definition

Prabhā, the commentary on Bhūṣaṇa, defines the '*anīpsita*' i.e. '*udāsina*' object as what is the abode of the effect but is not

intended to be the abode of the effect (*phalāśrayatve sati phalāśrayatvoddeśyatvena avivakṣitatvam*). For instance, in 'while going to the village he reaches the roots of a tree' (*grāmam gacchan vṛkṣamūlāni upasarpati*), the roots of a tree are the *anīpsita* (i.e. *udāsīna*) object since the same, despite being the abode of the contact, the effect, produced by the action of reaching are not intended by the agent to be the abode of the effect.

Observation

Prabhā does not introduce any new dimension to the *anīpsita* object, however, it provides a very accurate definition of *udāsīna* or indifferent type of object. While Bhartṛhari had simply outlined the general characteristics of the *udāsīna* object as that which is reached indifferently, Prabhā specifically mentions the lack of the agents intention to have the effect as the distinguishing characteristics of the same *karma*. Thus, *udāsīna karma* is one of the two types of *anīpsita karma*.

Description of *dveṣyakarma*

'Hated' or '*dveṣya*' is the second type of '*anīpsita karma*'. According to Bhartṛhari, just as the entities, that are sought to be obtained through the action, are objects, in the same way, the entities, that are not sought to be obtained by the agent through the action, are also objects (*yac ca kartur anīpsitam*). For instance, the poison (*viṣa*) etc. in 'he eats poison' (*viṣam bhakṣayati*) etc. are the 'hated' or *dveṣya karma* since the same are not sought to be obtained by the agent through the action of eating but nevertheless is associated with the effect, i.e. the contact with the throat. However, the basic difference between the '*udāsīna*' and '*dveṣya*' type of objects is that while the former becomes the abode of the effect by chance produced by the action such as resorting to the roots of a tree, the latter becomes the abode of the effect produced by the action deliberately undertaken such as eating poison.

Now it can be observed that the being the abode of the effect, actually when not intended to be the abode of the effect, is the common or geneal characteristics of both types of *anīpsita* objects such as '*udāsīna*' and '*dveṣya*'.

Description of *anākhyāta karma*

Following the rule (p. i.4.51), Bharatṛhari classifies the *kāraṅkas* that are not covered by any other designation, as the 'not covered object' (*anākhyāta karma*). According to him, the *kāraṅkas*, that are not intended to be any other *kāraṅkas* such as *apādāna*, are considered as 'not covered objects' by such a rule. For instance, 'cow' (*go*) in double accusative statements such as 'he milks milk (from) cow' (*gām dogdhi payaḥ*) is a 'not covered object' since the same is not covered, i.e. not intended to be any other *kāraṅka* such as *apādāna*. Here, the word 'not covered' (*akathita*) should be understood as 'not intended by the speaker' (*avivakṣita*) to have any other designation such as *apādāna*. For, when milk is being milked from the cow, the cow does function as the *apādāna*, i.e. ablation or fixed point from which milk is separated. Thus, the cow does become covered by the designation *apādāna*. Nevertheless, the speaker can be said not to intended the same (cow) as the fixed point from which milk is separated. And, under such a circumstance, the name *apādāna* does not become applicable to the cow since the *kāraṅka* designations are dependent on speakers intention. (*vivakṣātaḥ kāraṅkāṇi bhavanti*). Thus, now it could be held that to cover the cow etc. by the name 'object' in double accusative statements, the rule (p. i.4.51) becomes necessary.

Observation

It should be noted here that 'not covered object' is stated to be an object which is not intended to be any other *kāraṅka* by the speaker. Now, the speaker's 'non-intention' (*avivakṣā*) can be either due to the non-applicability of any other designation or due to non-desirability of any other designation. Thus, 'paurava' in 'he begs *paurava* for a cow' (*pauravam gām yācate*) and 'cow' in 'he milks the milk (from) the cow' (*gām dogdhi payaḥ*) are not covered objects due to non-applicability and non-desirability of any other *kāraṅka* designation respectively. Now, the 'non-covered object' is a secondary type of object and hence it does not possess any of the essential

characteristics of the primary object such as being the abode of the effect etc.

Another point to be noted is that 'not covered object' cannot be considered to be a non-prominent object by interpreting the word '*akathita*' to mean non-prominent '*akathita*' (*apradhāna*). For, in that case, even the 'vessel' in 'he milks the milk (from) cow in vessel' (*gām dogdhi payaḥ kāmśa pātryām*) would become the non-covered object since the same (vessel) is less prominent compared to milk.

According to Manoramā,⁸ the 'not covered object' is an exception to the '*śeṣa*' or unspecified syntactico-semantic relation. The rule p. i.4.51 enjoins the name 'object' to such *kāraṅkas* where otherwise genitive in the sense of '*śeṣa*' relation becomes applicable.

Gadādhara⁹ and few others like Gokulanatha, however, hold that 'not covered object' is a secondary object since the same is the abode of only the effect such as separation (*vibhāga*) which indirectly qualifies the root meaning such as the operation conducive to flowing (*kṣaraṇānukūla vyāpāra*). According to these scholars, the 'non-covered object' has some of the essential characteristics of primary objects such as being the abode of the effect etc.; nevertheless, the 'non-covered object' is a secondary object because the same possesses the effect which is only an indirect qualifier of the root-meaning.

On the other hand, Śabdaratna¹⁰ opposes such a view on the ground that 'non-covered object' must cover 'cow' etc. even when the root '*duh*' does not refer to the effect 'separation' that is indirectly produced by the action conducive to flowing; but rather refers to only the separation occurring in the milk produced by milking. Thus, it can be observed now that 'not covered object' is a secondary object intended to cover the *kāraṅkas* that are not intended to be covered by other *kāraṅka* designations such as *apādāna* in double accusative statements.

8. Prauḍhamanoramā, p. 824.

9. Vyutpattivāda, p. 242.

10. Śabdaratna, p. 845.

Description of anyapūrvaka karma

'Objects with other designations before' (*anyapūrvaka karma*) are those *kāraṅkas* which get the name object under special circumstances in preference to other designations such as '*sampradāna*', '*kāraṇa*' etc. In classifying '*anyapūrvaka karma*' as a separate category of secondary objects Bhartṛhari is guided by Pāṇini's rules such as '*krudhadruhor upasr̥ṣṭayoḥ karma*' (in the case of verbal bases '*krudh*' and '*druh*', when preceded by prepositions, the person against whom the feelings of anger etc. are directed, is called object p. i.4.38), '*divah karma ca*' (the *kāraṅka* which functions as the most efficient means with respect to the root '*div*' (to cast dice or play) is called 'object' and 'instrument' p. i.4.43) etc. According to Bhartṛhari,¹¹ *anyapūrvaka karma* is a type of secondary object which gets the name 'object' by overruling the other designations such as '*sampradāna*', '*kāraṇa*' etc. assigned by other rules. For instance, consider the *anyapūrvaka karmas* such as 'cruel' (*krūra*) and 'dice' (*akṣa*) in 'he is annoyed at the cruel' (*krūram abhikrudhyati*) and 'he plays the dice' (*akṣān dīvyati*) respectively. Here, the 'cruel' is originally assigned the designation of *sampradāna* by the rule '*krudhadruher̥ṣyārthānam yam prati kopah*' (in connection with verbal bases having the meaning of '*krudh*' 'to feel annoyed' etc., the person against whom the anger is directed, is called '*sampradāna*' p. i.4.37) and the 'dice' is originally assigned the name '*kāraṇa*' by the rule '*sādhakata-mam kāraṇam*' (the most effective means is called *kāraṇa* p. i.4.42). However, the rules p. i.4.38 and p. i.4.43 assign the designation 'object' (*karma*) to both the cruel one and dice. Nevertheless, they do so only under the special circumstances, namely, when the roots '*krudh*' and '*druh*' are preceded by prepositions or also when the root '*div*' is intended to denote the action of playing for the sake of playing dice.

Now, this category of object includes even the instances of the secondary objects such as the Vaikuntha in 'he lies down upon the Vaikuntha, (*vaikuṇṭham adhiṣete*) etc. This is so because the rule '*adhiṣṭin sthāsām karma*' (the *kāraṅka*, which functions as the location of the action of the roots '*ṣin*', '*sthā*' and '*ās*', when

11. Vākyapadīya, p. 267.

preceded by the preposition 'adhi', is called the object p. (i.4.46) assigns the designation 'object' to the location of lying down upon by over-ruling the designation 'locus' (*adhikaraṇa*) assigned by the previous rule 'ādharo' *dhikaraṇam*' (the support or location is called the locus p. i.4.45).

Observation

Objects with other designations before' (*anyapūrvaka karma*) is a large comprehensive category of objects. It includes instances of secondary objects which are originally other *kāraḥ* such as 'sampradāna', 'karaṇa', *adhikaraṇa*' etc. *Karakas*, when their original sense is already expressed or conveyed otherwise through other grammatical means, lose their original *kāraḥ* status. Thus, the *sampradāna kāraḥ*, namely, the cruel one etc. and the *adhikaraṇa kāraḥ*, namely, the *vaikunṭha* etc. lose their original *kāraḥ* status, in 'krūram *abhikrudhyati*', 'vaikunṭham *adhiṣete*' etc. and assume the new *kāraḥ* status by functioning as the object. However, in the case of the 'dice' (*akṣa*), which is actually an instrument, i.e. the most efficient means of playing, the same assumes the new *kāraḥ* status of object due to the speaker's intention and not due to the fact that such a function of instrumentality is already expressed otherwise. Thus, dice (*akṣa*) in *akṣān divyati* is a perfect example wherein the *kāraḥ* status of an object assigned due to the speaker's intention although the instrumentality, being not already expressed otherwise, is yet applicable.

Now, it can be observed that the category of the 'object with other designations before' is intended to cover the instances of objects which are originally other *kāraḥ* but assume the objecthood either due to the fact that their original *kāraḥ* status is already conveyed or due to the fact that speakers do not intend the same to function as the original *kāraḥ*.

Critical examination

Pāṇini's rule '*karturīpsitatamam karma*' (p. i.4.49) can be taken to define the primary grammatical object as something which the agent seeks to obtain most through his actions (*īpsitatama*). However, Patañjali's and following him, Kaiyata's

classification of the '*ipsitatama*' object as (i) '*prāpya*' (what is to be reached) (ii) '*nirvartya*' (what is to be brought about) and (iii) '*vikārya*' (what is to be produced) has led almost all the later epistemologists including Bhartṛhari to classify the '*ipsitatama*' object in terms of the same threefold division. This is in spite of the fact that Bhartṛhari and others do not agree in totality with the definition provided by Patañjali regarding the nature of such objects.

Also, Pāṇini's rules '*tathāyuktam cānīpsitam*' (p. i.4.50), '*akathitam ca*' (p. i.4.51) and '*krudha druhoh upasṛṣṭayoḥ karma*' (p. i.4.38) assign the name 'object' to i) '*anīpsita*' *kāraḥ* which are likewise associated with the action, to (ii) *kāraḥ* not already covered by any other designation and to (iii) *kāraḥ* that have some designations before but overruled under certain circumstances respectively. However Bhartṛhari takes these rules to assign the name 'object' to a group of *kāraḥ* which are quite opposite to the '*ipsitatama*' objects; while the '*ipsitatama*' objects are primary, these objects are secondary in nature. According to him, only the rule (p. i.4.49) assigns the name 'object' to primary objects since the same are sought to be obtained by the agent through his actions. Thus, the rules p. i.4.50 etc. assign the name 'object' to *kāraḥ* which are incidental objects. Bhartṛhari further divides the '*anīpsita karmans*' covered by p. i.4.50 into two subdivisions, namely, 'hated' (*dveṣya*) and 'indifferent' (*udāsīna*).

Now, the classification of the grammatical objects into two main groups as primary and also as secondary and further their subdivisions are accepted by later epistemologists with some modifications. The object to be reached (*prāpya*), though visualized by Patañjali, is actually developed by Bhartṛhari. According to him, such an object is simply what is reached, i.e. comes into contact with action and does not possess any distinction, i.e. effect produced by the action. On the other hand, Gadādhara and others differ completely from Bhartṛhari and visualize an effect contact even in the case of *prāpya karma*. Thus, according to them, *prāpya karma* is what is the abode of the effect such as contact produced by the action of going etc.

While Patañjali originally defined the '*nirvartya karma*' to be an object brought about such as '*odana*' in '*taṇḍulān odanam*'

pacati', Bhartṛhari defines the same as the object originated provided that the primary matter (*prakṛti*) which is actually the material cause (*upādāna*), is not expected to function as the material cause by transformation of its nature (*pariṇāminī*). By this definition, Bhartṛhari restricts the name '*nirvartya karma*' to the object originated under the special circumstances i.e., when the primary matter is not expected to function as the material cause despite being so.

On the other hand, Gadādhara holds that the name '*nirvartya karma*' is merely a conventional one and does not therefore, perceive much difference between the object to be brought about and also the object to be produced as both are originated from the material cause. Thus, according to him the name *nirvartya karma* is used conventionally to convey the objects originated wherein no word expressing the material cause is found.

The term 'the object to be produced' or '*vikāryakarma*' was obviously used by Patañjali to mean the object which is associated with the change or modification (*vikāra*). Bhartṛhari, greatly influenced by such a concept, states that the object to be originated is known as the object to be produced (*vikārya karma*) provided that the material cause is intended to be changing or transforming into the object to be brought about. Thus, the difference between the object to be produced and also the object to be brought about is that when the material cause is intended to be changing or transforming into the object brought about, the object originated is called 'produced' and when the same is not, intended to be so, the same is called 'brought about'. Gadādhara too follows this distinction of the objects, however, he technically expresses this distinction by stating that the two terms '*nirvartya*' and '*vikārya*' are strictly conventional and express the same object originated under the two different circumstances, i.e. when the word expressing the material cause is used and also when the term expressing the material cause is not used in the statements. Also, according to Gadādhara, the term '*vikārya*' covers even the material cause since there exists no separate term to cover such an object in the said scheme of objects.

Now, as regards the secondary objects : Patanjali takes the

rule '*tathāyuktam cānīpsitam*' p. i.4.50 to cover two types of objects : namely, hated or positively disliked such as poison and also the indifferent such as the roots of a tree. Bhartṛhari, too follows him in stating that the rule covers the object which is reached indifferently (*audāsīnyena yat prāpyam*) and the object which is not sought to be obtained (*yacca kartur anīpsitam*). However, according to him, the rules '*tathāyuktam*' p. i.4.50, '*akathitam ca*' p. i.4.51 and '*krudhadruhor...karma*' p. i.4.38, are expected to define the secondary kinds of objects such as '*anīpsita*' (i.e. '*udāsīna*', '*dveṣya*'), '*akathita*' and '*anyapūrvaka*' which are four in number (*caturdhā anyatly kalpitam*). Of the four types of secondary objects, *anīpsita* objects, i.e. that which is indifferently reached (*udāsīna*) and also that which is not sought to be obtained (*dveṣya*) constitute the first two kinds. Prabhā's definition of the *anīpsita* objects as 'what is the abode of the effect but is not intended to be the abode of the effect' provides a general and consecutive characteristics of the *udāsīna* and *dveṣya* type of objects. Thus, since both the roots of a tree and poison are the abode of the effect 'contact' etc., the same become the *anīpsita* type of objects.

The rule '*akathitam ca*' (p. i.4.51) assigns the name 'object' to those *kāraṅkas* which are not covered by any other *kāraṅka* designation. Thus, 'cow' etc. in double accusative statements such as 'he milks the cow into milk' become the 'not covered object' (*akathita karma*) since the same is not covered by the special *kāraṅka* designation such as *apādāna*. In the scheme of secondary objects, proposed by Bhartṛhari, the 'not covered object' constitutes the third variety. The point to be noted about the not covered object is that it is an exception to the *śeṣa* or unspecified syntactico-semantic relation. It incorporates such *kāraṅkas* which otherwise would have been considered *śeṣa*. Also, another point to be noted is that the proposition of Gadādhara etc, that such objects too are the abode of the secondary effects is not tenable. For, in that case, the cow etc. could not be considered to be the objects while the roots do not refer to the secondary effects such as separation.

Now as regards the last of the four types of secondary objects namely the objects with other designations before (*anyapūrvaka*). This category is meant to cover the instances of the

kāraḥ which are originally other *kāraḥ* such as *saṃpradāna*, *adhikaraṇa* etc. They are considered to be *anyapūrvaka* the objects when the original designation becomes untenable due to some special reason. Thus, this category includes those *kāraḥ* which are objects by exception to the originally intended *kāraḥ*.

It can be observed now that, according to Bhartṛhari, grammatical objects are mainly of two types (i) those that are *īpsita* and (ii) those that are '*anīpsita*'. He has used the criterion of desirability for distinguishing the primary and secondary objectness. While all the three types of primary objects, namely, (i) *prāpya*, (ii) *nirvartya* and (iii) *vikārya* are positively desired, all other four types of secondary objects, namely, (i) *audāśīnyena prāpta*, (ii) *anīpsita*, (iii) *anākhyāta* and (iv) *anyapūrvaka* are not positively desired. This is so because, the three types of primary objects such as *prāpya* etc. are all sought to be obtained by the agent whereas the four types of secondary objects are not at all sought to be obtained by the agent through his actions.

This division of grammatical objects on two levels involves, however, the difficulty of justifying the two separate rules namely, '*tathāyuktam cānīpsitam*' (p. i.4.50) and '*akathitam ca*' (p. i.4.51) as only the latter p. i.4.51 could have sufficed to cover all the instances of secondary objects.¹² Nevertheless, traditional scholars have, almost without exception, followed such a classification and hence the validity of the same classification of objects becomes unquestionable within the tradition.

12. See Dr. S.D. Joshi and Rood Bargan, *Mahabhasya* 1975 Poona for more details.

CHAPTER XVII

THEORY OF ACCUSATIVE-MEANING IN ASSOCIATION WITH ROOTS REFERRING TO KNOWLEDGE ETC.

(*saviṣayārthaka dhātuyoge dvitīyārthavicārah*)

Introduction

Accusative case endings have been enjoined in the sense of the syntactico-semantical notion of the 'grammatical object' (*karmaṇi dvitīyā* p. ii.3.2). And the grammatical object (*karma*) is defined by Panini as that which the agent seeks most to obtain through his actions (*karturīpsitatamam karma* p. i.4.49). Consequently, the grammatical object has been analysed as the abode of the effect produced by the action. And using the principle that 'whatever meaning is not already obtained otherwise through other source is the word-meaning' (*ananyalabhyaḥ śabdārthaḥ*), the epistemologists have held variously that the accusative case endings refer to the abode (of the effect), the effect, the superstratumness etc. in instances such as '*grāmam gacchati*' (he goes to the village) etc.

Nevertheless, the accusative case endings, associated with the verbal roots, denoting knowledge etc. (*saviṣayārthakadhātu*) which have a reference to an object such as pot, cannot be held to be referring to the abode (of the effect) etc. This is so because, the verbal roots referring to knowledge etc. such as '*jñā*' (to know), '*iṣ*' (to desire or endeavour), '*kr*' (to do or make) etc. are not conventionally transitives despite¹ Jagadīśa claiming that any verbal root, which has syntactical

1. See Chapter on transitivity.

expectancy for an accusative object, in its infinitive forms, is transitive. And therefore, the object such as 'pot' does not necessarily possess an effect that is produced by the action of knowledge etc. expressed by the roots. Thus, the accusative case endings, in association with such verbal roots as 'jñā' (to know), 'iṣ' (to desire), 'kr' (to do or make) etc., must be conceded to refer to some non-conventional meanings such as *viṣayatva* etc. and not to the conventionally accepted meanings such as the abode (of the effect) etc.

Problem

However, different epistemologists have proposed different theories of the meanings of the accusative case endings in such cases. While the Prācya logicians have held that the objectness (contentness) '*viṣayatva*' constitutes the accusative meanings, the Navyas have refuted that Prācya theory and state that the state of having what is an object (content) '*viṣayitva*' constitutes the accusative meanings. Also, Gokulanatha has proposed that the accusatives can be held to refer to the superstratumness (*ādheyatā*) which has been accepted generally to be the accusative meaning in association with transitive roots. On the other hand, grammarians maintain that the roots like *jñā* etc. too refer to an action like knowing etc. that can produce an effect like the destruction of covering such as ignorance, i.e. non-understanding (*āvaraṇabhanga*) etc. and thus the abode (*āśraya*) of such effects can be regarded as the accusative meaning (i.e. there is no need to accept that the accusatives refer to some secondary meanings). Also, the ritualists, Khaṇḍadeva etc., maintain that the roots like '*jñā*' etc. refer to the action of knowing etc. that can produce an effect like the unique contentness (*viṣayatāviśeṣa*), known as awareness *jñātātā*, and hence the accusatives in such cases can be held to refer to primary objectness (*mukhyakarmatā*) analysable into being the abode of such contentness. In the following pages, we shall analyse these various theories of accumulative-meanings so that a critical examination of all these various theories becomes possible.

Nyāya theories

Prācyā theory

Prācyas² hold that the accusative case endings, in association with the verbal roots denoting knowledge etc., which have a reference to an object, refer to the objectness (contentness) (*viṣayatva*). According to them, such an accusative-meaning is related to the root-meaning 'action of knowing' through the relation of conditioning. And the accusative-base-meaning, namely, 'pot', is related to the same contentness through the superstratumness (*ādheyatā*). Thus, one cognizes from the statement such as '*ghaṭam jānāti*' (he knows or perceives pot) that the person is the possessor of the knowledge that conditions the contentness occurring in the pot. (*ghaṭa niṣṭha viṣayatva nirūpaka jñānāśrayaḥ*).

Now as regards the accusative meanings in association with the roots '*iṣ*' (to desire or endeavour) and '*kr*' (to do or make) in '*ghaṭam icchati*' (he desires a pot) and in '*ghaṭam karoti*' (he makes a pot) etc. According to the Prācyas, the root '*iṣ*' refers to the desire and the accusative, associated with such a root, refers to the chief qualificandness, i.e. principal nucleusness (*mukhya viśeṣyatā*).³ And such an accusative meaning is related to the desire, the root-meaning, through conditioning. Thus, one cognizes from '*ghaṭam icchati*' that one is the possessor of the desire conditioning the chief qualificandness of the pot (*ghaṭa niṣṭha mukhyaviśeṣyatā nirūpakeccāśrayaḥ*).

This theory can be obtained from Gadādhara's observation⁴ on the accusative meanings in association with the desiderative roots. He observes that the accusative endings refer to the chief qualificandness when used with desideratives such as '*cikīrṣati*' which refer to a desire conditioning the activity (*kṛtīprakārakeccā*).

2. Vyutpattivāda P. 273.

3. In such cases, the desire has the form that 'may the pot be accomplished' (*ghaṭo bhavatu*) wherein the pot is the chief qualificand and hence the chief qualificandness is conditioned by the desire.

4. Vyutpattivāda P. 273.

According to the Prācyas, the root 'kr' (to do or make) refers to the activity conducive to the desired end. And the accusative, in association with such a root, refers to a particular type of objectness (*viṣayatā viśeṣa*) analysable into the state of being the material cause (*upādānatva*) etc. and the accomplishability (*sādhyatva*). Thus, in '*kāśān kaṭam karoti*' (he makes a mat out of *kāśa* grasses), one cognizes that the agent has the activity which conditions the state of being the material cause of the *kāśa* grass and also the accomplishability of the mat (*kāśānirūpita upādānatvākhyā viṣayatā viśiṣṭa kaṭānirūpita sādhyatvākhyā viṣayatā viśiṣṭā ca yā kṛtiḥ tadvān*).

However, in cases like '*kāṣṭham bhasma karoti*' (he makes the wood into ashes), the object produced (i.e. ash) destroys the material cause, i.e. wood. Therefore, the accusative, in such cases, refers to the destroyership (*nāśakatva*) and also to the producership (*utpādakatva*). Thus, one cognizes that the agent has the activity which conditions the producership of the ash and also the destroyership of the wood (*kāṣṭhaniṣṭha nāśakatva viśiṣṭa bhasmaniṣṭhotpādakatva viśiṣṭā cayā kṛtiḥ tadvān*).

Observation

Prācyas theory that the accusatives, in association with the verbal roots such as *jñā* (to know) etc. refer to the contentness (*viṣayatva*) is based on the fact that since such roots as '*jñā*' (to know) etc. denote knowledge etc., which have a reference to the objects like the pot etc., the same (pot etc.) become contents of such a root-meaning 'knowing' etc. Therefore, the accusative case endings, occurring after such objects and enjoined in the sense of objects, can only refer to the contentness (*viṣayatva*) occurring in the objects and conditioned by the 'knowledge' etc.

According to the Prācyas, the roots such as '*jñā*' (to know) etc. are not regular transitive roots like '*gam*' (to go), or '*pac*' (to cook) etc. For, the roots '*gam*' (to go) etc. refer to an action of going etc. which produce visible effects like 'contact' (*sam-yoga*), 'the becoming soft' (*viklitti*) etc., whereas the roots '*jñā*' (to know) etc. do not refer to any such action that can produce a visible effect occurring in the object. Thus, the accusatives,

associated with such roots, cannot be held to refer to any effects produced by the root-meaning 'knowing' etc.

Also, the Prācyas hold the theory that the accusatives in association with the roots 'iṣ' and 'kr', referring to a desire and to an effort or operation, refer to the chief qualificandness or principal nucleusness (*mukhyaviśeṣyatā*) and a particular type of objectness (*viśayatāviśeṣa*), analysable into the state of being the material cause and the accomplishability, which is based on the fact that such roots 'iṣ' (to desire) and 'kr' (to do) etc. do not refer to any action that can produce an effect. Thus, it can be observed that the Prācyas have analysed the meanings of the accusatives in association with the verbal roots as *jñā* (to know) etc. on the basis that since such roots do not refer to any action that can produce an effect, the accusatives must refer to the objectness etc. that are not the effects produced.

Giridharas theory

Giridhara⁵ follows the Prācyas in proposing that the 'viśayatva' is the accusative meaning. However, he is keen in avoiding the contradiction to the grammatical rule : "Even the object etc. are the meanings of the declensional endings, while the number is the meaning of the conjugational endings. And the semantical convention is established in respect to the meanings of the inflectional affixes". *supām karmādayo pyarthāḥ samkhyā caiva tathā tiṇām prasiddho niyamaḥ tatra niyammaḥ prakṛteṣu vā*). According to him, despite such a rule enjoining the accusative case endings, only in the sense of the objectness etc. that are sanctioned by the grammatical convention, the accusatives can be accepted as referring to the contentness (*viśayatva*) etc. Such a rule need not be taken literally since the phrase 'niyamaḥ prakṛteṣu 'vā' (the semantical convention regarding the use of the inflectional endings is established in respect to contextual meaning) indicates that such a rule is binding only optionally. Also, according to him, in cases like 'it destroys the merit achieved previously' (*hanti puṇyam purāḥṛtam*), the accusative must be conceded to have an indication in the sense of the counterpositiveness that can relate to

the effect 'destruction' (*nāśa*) produced by the root-meaning 'action of destroying. And, in accordance with such a precedence, the indication in the *viśayatva* is quite justified in the case of '*ghaṭam jānāti*' etc. Further, he refutes the objection that acceptance of the indication in the *viśayatva* would lead to the difficulty of conceding the indication in any and every meaning such as 'sky'. He states that such an eventuality would never arise since only conventionally acceptable meanings such as '*viśayatva*' can have indication in them. For, the rule '*nirūdhāḥ lakṣaṇāḥ kācit prasiddhā adbhidhānavat kriyante sāmpratam kāścīt nevatvasakitaḥ*' stipulates the indication only in probable meanings and opposes the same in improbable meanings. Thus, according to Giridhara, accusative, in '*ghaṭam jānāti*' etc., refers to only the *viśayatva*.

Observation

It can be observed that Giridhara was convinced that only *viśayatva* should be accepted as the accusative meaning in '*ghaṭam jānāti*' etc. However, since '*viśayatva*' is not a conventionally established meaning of the accusative, he defends the indication of the accusative in such a sense by stating that '*niyamah prakṛteṣu vā*' expresses disregard for the rule that the indication should be accepted in only an established meaning. Thus, Giridhara, like Prācyaś, views that the pot becomes the object of knowing means it becomes the content of the knowledge and hence the accusative, which is ruled in the sense of the objectness, should be accepted to have an indication in the sense of the contentness (*viśayatva*).

Navya theory

Navyas hold that accusative case⁶ endings, in association with the roots denoting knowledge etc., refer to the state of having a reference to what is a content (*viśayatva*) and not to the contentness (*viśayatva*). They hold so because, according to them, the relation, which is not occurrence-exacting (*vyṭyanīyāmaka*), is not the delimiting relation of the counter-positiveness conditioned by the absence (*abhāvapratīyogitānavacchedaka*); and therefore, the absence of the contentness cannot be related to

the action of knowing in a negative statement such as 'he knows a pot and not a cloth' (*ghaṭam jñāti paṭam na*). The contentness is related to the action of knowing through the relation of conditioning in the positive statement 'he knows the pot' (*ghaṭam jñāti*) and therefore, the absence of the same will have to be related to the action of knowing through the same relation of conditioning in the negative statement as well. However, due to the fact that the relation of conditioning is not an occurrence exacting relation, the absence of the contentness cannot be related through such a relation.

Navyas, therefore, ascertain that the state of having a reference to what is a content (i.e. object of knowledge) (*viśayitva*) is the accusative-meaning in such cases. Such a meaning is related to the action of knowing through the substratumness (*āśrayatā*), which is an occurrence exacting relation, in the positive statement. Consequently, the absence of the same '*viśayitva*' can be related to the action of knowing through the same substratumness. Thus, the cognition from the positive statement is that 'he is the possessor of the action of knowing which is the substratum of the state of having a reference to what is a content conditioned by the pot' (*ghaṭanirūpita viśayitvāśraya jñānavān*); and the cognition from the negative statement is that 'he is the possessor of the action of knowing which is the substratum of the absence of the state of having a reference to what is a content conditioned by the pot' (*ghaṭanirūpitaviśayitvābhāvāśraya jñānavān*).

Accusative meaning in other instances

The accusative case endings, in association with the roots such as '*drś*', which denote the sense perception through eye contact, refer to the state of having a reference to what is the content, i.e. object of sense perception (*laukikaviśayitva*). This must be held so because, the statement such as 'he perceives the smell' (*saurabham paśyati*) is not made at the time of quasi- or semi-visual sense perception such as 'this is a fragrant sandal wood' (*surabhi candanam*) wherein the knowledge of the sandal wood is obtained from the sense perception through eye-contact and the knowledge of the smell is obtained from the recollection of the earlier knowledge. Thus, one cognizes that 'he is

the possessor of sense perception through eye contact which is the substratum of the state of having a reference to what is a content, i.e. object of sense perception conditioned by the pot (*ghaṭa nirūpita laukika viśayitvāśraya cākṣuṣa pratyakṣāśrayaḥ*) in 'he perceives a pot' (*ghaṭam paśyati*).

However, the accusative case endings, in association with the root 'ghrā' (to smell), cannot be held to refer to the state of having a reference to what is a content, i.e. object of sense perception (*laukikaviśayitva*). Since only the fragrance, *gandha*, is the content, i.e. the object of smelling, the action of smelling cannot be said to have a reference to what is a content, i.e. object of smelling conditioned by the flower (despite the same (flower) possessing the 'gandha'). Therefore, the accusative case endings in cases like 'he smells flower' (*puṣpam jighrati*), must be held to refer to a qualierness (*prakārata*) conditioned by the contentness. And such a contentness is delimited by the relation of superstratumness which in turn is delimited by inherence. And such an accusative-meaning is related to the state of having a reference to the contentness of the smell, a part of the root meaning, through the relation of conditioning. Thus, one cognizes from the statement 'he smells flowers' (*puṣpam jighrati*) that 'he is the possessor of the sense perception that has a reference to the contentness of the smell which (i.e. the reference) is conditioned by such a contentness of the flower'. (*puṣpanirūpita samavāya sambandhāvacchinna ādheyatva samsargāvacchinna viśayatānirūpita prakārata nirūpitā ghandha-nirūpita laukika viśayitva śālīpratyakṣāśrayaḥ*).

Here the contentness, which conditions the qualierness, is stipulated to be conditioned by the superstratumness delimited by inherence. Otherwise, the same, conditioned by the superstratumness occurring in the present time, also can be claimed to be relating to the root-meaning ; and therefore, when one perceives that the 'gandha occurs in the flower of present time' (*idānintana-puṣpe gandhaḥ*), the statement 'he smells the time' could be imposed.

In metaphorical statements such as 'he smells the fragrance' (*āmodam upajighrati*), however, the accusative case endings refer to the state of having a reference to what is a content (*viśayitva*). For, the accusative case endings, associated with the

roots referring to the knowledge not delimited by any particular object (like flower), can refer to simply 'viṣayitva'. And the root itself refers to the sense perception not limited by any particular object. Thus, one cognizes from *āmodam upajighrati* that he is the possessor of the sense perception which has a reference to the contentness conditioned by the fragrance.

It should be noted that statements such as 'the king did not get satisfaction having smelled secretly at the face fragrant like earth' (*tadānanam mṛtsurabhi kṣitiśvaro rahaḥ samāghrāya na tṛptim āyayau*) are made only during an illusion that the fragrance occurs in the face. And therefore, the verbal cognition of the accusative meaning, namely, the qualifierness conditioned by the contentness of the face, is tenable.

As an alternative, it can be suggested that the root 'ghrā' (to smell) refers to the fragrance, (*gandha*), the state of having a reference to what is a content (*viṣayitva*) and sense perception (*pratyakṣa*) separately. Consequently, the contentness of the fragrance (*gandhaviṣayitva*) can be cognized to be the qualifier of the sense perception in the active construction, whereas the same can be cognized to be the qualificand of the sense perception in the passive construction. Thus, the flower is the object of smelling means the flower has the qualifierness conditioned by the state of having a reference to what is a content (i.e. object) of sense perception. This alternative suggestion allows the relation of the accusative-meaning to the root-meaning since the *viṣayitva* is an independent meaning of the root 'ghrā' and hence does not violate the epistemological convention that meaning of a word relates to the meaning of another word and to the part of another word.

It should be noted that statements such as 'Caitra does not perceive the sky' (*caitra ākāśam na paśyati*), 'pot does not perceive the sky' (*ghaṭa ākāśam na paśyati*) etc. are never made in the language owing to the invalidity of such statements. Therefore, it does not matter that the accusative case endings in such cases cannot be explained to be referring to the state of having a reference to what is a content (*viṣayitva*). Actually, it is quite impossible that *viṣayitva* can be explained to be the accusative meaning in such cases. For, the same (state of having a reference to what is a content (*viṣayitva*) cannot be

established to have been conditioned by the sky. Also, even if one accepts that the non-occurrence-exacting relation can be the delimiting relation of the counter-positiveness, conditioned by an absence, the absence of the sky cannot be stated to be related to the state of having a reference to what is a content through the relation of conditioning. For, in that case, the cognition from the negative statement 'he does not perceive the sky' (*ākāśam na paśyati*) could be insisted at the time of the cognition from the positive statement such as 'he perceives the sky' (*ākāśam paśyati*). This is so because, the negative particle 'na', in the negative statement, can produce the cognition of the relation of the absence of the sky to only some particular instances of 'viśayitva' since the cognition from 'Maitra does not perceive the sky' (*maitra ākāśam na paśyati*) is possible during the illusory knowledge that 'Caitra perceives the sky' (*caitra ākāśam paśyati*). Thus, the cognition, wherein the absence of the sky is related to the *viśayitva* cannot be prevented from the cognition where in the sky conditions, i.e. is related to the *viśayitva*.

Observation

It can be observed now that Navyas are guided by the epistemological convention that the relation which is not occurrence exacting is not the delimiting relation of the counter-positives conditioned by an absence. And therefore, they strictly oppose the Prācya theory that accusative case endings associated with *jñā* etc. refer to the contentness (*viśayatva*). According to them, in negative statements, the absence of such a contentness cannot be related to the root-meaning 'knowing' through conditioning which is a non-occurrence exacting relation.

They hold also that the accusative case endings, in association with the roots denoting the sense perception through eye contact, refer to the state of having a reference to what is a content, i.e. object of sense perception (*laukikaviśayitva*). Nevertheless, Navyas concede that the accusative case endings, in association with the roots 'ghrā' (to smell) etc., refer to a peculiar qualifierness (*prakāratā*) conditioned by the contentness. They were forced to concede such a theory since otherwise the

accusative meaning, namely, the state of having a reference to what is a content, i.e. object of sense perception (*laukika viṣayitva*), cannot be related to the root meaning, namely, the sense perception, through smelling as the flower cannot be smelled (only the fragrance in it is to be smelled).

However, Navyas insist that in other cases only the *viṣayitva* is the accusative meaning. And they defend such a theory on the ground that statements like *ākāśam na paśyati* etc. are not made owing to invalidity and hence need not be explained.

Gokulanātha's theory

Gokulanātha⁷ proposes that the accusative case endings can be accepted to refer to the superstratumness (*ādheyatā*) in association with '*jñā*' (to know) etc. as well. According to him, there is no difficulty in accepting the superstratumness, which is generally accepted to be the accusative meaning, to be the accusative meaning in the case of '*ghaṭam jānāti*' etc. as well. The superstratumness, relating to the effect, has generally been considered, by the Navyas, to be the accusative meaning, and hence there is no difficulty in relating the same superstratumness to the effect, namely, the contentness. The difficulty, however, that the contentness is not produced by the action of knowing and hence cannot be the effect can be solved by accepting that the same (contentness) is a secondary type of effect on account of its qualifying the root-meanings 'knowing'.

According to Gokulanātha, the accusative case endings could be understood to have only an indication in the sense of the superstratumness since the denotation is accepted to be only in the superstratumness as qualified by the difference (*bheda*). Since the difference, as an accusative meaning, has no function to perform in the case of '*ghaṭam jānāti*' etc. (it avoids the incorrect statement⁸ '*svam gacchati*' etc.), the same need not be an accusative meaning here.

However, as an alternative, Gokulanātha holds that the accusative endings can be regarded to have a denotation in

7. Padavākhyaratnākra P. 566-572.

8. See Chapter on avoidance of the incorrect statement '*svam gacchati*'.

the sense of the superstratumness. He holds so because, the principle of 'whatever meaning is not obtained through other source is the word-meaning' (*ananya labhyaḥ śabdārthaḥ*) can be considered to establish only the superstratumness, that has not been obtained through other source, as the accusative-meaning.

Observation

It can be observed now that Gokulanātha prefers to generalise the accusative-meaning as the superstratumness. He does not favour the view that a separate meaning, in the form of either *viśayatva* or *viśayitva*, be assumed for the accusative in association with the roots referring to knowledge etc. According to him, a uniform and common accusative-meaning in the form of the superstratumness is preferable as the same involves economy in the assumption and also has grammatical sanction.

It is, however, not that he does not recognize or appreciate the difference between the statements such as '*grāmam gacchati*' and '*ghaṭam jānāti*' etc. He is aware of the difficulty that no effect that is produced from the root-meaning, action of knowing, can be cited in the case of '*jñā*' etc, and hence the superstratumness cannot be related to the conventional type of effect. Nevertheless, he proposes that the '*viśayatva*' (contentness) can be conceded to be a secondary type of effect to which the superstratumness can be related.

As regards the reference to the superstratumness, Gokulanātha holds that the same is either an indicated or a denoted meaning of the accusative. Hence, according to him, no difficulty of any sort can be envisaged in its reference by the accusative.

Grammarians theory

Grammarians⁹ hold that the objectness must be defined only as the being the abode of the effect occurring in the locus other than that of the action which directly or indirectly produces it (effect). And the pot etc. in '*ghaṭam jānāti*' etc. are the objects by being the abode of the destruction of the covering (*āvaraṇa*) such as ignorance, the effect. Consequently,

they explain that the root 'jñā' (to know) etc. refer to an action of knowing conducive to the destruction of the covering, the effect ; and the accusative refers to the abode (*āśraya*) of such an effect in the statement '*ghaṭam jānāti*' etc.

It should be noted here that the covering (*āvaraṇa*), which can be described to be the ignorance (*ajñāna*), is the illusion (*māyā*) (the opposite of cognition) and hence the destruction of such an ignorance is possible. Also, it should be noted that even the past and the future pots etc., like the present pots etc., are the abode of the destruction of the covering, i.e. ignorance. The past and the future pots etc. become the abode of such a destruction due to the fact that the present knowledge can destroy the covering, i.e. ignorance regarding the past and future pots as well. That is why even the logicians accept that the past and the future pots etc., like the present pots etc., are the abode of the knowledge by the relation of the contentness, i.e. by being the content of the present knowledge. Also Sāṅkhyas, who hold that the origination (*utpatti*) means the manifestation (*abhivyakti*) of the existence (*sattā*) present in its cause subtly, consider that the destruction means the presence of *sattā* in subtle form in its cause after the disappearance. Thus, the statement such as 'I know the past pot' (*atitam ghaṭam jānāmi*) can be explained as tenable since the past pot too is the abode of the destruction, the effect.

Now as regards the accusative meaning in association with roots '*iṣ*' (to desire or endeavour) and '*kr*' (to do). Grammarians¹⁰ hold that the root '*iṣ*' (to desire) in '*ghaṭam icchati*' etc. refers to the state of being the object (*uddeśyatā*) and the desire (*kāma*). And the accusative, in association with such a root, refers to the abode. And such an abode relates to the state of being the object, the effect, through the relation of superstratumness. Thus, one cognizes, in such cases, that the desire conditions the state of being the object occurring in the abode identical with pot (*ghaṭābhinnāśrayavṛtyuddeśyatā nirūpakakāmah*). Also, grammarians hold that the root *kr* (to do) in '*ghaṭam karoti*' etc. refers to the accomplishment' (*sādhya*) characterized as origination) and also to the activity. And the

accusative refers to the abode only. Such an accusative meaning relates to the accomplishment, the effect, through the relation of superstratumness. Thus, one cognizes that the activity is conducive to the accomplishment which occurs in the abode identical with pot (*ghaṭābhinnāśrayavṛtti utpatyanūkulo vyāpārah* from '*ghaṭam karoti*').

Observation

The grammarians do not distinguish between the regular transitive roots such as '*pac*' (to cook), '*gam*' (to go) etc. and also the transitive roots referring to an object or content such as '*jñā*' (to know) etc. According to them, both types of roots refer to an action (activity) and also to an effect. The effect is either produced (like softness or accomplishment) or not produced (like the state of being the object). However, in both cases, they perceive, that the effect occurs in the object and hence the object becomes the abode of the effect and thus, accusative can be held to refer to only an abode of such an effect and hence no need to assume any indication in a new sense which is different from the abode.

It should be noted that logicians seriously object to the grammarians theory that accusative refers to the abode or substratum on the ground that such a theory leads to the difficulty of non-comprehension of accusative-meaning since every entity in the world is only the abode of one or other effect. However, grammarians justify their theory on the ground that accusative is enjoined in the sense of the object and since, excepting the abode of the effect, other aspects of the object are already referred to by other grammatical elements, only the abode is the accusative meaning.

Ritualists theory

Khaṇḍadeva holds that a unique contentness or objectness '*viśayatāviśeṣa*' (known as awareness or *jñātātā*) is produced by the action of knowing upon the knowledge such as 'the pot is known' (*ghaṭo jñātaḥ*). Consequently, the pot etc. become the abode of such a unique contentness. Thus, the pot etc., in '*ghaṭam jñāti*' (he knows the pot) etc., could be considered to be the primary object since the same have an effect of awareness

produced by the action of knowing like any other objects.

Also, Khaṇḍadeva holds that the root 'jñā' (to know) etc. refer to the knowledge, delimited by the effect of awareness (*prākāṭyāvacchinna jñāna*). And such an awareness is nothing but the unique contentness (*viśayatva*). In this theory, the accusative case endings refer to the contentness or objectness, a unique indivisible property analysable into the being the abode of such an awareness. Thus, one cognizes in such instances that the person has the knowledge that produces the contentness, i.e. the awareness occurring in the pot.

It may be noted that the theory that the accusative case endings have an indication in the sense of the *viśayatva* is however, objected on the following ground. The semantical conventions that the meanings of the inflectional endings are established and also that the use of the inflectional endings is established with respect to the contextual meanings (*prasidaho niyamaḥ tatra niyamaḥ prakṛteṣu vā*) are intended to mean respectively that 'only the accusative is used in the sense of the object' (*karmaṇi dvitīyaiva*) and that 'the accusative is used in the sense of the object only' (*karmaṇyeva dvitīyā*). And such conventions demand that the accusatives be used in the sense of the object only; and hence the assumption that the accusatives have an indication in the sense of '*viśayatva*' becomes contradictory to the established conventions.

However, Khaṇḍadeva refutes such an objection. According to him, the statement establishing the semantical convention, that 'only the accusative is used in the sense of the object' (*karmaṇi dvitīyaiva*), simply stipulates that only the accusative, and not the instrumental etc., denotes the object; and therefore, the same cannot be held to rule against the accusative having an indication in the sense of the '*viśayatva*'. Also, according to him, the statement establishing the semantical convention that 'the accusative is used in the sense of the object only' (*karmaṇyeva dvitīyā*) simply stipulates that the accusative denotes only the objectness among the several *kāraka* notions; and therefore, the same cannot be held to rule against the accusative having an indication in the sense of the '*viśayatva*'. Thus, there is no difficulty in accepting an indication for the accusative in the sense of the *viśayatva*.

Observation

Logicians, especially Jagadīśa etc., do not approve of the theory that the pot etc. in '*ghaṭam jānāti*' etc., can be considered to be the primary objects. They oppose the argument that a unique contentness known as awareness '*jñātata*', which is quite distinct from the being the content of the knowledge, can be produced from the root-meaning 'knowing'. According to them, the contentness, known as awareness '*jñātata*' and distinct from the being the content of the knowledge, cannot be established. And suppose, such a contentness is approved, then, on the analogy, an accomplishedness known as '*kṛtata*' which is quite distinct from the being accomplished of an activity, would also become necessary in the case of the statement such as '*ghaṭam karoti*' (he makes a pot). Consequently, it is necessary to accept that the contentness, which is same as the being the content or object of knowledge and which is not produced, is the accusative meaning. And thus, the pots etc. are only secondary objects due to their being the abode of such contentness.

It should be observed here that the question is whether or not an awareness is produced when an object like pot is being known. Suppose an awareness is produced, then the ritualists' argument that the contentness, which is known as the awareness '*jñātata*' and is distinct from the being mere content, is certainly admissible. However, suppose an awareness is not produced, then the ritualists' theory can be ignored and the logicians' theory that "the objects such as pots, when being known, become merely the contents of the knowledge and that no *jñātata* which is distinct from the being content, is produced" can be held as tenable.

Thus, while the logicians' theory is based on the fact that knowing etc. are not regular transitive actions since the same do not produce a visible effect such as becoming soft or contact, the ritualists' theory is based on the fact that even knowing etc. are regular transitive actions since the same too produce an effect such as awareness, i.e. *jñātata* and hence by being the abode of such an effect the pots are primary objects. Thus, both theories are right in their own way and are a matter of different convictions.

Critical Examination

Accusative case endings are found occurring after the objects in association with the roots such as '*jñā*' (to know), '*iṣ*' (to desire or endeavour), and '*kr*' (to do or make) etc. all of which refer to an object (*saviṣayārthaka*) like pot. However, such accusative endings, unlike accusative endings found in association with the roots '*gam*' (to go) etc., cannot be held to refer to the abode of the effect produced by the root-meaning, i.e. 'knowing' etc. This is so because, the roots '*jñā*' (to know) etc. are not transitive in the conventional sense as they do not necessarily refer to the actions that produce an effect like contact. On the other hand, they refer to the actions like 'knowing' (*jñāna*), desiring (*icchā*) and effort (*kṛti*) etc., which have a mere reference to some objects like pot. And grammatical objects, in such cases, are those which become merely the content of such actions like the 'knowledge', or 'desire' or 'effort'.

Under such a circumstance four different alternatives are open to epistemologists : (i) accusative case endings, occurring after such objects, refer to only the being (i.e. becoming) content of such root-meaning 'knowing' etc., (ii) accusative case endings refer to the superstratumness which can be related to the content, a secondary type of effect, (iii) accusative case endings refer to the abode of an effect such as the destruction of the covering or (iv) accusative case endings refer to the contentness which is of the form of *jñātātā* or awareness that is produced.

Prācyas have followed the theory that when the roots refer to the action of knowing etc. and the objects become the contents of such a knowledge, the accusatives, in such cases, could be held to refer to only the contentness '*viśayatva*' which is nothing but the being the content or object of such a knowledge etc. According to them, since the roots such as '*jñā*' have merely a reference to the objects, no effect, which can be described as being produced from the root-meaning, can be envisaged ; and hence the accusatives cannot be held to refer to an effect that is produced.

Also according to Prācyas, accusatives, in association with the roots such as '*iṣ*', referring to a desire or endeavour and '*kr*', referring to a doing or making, refer to the chief qualificand

ness or principal nucleusness (*mukhyaviśeṣyatā*) and to a particular kind of objectness (*viśayatā viśeṣa*) analysable into the state being the material cause etc. respectively. This theory is in keeping with their contention that the accusatives, in association with the roots referring to knowledge, (*jñāna*), desire (*icchā*) and operation effort (*kṛti*), refer to the contentness (*viśayatva*) etc. that are not produced from the action of knowing etc.

Giridhara proposes no new theory as such. He merely supports the Prācyā theory that the accusative refers to 'viśayatva' by defending the assumption of indication in the sense of *viśayatva*. According to him, the accusatives, despite being ruled in the sense of the grammatical object, can be accepted to have an indication in the sense of the *viśayatva*. Also, he refutes the argument that such an assumption is contradictory to the established semantical convention regarding the meanings of the inflectional affixes (*prasiddho niyamaḥ tatra*). According to him such a semantical convention is not to be taken seriously since the later half of the convention offers another alternative, i.e. 'semantical relation is established with respect to the use of inflectional affixes in the contextual meanings' (*niyamaḥ prakṛteṣuvā*) and thus does not impose the accusatives in the object alone.

Navyas too follow the same epistemological convention that the Prācyas have followed to analyse the accusative meaning. They too accept that the accusatives can refer to 'viśayatva' in association with roots referring to an object. Nevertheless, since a non occurrence-exacting relation like conditioning cannot be the delimiting relation of the counter-positive of an absence, and therefore, the absence of *viśayatva* cannot be related through conditioning in negative statements, they propose that 'viśayatva' or the state of having a reference to what is a content should be the accusative-meaning. And such a meaning is related to the root-meaning 'knowing' etc., through the substratumness (*āśrayatā*) which is an occurrence-exacting relation.

Gokulanatha, however, proposes that the superstratumness (*ādheyatā*), which is accepted to be the meaning of the accusa-

tive in general in statements like 'grāmam gacchati', should be the accusative meaning in 'ghaṭam jānāti' etc., as well. This proposal has been based on the principle that a uniform and a common accusative meaning be found which is applicable to cognitions of all instances of accusative statements. Nevertheless, he is faced with the difficulty that in cases of root-meanings, having a reference to an object, no effect, that is produced, can be cited and hence the *viśayatva* should be considered to be a secondary type of effect to which the superstratumness can be related.

It can be stated, as regards the theory proposed by the grammarians, that they visualize an effect such as destruction of the covering (ignorance) (*āvaraṇa bhaṅga*) as produced from the action of knowing etc. in the case of the roots such as 'jānāti' etc. Accordingly, they have held that the abode of such an effect can be accepted to be the accusative meaning. This is in direct contrast to the logicians theory that no effect, that can be considered to be 'produced', can be cited in the case of 'jānāti' etc. and hence only a *viśayatva* or *viśayitva* should be regarded as the accusative meaning by implication. That is to say that while the logicians do not perceive any distinguishable effect as produced in such cases, the grammarians perceive the *āvaraṇabhaṅga* as the effect produced so that the root *jñā* etc. could also be considered to refer to an action that produces an effect. Thus, for grammarians, the roots 'jñā' etc. are transitive in the conventional sense of referring to an action producing the effect and the accusatives in such cases can refer to the abode (*āśraya*) of the effect.

Now, with respect to the root 'iṣ' (to desire) and 'kr' (to do) etc. Here, too, grammarians hold that the roots refer to the action of desire (*kāma*) producing the objectness (*uddeśyatā*) and the action of doing *kṛti* producing the accomplishment (*sādhayatva*) etc. and hence the accusatives can refer to the abode of such effects only.

While grammarians have held that the action of knowing produces a negative effect, i.e. destruction of covering, ritualists have held that the same produces a positive effect such as a unique contentness or objectness (*viśayatāviśeṣa*) known as awareness *jñātatā*. And, consequently, according to ritualists,

the accusative case endings, in such cases, can be held to refer to the objectness, as an indivisible property, analysable into the being the abode of such a contentness.

Conclusion

Thus it can be concluded now that whereas logicians do not perceive any actual effect such as contact as produced by the root-meaning 'knowing' etc., i.e. do not regard the roots referring to '*jñāna*', '*icchā*' and '*kṛti*' to be transitive and hence view only a secondary sense such as *viṣayatā* or *viṣayitva* to be the accusative meaning in association with such roots, the grammarians and also the ritualists perceive *āvaraṇabhāṅga*, a negative effect, and *jñātātā* a positive effect etc., as produced from the root-meaning 'knowing' etc. and hence view the abode (*āśraya*) and the primary objectness respectively to be the accusative meaning.

CHAPTER XVIII

DESIGNATION OF 'OBJECT' FOR THE SECONDARY
OBJECTS IN CONNECTION WITH 'DVIKARMAKA'
ROOTS AND FOR 'TIME', 'ACTION' AND 'DIS-
TANCE' IN CONNECTION WITH 'AKARMAKA'
ROOTS AND THE JUSTIFICATION OF
THE RULE p. 1.4.51
(*akathitakarmatvavicārah*)

Introduction

In Sanskrit, verbal forms of the roots such as 'duh' (to milk) 'prech' (to ask) etc. take two objects. Consider for instance, 'gām dogdhi payah' (he milks the cow the milk) and 'māṇavakam panthānam prechati' (he asks the boy the way). In the first instance, 'payah' (milk) is the primary object since the agent desires to obtain the same through his action of milking ; whereas the 'go' (cow) is the secondary object since the agent does not desire to obtain the same cow through his action. Also, in the second instance, the 'patha' (way) is the primary object since the agent desires to obtain the same through his action of asking; whereas the 'māṇavaka' (boy) is the secondary object since the agent does not desire to obtain the same boy through his action.

Also, intransitive verbal forms of the roots such as 'ās', (to stay), 'svap' (to sleep) etc. take objects. Consider, for instance, 'māsam āste' (he stays for a month), 'krośam svapiti' (he sleeps all through krośa). Here, in the first instance, the month is the (secondary) object of staying since the agent does not desire to obtain the month in any way through his action of staying ; whereas, in the second instance, the *krośa* is the

(secondary) object since the agent does not desire to obtain the *krośa* in any way through his action of sleeping.

In the above cases, the secondary objects such as 'go' (cow) and *māṇavaka* (boy) in connection with double accusative verbal roots, and also the secondary objects such as *māsa* (month) and 'krośa' in connection with intransitive roots are found to take accusative case endings.

Now, in order to facilitate the accusative case endings after the secondary objects, the same must be assigned the designation 'object' (*karma*).

Nevertheless, such objects cannot be assigned the designation 'object' (*karma*) through either the rule '*kartur īpsitatamam karma*' (p. 1.4.49) (object is that which the agent seeks (i.e. desires) most to obtain through his action) or the rule '*tathāyuktam cānipsittam*' (p. 1.4.50) (object is also that which is likewise connected with the action even if not sought to be obtained by the agent through his action). This is so because, the rule p. 1.4.49 can assign the designation 'object' to only those *kāraṅkas* which are positively desired (i.e. sought to be obtained) by the agent through his action. For instance, the rule p. 1.4.49 assigns the designation 'object' to 'odana' (rice) in '*odanam pacati*' (he cooks rice). The rice, in such cases, is what the agent (Citra) desires, i.e. seeks most to obtain through his action of cooking ; whereas the cow, the boy, etc. in the double accusatives, and the time, action and the distance in intransitives, are not what the agent (s) desire(s), i.e. seek (s) to obtain through the actions of milking etc. Thus, the same (cow etc.) cannot be assigned the designation 'object' by the rule p. 1.4.49.

The rule p. 1.4.50.¹ can assign the name 'object' to only those *kāraṅkas* which are not positively desired, i.e. not sought to be obtained by the agent through his actions, but, nonetheless are likewise connected with the actions, i.e. are obtained through his actions. For instance, the rule p. 1.4.50 assigns the designation 'object' to the 'viṣa' (poison), '*vṛksamūla*' (roots of a tree) in '*viṣam bhakṣayati*' (he eats poison) and '*grāmam gacchan vṛksamūlany upasarpati*' (while going to the village he reaches

1. See Chapter VIII for further explanation.

the roots of a tree). Here, the position and also the roots of a tree are not positively desired, i.e. are not sought to be obtained through the actions of 'eating', reaching etc., but nonetheless are likewise obtained through such actions; whereas the cow, the time etc. are not the *kāraḥ* which are obtained through the actions of milking, staying etc. even if not desired (*anīpsita*). Thus, the same (cow etc.) cannot be assigned the designation 'object' by the rule p. i.4.50 as well.

Pāṇini, in view of this difficulty, has ruled '*akathitam ca*' (i.4.51) (objects are also those *kāraḥ* which are not covered by other designations) assigning the designation 'object' to those *kāraḥ* which are not covered by other *kāraḥ* designations such as *apādāna*. The 'cow', the 'boy' etc. in the statements '*gām dogdhi payah*', '*māṇavakam panthānam prcchati*' etc. can be assigned the designation 'object' because the same are not covered by any other *kāraḥ* designation such as *apādāna* (i.e. because they do not function as any other *kāraḥ*). Also, the 'time (month)', the 'distance' (*krośa*) in '*māsam āste*', '*krośam savpiti*' etc. too can be assigned the designation 'object' because the same too are not covered by any other *kāraḥ* designation such as *apādāna* (i.e. because they do not function as any other *kāraḥ*).

Problem

Nevertheless, Patañjali² proposes two distinct interpretations of the rule based on two different explanations of the term '*akathita*' as 'not covered' (*asankīrtita*) and also as 'not prominent' (*apradhāna*). Most of the traditional commentators have followed the interpretation of the rule based on the explanation of the term '*akathita*' as *asankīrtita*; although Bhartṛhari seems to follow somewhat the interpretation based on the explanation of the term as *apradhāna*. Also, Kaiyata has stated that the rule is meant to assign the designation 'object' to the secondary objects such as cow even when the same is not intended to release the milk. This statement has led the scholars to interpret the rule as assigning the designation 'object' to the cow etc. even when the same are not intended to be the abode of the

effect 'separation' etc. caused by the causative action of making the cow release the milk etc.

On the other hand, Gadādhara,³ by modifying Patañjali's statement '*apādānādiviśesakathābhiḥ akathitam*', 'holds that the rule is intended to assign the designation 'object' to the *kāraḥ* which are different from other *kāraḥ* such as *apādāna*, but, at the same time, are syntactico-semantically related to the root meaning. Again, Gokulanatha presents a peculiar interpretation of the rule that the same assigns the designation 'object' to 'milk' etc., by overruling the designation 'agent'. Thus, epistemologists have proposed divergent interpretations of the rule.

Also, Śloka-vārtika lists the double accusative roots taking two objects between which the secondary objects are the area or domain of the rule '*akathitam ca*'. Nevertheless, Patañjali does not recognise all the examples as genuine. However, Kaiyaṭa justifies the listing since otherwise the rule becomes general. Further, the extension of the application of the designation 'object' to 'time', 'action' and 'distance' in connection with intransitive roots is necessary since otherwise the accusative statements become untenable. In the following pages, we shall discuss these various views on the interpretations of the rule as well as the listing of the double accusative roots and the extension of the application of the designation 'object' to 'cow', 'time' etc.

Patañjalis position

Patañjali, while commenting⁴ on the rule, states, that the term '*akathitha*' means not covered (*asankīrtita*) by the special *kāraḥ* designations such as '*apādāna*' (*apādānādiviśesakathābhiḥ*). Thus, the rule assigns the designation 'object' to those items to which no special designation has been already assigned by the rules in the *kāraḥ* section. For instance, Paurava in '*pauravam gām bhikṣate*' (he begs Paurava for a cow) can be assigned the name 'object' since no special designation such as *apādāna* is assigned to him. (Paurava cannot

3. Vyutpattivāda, p. i.4.51.

4. Mahā Bhāṣya, p. i.4.51.

function as the *apādāna* because the same is not the fixed point from which some thing moves away).

Nevertheless, this interpretation faces the difficulty of not covering the 'go' (cow) in '*gām dogdhi payah*' (he milks the cow the milk). For, the cow in the statement does function as the fixed point from which milk is separated and hence becomes eligible for being covered by the designation of *apādāna* with respect to the milking. Since the cow is already covered by the special designation '*apādāna*', the name 'object' does not become applicable to the cow.

In view of this difficulty, Patañjali suggests on p. i.4.23 another interpretation of the term '*akathita*' as 'not prominent' or '*apradhāna*'. According to this, the word '*akathita*' can be taken to mean 'non-prominent' or '*apradhāna*'. Thus, the rule assigns the name 'object' to a *kāraka* which is less prominent compared to other *kāraḥ*. Now, since the cow is less prominent compared to the milk in the milking action, the same becomes the object *kāraka* by this rule.

Nevertheless, this interpretation too is not free from shortcomings. In statements such as 'he milks the milk (from) the cow in a vessel' (*kāmsa pātryām gām payo dogdhi*), the vessel can be said to play a less important role compared to the milk with respect to the milking and hence the same would become 'object' according to this interpretation.

Observation

Patañjali has proposed two separate interpretations of the rule based on two different explanations of the term '*akathita*' as '*asamkīrtita*' (not covered) and '*apradhāna*' (not prominent). The first interpretation, based on the explanation of the term '*akathita*' as '*asamkīrtita*', assigns the designation 'object' to those *ārakas* which are not already covered by the special designations such as *apādāna*. Nevertheless, Patañjali is not certain as to whether this interpretation can cover all instances of secondary objects. He is faced with the problem that 'go' (cow) in '*gām dogdhi payah*' is already covered by the special designation of *apādāna* and hence cannot get the designation 'object'. Thus, he has proposed the second interpretation based on the explanation of the term '*akathita*' as '*apradhāna*' (not pro-

minent). The second interpretation allows the designation 'object' to the secondary objects such as cow since the same is less prominent compared to the milk with respect to the milking action. However, this interpretation faces the difficulty of over-application. For, according to this interpretation, any *kāraka* such as *adhikaraṇa* (i.e. vessel), which is less prominent, can be assigned the name object since the same is less prominent. Thus, most of the later epistemologists, barring Bhartṛhari, vehemently oppose such a second interpretation.

Kaiyaṭas justification of the rule

According to Kaiyaṭa,⁵ the rule assigns the designation 'object' (*karman*) to those *kārakas* that are not covered by special designations such as '*apādāna*' and his position may be summed up as follows. The term '*akathita*' should be understood as not covered '*asamkīrtita*' by special designations such as '*apādāna*'. The basic condition for applying the designation 'object' '*kārman*' by p. i.4.51 is that the item concerned must be a *kāraka*; and therefore, it becomes obligatory that the item must have been already covered by the general designation of *kāraka*. Thus, the rule assigns the designation to those items that are already covered by the general designation '*kāraka*' but not covered by the special designations such as '*apādāna*', etc. Also, here the term '*akathita*' should be understood to have the derivational sense of '*asamkīrtita*' (not covered) and not the conventional sense of '*apradhāna*' (not prominent). For, otherwise, the twofold usages such as '*gobhyo dogdhi payah*' (he milks the milk from cows) and '*gām payo dogdhi*' (he milks the cow the milk) would become untenable. Such usages are, actually made on the basis of whether the speaker intends the cow to be fixed point, i.e. boundary from which the milk is separated or not. When the same cow is intended to be the boundary, the ablative usage '*gobhyo dogdhi payah*' is made and when the same is not intended to be so, the accusative usage '*gām dogdhi payah*' is made. Thus, suppose the term is taken to mean '*apradhāna*' (not prominent), then the ablative usage becomes untenable since the cow is not prominent, i.e. secondary com-

5. Pradīpa on p. i.4.51.

pared to the milk and hence is always 'akathita'. On the other hand, suppose the term 'akathita' is meant to be 'asamkirtita' (not covered), then the ablative usage becomes tenable when the speaker intends the cow to be the boundary since, in that case, the same cow is already covered by the special designation 'apādāna'. Thus, Kaiyaṭa establishes that the term 'akathita' means 'not covered', and also that the ablative as well as the accusative usages are made depending upon whether the speaker intends the cow to be the boundary or not.

Further, it should be noted that the rule is made to facilitate the assigning of the designation 'object' to cow etc. even when the cow is not intended to be releasing the milk, i.e. even when the cow is not intended to be the abode of the effect. Otherwise, the cow could be assigned the designation 'object' by the rules p. i.4.49. and p. i.4.50. since the same cow is the abode of the effect 'separation' produced by the (causative) action of making the cow releasing the milk.

Śabdaratnas clarification

Śabdaratna⁶ clarifies Kaiyaṭas position further as follows : The root 'duh' (to milk) may as well be accepted sometimes to denote merely the action of milking conducive to the separation occurring in the milk, i.e. it may not be accepted to refer to the causative action of making the cow releasing the milk whereby the effect 'separation' is produced as occurring in the cow. Under such a circumstance, the cow cannot be the object by being the abode of the effect, i.e. separation caused by the releasing of the milk. Thus, since the rule p. i.4.49. cannot assign the name 'object' to the cow, and the cow is not intended to be the apādāna, the rule p. i.4.51. becomes necessary to assign the designation 'object' to the cow in the double causative statement.

Observation

Kaiyaṭa has clarified that the rule assigns the designation 'object' to only the items that are covered by the general designation of 'kāraṇa'. That is to say that the being kāraṇa is a pre-

6. Śabdaratna, p. 845.

requisite to the application of the designation 'object'. Further, he points out that the term '*akathita*', in the rule, should be taken to mean only *asamkīṭita* (not covered) and not *apradhāna* (not prominent). He justifies his interpretation by stating that only such an interpretation allows the twofold usages such as '*gobhyo dogdhi payaḥ*' and '*gām dogdhi payaḥ*' etc. However, the most important suggestion that he makes is that the rule p. i.4.49. and i.4.50. cannot assign the designation 'object' to secondary objects in double accusatives etc. According to him, the rules p. i.4.49. etc. can assign the designation 'object' to only those *kāraḥ* that are the abode of the effect produced by the action; and since the secondary objects are not intended to be the abode, same need the rule p. i.4.51 to assign the designation. This point becomes clearer in Śabdaratna's explanation.

Bhaṭṭojis interpretation

Bhaṭṭojidīkṣita⁷, follows Kaiyata in his interpretation and states that the term '*akathita*' means 'not intended to be expressed' as any other '*kāraḥ*' (*avivakṣita*). According to him, the rule assigns the name 'object' to those *kāraḥ* which are not intended to be expressed as any other *kāraḥ* such as *apādāna*. Thus, since the 'go' (cow) in '*gām dogdhi payaḥ*' (he milks the milk (from) cow), is not intended to be any other *kāraḥ*, the same becomes object. The advantage of this theory is that no *kāraḥ* becomes the object when the same is intended to be any other *kāraḥ* such as *apādāna*. Thus, the ablative statement such as '*gobhyo dogdhi payaḥ*' (he milks the milk from the cow) is also facilitated when the cow is intended to be '*apādāna*'. Also, he states that the rule assigns the designation 'object' to *kāraḥ* such as '*apādāna*' when the same is not intended to be *apādāna*, but is intended to be only a *sambandha*. For, otherwise, such *kāraḥ* would have the designation '*sambandha*' and hence would get only the genitive case ending after the words denoting them. Thus, in order to avoid the genitive case endings after the secondary objects, the rule is justified.

Observation

Bhaṭṭoji, actually represents the view of Kaiyata that 'akathita' is meant to be 'avivaksita' (not intended to be expressed as any other *kāraka*). According to him, the rule means, that the *kāraka*, which the speaker does not intend to express in the role of *apādāna* etc., is called *karman*. Thus, when the speaker intends that the cow is the *apādāna*, the ablative expression 'gobhyo dogdhi payaḥ' is made, and when the speaker does not intend that the cow is *apādāna*, the accusative expression 'gām dogdhi payaḥ' is made.

Another point that Bhaṭṭoji makes is that the rule 'akathitam ca' is almost like a *śeṣa* device that covers all *kāraka* relations that have not been covered so far. Thus, when no special *kāraka* relation is to be expressed, the rule assigns the designation 'object' to those *kāra*kas; and consequently, the accusative case, occurring after such objects, could also be expressing only the *śeṣa* relation. This suggestion is not in conformity with the suggestion of earlier commentators and is opposed by *Śabdaratna*. Nevertheless, this suggestion rightly questions the validity of composing another *sūtra* apart from p. i.4.49-50 and tries to answer the same reducing the rule into a *śeṣa* device. The difficulty with this suggestion, however, is that suppose the rule is accepted to be, a *śeṣa* device, then only the genitive case could become applicable after such objects and not the accusative. Also, suppose such an accusative is held to denote the *sambandha* relation, then the question could arise as to why the accusative occurring after primary objects such as *payas* does not, likewise, denote the same relation.

Nagesha's two fold explanation of 'akathita'

Nāgesha⁸ too follows Patañjali's first alternative suggestion and interprets the word 'akathita' as 'asamkīrtita' or 'not covered' (by special designations such as *apādāna*). Nevertheless, he states that 'non-coverage' is two fold: (i) non-coverage due to non-desirability of any other special *kāraka* designation such as 'apādāna' or (ii) non-coverage due to non-applicability of any other such special designation. Thus, for instance,

consider 'gām dogdhi payaḥ' and 'pauravam gām yācate' once again. Here, the 'go' (cow) is a 'non-covered object' since the same is not intended or desired to be any other special *kāraka* such as *apādana*; whereas Paurava is a 'non-covered object' since any other *kāraka* designation such as *apādana* is not applicable.

It should be noted here that when the special designation such as *apādana* is not possible due to either non desirability of such a designation or due to non-applicability of such a designation and also when the objecthood is intended, the rule (p. i.4.51) assigns the designation 'object' to 'cow' etc. in the double accusatives. Nagesha clarifies this point further by stating that, in such cases, the roots 'duh' etc. can denote only the action of milking which produces the effect 'separation' occurring in the milk and the same does not denote the action of releasing which produces the effect 'separation' of milk occurring in the cow. Consequently, the cow cannot be the abode of the effect 'separation' and hence the rules p. i.4.49 and p. i.4.50 cannot assign the designation 'object' to the cow. Thus, since the objecthood is intended but cannot be obtained through the other rules, the rule 'akathitam ca' is needed to assign the designation 'object' to the cow etc.

Gadādhara's view

Gadādhara takes Patañjali's statement '*apādānādi viśesaka-thābhiḥ akathitam ca kārakam karmsamjñam syāt*' quite differently. According to him, such a statement means that the rule 'akathitam ca' assigns, the designation 'object' to the *kāraka* (secondary object), which is different from the category of *apādāna* etc. and also which is, at the same time, syntactico-semanticly related to the action expressed by the verb (*apādānatvādi bhinnam yad dhātu pratipādyānvayi karmāntaram tatkarma sanjñam syāt*). For instance, the rule assigns the designation 'object' to the 'go' (cow) in *gām dogdhi payaḥ* since the same cow is both different from the *kārakas* such as *apādana* (only the *kārakas* that are intended to be the fixed point from which the separation takes place is considered the *apādāna*) and is related to the separation produced by the releasing of the milk, in turn, produced by the milking action.

Gadādhara, further, states that the rule '*kartar īpsitamam karma*' (p. i.4.49) cannot assign the designation object to the secondary object '*go* (cow) in '*gām dogdhi payaḥ*' despite the same cow possessing the effect 'separation' caused by the releasing of milk. According to him, the rule (p. i.4.49) assigns the designation 'object' to only those *kāraḥ* (primary objects) which possess the effect which is a direct qualifier of the action denoted by the verbal root (*dhātuvṛttigraha viśesyāmśe sāksād viśesaṇiphūta*). And, since the cow, in the present context, possesses only the effect 'separation', which is an indirect qualifier of the action denoted by the verbal root, the rule (p. i.4.49) cannot assign the designation 'object'. Thus, the rule '*akathitam ca*' becomes justified by assigning the designation to the secondary objects.

Observation

It should be noted that Gadādhara interprets Patañjali's statement '*apādānādi viśesakathābhiḥ akathitam*' to mean that the rule '*akathitam ca*' assigns the designation 'object' to those *kāraḥ*, which are essentially different from the *apādāna* etc., but at the same time are syntactico-semantically related to the root meaning ; Gadādhara considers that even the secondary object such as '*go*' (cow) in '*gām dogdhi payaḥ*' is the possessor of the effect like the primary object such as the milk (*payah*). According to him, the difference between the primary object and also the secondary object is that while the former possesses the direct effects, the latter possesses the indirect effects. And the rule '*akathitam ca*' is necessary because the rule '*kartur īpsitamam karma*' (i.4.49) etc. can assign the designation 'object' to only those *kāraḥ* that possess, the direct effects.

Gokulanāthas position

Gokulanāth⁹ presents a peculiar interpretation of the rule p. i.4.51. According to him, the rule is meant to assign the designation 'object' to the objects such as 'milk' (*payas*), in '*gām dogdhi payaḥ gopālaḥ*' (the milkman milks the cow for milk). He argues that otherwise even the milk, in such cases,

would become the agent (*kartr*) since the designation 'agent' is applicable to any *kāra* that is the possessor of an action (*kriyā*). And the root '*duh*' (to milk) refers to the human operation (*purusavyāpāra*) flowing (*syandana*) and separation (*vibhāga*). In such a reference, both the human operation and flowing become '*kriyās*' because the separation qualifies the flowing and the same qualifies the human operation and whatever is qualified by an effect is a *kriyā* in the denotation of verbal roots. Now, since the milkman possesses the human operation and the milk possesses the 'flowing', both become liable to be applied the designation 'agent'. Thus, the rule '*akathitam ca*' is formed to overrule the designation 'agent' for the milk by virtue of its being occasionless elsewhere.

Observation

It can be observed now that Gokulanatha seems to have been influenced by the theory that the agents are those who possess an operation or action ; and therefore, even the secondary objects such as *payas* (milk) etc., in double accusatives, can be applied the designation 'agent' (*kartr*) since the same too are the possessors of the operation of flowing. Thus, according to Gokulanatha, in connection with the double accusative verbs such as '*duh*' etc., the rule '*akathitam ca*' is necessary to assign the designation 'object' to the secondary objects such as the milk, which, by virtue of their possessing the operation 'flowing' etc., are liable to be applied the designation 'agent',

Bhartr̥hari's theory

Bhartr̥hari¹⁰ occupies a unique position in the linguistic analysis of sentence meaning. He alone seems to have been influenced by Patañjli's alternative interpretation of the rule based on the explanation of the term '*akathita*' as '*apradhāna*' or 'not-prominent'. According to him, the rule '*akathitam ca*' assigns the designation 'object' to the *go* (cow) etc. in double accusative statements such as '*gām dogdhi payaḥ*' (he milks the

10. *sarvam vā akathitam karma bhinna kakṣyam pratiyate.*

Vākyapadīya, p. 286.

cow) which belong to quite a different category (*bhinnakakṣya*), i.e. 'not prominent' (*apradhāna*). He explains that the prominent object (*pradhānakarma*) is that for the accomplishment of which all the *kāraṇas* get ready, i.e. contribute and retire immediately after its accomplishment. For instance, the milk (*payas*) is the prominent object of milking since all the *kāraṇas* such as the agent 'Devadatta', the locus 'vessel' (*sthāli*) etc. get ready i.e. contribute so that same milk is accomplished and they retire as soon as the milk is produced. The 'not prominent object' (*apradhāna karma*), on the other hand, is that which is associated with the action as the means and is not intended to be accomplished. For instance, the 'cow' (*go*) is the not prominent object since the same is associated with the action of milking as the means and is not intended to be accomplished through such action. Now, since such an object as cow is not intended to be accomplished and also since the same is associated with the action of milking as the means, the same gets the designation 'object' by the rule '*akathitam ca*'.

Observation

Bhartṛhari is the only epistemologist who supports the second interpretation of the rule based on the explanation of the term '*akathita*' as '*apradhāna*'. According to him, the *apradhāna karma* or not prominent object belongs to a totally different category (*bhinnakakṣya*) because the same does not incorporate any of the essential characteristics of the *pradhāna karma* (prominent object). While the *pradhāna karma* has all the *kāraṇas* helping it for its accomplishment, the *apradhāna karma* functions itself as the means and helps the *pradhāna karma* come into being. Also while the *pradhāna karma* becomes the abode of the effect by becoming the object of accomplishment, the *apradhāna karma* never possesses any effect due to its status of 'not accomplished'. Thus, Bhartṛhari envisages that '*akathitam ca*' assigns the designation of object to a totally different type of *kāraṇa*.

List of dvikarmaka verbs wherein the secondary objects are assigned the designation 'object'

As regards the secondary objects in double accusatives

usages, i.e. the area or domain to be covered by the rule 'akathitam ca', Patañjali quotes a *Śloka-vārtika* which runs as follows : "In the case of the absence of previous prescription of a particular designation, those which function as the causes (*nimittabhūta*) in connection with verbal roots 'duh' (to milk), 'yāc' (to ask), 'rudh' (to lock up), 'pracch' (to inquire) 'bhiḥ' (to beg), 'cin' (to pick), and also those which are related to the subordinate objects (*guṇa*) of the verbal root 'brū' (to speak), and *sās* (to teach) are treated as the 'not covered' by the sage" (*duhiyāci rudhi pracchi bhiḥsi cinām upayoganimitam apūrvavidhau bruviśāsi guṇena ca yat sacate tadakīrtitam ācaritam kavīnā*). According to this *Vārtika*, the *kāraka* items which serve the purpose to have the milk etc., i.e. which function as the cause of the milk etc., assume the status of an object provided that there are no other previous prescription assigning any other designation such as 'apādāna' etc. For instance, the 'go' (cow) in 'gām dogdhi payah' (he milks the milk (from) cow) is the 'not covered object' since the same serves the purpose to have milk and is not prescribed any other *kāraka* designation such as 'apādāna'.

Also the *kāraka* items which assume the status of 'object' are : Paurava, in 'pauravam gām yācate' (he asks Paurava for a cow), *vraja* (cow-pen) in 'anvavaruṇadhi gām vrajam' (he shuts the cow in the cow-pen), *māṇavaka* (boy) in 'māṇavakam panthānam prcchati' (he asks the boy the way). Paurava in 'pauravam gām bhiḥsate' (he begs Paurava for a cow), *vrkṣa* (tree) in 'vrkṣam avacinoi phalāni' (he picks fruits from tree), and also *putra* (son) in 'putram brūte dharmam' (he tells his son *dharma*) and 'putram anuśāsti dharmam' (he teaches his son duty).

Nevertheless, Patañjali rejects most of the above examples as the area or domain to be covered by the rule p. i.4.51. According to him, in such cases, Paurava etc. have already been covered by the previous prescriptions assigning 'apādāna' etc. For instance, 'gau' (cow) in 'gām dogdhi payah' is not an item to be covered by the rule (p. i.4.51) since the name 'apādāna' becomes applicable to the cow due to its functioning as the fixed point from which the milk flows away. Thus, Patañjali states that only Paurava in 'pauravam gām yācate'

(he asks Paurava for a cow), *māṇavaka* (boy) in '*māṇavakam panthānam prcchati*', (he inquires boy about the way) and Paurava in '*pauravam gām bhikṣate*' (he begs Paurava for a cow) are the genuine examples since the same cannot be claimed to be *apādāna* etc. with respect to begging etc.

However, this view of Patñjali is not to be taken seriously because it contradicts the established convention of double accusative usages such as '*gām dogdhi payaḥ*' etc.

Further Patañjali quotes another *Ślokavārtika* with respect to double accusative verbal roots (*dvikarmaka dhātu*) outside the list of '*duh ...*' etc. According to the *Vārtika* quoted, besides '*duh*' etc., which take two objects, the verbal roots '*nī*' (to bring), '*vah*' (to carry), '*harati*' (to fetch) and also the verbs of motion such as '*gamayati*' (to make someone go) and '*yāpayati*' (to make someone go) should also be included in the list of double accusatives. For instance, consider '*ajām nayati grāmam*' (he brings the goat to the village), '*bhāram vahati grāmam*' (he carries the load to the village), '*bhāram harati grāmam*' (he takes the load to the village); '*gamayati devadattam grāmam*' (he makes Devadatta go to the village); '*yāpayati devadattam grāmam*' (he makes Devadatta go to the village). In the above instances, '*nī*' (to bring) etc. take two objects, namely, a goat (*ajā*) and also the village (*grāma*) etc.; wherein the former are assigned the designation 'object' by the rule '*akathitam ca*' due to their not being alcovered by previous prescriptions assigning the designation '*apadana*' etc.

Kaiyaṭas justification of the listing of double accusative verbs

Kaiyaṭa holds that the listing of the double accusative verbal roots such as '*duh*' (to milk)... etc. by *Ślokavārtika* is an absolute necessity. According to him, suppose the list is cancelled, then the rule '*akathitam ca*' becomes general in nature i.e. the same rule would assign the designation to all the 'not concerned' instances of *kāraṅgas* including even the roots of tree (*vrksamūlāni*) in '*grāmam gacchan vrksamūlāny upasar-pati*' (while going to the village he reaches the roots of a tree) as the same are not covered by the rule 'object is that which is desired most to be obtained' (p. i.4.49). Consequently, the rule '*tathayuktam cānipsitam*' (p. i.4.50) becomes redundant.

Nevertheless, such an eventuality is not desirable. For, when the list of 'duh' etc. is discarded, i.e. when the rule 'akathitam ca' (p.i.4.51) becomes general, the same would be liable to overapplication. For instance, the rule can be overapplied to 'naṭa' in 'naṭaṣya śruṇoti' (he listens to the dancer) since the same is not covered by any special *kāraka* designation such as *apādāna*. Thus, in order to avoid the over-application of the designation 'object' to 'naṭa' etc. and thereby avoid the incorrect usage 'naṭam śruṇoti', the list of double accusative verbs, wherein the secondary objects are the area or domain of the rule (p. i.4.51), must be persisted with.

Patañjali's theory of the designation 'object' to 'time', 'action' and 'distance'

Now, as regards the designation 'object' (*karma*) for the 'time' (*kāla*) 'action' (*bhāva*) and 'distance' (*adhvaganavya*) in connection with the intransitive verbs : According to Patañjali, the Śloka-vārtika, namely, "words, standing for '*kāla*' (a period of time), '*bhāva*' (action) and (*adhvaganavya*) (a distance to be travelled) receive the designation 'object' (*karman*) in connection with the intransitive verbs", assigns the designation 'object' to the words standing for 'time' etc. Thus, for instance '*māsa*' (month) in '*māsam āste*' (he stays for a month), '*godoha*' in '*godoham āste*' (he sits through milking of the cow), and '*krośa*' (a distance) in '*krośam svapiti*' (he sleeps for a *krośa*) receive the designation 'object' in connection with the intransitive verbs *ās* (to stay), '*svap*' (to sleep) etc. According to Patañjali, the *Vārtika* includes, further, even '*deśa*' (country) in the list of entities that receive the designation 'object' in this connection. Patañjali, justifying such an inclusion of *deśa*, provides the example of '*kurūn svapiti*' (he sleeps in the country of Kurus) wherein the word standing for the country of Kurus, namely '*kurūn*' receives the designation 'object' in connection with the intransitive root '*svap*' (to sleep).

It should be pointed out now as follows : 'Time', 'action', 'distance' and also 'region' cannot determine the transitivity of verbal roots. That is to say that in spite of the association of the time etc., the roots such as '*ās*' (to stay) etc. in '*māsam āste*' etc. are intransitive. This is so because, the 'time' etc., being

permanent in their association with the verbal action of staying etc., are quite ineffective as far as making the roots 'ās' (to stay) etc. transitive is concerned. On the other hand, it is the object of substance such as 'odana' (rice) etc., which are not permanent in their association with the action, that make the verbal roots transitive. Thus, it becomes clear that in spite of the association of the 'time' etc. with the verbal action, the roots do not become transitive.

In view of this fact, the time etc. cannot be considered as the natural objects of the action of staying etc. Consequently, Ślokavārtika makes a special provision for assigning the designation of 'object' to the 'time' etc. in association with the intransitive verbal roots such as 'ās' (to stay) etc.

Kaiyaṭas justification

Kaiyaṭa justifies the Ślokavārtika assigning the name 'object' to the words 'kāla', 'bhāva', 'adhvagantavya' etc. as follows : It is true that the rule 'kālādhvanor atyantamyoge' (accusative cases are used after the words standing for 'time' and 'distance' when the sense of intense contact is to be conveyed p. ii.5) can itself take care of the accusative statements such as 'masām āste', 'godoham āste' etc. Nevertheless, such a rule cannot account for the designation of 'object' for the 'time', 'action' and 'distance' etc in general. And unless the 'time' etc. receive the designation of 'object', the passive usages such as 'āsyate māsaḥ' (a month is stayed for) etc., wherein the word 'māsaḥ' etc., denoting the time etc., have the nominative case ending, cannot be tenable. The nominative case endings, can be used after the words 'māsa' etc. by the rule 'when already expressed otherwise' (anabhihite p. ii.3.1) provided that they are 'objects' and some other grammatical elements such as conjugational endings have expressed such a sense already. Thus, in order to justify the passive usages 'māsaḥ āsyate' etc., it is absolutely necessary that the Ślokavārtika does assign the name 'object' to the 'time' etc.

'Time' (kāla) etc. as the akathita 'objects'

Bhartṛhari points out that 'time' (kāla) etc. are dependent on the primary objects (i.e. *pradhānakarma*) for their

functioning as objects and hence belong to a different category of objects (*bhinnakaṣya*). He states that 'time' such as month in '*māsam odanam pacati*' (he cooks rice for a month) etc. are not the primary objects such as rice grains since the same depend upon the substance object (*dravyakarma*) i.e. primary object 'rice' for functioning as the objects. Thus, according to Bhartṛhari, such dependent objects as 'time' etc. are assigned the designation 'object' by the rule '*akathitam ca*' by Panini.

However, it should be pointed out here that Bhartṛhari takes the rule p. i.4.51 as assigning the designation 'object' to 'time' (*kāla*) etc. only in '*māsam odanam pacati*' etc., wherein a transitive verb such as '*pac*' (to cook) is used; whereas, according to the Ślokavārtika, the rule assigns the designation 'object' to the same in '*māsam āste*' (he stays for a month) etc. wherein an intransitive verb such as '*ās*' (to stay) is used. Another point to be noted here is that Bhartṛhari clearly distinguishes between the primary objects such as rice grains, which are substance objects (*dravyakarma*), and also the secondary objects such as time, which are not substance, i.e. temporal objects (*adravya karma*). Thus, according to Bhartṛhari, 'time' etc., in connection with intransitive roots, are taken care of as objects by the rule '*kālādhvanor*' itself.

Critical examination

Most of the commentators as well as the later epistemologists justify Panini's rule '*akathitam ca*' as assigning the designation of 'object' to the not covered secondary objects in connection with double accusative roots and to the 'time' etc. in connection with intransitive roots. Thus, according to the epistemologists, the rule assigns the designation 'object' to the not covered secondary objects such as 'cow' (*go*) in 'he milks the cow the milk' (*gām dogdhi payah*) etc. and to the 'time' such as 'month' (*māsa*) etc. in 'he stays for a month' (*māsam āste*) etc. Nevertheless, the epistemologists are divided over the interpretation of the rule. While Patañjali has suggested two distinct interpretations based on two separate explanations of the term '*akathita*' as '*asamkīṛita*' (not covered) and '*apradhāna*' (not prominent), scholars have mostly favoured the

interpretation based on the explanation of the term '*akathita*' as '*asamkirtita*' i.e. that the *kāraka*, which is not covered by the special designations such as *apādāna*, is the object. Thus, Kaiyaṭa holds that the rule assigns the designation 'object' to only those items that are covered by the general designation of *kāraka* but are not covered by the special designations such as *apādāna*. According to Kaiyaṭa, '*asamkirtita*' signifies the lack of speakers intention to cover the *kāraka* items by the special designations. Consequently, the interpretation allows both the ablative as well as the accusative statements ('*gobhyo dogdhi payaḥ*' and '*gām dogdhi payaḥ*') depending on whether the speaker intends the *kāraka* item to be the *apādāna* or not.

Now, the most important aspect of Kaiyaṭas justification of the rule is that earlier rules, namely, (p. i.4.49 and p. i.4.50) cannot assign the designation 'object' to the not covered secondary objects 'cow' etc. since the same assign the designation to only those that are the abode of the effect produced by the action.

Śabdaratna clarifies Kaiyaṭas' position as follows: The root '*duh*' (to milk) may as well be accepted to denote merely the action of milking which produces the separation in the milk. The same root, therefore, need not necessarily denote the causative action of making the cow release the milk. Under such a circumstance, the cow does not become the abode of the effect of separation (of milk). Thus, in order to facilitate the designation 'object' to a non-abode of the effect, the rule p. i.4.51 is necessary.

Bhaṭṭoji follows Kaiyaṭa in interpreting the term '*akathita*' as '*avivakṣita*' (not intended). He, thus, explains that the ablative statement '*gobhyo dogdhi payaḥ*' is made when some *kāraka* is intended to be a special *apādāna kāraka* and the accusative statement '*gām dogdhi payaḥ*' is made when some *kāraka* is not intended to be any other *kāraka* than the object. However, he further points out that since the rule assigns the designation 'object' to the *kāraka* when no other *kāraka* relationship is intended, the objectness assigned is like a *śeṣa sambandha* relation. This interpretation is against the established convention of traditional interpretation. Nevertheless, it points out an inherent difficulty in justifying the separate

rule '*akathitam ca*' as assigning the designation of object'.

Nagesha explains that 'non-coverage' (*asamkirtana*) can be due to : (i) either non-desirability (ii) or non-applicability. Thus, he explains that 'go' (cow) in "*gām dogdhi payaḥ*" is '*akathita*' object due to non-desirability of other designation and Paurava in '*pauravam gām yacate*' is '*akathita*' object due to non-applicability of other designation. This explanation clearly shows that '*akathita*' objects are basically of two types : (i) those that are objects since other designations are not desired and (ii) those that are objects since other designations are not applicable. Logicians especially Gadādhara etc. have taken Patañjali's statement '*apādānādi viśeṣakathābhiḥ akathitam*' to mean that the rule '*akathitam ca*' assigns the designation 'object' to those *kāraṅkas* that are essentially different from *apādāna* etc. but at the same time are related syntactico-semanticly with the root-meaning. Gadādhara has held such a view on the basis of the fact that the other rules, namely, p. i.4-49-50 can assign the designation 'object' to only those *kāraṅkas* that are the abode of the direct effect and not to the *kāraṅkas* that are the abode of the indirect effects such as the separation caused by the releasing of the milk which in turn is caused by the action of milking.

On the other hand, Gokulanatha has proposed a peculiar theory that the rule is intended to assign the designation by over-ruling the designation 'agent' to the milk. This theory is basically in conformity with the idea that the rule p. i.4.51 assigns the designation 'object' by overruling the other *kāraṅka* designations. Nevertheless, the peculiarity of the theory lies in the fact that he considers the milk (*payāḥ*) as the secondary object as opposed to the cow (*go*). He is probably influenced by Jagadśīas view that cow is the primary object due to its possession of the 'operation' directly caused by the milking, whereas the milk is the secondary object due to its possession of the 'separation' indirectly caused by such an action.

Bhartṛhari is the only epistemologist to have supported the alternative interpretation of the rule based on the explanation of the term '*akathita*' as '*apradhāna*' or not prominent. He envisages that while the rules (p. i.4.49-50) assign the designation 'object' to '*pradhāna karma*' (prominent objects),

the rule '*akathitam ca*' assigns the designation 'object' to secondary objects i.e. not prominent objects. According to him, such a position is necessitated by the fact that the earlier rules p. i.4.49-50 cannot assign the designation 'object' to 'not prominent objects' which do not incorporate any of the essential characteristics of the prominent objects, namely, possession of the effect produced by the action etc. While the prominent objects possess the effect due to their being accomplished through the action, the non-prominent objects merely function as the means of accomplishment of the prominent objects due to their being not accomplished.

Thus, both ways, whether '*akathita*' means '*asankṛtita*' or '*apradhāna*', the rule is established to assign the designation 'object' to secondary objects such as '*go*' (cow) in connection with '*dvikarmaka*' verbs such as '*duh*' (to milk) etc. However, the question arises as to which are the '*dvikarmaka*' verbs with which the secondary objects are assigned the designation 'object' by the rule. In answer to such a question, Ślokavārtika lists eight verbs such as '*duh*' (to milk), '*jac*' (to ask), '*rudh*' (to lock up), '*prach*' (to inquire), '*bhikṣ*' (to beg), '*cin*' (to pick), '*brū*' (to seek), and '*śās*' (to teach) as *dvikarmaka* verbs. However, Patañjali disagrees with the *Vārtika* and states that only *kāraṅkas* such as Paurava etc. in connection with the three roots '*yāc*' (to ask) '*prach*' (to inquire) and '*bhikṣ*' (to beg) are the real examples. According to him, in other cases, the *kāraṅkas* are already covered by other designations such as *apādāna* etc. and hence cannot be the examples. Patañjali strictly takes the term '*akathita*' as '*asankṛtita*' and hence discards the others as non-examples. Nevertheless, the term '*akathita*' seems to have been used in the sense of 'not intended' (*avivakṣita*) as later grammarians have pointed out. Otherwise, the double accusative constructions in connection with such roots as '*gām dogdhi payah*' would become untenable. This fact is reiterated by the justification of the listing by Kaiyaṣa as well. According to Kaiyaṣa, the listing is necessary because otherwise the rule becomes general and therefore, can assign the designation 'object' to even to the dancer (*naṭa*) in '*naṭasya śṛnoti*' etc.

Thus, by explaining the word '*akathita*' as '*avivakṣita*' (not intended), the *kāraṅkas* such as 'cow', which function as

the means (*nimittabhūta*), should be considered as the examples of the rule.

Now as regards the secondary objects such as 'time', 'action' and 'distance' in connection with intransitive verbs : *Ślokavārtika* again lists words standing for 'time', 'action' and 'distance' as the instance of secondary objects covered by the rule '*akathitam ca*'. And Patañjali provides '*māsa*' 'month' in '*māsam āste*', '*godoha*' 'milking' in '*godoham āste*', and '*krośa*' in '*krośam svapiti*' respectively as the examples. As Kaiyaṭa suggests, the assigning of the designation 'object' is necessary for 'time' etc. since otherwise the nominative case endings occurring after the *māsa* 'month' etc. in the passive usage '*āsyate māsaḥ*' etc. would become untenable. (Nominatives occur in passive after only objects). Thus, in spite of Bhartṛhari's position that the rule assigns the designation 'object' to 'time' etc., in '*māsam odanam pacati*' etc., the rule must be understood to assign the designation 'object' to 'time' etc. in intransitives so that the nominatives, occurring after the objects in passive construction, can be explained.

CHAPTER XIX

ASSUMPTION OF OBJECTHOOD BY PRIMITIVE AGENTS

(*anyantakartṛṇām karmatvam*)

Introduction

Sanskrit has two types of causative constructions : (i) Causative construction, wherein the word standing for the agent of the primitive action, which occurs in the nominative case endings(s) in the primitive construction, is found to occur in the accusative case endings ; (ii) causative construction, wherein the word standing for the agent of the primitive action, which occurs in the nominative in the primitive construction, is found to occur in the instrumental case endings. Consider, for instance, the following two sets of examples :

non-causative (primitive)	causative
(i) 'caitro grāmam gacchati' (Caitra goes to the village)	'gamayati caitram grāmam' (he makes Caitra go to the village)
(ii) 'devadattaḥ odanam pacati' (Devadatta cooks rice)	'devadattena pācayati odanam' (he makes Devadatta cook rice)

In the first instance, 'caitro grāmam gacchati' is the primitive or non-causative construction ; whereas 'gamayati caitram

grāmam’ is the corresponding causative construction. Here, ‘*Caitra*’ is the agent of the primitive action of going and the word ‘*caitra*’ expressing the same occurs in the nominative case ending (*s*) in the primitive construction, whereas the same word ‘*caitra*’ occurs in the accusative (*am*) in the corresponding causative construction. The occurrence of the word ‘*caitra*’ expressing the agent ‘*Caitra*’ in the nominative case ending in the primitive construction is explained by the fact that the agenthood of ‘*Caitra*’ is already expressed otherwise by the grammatical element, namely, ‘*ti*’ of ‘*gacchati*’ and hence the rule ‘*prātipadikārtha*’ (p. ii.3.46) becomes applicable and allows only the nominative case endings after the words standing for the agent. Nevertheless, ‘*caitra*’, the word standing for the agent of the primitive action of going, occurs in the accusative case ending (*am*) in the causative construction and this has to be explained by the fact that *Caitra* assumes the objecthood in the causative construction and hence the rule ‘*karmani dvitīyā*’ (p. ii.3.2) assigns the accusative case ending after the word expressing the object.

In the second instance, ‘*devadattaḥ odanam pacati*’ is the primitive or the non-causative construction ; whereas ‘*devadattena odanam pācayati*’ is the corresponding causative construction. Here, ‘*Devadatta*’ is the agent of the primitive action of cooking and the word ‘*devadatta*’ expressing the same occurs in the nominative case ending (*s*) in the primitive construction whereas the same word ‘*devadatta*’ occurs in the instrumental case ending (*ena*) in the causative construction. The occurrence of the word ‘*devadatta*’ expressing the agent ‘*Devadatta*’ in the nominative case ending in the primitive construction, is again explained by the fact that the agenthood of *Devadatta* is already expressed by the grammatical element ‘*ti*’ of ‘*pacati*’ and hence the rule p. ii.3. 46 allows only the nominative case endings. However, ‘*devadatta*’, the word standing for the agent of the primitive action of cooking, occurs in the instrumental case ending (*ena*) in the causative construction ; and this has to be explained by the fact that *Devadatta* does not, unlike *Caitra*, assume the objecthood in the causative construction and hence the rule ‘*kartr karmanoh tritīyā*’ (the *kāraḥ* that are

either the agent or the instrument of action take instrumental case ending) (p. ii.3.18) assigns the instrumental case ending after the word standing for the agent.

Now, this phenomenon of the assumption of the objecthood by the primitive agent such as Caitra in connection with verbal roots such as 'gam' (going) and also the non-assumption of the same objecthood by the primitive agent such as Devadatta in connection with verbal roots such as 'pac' (cooking) is explained linguistically by stating that the primitive agents of only certain specific actions expressed by specific verbs function as the objects in the corresponding causative constructions while the primitive agents of certain specific actions expressed by certain other specific verbs do not function as the objects in the corresponding causative constructions. Panini, however, grammatically explains such a phenomenon by framing a rule which allows the primitive agents of certain categories of roots to function as the object in the corresponding causative constructions. The rule is as follows :

That (word which denotes the) agent of verbs having the meanings of 'going' (*gati*), 'knowing' (*buddhi*), 'eating' (*pratyavasāna*) and also of verbs whose object is (a word standing for) sound, or of intransitive verbs in the non-causative becomes the 'object' (*karman*) in the causative (*gatibhuddhi pratyavasānārtha śabdakarmākarmakāṇām aṇi kartā sa nau* (p. i.4.52). According to this rule, the primitive agents of the verbs denoting the action of going, knowing, eating, *śabdakarman* and of intransitive verbs become the objects in the corresponding causative constructions. Following are the examples :

<i>primitive or non-causative</i>	<i>causative</i>
(i) 'caitro grāmam gacchati' (Caitra goes to the village)	'gamayati caitram grāmam (he makes Caitra go to the village
(ii) 'caitra budhyate dharmam' (Caitra knows <i>dharma</i>)	'bodhayati dharmam caitram' (he makes Caitra know <i>dharma</i>)
(iii) 'caitro bhuñkta odanam' (Caitra eats rice)	'bhojayati caitram odanam' (he makes Caitra eat rice)

- (iv) 'adhīte caitro vedam' (Caitra 'adhyāpayati caitram
studies the Vedas) vedam' (he makes
Caitra study the Vedas)
- (v) 'āste caitrah' (Caitra sits) 'āsayati caitram' (he
makes Caitra sit).

In the above examples, Caitra, etc., who are the primitive agents of going etc., in statements such as 'caitro grāmam gacchati' etc., function as the objects of the causative action of making him go etc. and thus the words expressing the same take the accusative case ending in the causative statements such as 'caitram grāmam gamayati'.

Traditional explanation of the rule

Kāśikāvṛtti explains that the word 'artha' in the rule¹ is construed with the words 'gati', 'buddhi' and 'pratyavasāna' separately. The words 'śabdakarman' and 'akarmaka' mean the verbs which have sound as their object and also those of intransitive sense respectively. And 'anikartā' and 'ṇanu' mean 'the agent in the non-causative' and 'in the causative' respectively. Thus, the rule means that the agent in the non-causative (i.e. primitive agent) of the verbs denoting 'going', knowing, eating, and of the verbs which have sound as their objects or those of the intransitive sense becomes the object in the corresponding causative construction.

Patanjali² does not comment on the interpretation of the rule as such. He takes it for certain that the rule restricts the designation of the object (*karman*) to only the primitive agents of the verbs denoting the sense of 'going' (*gati*), 'knowing' (*buddhi*), eating (*pratyavasāna*), or of the verbs having sound as their object (*śabdakarman*) and those of intransitive sense (*akarmaka*) in causative construction. Also, he does not comment on the significance of the terms 'gati', 'buddhi' and 'pratyavasāna' since the same are well known to refer to 'going', 'knowing' and eating. Nevertheless, he recognizes the linguistic fact that the primitive agents of certain verbs, denoting going and eating, do

1. On p. i.4.52.

2. On p. i.4.52.

not assume the objecthood in the causative constructions. For instance, in causative constructions involving the verbs such as 'ād' (to eat) 'khād' (to chew), 'nī' (to lead) and 'vah' (to carry), the agents of primitive actions are found occurring in the instrumental endings. Consequently, they cannot be classified as the objects (*karman*) in such cases. For instance, 'ādayate devadattena' (he makes Devadatta eat), 'khādayate devadattena' (he makes Devadatta chew), 'nāyayati devadattena' (he makes Devadatta lead) etc. Patañjali, therefore, states the prohibition for the primitive agents in connection with the verbs 'āa' (to eat), 'khād' (to chew), 'nī' (to lead), and 'vah' (to carry) since otherwise by denoting 'eating' (*pratyavasāna*) and 'going' (*gati*) they come under the jurisdiction of the original rule.

Nevertheless, he further restricts such a prohibition for the primitive agents in connection with the verbs 'vah' (to carry) etc. which have other than the controller, i.e. inanimate operator as the agents (*aniyantr kartṛka*) and for the agents in connection with the verbs 'bhakṣ' (to eat), which denote a sense other than injury (*ahimsārthaka*), respectively. Thus, when the verb 'vah' has an inanimate as the agent and *bhakṣ* denotes the sense of injury, the statements such as 'vāhayati balivardān yavān' (he has the bullocks carry the barley) and 'bhakṣayati yavān balivardān' (they make bullocks eat barley), wherein the agents of the primitive actions are in the accusative case endings, can be accommodated. Also, when the verb 'vah' has the agent as an animate one and the verb 'bhakṣ' denotes the sense of non injury, the statements such as 'vāhayati bhāram devadattena' (he has Devadatta carry the load) and 'bhakṣayati pindīm devadattena' (he makes Devadatta eat sweet meet), where the agents of the primitive actions are in the instrumental case endings, can be accommodated.

Significance of the term 'śabdakarma' and the assumption of objecthood by the primitive agents

Patañjali presents two different interpretations on the denotation of the term 'śabdakarma'. According to him, the term can be taken to denote either verbs whose action is making sound (*śabdo yeṣām kriyā*) or verbs whose object is sound (*śabdo yeṣām karma*). In the first interpretation, the verbs

'*hwayati*' (to call) '*krandati*' (to cry) '*śabdāyate*' (to make sound) should be prohibited from being considered as the *śabdakarma* since in the causative constructions '*hvāyayati devadattena*' (he makes Devadatta call), '*krandayati devadattena*' (he makes Devadatta cry) and '*śabdāyayati devadattena*' (he makes Devadatta make sound), the agents of such roots are not objects. Further, he suggests that the verbs '*śṛṇoti*' (to hear), '*viśānāti*' (to notice) and '*upalabhate*' (to perceive) should be added since in '*śrāvayati devadattam*' (he makes Devadatta hear), '*viśāpayati devadattam*' (he makes Devadatta notice) and '*upalambhayati devadattam*' (he makes Devadatta perceive), the agents of such verbs are objects. Thus, there will be both overapplication and under-application of the rule in such an interpretation.

In the second interpretation, the verbs '*jalpati*' (to mutter), '*vilapati*' (to lament), '*ābhāṣate*' (to talk) should be added since, in the causative constructions '*jalapayati devadattam*' (he makes Devadatta mutter), '*vilāpayati devadattam*' (he makes Devadatta lament) and '*ābhāṣayati devadattam*' (he makes Devadatta talk), the agents of such verbs are the objects. Thus, there will be under application of the rule in the second interpretation.

Nevertheless, in both the interpretations, the verb '*drś*' (to see) should be added since in the causative construction '*darśayati rupatarkam kārṣāpaṇam*' (he shows the officers of mint the *kārṣāpaṇa* coin), the agent is the object. Thus, there will be under application in both the interpretations as regards the verb '*drś*' (to see).

Patañjali does not discuss as to which of the two interpretations is superior. He merely points out the difficulties of overapplication and also underapplication in the interpretations. Nevertheless, it can be assumed that Pāṇini has used the term '*śabdakarma*' in the sense of verbs which have a word standing for sound as its object (*śabdasādhana karma*) since otherwise he could have deleted the word '*karma*' from the rule i. 4. 52.

View that the term 'karma' means 'karma kāraṇa'

Kaiyaṭa holds that the term '*karma*' in the *sūtra* should be taken to mean only the *karma kāraṇa* (grammatical object). According to him, suppose the term '*karma*' is taken to mean

kriyā (action of making sound), then the very use of the term in the rule becomes unjustified since even without using the term (i.e. by composing the rule as *gāti budhī pratyavasāna śabda akarmākānām*), the same sense of verbs denoting the action of making sound can be obtained. Therefore, the term '*karma*' should be taken to mean only the *karmakāraka* and the phrase '*śabdakarma*' to mean the verbs whose object is sound. Thus, since the verbs '*jalpati*' etc. do not get included automatically, the same (verbs '*jalpati*' etc.) need to be included.

Bhaṭṭoji too supports Kaiyaṭas view that the term '*karma*' should be taken to mean *karma kāraka* such as the 'sound'. According to him, suppose the term is taken to mean '*kriyā*' (action of making sound), then the rule that between etimological and conventional senses, conventional sense is to be preferred (*kṛtrimākṛtrimayor madhye kṛtrime kārya sampratyah*) gets violated since only the sense of the '*karma kāraka*' is conventional. Thus, since '*jalpati*' etc. are not included, they need to be included separately.

Observation

It can be stated now as follows :

Patañjali has interpreted the phrase '*śabdakarma*' both ways as '*śabdo yeṣām kriyā*' (verbs whose action is making sound) and '*śabdo yeṣām karama*' (verbs whose object is sound) and has not shown any performance in one or the other interpretation. However, later commentators have held that only the second interpretation, i.e. '*śabdo yeṣām karma*' is to be accepted as correct. They are guided by the fact that otherwise the use of the term '*karma*' becomes redundant in the rule as the sense of 'the action of making sound' can be obtained by the phrase '*śabdo*' itself. They are also guided by the fact that otherwise the grammatical convention such as "between the etimological and conventional meanings, only the conventional meaning is to be preferred" gets violated. Thus, since the second interpretation, namely '*śabdo yeṣām karma*' is to be adhered to, the roots '*jalpati*' etc. are to be included.

View that 'akarmaka' (intransitive) includes verbs having time etc. as their objects

According to Ślokavārtika on p. i.4.51, words denoting 'time', 'action', 'distance' and 'region' get the designation 'object' in connection with the intransitive verbs such as 'ās' (to stay) etc. Therefore, such verbs, when associated with 'time' etc., cannot be classified as intransitive (*akarmaka*) or devoid of objects. Consequently, the agents of the primitive actions in connection with intransitive verbs, such as 'ās', cannot be assigned the designation of 'object' by the rule p. i.4.52 and thus the grammatically correct causative statements such as '*māsam āsayati devadattam*' (he makes Devadatta stay for a month) wherein the agent '*devadatta*' occurs in the accusative, becomes untenable. In order to overcome such an undesired eventuality, Patañjali has stated that the term '*akarmaka*', in this rule, should be taken to include, by convention, verbs which take 'time' etc. as their objects. Since, now, the rule can assign the status of an 'object' to the agents of the intransitive verbs which take words denoting time etc. as their objects, the grammatically correct statements such as '*māsam āsayati devadattam*' etc. can be explained as tenable.

The use of the term '*akarmaka*' in the rule warrants some further elaboration. Intransitives (*akarmaka*) are four types : They are (i) those which have the denotation in an action, not capable of taking an object (*karmayoga arthāntarārthaka*), (ii) those which have included the sense of the object in their root-meanings (*dhātvarthopasaṃgrhita karmaka*), (iii) those which have their objects well established (*prasiddhakarmaka*) and (iv) those which have their objects unintended (*avivakṣita karmaka*). For instance : the root 'vah', which originally denotes leading or carrying, is intransitive in the sense of flowing in '*nadi vahati*' (river flows) since the action of flowing cannot take an object; the root 'jiv', which denotes the holding, the breath, (the object), is intransitive in '*caitro jīvati*' (Caitra lives) since the root-meaning, i.e. the action of holding the breath, includes the sense of the object; the root 'varṣ', which denotes the pouring or raining water, is intransitive in '*megho varṣati*' (cloud pours) since it has its object, namely, the 'water well established; and the root 'samśru', which denotes listening,

is intransitive in '*puruṣāt na saṁśṛunute*' (he does not listen to the person) since here the object 'wellbeing' (*hita*) is not intended. Nevertheless, of the four types of intransitives, only the first three types are to be covered by the term '*akarmaka*' in the present context by excluding the last category of intransitives, i.e. '*avivakṣita karmaka*'. This is necessitated on the ground that otherwise even the primitive agent of the root '*pac*' (to cook) etc., if not intended to take the object such as rice (*odanam*), would become the object in the causative usage such as '*pācayaty sahāyena*' (he has something cooked through his assistant) since the root '*pac*' is '*akarmaka*' in the primitive usage.

On the other hand, some scholars maintain that the term '*akarmaka*' 'intransitive' includes even the fourth category of intransitives, i.e. those which have their objects unintended (*avivakṣitakarmaka*). They argue that Kaiyaṭa, while commenting on the rule '*ner aṇau*' (p. i.3.61), has accepted the intransitive status for *avivakṣitakarmakas* and consequently, explained the designation of 'object' for the meadow (*kedara*) in '*lāvayati keaāram devadattaḥ*' (Devadatta has meadow cut off). Nevertheless, in view of the fact that the designation of 'object' to the primitive agents such as *sahāya* (assistant of the cooking etc.) is not desirable in the causative such as '*pācayati odanam sahāyena*', the inclusion of the fourth category of intransitive should be restricted to only those instances wherein the objects are not naturally intended to be included like in '*lāvayati kedāram devadattaḥ*' etc.

It should be noted in this connection that the objects such as time, action, distance and also region cannot determine the transitivity of verbal roots. That is to say that in spite of the association of time etc., roots such as '*ās*' in '*māsam āste*' etc. are intransitive. This is so because, the time etc., being permanent in their association with the verbal action of staying etc., are quite ineffective as far as making the verbal roots change their intransitive status in concerned. On the other hand, it is the substance-objects (*dravya karman*) such as rice which determine the transitivity of the verbal roots owing to their occasional association with the verbal action. In view of this fact, the objection that "the primitive agents of intransitive roots become

the objects in causative since there exist no intransitive roots as such, i.e. all the roots including 'sthā' (to stay) are also transitive due to their association with the time etc. permanently" stands refuted. For, the roots 'sthā' (to stay) etc., despite their association with the time, etc. remain intransitive.

Problem

However, while most of the Prācya scholars consider the rule p. i.4.52, to be restrictive, some Navya scholars hold the same (rule) to be assigning the designation 'object'. The position of the prācya scholars, who consider the rule to be restrictive, can be explained as follows : The rule '*sanādyantā dhātavaḥ*' (p. ii.1.32) assigns the designation 'verbal root' (*dhātu*) to even causatives. Consequently, in '*caitram grāmam gamayati*', the primitive agent such as Caitra, who is the abode of the action of going etc., can be said to be the object since the same primitive action of going functions as the effect of the causative action of making him to go (*gamay*); and hence the same primitive agent becomes the *karāka*, whom the (causative) agent seeks most to obtain through his (causative) action. Thus, the rule '*kartur īpsitatamam karma*' (p. i.4.49) can itself assign the designation 'object' to the primitive agent in causative constructions due to his being the most desired item to obtain through the causative action. Now, according to the convention that "the rule enjoined, when the designation (object etc.) is already established, is considered to be restrictive due to the absence of the designation to be assigned", the rule '*gati buddhi...*' can only be restrictive. Such a rule can restrict the application of the designation 'object' which is due to the being most desired item to obtain through the causative action (i.e. due to the being abode of the effect of the causative action) to only the primitive agents of specific verbs such as of going (*gati*), of knowing (*buddhi*), of eating (*pratyavasāna*), of '*śabdakarma*' and of intransitive (*akarmaka*) in the causative construction. Thus, the primitive agents of other verbs such as 'cooking' (*pac*) need not be the objects and so the word standing for the primitive agent, namely, '*devadatta*' in '*pācayaty odanam devadattena*' (he makes Devadatta cook rice) cannot be imposed the accusative case ending despite Devadatta being the item most desired to obtain

through causative action (i.e. being the abode of the primitive action).

Navyas position that the rule enjoins the designation 'object'

The position of the Navya scholars, who consider the rule to be enjoining the designation 'object', is as follows : The primitive agents such a Caitra in '*caitram grāmam gamayati*' etc, are indeed the *kāraṅkas* that the causative agent (Yajñadatta) seeks to obtain through his actions (i.e. are the abode of the primitive action of going etc. which are the effects of the causative action of making them to go etc.). And therefore, they can be considered as the grammatical objects with respect to the causative actions. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the same primitive agents are independent in their primitive action of going etc.; and therefore, they can considered to be the grammatical agents with respect to their own primitive actions. Now, when the two different grammatical designations, namely, 'object' and 'agent' become application, to the primitive agents, the convention that the (designation), which is later and without any other occasion for application, is applied first comes into operation; and hence allows the application of only the designation 'agent' by preventing the application of the designation 'object' to the primitive agents in causatives. Thus, in order to facilitate the designation 'object' by preventing the unwanted application of the designation 'grammatical agent' to the primitive agent in causatives, the rule '*gatibuddhi...*' is justified in assigning the designation 'object' to primitive agents.

Helārājas view

Helārāja³ follows the traditional Prācya interpretation that the rule is only restrictive. However, according to him, when the power of prominent, i.e. power of principle action (*pradhānakriyāśakti*) and the power of subordinate, i.e. power of subsidiary action (*guṇ kriyāśakti*) are engaged in the production of their respective effects, only the former succeeds in producing of its effect, whereas the latter looses out in producing its effect. Therefore, when the power of the causa-

tive action and also the power of the primitive action are engaged in the production of the designations, namely 'object' and 'agent' for the primitive agent in the causative, only the designation of 'object' becomes produced since the same is caused by the power of the prominent action. Thus, since the primitive agent has the designation of 'object' already assigned to him, the rule need not be taken to be assigning the designation 'object' again ; rather it can be considered to be merely restrictive of the designation 'object' to the primitive agents in cases of certain verbs such as 'going' (*gati*) etc.

Kaiyaṭas view

Kaiyaṭa, while commenting on the Bhāṣya of 'ākadārād *ekā samjñā* (p. i.4.1), holds that the rule (p. i.4.52) is restrictive since the same is read in the *ekasamjñā* section. However, his reasoning is different, According to him, when both the designations, namely, the designation of the 'agent' (due to the primitive agent being independent in his action) and also that of the 'object' (due to the primitive agent being the most sought to be obtained by the causative agent through his action) are liable to be applied, only a single designation is applied as a single *kāraka* can have only a single designation. Now, since, in the grammar, only the designation caused by the principle or prominent qualificand is stronger than even the one caused by *antaraṅga* etc., only the designation of 'object' is applied as the same is caused by the principle qualificand, i.e. the causative action of the causative agent ; and the designation of the 'agent' is caused by the non-prominent or non-principle qualificand, namely the primitive action of the primitive agent. Thus, since the designation 'object' is already established, the rule is merely restrictive in stating that the primitive agents of the roots of only going etc. become the objects.

Kaiyaṭa refutes the claim that primitive agents would have an eventuality of taking both the instrumental and the accusative case endings in the causative constructions since while the rule (p. i.4.52) allows the accusative case ending by restricting the designation 'object' to only the primitive agents of the roots

of going etc., the rule '*prāk kadārād param kāryam*' allows the instrumental by facilitating the later designation 'agent' to the same. According to him, since Panini has included the word '*anyatarasyām*' (either of the two) in the rule '*hru kror anyatarasyām*', the application of both the designations 'object' and 'agent' is not possible to primitive agent of the roots of going (*gati*) etc. (it is possible to the primitive agent of only the verbs '*hr*', '*kr*' in the causative).

Bhaṭṭojis view

Now, the three different reasons for considering the rule '*gatibuddhi...*' as assigning the designation 'object' may be as follows : First : since the designation 'agent' is later and without any other occasion, the same takes precedence over the designation 'object'. Hence, to overrule such a designation of 'agent', the rule '*gatibuddhi...*' should be assigning the designation 'object'. Second : since the primitive agent is semantically related to the primitive action and the same is related to the causative action in the causative construction, the designation 'agent' becomes *antaraṅga* compared to the designation 'object' which is *bahiraṅga*. Hence, to overrule the stronger *antaraṅga* designation of 'agent', the rule should be considered as assigning the designation 'object'. Third : since the causative action (verb) is assigned the causative affix (*nic*) only after the designation '*hetu*' becomes effective to the causative agent, who prompts the primitive agent, the designation 'primitive agent' becomes the '*upajīvyā*' to the designation 'object' which is *upajīvaka*. Here, to overrule the stronger *upajīvyā* designation of 'agent' to the primitive agent, the rule '*gatibuddhi...*' should be considered to be assigning the designation 'object'.

However, Bhaṭṭoji, in his *Manoramā*, rejects all the three reasons as insufficient to prove the rule as assigning the designation 'object'. According to him, only in the case of a conflict between the two different designations, the later designation becomes effective (*vipratīṣedhe param kāryam*). However, since, in the case of causatives, the designation of 'object' caused by the prominent causative action is stronger than the designation of 'agent' caused by the subsidiary primitive action, there is no

conflict between the two designations, and therefore, the later designation of 'agent' cannot be effective. Also, only in the case of two designations which are of equal strength, the *antaraṅga* designation would be considered as stronger than the *bahiraṅga* designation. However, since, in the causative, the designation of 'object' caused by the prominent causative action is stronger than the designation of 'agent' caused by the subsidiary primitive action, there is no equality between the two designations ; and therefore, the designation of 'agent' cannot be effective due to being *antaraṅga*. Again, only in the use of two designations which are *upajīvyā* and *upajīvaka*, the *upajīvyā* designation would be considered as stronger than the *upajīvaka* designation, However, since in the causative, the designation of 'object' caused by the prominent or principle causative action is stronger than the designation of 'agent' caused by the subsidiary primitive action, there is no *upajīvyā* or *upajīvaka* relation between the two designations ; and therefore, the designation of 'agent' cannot be effective due to being *upajīvyā*.

Observation

It can be observed now that Bhaṭṭoji prefers to consider the rule as restrictive since the designation of 'agent' is not effective due to being weaker. Nevertheless, it can be pointed out that despite the causative action having word prominence (*śabdaprādhānya*) in causative construction, the primitive action has the sense-prominence (*arthaprādhānya*) even in causative construction since, after all, the causative agent exerts only for the sake of accomplishing the primitive action through the primitive agent. For instance, when the causative agent 'Devadatta' causes Caitra to go to the village, the causative agent 'Devadatta' can be said to exert so that the primitive action of going can be accomplished by the primitive agent, namely, Caitra. Since sense-prominence (*arthaprādhānya*) is found to occur only in the primitive action, the designation of 'agent', caused by such a primitive action, is stronger than the designation of 'object' caused by causative action. Keeping in view of such a fact, Bhaṭṭoji agrees also that no harm is done in considering the rule '*gati buddhi...*' as assigning the designation of

'object' either. In both the cases of interpretations, the desired goal of the rule, namely, the designation of 'object' for the primitive agent of the verbal roots, denoting the 'going' (*gati*) etc., and avoidance of the same designation of 'object' for the primitive agents of the verbal roots denoting the meaning other than 'going' (i.e. cooking) etc. gets accomplished.

Gadādhara's view

Gadādhara,⁴ in his Vyutpattivāda, states the view of a section of logicians as follows : The rule '*gatibuddhi...*' is restrictive in the sense that the same restricts the designation of the 'object' to the primitive agents in causatives only in association with the roots denoting 'going' (*gati*) etc. while allowing either the designation of 'agent' or the designation of 'object' to the primitive agents in causatives in association with roots denoting other than 'going', i.e. cooking etc. The rule disallows the agentive affix (i.e. the instrumental case ending) as grammatically incorrect after the word standing for primitive agent, in association with the verbal roots denoting the 'going' (*gati*) etc. while it allows either the agentive or objective affix (i.e. either the instrumental case ending or the accusative case ending) after the word standing for the primitive agent in causatives in association with the roots denoting other than the going etc. (i.e. cooking etc.).

Here, the rule '*gatibuddhi...*' restricts the primitive agents in the causatives to only the designation 'object' in association with the verbal roots denoting the going (*gati*) etc. by stipulating that the primitive agents in such cases are intended to possess the primitive agentness (analysable into the primitive action and hence the effect of the causative action) and hence are perceived to be only objects. Thus, according to this view, only the accusative statements such as '*ajām grāmam gamayati*' (he leads the goat to the village), wherein the word standing for the primitive agent has the accusative case ending by being the object, are correct in association with the roots denoting the going etc. ; whereas both the accusative as well as the instrumental statements such as '*pācayaty odanam yajñadattam*

4. Vyutpattivāda, p. 256.

yajñadattena vā, (he has Yajñadatta cook rice or has rice cooked by Yajñadatta), wherein the word standing for the primitive agent has either accusative or instrumental case ending by being either the object or the agent, are correct in association with the roots denoting other than the going etc. (i.e. cooking etc.)

Observation

According to these logicians, the restriction is that the primitive agents have only the designation of 'object' in causatives in association with the roots denoting the 'going' etc. Thus, they explain the accusative statements such as '*ajām grāmam gamayati*' and also rule out the instrumental statements such as '*ajayā grāmam gammayati*' as incorrect in association with the roots denoting the going, while, at the same time, allow either accusative or instrumental statements such as '*pacayaty odanam yajñadattam yajñadattena vā*'.

However, this interpretation of the rule goes against the basic grammatical convention that *kāraḥ* have only a single designation and two or more designations would not be allowed for a single *kāraḥ*. According to '*ā kadārād ekā samjñā*', all the *kāraḥ* enumerated after '*kadāvāḥ*', would have only a single denotation. Thus, the designations of 'object' and 'agent' for the primitive agent facilitating both the accusative and instrumental statements are contrary to the grammar. Also, such an interpretation is against the interpretation of the rule by Kaiyaṣa, Bhaṭṭoji etc. that the designation of object is applicable to the primary agents in causatives in association with only the roots denoting the going etc. Thus, this view of the section of logicians is not in conformity with established grammatical convention.

Giridharas interpretation

Giridhara⁵ too interrupts the rule as only restrictive. However, according to him, the rule could be interpreted in two

ways as the primitive agents of the roots denoting only 'going' etc. are objects in causative and also as the primitive agents of such roots are objects only. Consequently, in causatives such as '*gamayati digantam arāṭin*' (he sends his enemies to the end of the horizon), the enemies can be the objects despite them being the substratum of the primitive action of going. Also, in causatives such as '*citreṇa pācayaty odanam maitraḥ*' (Maitra makes Caitra cook the rice), Caitra can be the agent despite being the abode of the primitive action of cooking.

Observation

Actually, this two way interpretation of the rule is natural extension of the rule '*gatibuddhi . . .*' that the primitive agents, in connection with the roots denoting the 'going' etc., are assigned the designation 'object' in causatives. This interpretation clarifies the intended sense that the primitive agents of such roots as denoting 'going' etc. are invariably assigned the designation 'object', whereas the primitive agents of roots denoting other than 'going' etc. are never assigned the designation 'objects' in causatives.

Critical Examination

Indian epistemologists, lead by grammarians, have made distinction between the causative constructions, wherein the primitive agents occur in the accusative case endings and also the causative constructions wherein the primitive agents occur in the instrumenral case endings. They have recognized the fact that while the agents of the primitive actions expressed by certain verbal roots in the primitive constructions assume the objecthood in the corresponding causative constructions, the agents of the primitive actions expressed by certain other verbal roots remain agents only. Also, they have recognized the fact that while the occurrence of the primitive agents in the accusative and the instrumental case endings in the causatives is a syntactical phenomenon of the surface structure, the assumption of the objecthood and the retaining of the agenthood by the primitive agents in the causative constructions is a semantical phenomenon of the deep structure.

Panini has sanctioned the occurrence of the primitive agents in the accusative and the instrumental case endings in the causative and other constructions by the rules '*karmanī dvitīyā*' (p. ii.3.2) and '*kartṛkaraṇayoh tritīyā*' (p. ii.3.18). However, the assumption of the objecthood by the primitive agents in the causative constructions requires a special sanction; and therefore, Panini has composed the rule '*gati buddhi . . .*' (p. i.4.52). This rule envisages that the primitive agents of actions expressed by only certain verbs assume the objecthood in the causative construction. The verbs have been specified as verbs denoting the going (*gati*), the knowing (*buddhi*), the eating (*pratyavasāna*) and also the verbs whose object is (word standing for) sound or intransitive verbs. Therefore, in the causatives involving such verbs, i.e. in (i) '*gamayati caitram grāmam*', (ii) '*bodhayati caitram dharmam*', (iii) '*bhojayati caitram odanam*', (iv) '*adhyāpayati caitram vedam*' and (v) '*āsayati caitram*', the primitive agent, namely Caitra, assumes the objecthood; and consequently, the word standing for '*Caitra*' (i.e. *caitram*) occurs in the accusative case endings.

Nevertheless, Patañjali, while interpreting the rule as restrictive, recognizes the linguistic fact that the primitive agents do not assume the objecthood in causatives in connection with all verbs which may denote the 'going' or eating. Patañjali, therefore, prohibits the verbs such as '*ād*' (to eat) '*khād*' (to chew), '*nī*' (to lead) and '*vah*' (to carry) from being included under '*pratyavasāna*' and '*gati*'. Thus, the instrumental statements such as '*ādayate devadattena*', '*khādayate devadattena*', '*nāyayati devadattena*' etc. are facilitated.

Also, Patañjali recognizes the linguistic fact that the primitive agents assume the objecthood in the causatives in connection with certain verbs such as '*jalpati*' (to mutter), '*vilapati*' (to lament), '*ābhāṣate*' (to talk) as well. However, these verbs cannot be, strictly speaking, considered as '*śabdakarma*'. Therefore, such verbs should be added to the category of *śabdakarma* verbs by extension of its natural sense. Of course, this addition is based on the theory that the phrase '*śabdakarma*' is to be interpreted as '*śabdo yeṣām karma*' (verbs whose object is a sound) and not as '*śabdo yeṣām kriyā*' (verbs whose action is making

sound); and hence 'jalpati' etc., whose objects are not sound, cannot be categorized as *śabdakarmans* naturally. As far as the interpretation of the phrase '*śabdakarman*' is concerned, all most all of the commentators and other grammarians have preferred '*śabdo yeṣām karma*' as the interpretation since, otherwise, the use of the term *karma* itself becomes redundant in the rule.

As regards the '*akarmaka*' or intransitive verbs, Patañjali suggests that the term '*akarmaka*' or 'intransitive' is conventional; and therefore, the same includes even verbs which have 'time', 'action', 'distance' etc. as their objects. This suggestion is based on the ground that 'time' etc., due to their permanent association, do not change the intransitivity of verbs. Therefore, the primitive agents can obtain the objecthood in connection with the intransitive verbs such as '*ās*' which take 'time' etc. as their objects in causatives such as '*māsam āsayati caित्रam*'. Now, since the 'intransitive' is basically of four types and of the four types only the first three types, i.e. *karmayogya arthāntarātmaka*, *dhātvarthopasaṁgṛhīta karmaka*, and *prasidhakarmaka* are intended to be covered by intransitive, the primitive agent need not assume the objecthood in connection with the verb '*pac*' (to cook) etc. despite the same not being intended to take an object.

Now, as regards the problem of the interpretation of the rule it can be stated as follows: Both the *prācīyas* and the *Navyas* disagree between themselves as to whether the rule is restrictive or assigning the objecthood newly. *Navya*'s theory that "the designation of the agent, being later and without any other occasion for application, takes precedence over the designation of the object" is based on the conviction that the assumption of the objecthood by the primitive agents in causative construction is a peculiar linguistic phenomenon, i.e. is not an already covered linguistic reality; and therefore, *Panini* must compose a new rule assigning the designation 'object' to primitive agents. This theory deserves due credit as far as recognizing the linguistic fact that the assumption of the objecthood by primitive agents is not an ordinary event and is unlike the most desired item of the *kāraṅgas* becoming the object. Nevertheless, the basis of the theory that whatever designation is later and without any other

occasion for application takes precedence over the earlier designation is too technical, and therefore, poses only a conventional objection to the rule being restrictive.

On the other hand, Prācyas hold the theory that "the primitive agent, by possessing the primitive action, which is the effect of the causative action in causatives, becomes the item most desired to be obtained by the causative agent through his actions; and hence the rule '*kartur īpsitamam karma*' (p. i.4.49) can itself assign the designation of object to the primitive agent". Such a theory is based on the conviction that the assumption of the objecthood by the primitive agent in causatives is a natural linguistic phenomenon of the most desired item of the *kāra*kas and therefore, the same does not require any special rule to assign the designation of the object to the primitive agents. This theory generalizes the assumption of the objecthood by any *kāra*ka as an event covered by the rule (p. i.4.49) itself. According to this theory, there need not be any distinction between the village etc., assuming the objecthood in the primitives, and also the primitive agents such as Caitra, assuming the objecthood in the causatives, since, in both cases, the *kāra*kas such as the village and Caitra are desired most to be obtained by their respective agents through their respective actions.

Now, as regards the arguments of the traditional scholars regarding the rule being restrictive : While Helārāja has proposed that the causative action, being prominent, achieves its effect, i.e. the designation of 'object' to the primitive agent ahead of the primitive action; Kaiyaṣa has maintained that when both the designations (the agent and the object) are liable to be applied, only the designation caused by the prominent or chief qualificand, i.e. the object is applied since only a single designation is allowed for a single *kāra*ka (*ā kadārād ekā samjñā*). However, Bhaṭṭoji states that neither the designation (the agent) being later, nor it being *antaraṅga*, nor it being *upajīvyā*, can cause the same designation since such an eventuality can occur only in the case of a conflict of equal designations being effective, or in the case of *upajīvyā* and *upajīvaka* relations. Thus, the designation of the 'object' being in any way obtained, the rule can be restrictive of the designation of the

object in connection with the verbs of *gati* etc. only. Finally, however, as Giridhara points out, there is no harm in interpreting the rule both ways as ruling the designation of the 'object' for primitive agents of the roots, denoting '*gati*' etc., in causatives and also as restricting the primitive agents of such roots as objects only; for, in both the interpretations, the intended objective of obtaining the designation of the primitive agents is the same.

CHAPTER XX

ASSUMPTION OF THE DESIGNATION OF GRAMMATICAL OBJECT (KARMAN) BY LOCATION (ĀDHĀRA) AND THE EXPLANATION OF THE ACCUSATIVE CASES AFTER THE WORDS STANDING FOR LOCATION

(*ādhārasya karmasamjñā*)

Introduction

Sanskrit has accusative usages such as (i) '*vaikuṇṭham adhyāste hariḥ*' (Hari inhibits *Vāikuṇṭha*), (ii) '*abhiniviśate sanmārgam*' (he settles down into, i.e. adopts the righteous path), and (iii) '*upavasati parvatam caitraḥ*' (Caitra lives on i.e. occupies the mountain). However, in the deep structure analysis of such usages, the '*Vaikuṇṭha*', the '*righteous path*' and also the '*mountain*' are only the locations (*ādhāra*) of the actions of staying, existing and also living respectively. Consequently, since the locations get the designation of '*locus*' (*adhikaraṇa*) by the rule '*ādharo 'dhikaraṇam*' (the location of the actions belonging to the agent and object is called the locus (*adhikaraṇa*) when it becomes instrumental in bringing about the action p. i.4.45), only the locative case endings (*saptamī vibhakti*) are possible after the words standing for the locations such as '*Vaikuṇṭha*'. Thus, the accusative usages, wherein the words standing for the locations such as *vaikuṇṭha* occur in the accusative endings, become untenable.

These accusative usages, nevertheless, should be explained on the linguistic ground that the locations (*ādhāras*) such as *Vaikuṇṭha*, '*righteous path*' and '*mountain*' have the designation of grammatical object (*karman*) in connection with such verbs

as 'adhyāste' (to inhabit), 'abhiniviśate' (to adopt) and 'upava-sati' (to occupy). Historically speaking, the designation of the 'grammatical object' (*karman*) is a general designation which can cover several other *kāra*kas, i.e. either those which are not intended to be covered by other *kāra*ka designations (*akathita*) or those which assume other designations in preference to their original designations. However, the designation of grammatical 'object' (*karman*) for the locations (*ādhāra*) is to be explained by the phenomenon of the assumption of the designation 'object' by the *kāra*kas which are originally some other *kāra*kas. The phenomenon of the assumption of the designation of the 'object' by the other *kāra*kas is most evident i.e. pronounced in the case of the locations (*ādhāra*). This instance is, of course, similar to the instance of assuming the designation of 'object' by the *sampradāna* *kāra*ka such as 'krūra' (cruel one) in 'kūram abhik-rudhyati' (he is annoyed at the cruel one) and the *kaṛaṇa* *kāra*ka such as *akṣa* 'dice' in 'akṣān dīvyati' (he plays the dice) respectively.

Panini explains the assumption of the designation of 'the grammatical object' by the locations by the following rules : (i) (The location) in connection with the verbal bases 'śīn' (to lie down), 'sthā' (to stay) and 'ās' (to remain), preceded by the prefix 'adhi' is called the 'object' (*karman*) when it becomes instrumental in bringing about the actions' (*adhi śīn sthāsām karma* p. i.4.46); (ii) (the location) in connection with the verbal base 'viś' (to settle down), preceded by the prefixes 'abhi', is called the 'object' (*karman*) when it becomes instrumental in bringing about the action (*abhiniviśas'ca* p. i.4.47); and (iii) (The location) in connection with the verbal base 'vas' (to dwell), preceded by 'upa', 'anu', 'adhi' or 'ān', is called 'object' (*karman*) when it becomes instrumental in bringing about the action ('*upān vadhyān vaśaḥ*' p. i.4.48). According to Panini, the locations of the actions of staying etc. assume the designation of the 'grammatical object' in connection with the verbal bases 'śīn' (to lie down) etc. when preceded by 'adhi' etc. Thus, for instance, consider the following usages : (i) 'grāmam adhiśete' (he lies down in, i.e. occupies the village). (ii) 'grāmam adhitiṣṭhati' (he inhabits the village); (iii) 'vaikunṭham adhyāste' (he settles down in, i.e. inhabits the Vaikunṭha); (iv)

'*sanmārgam abhiniviśate*' (he settles down into, i.e. adopts the righteous path); (v) *parvatam upavasati* (he dwells on, i.e. occupies the mountain) and (vi) '*grāmam anuvasati*' (he inhabits the village). Here, '*grāma*' (the village), the *Vaikunṭha*, etc., which are originally the locations of the actions such as 'lying down', 'staying', and 'remaining' etc., assume the designation of the grammatical object in connection with the verbal bases such as '*sthā*', '*śin*', '*ās*', preceded by the prefix '*adhi*'; and also the '*sanmārga*' (righteous path), which is originally the location of the 'settling down', assumes the designation of the grammatical object in connection with the verbal base *viś* preceded by '*abhini*'; and also the '*parvata*' (mountain), '*grāma*' (the village) etc., which are originally the locations of the 'dwelling' etc., assume the designation of the grammatical object in connection with the verbal base '*vas*' preceded by '*upa*' '*anu*' etc.

Panini's explanation of the assumption of the designation of the grammatical object by the locations in connection with verbal bases such as '*śin*' etc., preceded by certain prefixes such as '*adhi*' etc., points to the most significant linguistic phenomenon that the locations of the actions expressed by the intransitive verbal bases (*okarmaka dhātu*) become the grammatical objects in connection with the actions expressed by the corresponding transitive verbal bases. Here '*grāma*' (the village), the '*Vaikunṭha*' etc. are the locations only in so far as they are connected with the actions expressed by the intransitive verbal bases such as '*śin*' (to lie down), '*sthā*' (to say) etc. However, when the same (*grāma*) (village). '*Vaikunṭha*' etc.) are connected with the actions expressed by the corresponding transitive verbal bases such as '*adhiśin*' (to lie down i.e. occupy), '*adhisthā*' (to inhabit) etc., the same locations such as '*grāma*' (the village), the *Vaikunṭha* etc. become the grammatical objects. (Here the intransitive verbal bases such as '*śin*', '*sthā*' etc. express transitive actions such as occupying and inhabiting when they are preceded by the prefix '*adhi*' etc.)

Problem

However, despite most of the epistemologists defending the rule '*adhiśin sthāsām karma*' as necessary to assign the

designation of the object to the locations in connection with 'ādhiśīn' etc., Nagesha, Gadādhara and Giridhara hold divergent views regarding the methodology of defending the rule. Also, they differ amongst themselves as to the transitivity of the verbal bases 'ādhiśīn' etc. Further as regards the rule 'abhiniviśaś ca', scholars point out that the same rule should assign the designation of the object to the location only optionally. Again, as regards the rule 'upāñivādhyān vasah', Katyayana prohibits the application of the designation of the 'object' to the location in connection with 'upavas' meaning 'non-eating' or 'fasting', whereas Patañjali rejects such a prohibition on the ground that 'time' such as 'trirātra' is the location expressed by 'upavas' in 'grāme upavasati' etc. In the following pages, we shall explain all the three rules and their implications in the analysis of the locations of intransitive actions as the objects in connection with the corresponding transitive actions.

Explanation of the rule 'adhiśīnthāsām karma'

The rule 'adhiśīnthāsām karma' (the *kāraka*, which functions as the location in connection with the verbal bases 'śīn' (to lie down), 'sthā' (to stay) and 'ās' (to remain) preceded by the prefix 'adhi', is called object) assigns the designation of the grammatical object to the locations in connection with 'śīn', 'sthā' and 'ās' preceded by 'adhi' as an exception to the designation of the locus' (*adhikaraṇa*), which is in turn assigned by the rule 'adhāro ahikaraṇam' (The locations of the agent and the object, the possessors of the actions, are called the locus when they become instrumental in bringing about the action p. i.4.45). Consequently, the accusative case ending (*am*) occurring after the word 'grāma' (village) etc., which express the location, in 'grāmam adhiśete' (he lies down, i.e. occupies the village) etc. become tenable and also the same can be explained to express the locushood.

The rule p. i.4.46, indicates the fact that the locations of the intransitive actions of 'lying', 'staying and 'remaining' become the objects in connection with the corresponding transitive actions of 'occupying' 'inhabiting', etc. While the 'śīn' etc., without the prefix 'adhi', are intransitive and express the

intransitive action of lying etc., the same ('śñ' etc.), prefixed with 'adhi', become transitive and therefore, refer to the corresponding transitive action of 'occupying', 'inhabiting' etc. And such actions are syntactico-semantically related with the accusative case-meaning, i.e. locus-hood.

Meaning of the accusative occurring after the words expressing the location

It should be noted here that, according to the Prācyaś, the accusative, occurring after the words expressing the location, refers to the locus-hood (*ādhāratva*). Therefore, in '*sthalim adhiśete*' (he occupies the ground) etc., the locus-hood, expressed by the accusative, is related with the peculiar bodily-contact, the effect, through conditioning and the same (effect) is related, further, with the operation. Thus, the cognition is that the person is the possessor of the operation conducive to the peculiar bodily contact conditioning the locus-hood of the ground.

However, the Navyas hold that the accusative, in such cases, refers to the superstratumness (*ādheyatva*). And the same superstratumness is related with the peculiar bodily contact through the relation of substratumness (*āśrayatā*). Thus, the cognition in such statements, according to them, is that the person is the possessor of the operation conducive to bodily contact that has the superstratumness conditioned by the ground.

Navyas hold so on the ground that otherwise, the relation of conditioning, being a non-occurrence-exacting relation (*vṛtyaniyāmaka*), cannot be the delimiting relation of the counter positiveness, and therefore, the absence of the locus-hood cannot relate to the peculiar body-contact through the conditioning in the negative statements such as '*sthalim nādhiśete*' (he does not occupy the ground) etc. However, in the Navya theory, since the substratumness, is the occurrence exacting relation, the absence of the same superstratumness can be related with the effect through the substratumness. Also the Navyas position is in conformity with the rule that "the accusative case endings are used after the words expressing the locations provided that the accusative meaning, i.e. the superstratumness is intended or related with the effect 'contact' etc. and the

locative case endings are used after the words expressing the location provided that the accusative meaning, i.e. superstratumness is intended to be related with the operation conducive to the effect". For, the Navyas, accept the superstratumness to be related with the effect 'bodily contact'.

Necessity of the rule

Position that the rule p. i.4.48 indicates that location possess the power of the objectness. Nagesha holds that the being the object is generally the possession of the power of objectness. And those *kāraṅkas*, which possess such an objectness, are assigned the designation 'object' by the rule '*kartur īpsitatamam karma*' (that which the agent seeks most to obtain through his action is called the object p. i.4.49). Since the locations such as *Vaikuṇṭha* etc. in '*vaikuṇṭham adhyāste*' (he occupies *Vaikuṇṭha*) etc. too possess the power of the objectness, the same are assigned the designation of the 'object' by the rule p. i.4.49. Therefore, the rule '*adhiśin sthāsām karma*', wherein the word '*adhāra*' (location) is continued, simply indicates the fact that the locations such as *Vaikuṇṭha* in '*vaikuṇṭham adhyāste*' etc. are the possessors of the power of the objectness so that the designation of the object can be assigned to the locations by the rule p. i.4.49.

Observation

Nagesha is the only epistemologist who does not consider the rule p. i.4.48 as necessary to assign the designation of object to the locations such as *Vaikuṇṭha*. Nevertheless, he does not refute the necessity of the rule as such. His statement that the rule indicates the fact that the locations such as *Vaikuṇṭha* etc. in '*vaikuṇṭham adhyāste*' etc. are the possessors of the power of the objectness is, in an indirect way, the recognition of the necessity of the rule for considering the locations as the objects in connection with the verbs '*adhiśin*', '*adhīsthā*' and '*adhyās*'. The difference, however, is that while Panini considers the rule to be assigning the designation of the object to the locations, Nagesha merely views the same as indicating the fact that the same possess the power of the objectness. Thus, despite techni-

cally differing from Panini, Nagesha does not rule out the necessity of the rule in viewing the locations as the objects in connection with the verbal bases, 'śiñ' 'sthā' and ās preceded by 'adhi'.

Gadādhara's position

Gadādhara holds that the rule (p. i.4.46) assigns the designation of the object to the locations in connection with the verbal bases 'śiñ' etc. preceded by 'adhi' so that the accusative endings become tenable after the words expressing the locations in 'sthalim adhiśete' (he occupies the ground) etc., and also holds that the rule facilitates the genitive case endings after the word expressing the location in association with primary derivatives such as 'sthalyā adhiśayitā' (he is the occupier of the ground) etc.

He holds the view that the rule (p. i.4.46) assigns the designation of the object to the locations in connection with the verbal bases 'śiñ' etc. preceded by 'adhi' by refuting the claim that the rule '*kartur ipsitatamam karma*' (that which the agent seeks most to obtain through his actions is the object (p. i.4.491) can itself assign the designation of the object to the location as well. According to him, the position of the scholars, who claim the rule p. i.4.49 to be assigning the designation 'object' to locations can be explained as follows : Verbal bases 'śiñ' etc., preceded by the 'adhi', would have an indication in the sense of an operation conducive to the sleeping, i.e. the peculiar contact between the bodily parts and also the ground; and therefore, the location such as the *sthali* (ground) in '*sthalim adhiśete*' would become only the abode of the effect (peculiar bodily contact). Thus, the location is most sought to be obtained by the agent through his actions. Therefore, the rule p. i.4.49 can assign the designation of the object to the location as well.

However, according to Gadādhara, such a claim is not tenable. The verbal roots 'śiñ' etc., preceded by 'adhi', may be used even in the primary sense of mere sleeping without intending to have an indication in the sense of the operation

conducive to the sleeping. And, under such circumstances, the ground (*sthali*), despite being the abode of the peculiar bodily contact, cannot be assigned the designation of 'object' by the rule p. i.4.49 (i.e. cannot be considered to be the *kāraka* sought most to be obtained by the agent through his action) since the same does not possess the effect produced by the operation conducive to sleeping. Thus, the rule p. i.4.46 is needed to explain the statement such as '*sthaliṃ adhiśete*' (he occupies the ground) by facilitating the designation of object to the ground etc. and thereby the accusative case endings after the words standing for the 'ground' etc.

However, it should be noted here that this position of Gadādhara is contradictory to the original intention of Panini that the roots *śiñ* etc., preceded by '*adhi*', are transitive and therefore express the transitive action of occupying etc.

Giridharas position

Giridhara too views the rule (p. i.4.48) as necessary to assign the designation of object to the location. In this connection, he refutes the theory that the *Vārtika* (on p. i.4.51) that the region, time, action and the distance to be travelled get the designation of object in connection with intransitive verbs (*kālabhāvādhva gantavyāḥ karmasamjñā hyakarmaṇām, 'deśaśca'*) can itself be said to assign the designation of the object to even the locations such as '*Vaikunṭha*' in '*vaikunṭham adhyāste*' (he inhabits Vaikuntha) etc., and therefore, the rule (p. i.4.46), assigning the designation of the object to the locations in connection with the intransitive verbs such as '*adhi śiñ*' etc., could be held to be unnecessary. He points out that the *Vārtika* can be said to have assigned the designation of object to the 'region' (*deśa*) etc. only specifically, as '*kuru* region', '*pāñcāla* region' etc. and not, generally as the region that includes the location such as Vaikunṭha 'house', ground, mountain etc. Thus, in order that the regions, covering generally all sorts of locations, should receive the designation of the object in connection with the transitive verbs, the rule '*adhiśiñsthāsām karma*' is necessary.

Observation

Giridhara justifies the rule (p. i.4.48) on the ground that the same is needed to assign the designation of the object to the location such as Vaikuṇṭha 'village', etc. as the locus of certain action. He views that the *Vārtika* 'kālabhāvādhvagantāvyāḥ...' 'deśaśca' can assign the designation of the object to the region only specifically as 'kuru', 'pāncāla' etc. and not generally as location of some action. And therefore, the rule is necessary to assign the designation of the object to the locations as the locus of certain actions.

Also, it should be noted here that the position "that the *Vārtika* can assign the designation 'object' to the location in connection with verbs 'adhiśīṇ' etc. since the same assigns the designation of object to the regions in connection with intransitive verbs" is not quite satisfactory. For, such a position considers that verbs such as 'śīṇ' etc., preceded by 'adhi', are intransitive like 'śīṇ' etc. which are not preceded by 'adhi'. Panini is quite clear in his perception that while 'śīṇ', 'sthā' and 'ās' are intransitive, the same preceded by 'adhi' become transitive and therefore, a separate rule, assigning the designation of the 'object' to the locations in connection with such transitive roots as 'adhiśīṇ', 'adhisthā' and 'adhyās' is necessary. Suppose, 'adhiśīṇ' etc. were intransitive, like 'śīṇ' etc., then the difference between the locative statements such as 'grāme śete' (he lies down in the house), 'vaikuṇṭhe tiṣṭhati' (he stays in Vaikuṇṭha), 'grāme āste' (he remains in the village) and also the corresponding accusative statements such as 'grāham adhiśete' (he occupies the house), 'vaikuṇṭham adhistiṣṭhati' (he inhabits the Vaikuṇṭha) and 'grāmam adhyāste' (he settles down in the village) would not be tenable. Thus, it is imperative to hold that while 'śīṇ', 'sthā' etc., without the prefix 'adhi', are intransitive, the same with the prefix 'adhi', become transitive; and therefore, the rule p. i.4.46 is necessary to assign the designation of object to the location in connection with such transitive verbs.

Explanation of the rule 'abhiniviśaśca'

The rule 'abhiniviśaśca' (The *kāraka*, which functions as

the location in connection with the verbal base 'viś' (to enter), preceded by the prefix 'abhini', is called the object) (p. i.4 47) assigns the designation of 'grammatical object' to the location in connection with the verbal base 'viś' preceded by 'abhini' as an exception to the designation of the 'locus' (*abhikaraṇa*). Consequently, the accusative usage such as '*abhiniviśate sanmāraam*' (he adopts the righteous path), wherein the accusative case 'am', occurring after the word '*sanmārgā*' (righteous path), expresses the location of entering, becomes facilitated. Here too, the prefix 'abhini', indicates the fact that the location of intransitive 'entering' is the object of transitive action of adopting etc. And therefore, the prefixed verbal base '*abhintviś*' becomes transitive and refers to the transitive action of adopting. And such an action can be explained to be the firm mental perfection or refinement obtained through continuous knowledge (*dhārāpanna jñānājanya dhṛḍhatarasamskāra*). And the accusative, after the word '*sanmārgā*', refers to the locushood delimited by the contentness, i.e. objectness of righteous path. Such an accusative meaning is related to the root-meaning 'mental refinement'. Thus, one cognizes from such a statement that the person is the abode of the mental refinement produced from the continuous knowledge regarding the righteous path.

Explanation of locative statement 'pāpe abhiniveśaḥ'

Besides the accusative statements such as '*abhiniviśate sanmārgam*', Sanskrit has the locative statement such as '*pāpe abhiniveśaḥ*' (he has inclination with respect to sinful activities), wherein the verbal derivatives of '*abhiniviś*', i.e. '*abhiniveśaḥ*' etc. are used in association with locatives. However, since the locations in connection with the verbal derivatives of '*aboiniviś*', have been assigned the designation of the object by p. i.4.47, the locative case ending after the word '*pāpa*', expressing the location in '*pāpe abhiniveśaḥ*', becomes untenable. In order that such a statement be explained, Bhaṭṭoji² states that the rule '*abhiniviśaśca*' (p. i. 4.47) should be held to be optionally assigning the designation of the 'object' to the location in connection with the verbal derivatives of '*abhiniviś*'. This is to be

effected by continuing the word 'anyatarasyām' (optionally) from the preceding rule (*parikrayaṇe sampradānam anyatarasyām* p. i.4.44), by resorting to the law of *maṇḍūkapluti* (frog-leap), i.e. skipping of several *sūtras* and supplying the word from previous *sūtra*. Now, since the rule assigns the designation of the object only optionally, i.e. since the rule allows both the designations of the 'locus' and the 'object', the same facilitates both the locative as well as the accusative case endings after the word 'pāpa' etc. expressing the location in connection with 'abhiniviś' depending upon whether the speaker wants the location to be the locus or the object of the action.

Observation

Unlike the verbal bases 'adhiśīṇ', 'adhista' and 'adhyās', which become transitive due to their association with the prefix 'adhi', the verbal base 'abhiniviś' is both intransitive and transitive even with the prefix 'abhini'. This phenomenon is illustrated by the fact that Sanskrit has both locative statement 'pāpe abhiniviśaḥ' and the accusative statement 'sanmārgam abhiniviśate'. When the speaker intends that the verbal bases 'abhiniviś' should refer to the intransitive action of 'inclining towards', the location remains the location and therefore, assumes the locushood by taking locative case endings; whereas when the speaker intends that the same verbal base should refer to the transitive action of 'adopting', the location becomes the object by assuming the accusative case ending. This linguistic phenomenon has been noticed and facilitated by Bhaṭṭoji by holding that the rule p. i.4.47. assigns only optionally the designation of object to the location in connection with 'abhiniviś'.

Alternative explanation optional assigning of the designation of object

Giridhara too holds that the rule p. i.4.47 assigns the designation of the object only optionally. However, he explains such an optional designation by interpreting the word 'ca' in the rule 'abhiniviśaśca' 'ca' as prohibiting the designation of the object in some cases. Thus, since the word 'ca' prohibits

the designation of the object to the location in connection with the verbal base *abhiniviś*, in some cases, both locative (*pāpe abhiniveśaḥ*) and accusative (*abhiniviśate sanmārgam*) are facilitated.

Explanation of the rule 'upānvadhyān vasaḥ'

The rule '*upān vadhyān vasaḥ*' (p. i.4.48) (The *kārika*, which functions as the location in connection with the verbal base '*vas*' (to dwell), preceded by the prefixes '*upa*', '*anu*', '*adhi*' and '*ān*', is called the object when it becomes instrumental in bringing about the actions) assigns the designation of grammatical object to the location in connection with the verbal base '*vas*', preceded by '*upa*', '*anu*', '*adhi*' and '*ān*', as an exception to the designation of the locus (*adhikaraṇa*). Consequently, the accusative usages such as '*grāmam upavasati senā*' (the army has set up a camp in the village), and '*parvatam upavasati*' (he occupies the mountain), etc., wherein the accusative '*am*' occurs after the words '*grāma*' and '*parvata*', expressing the location of dwelling, become facilitated.

Here too, the words '*upa*' etc., prefixed to the verbal base '*vas*' (to dwell), indicate the fact that the locations of the intransitive action of dwelling are the objects of the transitive action of occupying; and therefore, the prefixed verbal bases such as '*upavas*', '*anuvās*' etc. are transitive in their senses and refer to the transitive actions of occupying for a long time etc. And the accusative case endings, occurring after the word '*grāma*' expressing the locus, refer to the locushood conditioned by such action. Thus, one cognizes from such statements as '*grāmam upavasati senā*' that the army is the abode of the action of occupying which conditions the locushood of the village.

Nevertheless, Navyas, like Giridhara,³ hold that the verbal base '*upvas*' refers to the occupying for a long time. And the accusative case ending, after the word expressing the location, refers to the superstratumness which can be related to the verbal base-meaning through the substratumness (*āśrayatā*), an

3. Vibhaktyarthanirṇaya, p. 175.

4. Ibid., p. 176.

occurrence exacting relation. Thus, one cognizes from such a statement that the army is the abode of the action of long staying which, conditions the superstratumness occurring in the village.

Explanation of the locative statement 'grāme upavasati'

However, Sanskrit has the locative statements such as 'grāme upavasati' (he observes a fast in the village) when the verbal base 'vas' (to dwell) is used in the sense of non-eating or fasting.

This is so because, the location of (non-) eating, i.e. the village, wherein the observance of fasting takes place, cannot be considered to be the object of (non-) eating since the village is not what is not eaten, but the village is the place wherein the non-eating or fasting takes place (happens.) In order that such locative statements be facilitated, *kātyāyana* on p. i.4.48 rules that the prohibition of the designation of the object be made in connection with the verbal base 'vas' (to dwell) in the sense of 'as' (to eat) (*vaser asyarthasya pratiṣedhaḥ*). Also, this (*Vārtika*) rule facilitates the accusative statement 'grāmam upavasati' (he occupies the village) provided that the verbal base 'vas' (to dwell) does not refer to the action of fasting but to the action of staying.

Difficulty in the explanation of the term 'asyarthasya'

Nevertheless, a difficulty is encountered in the interpretation of the *Vārtika*. For, the *Vārtika* literally states that a prohibition be made in connection with the verbal base 'vas' in the sense of 'as' (to eat) (*vaser asyarthasya pratiṣedhaḥ*) instead of stating 'in the sense of fasting' (*vaser anasyarthasya pratiṣedhaḥ*).

This difficulty, according to *kaiyaṭā*,⁵ may be overcome by analysing the word 'artha' in 'asyarthasya' as meaning 'nivṛtti' or 'cessation' (from eating) or by analysing 'asyarthasya' as 'a—śi—arthasya' (not-referring to staying).

However, both these explanations of the term 'asyarthasya' are far fetched. Actually what *Kātyāyana* meant to say is

5. Kaiyaṭa on p. i.4.48.

that a prohibition should be made with respect to the designation of the object in connection with the verbal base 'vas' referring to the 'non-eating', i.e., 'fasting' 'anaśyarthasya' or 'abhuktyarthasya'. And therefore, it should be concluded that Katyayana has used the term 'aśyarthasya' instead of the term 'anaśyarthasya or abhuktyarthasya' for the sake of economy.

Rejection of Vārtika as unnecessary

P. i.4.48 states that the location of the action of staying etc. in connection with the verbal base 'vas', preceded by 'upa' etc., gets the designation of the 'object'. And therefore, the accusative case ending is facilitated in 'grāmam upavasati' etc. Katyayana, however, has restricted, by his *Vārtika*, the designation of the object to the location of the action of fasting in connection with verbal base 'upavas' and thereby has facilitated the locative case ending in 'grāme upavasati' (he observes fast in the village).

Patañjali, on the other hand, rejects the *Vārtika* on the ground that in 'grāme upavasati' the village does not function as the location of fasting; rather it functions as the location of 'staying' since the same statement 'grāme upavasati' is to be understood as 'he fasts for three nights by staying in the village' (grāme vasan trirātram upavasati) by supplying the word 'vasan'. Thus, since the village is not the location of the action of staying expressed by 'vasan'; but rather is the location of the action of staying expressed by 'vasan', not preceded by 'upa', the locative case ending becomes automatically (even without the restrictive *Vārtika*) facilitated after the word 'grāma' expressing the location and also the accusative case ending becomes necessary after 'trirātra', expressing the three nights, by 'kālādhvaugh' p. ii.3.5.

Observation

According to some scholars, Patañjalis argument to reject the *Vārtika* is not convincing. Such an argument would disallow the application of the designation of the object to the location with nearly every verbal base. For, it considers

that the location of the action of fasting in the example is 'trirātra' rather than 'grāma'; and since the rule p. i.4.48 would assign the designation 'object' to 'trirātra', the *Vārtika* would need to reject such an application of the designation. However, if this were the case, then the '*Vārtika*' would disallow the application of the designation of the locus (*adhikaraṇa*) in connection with nearly every verb; and consequently, sentences like 'he sleeps in the room' would have to be analysed as 'staying in the room, he sleeps' etc.

Explanation of the accusative statement 'ekādaśim upavaset...'

Sanskrit has the accusative statments such as '*ekādaśim upavaset dvādaśim athavā punaḥ*' (one should abide in a state of abstinence on eleventh day or again on twelfth). Here, the accusative case ending is used after the word '*ekādaśi*' and '*dvādaśi*', expressing the time, i.e. eleventh and twelfth days which function as the locations of the abiding in a state of abstinence. And such an accusative ending should be explained by assigning the designation of the 'object' to the location of the abstinence. However, since the *Vārtika* prohibits the designation of the object in connection with the verbal base '*vas*', expressing the non-eating or fasting (*vaser āśyarthasya na*), the designation of the object cannot be applied to the words expressing the location, i.e. the '*ekādaśi*' and '*dvādaśi*'; and therefore, the accusative case endings after the same words '*ekādaśi*' and '*dvādaśi*' become untenable.

In order to explain the accusative case endings in such cases, Giridhara⁶ holds as follows : 'Abiding in a state of abstinence' (*upavāsa*) means "the abstaining of a person, who has resisted all the evil influences, from the enjoyments which are qualified by the staying with virtuous qualities" (*upāvṛttasya doṣebhyaḥ yastu vāso guṇaiḥ saha, upavāsaḥ sa vijñeyah sarva-bhogavivarjitah*). Consequently, since the verbal base '*upavas*' does not refer to the non-eating or fasting but rather the same base refers to the abstaining, qualified by staying, the *Vārtika* cannot prohibit the designation of the object to the location

of the action of staying in connection with the verbal base 'upavaś'. Therefore, the accusative case endings, after the words 'ekādaśi' and 'dvādaśi' can be explained without any difficulty. Thus, the accusative statement 'ekādaśim upavaset...' is not untenable.

Nageśa's explanation of 'upośya rajanim ekām'

Nageśa too explains the accusative case ending after the words standing for the location in connection with the verbal base 'vas' in 'upośya rajanim ekām' (having abstained for a night) etc. However, his arguments substantially differ from that of Giridhara. According to him, verbal base 'vas', which is enumerated in the first 'bhvādigāṇa' and which refers, to the sense of staying, is meant to be taken by 'vasaḥ' in the rule 'upānvadayān vasaḥ'; and not 'vas', which is enumerated in the second 'adādigāṇa' and which refers to the sense of putting on or assuming etc. This is so because, according to the convention that "between the verbal bases with a loss and non-loss of the 'a' augment in their vikaraṇas, only the verbal base with a non-loss of 'a' augment, should be preferred", only the verbal base 'vas' which is enumerated in the first *bhvādigāṇa* and therefore, has no loss of 'a' augment in its 'vikaraṇa' has to be selected. Now, since the *Vārtika* (*vaser aśyarthasya pratiṣedhaḥ*) prohibits the designation of the object to only the location in connection with the verbal base 'vas', expressing the non-eating or fasting, and not to the location in connection with the verbal base 'vas', expressing the staying, the accusative statement such as 'upośya rajanim ekām' (having abstained for a night), wherein the word 'rajanim', expressing the location of the abstinence, has an accusative case ending, can be explained. Here, the verbal base 'vas' actually belongs to the first 'bhvādigāṇa' and refers to the abstaining, i.e. staying; and therefore, the location, in connection with such a verbal base, can be assigned the designation of the object so that the accusative case ending, after the word standing for such a location, becomes tenable.

It should be observed now that this theory too, like that of Giridhara, explains the accusative case endings after the words expressing location in connection with the verbal base 'vas'

meaning abstaining. However, the difference is that while Giridharas theory explains the accusative statement by stating that 'vas', in such cases, refers to the abstaining qualified by staying, and therefore, the prohibition is not applicable to the location in connection with the verbal base 'upavas'. Nagesa's theory explains the accusative statement by holding that only the 'vas', which refers to the sense of staying is meant to be taken by 'vasah' in the rule and therefore, the prohibition is not applicable to the location in connection with the verbal base 'upavas'

Critical examination

Assumption of the designation of the 'grammatical object' (*karma*) by the 'locations' (*ādhāra*) and the occurrence of the accusative case endings after the words standing for the 'location' must be explained on the basis of the use of the transitive (*sakarmaka*) verbal bases expressing the syntactico-semantic relations of the transitive verbal actions. Consider, for instance, the following sets of examples:

(1A) 'grāme śete' (he lies down in the village), (1B) 'grāmam adhiśete' (he occupies the village), (2A) 'sanmārge viśati' (he settles down in the righteous path), (2B) *sanmārgam abhinivisate* (he adopts the righteous path), (3A) 'parvate vasati' (he lives in the mountain) and (3B) 'parvatam upvasati' (he inhabits the mountain). Here, the instances of 1A, 2A and 3A contain the use of three intransitive verbal bases, namely 'śiñ' (to lie down), 'viś' (to settle down) and 'vas' (to live) respectively; whereas the instances of 1B, 2B and 3B contain the use of corresponding transitive verbal bases, namely 'adhiśiñ' (to occupy), 'abhiniviś' (to adopt) and 'upavas' (to inhabit) respectively. Consequently, it can be observed that the locations such as the 'village', 'righteous path' and 'mountain' assume the status of the grammatical object in connection with the use of the transitive verbal bases. Thus while, in connection with the intransitive verbal bases, the locations of the intransitive action of staying (lying), settling down, and living get the designation of the 'locus' (*ādhikaraṇa*) by the rule 'ādhārodhikaraṇam' (p.i.4.45), the same (locations) assume the status of the grammatical object (*karma*) in connection with the transitive verbal bases such as 'adhiśiñ' (to occupy), 'abhiniviś' (to

adopt) and 'upavas' (to occupy). And this phenomenon of the locations getting the designation of the locus in connection with intransitive actions and assuming the status of the grammatical object in connection with the corresponding transitive actions can be said to have a parallel in other languages mainly in English. For instance, consider :

(1A) John sleeps on the ground,

(1B) John occupies the ground,

(2A) Mary lives in the village,

(2B) Mary inhabits the village.

Here too, the ground and the village, which function as the locations of the action of sleeping and living in connection with the intransitive verbs such as 'sleep' and 'live', function as the grammatical objects of the transitive action of occupying and inhabiting in connection with the use of the corresponding transitive verbs such as 'occupy' and 'inhabit'.

This linguistic phenomenon was recognized as early as 2nd century B.C. by Panini, and therefore, he has ruled that (i) (The location) in connection with the verbal bases 'śīn' (to lie down), 'sthā' (to stay) and 'ās' (to remain), preceded by 'adhi', is called the 'object' (*adhi śīn sthāsām karma*); and (ii) (The location) in connection with the verbal base 'vas' (to dwell), preceded by 'upa', 'anu', 'adhi' or 'ān', is called the object (*upān vadhyān vasah*).

According to these rules, the 'location', such as the 'the village', 'Vaikuṇṭha', 'righteous path', 'mountain' etc., which are the abodes of the intransitive actions of 'lying', 'remaining', 'settling down', 'dwelling' etc., assume the designation of the object in connection with the verbal bases such as 'śīn', 'sthā', 'ās', preceded by 'adhi', 'viś' preceded by 'abhini', and 'vās' preceded by 'upa', 'anu', 'adhi' and 'ān'. Therefore, the accusative statements such as (i) '*grāmam adhiśete*' (he occupies the village), (ii) '*vaikuṇṭham adhyāste*' (he inhabits Vaikuṇṭha) (iii) '*sanmārgam abhinivīśate*' (he adopts the righteous path). '*parvatam upavasati*' (he occupies the mountain) etc. become tenable since the words standing for the locations

receive the designation of the object and consequently they take accusative case endings by the rule '*karmaṇi dvitīyā*' p. ii.3.2.

These rules recognize the linguistic fact that the locations of the intransitive actions such as 'lying', 'staying', 'remaining', 'settling down' and 'dwelling' etc. become the objects in connection with only the transitive actions and therefore, state that the locations become the objects in connection with verbal bases '*śīṇ*' etc. preceded by '*adhi*' etc.

Now as regards the necessity of the rule '*adhi śīṇsthāsām karma*'. Traditionally, most of the epistemologists defend the rule as necessary. However, Nagesha, holds that the rule simply indicates the fact that the locations such as *Vaikuṇṭha*, are possessors of the power of the objectness; whereas the rule '*kartur ipsitatamam karma*' (p. i.4.49) actually assigns the designation of the 'object' to the locations since the same rule assigns the designation of 'object' to all those *kāraṇas* which possess the power of the objectness. This interpretation of the rule, despite accepting the necessity of the rule, makes the same as merely auxiliary in assigning the designation of the object through the rule (p. i.4.49). Nevertheless, the most important aspect of the interpretation to note is that the same recognizes the linguistic fact that the locations of the intransitive actions of lying etc. do become the objects in connection with verbal bases such as '*adhiśīṇ*' etc. which are expressive of transitive actions 'occupying' etc.

Gadādhara too was aware of the linguistic (epistemological) fact that the locations can be assigned the designation of the object in association with the verbal bases '*adhiśīṇ*' etc. by the rule (p. i.4.49) itself since the same locations become the abode of the 'lying', 'staying' etc. which may be viewed to be the effects of the operations leading to the 'lying', 'staying' etc. expressed by the verbal bases '*adhiśīṇ*' etc. However, he views that the verbal bases '*adhiśīṇ*' etc. may at times be simply intransitive and express an intransitive action of 'lying' (i.e. sleeping), 'staying' etc. and not the transitive operations leading to the sleeping etc.; and therefore, the rule '*adhiśīṇ sthāsām*' should be accepted to assign the designation of the object to the location in connection with the verbal bases expressing intransitive

sitive actions. It should be noted now that this position of Gadādhara is quite contradictory to the original intention of Panini that 'śin' etc., preceded by 'adhi', are always transitive and therefore, always express a transitive action of occupying etc.

On the other hand, Giridhara makes a very interesting contribution to the problem of necessity of the rule by refuting the supposition that "the *Vārtika* 'deśaśca' itself can assign the designation of the object to the locations in connection with 'adhiśin' etc. as the same are intransitive and the locations in connection with intransitive verbal roots receive the designation of object by convention. He makes a valid distinction between the intransitive and transitive uses of verbal bases by demonstrating that while the 'locations' in connection with intransitives have locative case endings, the same have the accusative case endings in connection with the transitives and thus justifies a separate rule assigning the designation of object to the locations.

Now, as regards the rule '*abhiniviśaśca*'. This rule assigns the designation of the 'object' to the location of the intransitive action of entering in connection with the verbal base '*abhiniviś*'. However, the same rule should be held to assign the designation of the object only optionally. For, unlike the verbal bases '*adhiśin*' etc., the verbal base '*abhiniviś*' is both transitive and intransitive. Consequently, there are both accusative and locative statements such as '*sanmārgam abhiniviśate*' (he adopts righteous path) and '*pāpe abhiniveśah*' (he has inclination with respect to the sinful activity). Thus, in order that such accusative and locative statements be facilitated, the rule should be held to assign the designation of the object to the location of entering in connection with the verbal base '*abhiniviś*' only optionally.

Finally, as regards the rule '*upānvadhyān vasah*'. This rule assigns the designation of the object to the location in connection with 'vas' preceded by 'upa' 'anu' etc. Nevertheless, in connection with the verbal base '*upavas*', the same rule should be held to assign the designation of the object to the location conditionally as when the verbal base '*upavas*' means something other than non-eating i.e. occupying etc. For, when the '*upavas*' means non-

eating, i.e. fasting, the location does not function as the object; and therefore, the word standing for the same location takes locative case ending in '*grāme upavasati*' (he fasts in the village) etc. In this connection, Kātyayanas *Vārtika*, namely, '*veser āśyarthasya pratiṣedhaḥ*' should be taken to prohibit the designation of the object to the location in connection with '*upavas*' which means 'fasting'. Nevertheless, Patañjali objects to the theory that the *Vārtika* is necessary to state the prohibition. According to him, since the statement '*grāme upavasati*' is to be understood as '*grāme vasān trirātram upavasati*' (he fasts for three nights by staying in the village), the village functions as only the location of staying. Patañjali tries to demonstrate that the village, in such cases, is not the location of fasting but is the location of staying and therefore, the designation of the 'locus' is automatically facilitated. However, according to Dr. Joshi, such a demonstration would disallow the designation of the object to the location in connection with almost every verb since the same (demonstration), by supplying an object like '*trirātra*', etc. provides the time as an object of fasting etc.

Nevertheless, an interesting point to note here is that the verbal base '*upavas*' does take an accusative object so long as it is 'time'. That is to say that the 'time', which functions as the location of the action expressed by the verbal base '*upavas*', does become the object and therefore, takes the accusative case endings. Thus, we have the statements such as '*ekādaśīm upavaset*' (one should observe abstinence on eleventh day) and '*upoṣya rajanīm*' (having observed the abstinence on the night) etc. Now, these statements have been explained, in view of Kātyayanas *Vārtika*, namely, '*vaser āśyarthasya. . .*' by Giridhara and Nagesha that the verbal base '*upavas*' does not mean 'non-eating' or 'fasting' here; but rather the same means either 'abstaining qualified by staying' or 'merely staying'. Nevertheless, in the light of these statements, wherein the words standing for 'time' such as '*ekādaśīm*' and '*rajanīm*' have accusative case endings and function as the location of '*upavas*', it seems justified that Patañjali should reject the *Vārtika* and supply the word '*trirātra*' expressing the 'time' (i.e. three nights) as the

object of the action expressed by the verbal base 'upavas' in 'grāme upavasati' as well. Also, once the *Vārtika*, which prohibits the application of the designation of object to the location in connection with *upavas*, is rejected, the time in the statements 'ekādaśim upavaset' etc. could be explained as having accusative case endings since the locations of time in connection with 'upavas' are naturally the 'objects'.

CHAPTER XXI

ARE KRIYĀVIŚEṢAṆAS (ADVERBS) KARMAS (OBJECTS)

(*kriyāviśeṣaṇānām karmatvam*)

Introduction

Like nouns and substantives, verbs, i.e. actions too can be qualified by using a qualifying clause. Consider, for instance,

- (i) '*nilo ghaṭaḥ*' (pot is blue) and
- (ii) '*stokam pacati*' (he cooks a little).

In the first instance, the noun '*ghaṭaḥ*' (pot) is qualified by the '*nilaḥ*' (is blue) by attributing a quality like blueness. In the second instance, the verb '*pacati*' (cooks) is qualified by the phrase '*stokam*' (a little) by attributing a quality like being a little. Sanskrit uses the terms '*viśeṣaṇa*' (qualifier or modifier) or *guṇavacana* (quality-expressor) for the clause which qualifies or modifies a noun or substantive by denoting the quality of the thing (or person) named to indicate its (his) distinct nature from something else, and is roughly 'equivalent to adjective'. Sanskrit uses the term '*kriyāviśeṣaṇa*' (qualifier or modifier of action) for a clause which qualifies or modifies a verb (i.e. action) by expressing some relation of manner, quality, time, space, etc. so that its mode can be understood; and therefore, is roughly equivalent to 'adverb'.

kriyāviśeṣaṇa thus, can be defined, in general, as the clause which qualifies or modifies the verb (i.e. action) to be accomplished by expressing a relation of quality etc. Now, such a

relation can be either identity (*abheda*) or non-identity, i.e. distinction (*bheda*). Consider, for instance :

- (1A) '*caitramaitrābhyām supyate*' (it is slept by Caitra and Maitra)
 (1B) '*devadatta jānīhi*' (O Devadatta, please understand)
 (2A) '*stokam pacati*' (he cooks a little)
 (2B) '*drutam gacchati*' (he goes quickly).

In the first two instances (1A and 1B), the clauses, namely, '*caitramaitrābhyām*' (by Caitra and Maitra) and '*devadatta*' (O Devadatta) qualify the verbs '*supyate*' (is slept) and '*jānīhi*' (please understand) respectively by expressing the relation of non-identity (i.e. the *kāraṅkas* Caitra and Devadatta are distinct from the action of sleeping and understanding and therefore, they have a relation of non-identity, i.e. they don't have such a close relationships as to identify themselves with the sleeping etc.). On the other hand, in the second two instances (2A and 2B), the clauses namely, '*stokam*' (a little) and '*drutam*' (quickly) qualify the verbs '*pacati*' (cooks) and '*gacchati*' (goes) respectively by expressing the relation of identity (i.e. the quality of being little and that of being quick are the properties of the effect, namely, the becoming soft (*viklitti*) produced by the action of cooking and also of the operation namely, the going (*gamana*) respectively).

Thus, while in the first examples (1A and 1B), the cognitions produced are that "Caitra and Maitra have the agentship of sleeping" and that "Devadatta has the agentship of understanding" respectively, in the second examples (2A and 2B), the cognitions produced are that 'little is identical with cooking' and that 'quick is identical with going' respectively.

In the scrutiny of first and second set of examples, the most significant linguistic phenomenon that strikes us is that while the first sets have the words expressing the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* namely, '*caitrābhyām*' and '*devadattaḥ*' in the instrumental and also in the nominative case endings respectively, the second sets have the words expressing the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas*, namely, '*stokam*' and '*drutam*' in the accusative singular endings (*am*). And

this phenomenon is explained by the fact that the words expressing *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* have the instrumental case endings when the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* are syntactico-semantically related with the action expressed by the verb through a relation of non-identity; whereas the words expressing the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* have the accusative singular endings when the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* are syntactico-semantically related with either effect produced by the action or with the operation through the relation of identity.

Problem

However, epistemologists are divided in their opinion as to the status and characteristics of the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas*. They are guided by the fact that the words expressing the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* are mostly found occurring in the accusative singular endings when the same are related with either the effect, produced by the action, or with the operation, expressed by the verbs, through identity. The syntactico-semantical feature of the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas*, namely, the occurrence in the accusative singular ending, is common to even the words expressing the grammatical objects as the same too occur in the accusative ending in the statements such as 'gramām gacchati' (he goes to the village) and 'odanam pacati' (he cooks rice).

Nevertheless, the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* in 'stokam pacati' and 'drutam gacchati' etc. cannot be considered to be the grammatical objects. For, the rule 'kartur īpsitatamam karma' (p. i.4.49) states that the *kāraka*, which the agent desires most to obtain through his action, is called the object, and hereby implies that the *kāraka*, which functions as the abode of the effect produced by the action, is the object. And on the other hand, the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas*, namely, 'stokam' (a little and 'drutam' (quickly) are by no means, functioning as the abode of any effect produced by the action of cooking and going respectively. Thus, the same *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* cannot be considered to be the grammatical objects of the action of cooking and going respectively. Now, since the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* are not the grammatical objects, and also since Panini has not composed any special rule allowing the accusative case endings after the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas*, the same accusative case endings become difficult to explain in the case of *kriyāviśeṣaṇas*. Also, it should be noted

here that the accusative case endings cannot be explained after the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* even by following the grammatical convention that "neither the unfinished base-words nor the simple finishings such as affixes alone should be used in the language" (*na kevalā prakṛtiḥ prayuktavyā nāpi pratyayaḥ*). For, such a convention lays down only the condition that words should be used in the language with their proper finishings, i.e. affixes, and therefore, unfinished words or word-elements should not be used alone. Consequently, any case ending, even the dative, would fulfill such a condition after *kriyāviśeṣaṇas*; and therefore, the same convention cannot be said to facilitate the accusative case endings after the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas*.

Thus, the Indian epistemologists were faced with the problem of the status and the explanation of this object-like characteristics of the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas*. In the connection, Nagesha holds that the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* can be considered to have the status of the objects since the same function as the qualifiers of the *vyapadeśivadbhāva* objects, and thus explains the object-like characteristics. However, Gadādhara holds that the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* can be considered to have the status of the object by transfer or extended application (*atideśa*) of the objectness since the grammatical convention '*kriyāviśeṣaṇānām karmatvam klībatvam ca*' allows such a status. On the contrary, Giridhara and Khaṇḍadeva reject the theory that the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* need to be considered as the grammatical objects to facilitate the accusative case endings and other object-like characteristics. While Giridhara rejects Gadādhara's theory on the ground that the grammatical convention '*kriyāviśeṣaṇānām karmatvam...*' can be explained to merely assign the accusative endings after the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* due to their object like function; Khaṇḍadeva does so on the ground that the *Vārtika* '*tato nyatrāpi dṛśyate*' assigns the accusative endings after the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas*. Also, the accusative usage is found in connection with *ghaṇanta* words such as '*pākaḥ*' in '*stokam pākaḥ*' etc. In the following pages, we shall give a detailed account of these various theories proposing and rejecting the status of the grammatical object for *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* so that a viable conclusion regarding the status of the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* and their object-like characteristics can be arrived at.

Nageshas position that kriyāviśeṣaṇas are objects by qualifying the effects which are objects by vyapadeśivadbhāva

Nagesha¹ holds that the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* can be considered to have the status of the objects because they function as the qualifiers or modifiers of *vyapadeśivadbhāva* objects. According to him, the verb 'pac' (to cook) in 'stokam pacati' (he cooks a little) refers to an action conducive to the becoming soft (*viklityanukūlavyāpāra*). Here, the becoming soft (*viklitti*) is actually the effect since the same is produced by the action of cooking; nevertheless, the same can be considered to be the object by the convention of designated like object status (*vyapadeśivād bhāva*). Now, the *kriyāviśeṣaṇa*, namely, a 'little' expressed by 'stokam' is related to the becoming soft 'viklitti', the designated like object, through the relation of identity', i.e., qualifies or modifies the 'viklitti' through identity. Consequently, the 'little' (*stokam*), which is in syntactico-semantic agreement with the 'becoming soft', also receives the designation of 'object' by extension; and therefore, the word 'stokam' expressing the '*kriyāviśeṣaṇa*' i.e., 'little', is facilitated the accusative case endings by '*karmani dvitīyā*' (p. ii.3.2).

It should be noted here that the phenomenon of the modifiers or qualifiers (*viśeṣaṇas*) receiving the designation that belongs to what they actually modify is an established linguistic fact. For instance, 'stokam' 'little', when it modifies or qualifies the object i.e. *odana* rice in 'stokam odanam Pacati' 'he cooks little rice', receives the designation of the object that actually belongs to the rice i.e. what it actually modifies. Thus, on the analogy of such an established linguistic phenomenon, the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* too can be claimed to receive the designation of 'object' when they modify or qualify the designated-like object i.e. 'viklitti' in 'stokam pacati' etc. Also, it should be noted here that intransitive verbs such as 'svap' (to sleep) etc. too can be accepted to refer to an action such as sleeping which is conducive to the loss of sensation (*svāpa*) or lightness of body by deep sleep (*śarīralāghava*). And, since the 'svāpa', is the designated like object (*vyapadeśivād bhāvena karma*), the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* such as 'happiness' (*sukham*) in 'sukham svapiti' (he sleeps

happily) too can receive the designation of the object by extension due to their function of qualifying the same *svāpa*'.

Observation

Nagesha has recognized the linguistic function that *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* are basically the qualifiers or modifiers (*viśeṣaṇas*) of the effect or action expressed by the verb (*kriyā*). Thus, he explains that the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* such as *stokam* 'little' in '*stokam pacati*' (he cooks a little) qualify the effect of *viklitti* 'becoming soft' through identity. And, on the basis of such a linguistic function, he determines the status of the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* as the grammatical objects; and thereby justifies the accusative case endings after the words expressing the same (*kriyāviśeṣaṇas*). He explains that even the effects such as '*viklitti*' are objects by the convention of 'designated-like object status' (*vyapadeśivadbhāva*) and therefore, *kriyāviśeṣaṇas*, which actually qualify such effects, can also be considered to be grammatical objects. Now, once the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* are considered as the grammatical objects, the same can be justified in having the accusative case endings after them since the rule '*karmaṇi dvitīyā*' (p. ii.3.2) assigns the accusative endings in the sense of the grammatical objects.

Another point to be observed here is that Nagesha explains the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* as the objects in connection with the intransitive usages such as '*sukham svapiti*' (he sleeps happily) etc. as well. The basic problem, however, with respect to the intransitive usages, is that actions expressed by intransitive verbs do not produce any effect as such; and therefore, the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* cannot be considered to be the grammatical objects by qualifying the effects which are in turn objects by *vyapadeśivadbhāva*. In view of this problem, Nagesha has suggested that intransitive verbs such as '*svap*' (sleep) too refer to an action such as sleeping which is conducive to the loss of sensation (*svāpa*), an effect, so that the '*kriyāviśeṣaṇas sukham*' etc. can be considered to be the grammatical objects by qualifying the same.

This theory has sanctions from other grammarians such as Vāmanajayāditya² as well. He too has explained that '*pratīpa*'

considered to be the grammatical object by extension since the in 'pratīpam vartate' (he behaves adversely) etc. should be same qualifies the 'vartana' (being), the object by *vyapadeśivadbhāva*. (Here, 'vartate' refers to the action 'behaving' conducive to the being (*vartanānukūlavypāra*); and therefore, 'vartana' (being) is actually the effect, but receives the designation of object by *vyapadeśivad bhāva*).

Also, according to Nagesha, such a theory, which views 'svap' etc. as referring to the action of sleeping conducive to the 'svāpa' etc., does not make the same verbs transitive. For, only those verbs, which refer to an action not sharing the same locus as that of its effect (*phalavyadhikaraṇa vyāpāravācaka*) is transitive and the sleeping shares the locus of its effect 'svāpa' by occurring in the body.

It should be observed now that Nagesha has used the theory of *vyapadeśivad bhāva* to facilitate the status of grammatical object to the effects and thereby to extend the same to the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas*, which qualify them. He does not, however, accept the linguistic fact that *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* simply occur in the accusative case endings adverbially, and therefore, are merely adverbs.

Theory that vyapadeśivadbhāva principle is not necessary

Some grammarians, as Khaṇḍadeva³ reports, explain the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* as objects without resorting to the convention of *vyapadeśivadbhāva*. According to them, verbs like 'pacati', can be held to refer to the action of cooking conducive to the origination of becoming soft (*viklity-utpattyanukūlavypāra*). And, in such a reference, the origination of becoming soft is the effect and the becoming soft (*viklitti*) is the object due to its possessing the origination (*utpatti*). Since the *kriyāviśeṣaṇa*, namely, 'a little' (*stokam*) qualifies the becoming soft through identity, the same is also the object by extension; and so there is no need to resort to the *vyapadeśivadbhāva* convention to explain the status of grammatical object to the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas*.

Observation

This theory too accomplishes the goal of explaining the status of grammatical object for the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* by extension due to their qualification of the object, namely, 'viklitti'. However, the difference between this and Nageshas theory is that while *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* such as *viklitti* are explained to be the objects here even without resorting to the *vyapadeśivadbhāva* convention Nageshas has to take recourse to the *Vyapadeśivadbhāva* convention to explain the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* as the objects. Also, an epistemological problem plagues this theory. That is to say that since 'viklitti' is considered to be the regular object without resorting to *vyapadeśivadbhāva* convention, the accusative case ending could be insisted after the words expressing the same *viklitti*; and therefore, the incorrect statement such as '*stokam viklittim pacati*' (he cooks the becoming soft a little) can be insisted.

Gadādhara's position that kriyāviśeṣaṇas are objects by the convention 'kriyāviśeṣaṇānām karmatvam'

Gadādhara⁴ holds that *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* are grammatical objects by the convention that "*kriyāviśeṣaṇas* have the status of the object and have the neuter endings after the words expressing them" *kriyāviśeṣaṇānām karmatvam klibatvam ca*.⁵ What Gadādhara means is that the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* receive the status of the grammatical object by transfer or extended application (*ātideśa*) of the objecthood which originally rests in the grammatical objects such as 'odana' (rice) in '*stokam odanam pacati*' (he cooks rice a little). Now, since the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* receive the objecthood by transfer, no case ending except the accusative can occur after the words expressing the same *kriyāviśeṣaṇas*. This is so because, the rule '*karmaṇi dvitīyā*' (p. ii. 3.2) assigns only the accusative endings in the sense of the objects. Thus, in '*stokam odanam pacati*' etc. the word '*stokam*', expressing the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas*, namely, 'a little' has only the accusative case ending (*am*) and not any other case ending such as nominative, instrumental etc.

4. Vyutpattivāda, p. 31.

5. Paribhāṣāvṛtti, Śiradāva.

Nevertheless, it should be accepted, according to Gadādhara, that the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* such as 'stokam' (a little) relate through only identity to the action such as cooking in 'stokam pacati' (he cooks a little) etc. Consequently, the cognition produced from such a statement is that 'the cooking is identical with a little' etc. Such a cognition of identity is produced in spite of the fact that the words expressing the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* such as 'stokam' are found occurring in the accusative case ending 'am', which is different from the conjugational ending 'ti' of the verb 'pacati'; and also that usually the cognition of identity is ruled between only the two meanings expressed by the words occurring in the same case endings. Therefore, according to Gadādhara, the sequence of the accusative such as 'stokam' and the verb such as 'pacati' is also conducive to the cognition of identity between the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* and the actions.

Observation

It should be observed here that the actual status of the grammatical object cannot be conferred on the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* since the same are not the abode of the effect produced by the action such as cooking. However, the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* do betray all the essential characteristics of the grammatical object, namely the occurrence in the accusative case endings etc. In view of this difficulty, Gadādhara has explained that the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* receive the grammatical status of the object by transfer or extended application (*atideśa*). This transferred status facilitates the manifestation of all the characteristics of an object by *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* despite them not being actually grammatical objects. Thus, in order that the manifestation of the essential characteristics of an object by *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* be facilitated despite their not being actual objects, Gadādhara has resorted to the principle of transfer.

An important difference between the theory of Nagesha, namely, that the effects are the objects by the convention of designated like object status (*vyapadeśivadbhāva*) or the theory that the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* are objects because they qualify such designated like objects (i.e. effects) and also the theory of Gadādhara explained above is that while the former treats the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* as the qualifiers or modifiers of the designated-

like objects (i.e. effects) and therefore, extends the designation of the object to the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* due to their agreement with the designated-like object, the latter treats the same *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* as the part(s) of speech which behave like objects despite being so. That is to say that this theory of Gadādhara transfers the grammatical status of the object to the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* so that certain characteristic of the objects like the accusative case endings etc. can be facilitated to the same *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* without them actually being the grammatical objects.

Giridharas position that 'kriyāviśeṣaṇānām karmatvam' assigns merely the accusative endings after the kriyāviśeṣaṇas and not the status of the object

Giridhara makes a very significant contribution to the status of the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* in Sanskrit. According to him, the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* cannot be considered to be the grammatical objects despite their functioning as the qualifiers or modifiers of actions.

Consequently, the accusative case endings, found occurring after such *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* as '*stokam*' etc., must be held to be indicating only the function of the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* as the qualifiers or modifiers of actions; they do not indicate the status of being the grammatical objects. He holds, therefore, that the convention '*kriyāviśeṣaṇānām karmatvam klibatvam ca*' merely assigns the accusative case endings, which are explanatory to the object like function of the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* and therefore, does not assign the status of the grammatical object to the same.

Observation

The position of Giridhara that the convention '*kriyāviśeṣaṇānām karmatvam...*' assigns merely the accusative case endings after the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* and does not assign the grammatical status of an object to the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* has a distinct advantage over the theory proposed by Gadādhara that "the same convention assigns the grammatical status of an object to the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas*". Since the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* are not the objects, but merely receive the accusative case endings after the words expressing them, the same *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* can have the accusative case endings after them in the active instances like '*stokam pacati*'

(he cooks a little); nevertheless, they need not have the nominative endings in the passive instances and hence the incorrect passive usages such as '*stokah pacyate* (the little is cooking) cannot be imposed.

Giridhara's theory is based on the epistemological fact that only the *kāraḥ*, which relate to the effect or to the action expressed by the verb through a relation other than that of identity, are the grammatical objects; and since the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* such as *stokam* (a little) are related to the effect *viklitti*, (the becoming soft) through the relation of identity, the same are not the object *kāraḥ*, but merely receive the accusative case endings after them. Giridhara explains further, the phenomenon of the assumption of the accusative case endings by the principle of *karmānuvāda* (the expression of the functioning as the objects). For instance, the accusative case ending '*am*' is found in '*tāram śabdāyati*' (he makes sound loudly) etc. after the word '*tāra*' (loud) expressing the modifier or qualifier of the object '*śabda*' (sound) included in the verbal form; and such an accusative is to be explained by the principle of *karmānuvāda* as the word '*tāra*' merely expresses the qualifier (loudness) of the sound, the actual grammatical object.

Now, finally, it can be stated that Giridhara radically differs from Gādādhara in his theory of *kriyāviśeṣaṇas*. He recognizes the fact that *kriyāviśeṣaṇas*, despite functioning as the objects by way of qualifying the action, cannot be considered to be the grammatical objects since the same qualify only through the relation of identity; he views also that the accusative case endings, found after the words expressing the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas*, can be explained by the principle of *karmānuvāda* and hence the same accusative need not be taken to suggest the object status for the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas*.

Khaṇḍadevas position that kriyāviśeṣaṇas are not objects; but accusative is facilitated after them by 'tato' nyatrāpi dṛsyate'

Khaṇḍadeva⁶ too, like Giridhara, holds that the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* cannot be considered to be the grammatical objects. According to him, only the *kāraḥ*, which fulfil the syntactico-

semantical expectancy of 'what does one do' (*kim karoti*) etc. are to be considered as the grammatical objects. For instance, the village (*grāma*) in 'he goes to the village' (*grāmam gacchati*) fulfils the syntactico-semantical expectancy of 'what does one go to' (*kim gacchati*); and therefore, the same is the grammatical object with respect to going. However, the part of speech, which fulfils the syntactico-semantical expectancy of 'how does one do' (*katham karoti*) etc., are not to be considered as the objects. Consequently, since 'a little' (*stokam*), in 'he cooks a little' (*stokam pacati*), fulfils the syntactico-semantical expectancy of 'how does one cook' (*katham pacati*), and not the expectancy of 'what does one cook' (*kim pacati*), the same part of speech, i.e., 'a little' (*stokam*), cannot be considered to be the object with respect to the cooking. Also, since other *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* such as 'happily' (*sukham*) etc. too in 'he sleeps happily' (*sukham svapiti*) etc. fulfil the syntactico-semantical expectancy of only 'how does one sleep' (*katham svapiti*) etc., and not the expectancy of 'what does one sleep' (*kim svapiti*), the same *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* cannot be considered to be the grammatical objects anywhere. Consequently, accusative case endings cannot be enjoined after the words expressing the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* in the sense of the object.

Khaṇḍadeva, therefore, maintains that the accusative case endings must be explained after the words expressing the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* only by way of the case endings occurring in non-*kāraka* instances. And this is facilitated by the fact that the *Ślokavārtika* (on p. ii.3.2), namely, "Accusative is to be assigned after 'ubha', 'sarva' etc. and also the same accusative is found in the case of the repetitions of three words (*āmreḍitas*) and elsewhere" (*ubhasarvatasoh kāryā dhiguparyādiṣu triṣu dvitīyā āmreḍitānteṣu tato'nyatrāpi dṛśyate*) assigns the accusatives in non-*kāraka* instances such as *kriyāviśeṣaṇas*. Thus, the accusatives, found occurring after *kriyāviśeṣaṇas*, are only non-*kāraka* case endings enjoined without the implication of the objecthood for the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas*.

Observation

Khaṇḍadeva is very clear in his perception that *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* cannot be considered to be the objects since only those

kāraḥ that fulfil the syntactico-semantic expectancy of 'what does one do' (*kim karoti*) and not the expectancy of 'how does one do' (*katham karoti*) are the objects; and the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* do not fulfil the expectancy of 'what does one do' (*kim karoti*). Thus, he explains the accusative case endings after *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* as only the non-*kāraḥ* case endings enjoined by the *Ślokavārtika* 'tatonyatrāpi dṛśyate'.

However, the difficulty in his explanation is that the *Ślokavārtika* on p. ii.3.2 cannot be claimed to assign the accusative after the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas*. For, the first part of the *Vārtika*, namely, 'ubhasarvatasoh' assigns the accusatives in connection with the *upapadas* such as 'ubhayatas', 'sarvatas' etc., and therefore, the last part of the *Vārtika*, namely, 'tāto nyatrāpi dṛśyate' too should assign the accusative in connection with some other *upapadas* such as 'abhitas' etc. and not in connection with the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas*. Thus, Khaṇḍadevas argument that the *Ślokavārtika* assigns the accusatives after *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* is not satisfactory.

Explanation of kriyāviśeṣaṇas in connection with ghañantas

However, the theories, which consider the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* as the grammatical objects, face an epistemological problem. The *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* have been considered as the grammatical objects in view of their function, namely, the qualifying or modifying of the action or the effect expressed by the verbs. Now, suppose the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* are the grammatical objects due to their function of qualifying the action or the effect, then the same would receive the designation 'objects' even when they qualify the action expressed by a *ghañanta* word such as 'pākaḥ' (cooking). Consequently, the accusative case endings become necessitated after the words expressing such *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* as 'stokam' in association with *ghañanta* words such as 'pākaḥ'; and thus, would lead to the incorrect accusative usages such as 'stokam pākaḥ' (cooking is a little) etc.

Grammarians view

In view of such a problem, grammarians, especially Kātantra etc., have held that the actinos expressed by *ghañantas* are of two types (i) those that are yet to be accomplished

(*sādhya*) and (ii) those that are already accomplished (*siddha*). When the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* qualify the action that is yet to be accomplished, the words expressing the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* have the accusative singular ending and neuter gender ; whereas when the same *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* qualify the action that is already accomplished, the words expressing the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* have the same case, number and gender as that of the *ghaṇanta* words. Thus, the accusative usages such as '*stokam pākāḥ*' (cooking is little) are explained by the fact that the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* such as '*stokam*' (little) qualify the action of cooking which is yet to be accomplished. On the other hand, the non-accusative usages such as '*stokāpi bhaktiḥ*' (a little devotion) are explained by the fact that the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* such as '*stoka*' (a little) qualify the action of devotion which is already accomplished.

Logicians view

According to the logicians, however, only the usage, '*stokāḥ pākāḥ*', wherein the word '*stokāḥ*', expressing the *kriyāviśeṣaṇa*, agrees in case, number and gender is correct; whereas, the usage '*stokam pākāḥ*', wherein the word '*stokam*', expressing the *kriyāviśeṣaṇa*, does not agree in case number and gender, with the *ghaṇanta* word '*pākāḥ*', is incorrect. Therefore, the logicians hold that the rule is that the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas*, when they qualify the action expressed by the finite form of verb, must have the accusative singular ending and neuter gender after the words expressing them; whereas the same *kriyāviśeṣaṇas*, when they qualify the action expressed by the *ghaṇanta* words, should not have the accusative singular ending and neuter gender, i.e. they must agree in case, number and gender with the *ghaṇanta* words. Thus, according to them, while the usage '*stokam pacati*' is grammatically correct, the usages '*stokam pākāḥ*' etc. are grammatically incorrect since the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas*, such as '*stokam*', have the accusative singular ending and neuter gender; and therefore, do not agree with the *ghaṇanta* word '*pākāḥ*' etc. in case number and gender.

However, Gadādhara explains the accusative usages involving *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* as follows : The *kriyāviśeṣaṇas*, which qualify the action expressed by the verbal form with a meaningful conjugational ending, are considered to be objects ; whereas the

kriyāviśeṣaṇas, which qualify the action expressed by the verbal form with a meaningless ending, i.e., the *ghañanta* word *pākāḥ* etc, are not to be considered as the objects. Since the *kriyāviśeṣaṇa*, namely, '*stokam*' (a little) qualifies the action of cooking, expressed by the verbal form '*pacati*', with a meaningful ending '*ti*', in '*stokam pacati*', the same is to be considered as the object of cooking; whereas since the *kriyāviśeṣaṇa*, namely, '*stokaḥ*' (a little), qualifies the action of cooking expressed by the verbal form '*pākāḥ*', with a meaningless *ghañ* affix, in '*stokaḥ pākāḥ*' the same is not to be considered as the object. Thus, the accusative usage '*stokam pacati*' is correct because the *kriyāviśeṣaṇa*, namely, '*stokam*' is the object; whereas the accusative usage '*stokam pākāḥ*' is incorrect because the *kriyāviśeṣaṇa*, namely, '*stokam*' is not the object (i.e., the non-accusative usage '*stokaḥ pākāḥ*' where '*stokaḥ*' agrees in case, number and gender with *pākāḥ*', is alone correct).

Observation

It can be observed now that both grammarians and logicians have appreciated the difficulty of considering the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* as the grammatical objects as the grammatical status of the object for *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* would lead to the accusative usages in connection with the *ghañanta* words as well. However, both have proposed diametrically opposing theories to explain the resulting accusative usages. Grammarians have proposed the theory that only the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* that qualify the action yet to be accomplished (*sādhya*) are to be considered as the objects and therefore, have explained the accusative usage such as '*stokam pākāḥ*' as being correct due to the fact that *ghañanta* words '*pākāḥ*' etc., express the action which is yet to be accomplished (*sādhya*). On the other hand, logicians such as Gadādhara have proposed the theory that only the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas*, which qualify the action expressed by a word with a meaningful ending, are to be considered as the objects; and therefore, have explained that only the non-accusative usages such as '*stokaḥ pākāḥ*', wherein the words, expressing the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* such as '*stokaḥ*' etc., agree in case, number and gender with the *ghañanta* word *pākāḥ*, are correct, whereas the accusative usages such as '*stokam pākāḥ*', wherein

the words expressing the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* such as 'stokam' do not agree in case, number and gender, with the *ghañānta* word *pākah*, are in correct.

Critical Examination

Indian epistemologists have recognized the fact that *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* are qualifiers (modifiers) of action (i.e. operation) or effect by expressing a relation which can be either identity (*abheda*) or non-identity (*bheda*). While the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* such as 'caitrābhyām', in 'caitrābhyām supjate' (it is slept by Caitra and Maitra), which qualify the action of sleeping by a relation of non-identity, are to be considered as *kāraṇas*, the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* such as 'stokam', in 'stokam pacati' (he cooks little), which qualify the action of cooking by expressing the relation of identity, are to be considered as non-*kāraṇas*.

The special feature of the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas*, especially of those that qualify the action by expressing the relation of identity, is that they take accusative singular ending and neuter gender. Thus, 'stokam', which qualifies the action of cooking by identity, takes the accusative singular ending (*am*) and neuter gender in 'stokam pacati'. Now, this special feature of the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas*, especially the accusative singular ending, is found in the case of the grammatical objects in Sanskrit. Thus, the words expressing the grammatical objects such as 'grāmam' (the village) in 'grāmam gacchati' (he goes to the village) etc. too take the accusative singular ending.

The epistemologists differ in their views as to whether the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* are to be considered as the actual grammatical objects enjoined by the rule '*kartur ipsitatamam karma*' (p. i.4.99) or not (the rule assigns the designation 'object' to only those *kāraṇas* that are sought most to be obtained through the actions, i.e., are the abode of the effect produced by the actions). This disagreement amongst themselves has led Indian epistemologists to propose mutually contrasting theories as regards the status of the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas*.

Negesha proposes that the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* can be considered to have the status of the grammatical objects. According to him, since the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* function as the qualifiers of the effects which are the objects by *vyapadeśivadbhāva* convention,

the same *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* too can be considered to be the objects. Now, when the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* are considered to be the objects, the same can be explained to have the accusative case endings by the rule '*karmaṇi dvitīyā*' (p. ii.3.2) as the rule assigns the accusative in the sense of the objects.

It should be observed however, that Nagesha was primarily concerned with the explanation of the accusative case endings for *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* and therefore, he has considered the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* as the grammatical objects. Therefore, he should not be misunderstood as not distinguishing the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* from the grammatical objects. Also, he must be given due credit for recognizing the basic function of the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* (i.e. that they qualify the effect expressed by verbs) and for explaining the object-status for them on the very basic linguistic function.

Gadādhara too explains the status of the grammatical object to the *kriyā-viśeṣaṇas*. He does so on the basis of the grammatical convention that '*kriyāviśeṣaṇas* have the status of object...' *kriyāviśeṣaṇānām karmatvam ktibatvam ca*). However, Gadādhara states that the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* receive the status of the grammatical object by transfer or extended application (*atideśa*). The difference between the theory suggested by Nagesha and also the theory of Gadādhara is that while the former considers the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* as the objects and therefore, facilitates the accusative and other characteristics of the grammatical objects to the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas*, the latter explains the status of the objects to the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* by transference (*atideśa*); and therefore, allows the grammatical operations based on the status of the objects such as the assumption of accusative case endings etc. without actually considering them as objects.

Giridhara and others are opposed to the theory that the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* are the grammatical objects by *vyapadeśivadbhāva* convention or by *atidesa*. He holds that the convention *kriyāviśeṣaṇānām karmatvam* assigns only the accusative case endings after the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* which explain merely the object like function of the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas*. According to Giridhara, *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* cannot be considered to have the status of the grammatical objects since only the *kāraṅkas*, which are related to

the action through a relation of non-identity, can be considered to be the objects; and the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* are not the *kāraṇas* which can relate to the action expressed by the verb through a relation of non-identity.

This theory of Giridhara gains further significance by the fact that *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* are merely the qualifiers or modifiers of the action (or the effect as the case might be) and therefore, they must be viewed as 'adverbs' and not as the *kāraṇas* which accomplish the action.

Khaṇḍadeva too refutes the claim that the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* have the status of the object. And he considers the characteristics of the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas*, i.e., the accusative endings as a peculiar linguistic phenomenon. And therefore, he tries to explain the same accusative endings as an exceptional or irregular feature sanctioned by the *Ślokavārtika* '*tato*' *nyatrāpi dṛśyate*'. He is right in so far as regarding the accusative endings as a peculiar linguistic phenomenon; however, his explanation that the *Ślokavārtika* (*tato*'*nyatrāpi dṛśyate*) assigns the accusative is not tenable since the same is meant to be assigning accusative endings after only the adnominals (*upapadanimittakadvitīyā*). Now, it can be concluded that Indian epistemologists have perceived the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* mainly as the qualifiers or modifiers of the action or the effect. However, the object-like function of *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* such as the accusative case endings made some of them to consider the same as the objects, while others have duly refused such a claim and explained such a function as the very essential function of *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* and also the accusative case endings as the peculiar linguistic phenomenon of the same.

Finally, as regards the problem of considering the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* as objects in connection with the *ghaṇānta* words. Both grammarians and logicians are at great pains to establish the status of grammatical object for *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* so that they can explain the accusative usage such as '*stokam pākaḥ*'. While grammarians have proposed the theory that the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas*, which qualify the action yet to be accomplished are objects; and therefore, the accusative endings after the same *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* are correct when the *ghaṇāntas* express an action yet to be accomplished (*sādhya*); the logicians, especially Gadādhara etc.,

have proposed the theory that only the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas*, which qualify the action expressed by a verbal form with a meaningful ending, are objects; and therefore, the accusative endings after the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* in connection with *ghaṇantas* are incorrect. Nevertheless, in view of the difficulty in considering the *kriyāviśeṣaṇas* as objects, it is appropriate to conclude that the accusative usage in connection with the *ghaṇanta* words is merely an irregular linguistic phenomenon.

CHAPTER XXII

THEORY OF NON-KĀRAKA CASES, A LINGUISTIC STUDY OF UPAPADA AND KARMAPRAVACANĪYA ACCUSTAIIVES

(*akāra-kavibhaktiyartha vicārah*)

Introduction

Sanskrit has two types of usages : (i) a usage wherein the syntactico-semantic relation of a *kāra-ka* item is perceived to be qualifying the action expressed by the verb, and (ii) a usage wherein no syntactico-semantic relation of a *kāra-ka* item is perceived to be qualifying the action expressed by a verb; but, on the other hand, the relation of a noun is perceived to be qualifying another noun. For instance, consider the following two examples :

(i) '*taṇḍulam pacati*' (he cooks rice grains) and (ii) '*ubhayataḥ kṛṣṇam gopāḥ*' (Gopas are on both sides of Kṛṣṇa). In the first instance, the rice grains are the object *kāra-ka*s since they are desired most to be obtained by the agent through his action of cooking; and therefore, the accusative (*am*), following '*taṇḍula*' standing for 'rice grains, expresses the syntactico-semantic relation of the object *kāra-ka* (i.e. rice grains) which qualifies the action of cooking by being accomplished. In the second instance, Kṛṣṇa is not the object *kāra-ka* since he is not desired most to be obtained by the agents (Gopas) through their action of remaining on his sides (here the action of staying is not really expressed by any verb in the sentence, but such an action is merely implied and also the implied action is intended to be merely a state of affairs and therefore, is not expected to describe the objectness of any object). Consequently, the accusa-

tive (*am*) following 'kr̥ṣṇa', standing for Kṛṣṇa, does not express the syntactico-semantic relation of any object *kāraka*, which can qualify the action by being accomplished.

The above instances demonstrate that while the accusative (*am*) following 'taṇḍula', in the first instance, is a *kāraka vibhakti* (i.e. a case ending, which expresses the syntactico-semantic relation of a *kāraka*), the accusative (*am*) following 'kr̥ṣṇa' in the second instance, is an *akāraka vibhakti* (i.e. a case ending, which does not express any syntactico-semantic relation of a *kāraka*).

Consequently, case endings (*vibhaktis*) can be divided into two main groups : (i) those that express *kāraka* relations (*kāraka-vibhakti*) and (ii) those that express non-*kāraka* relations (*akāraka-vibhakti*). The case endings such as 'am' found after the *kāra*kas such as the object (*karman*) in *taṇḍulam pacati* (he cooks rice grains) etc. are *kāraka-vibhaktis* since the same express the syntactico-semantic relation of the object *kāraka*, namely, rice grains (*taṇḍula*) with respect to the action of cooking. On the other hand, the case endings such as 'am', found after the non-*kāra*kas such as *kr̥ṣṇa* in 'ubhayataḥ kr̥ṣṇam gopāḥ' (*Gopas* are found on both sides of Kṛṣṇa) etc., are non-*kāraka vibhaktis* since the same express only the non-*kāraka* relation of Kṛṣṇa with respect to the two sides and not the syntactico-semantic relation of any *kāraka* with respect to any action. While the *kāraka vibhaktis* express the relation of the syntactico-semantic items (*kāraka*) with respect to an action, the non-*kāraka vibhaktis* express only the relation of non-*kāraka* items with respect to the meaning item expressed by another non-verbal words (i.e. a noun etc.)

The non-*kāraka vibhaktis* can be generally stated to be the case endings which are found after the words standing for the non-*kāra*kas, and therefore, expressing a relation of a noun with respect to another noun and not with respect to any action. For instance, consider once again the statement 'ubhayataḥ kr̥ṣṇam gopāḥ'. Here the accusative (*am*), which is a non *kāraka vibhakti*, is found after the word 'kr̥ṣṇa' standing for non-object *kāraka*; and therefore, expresses a relation of the noun, Kṛṣṇa, with respect 'to another noun, i.e., 'ubhayatas' (both sides).

The non-*kāraka vibhaktis* can be, further, classified into two main groups : (i) those that are caused by certain words (other than verbs), i.e., added to a noun on account of the presence of certain other nouns requiring addition (*upapadanimittaka*), and (ii) also those that are found in association with certain indeclinables called *karmapravacanīyās* (or 'object denoter') which facilitate the designation of object by expressing actions; and therefore, are used without any verbs expressing actions (*karmapravacanīyayukte*). For instance, consider the following two statements. (i) '*upary upari lokam hariḥ*' (Hari is not far above the word) and (ii) '*śākalyasya saṁhitām anu prāvarṣat*' (it has rained following the recitation of *Samhitā* of Śākalya). In the first statement, the accusative '*am*', found occurring after the word '*loka*' (world), is an *upapadanimittaka vibhakti* because it is caused, i.e., added to the noun '*loka*' on account of the fact that repeated occurrence of the words '*upary-upari*' requires the addition of the same accusative for grammatical correctness ; and thus does not express any *kāraka* relation. In the second instance, the accusative '*am*', found occurring after the word '*saṁhitā*', is a *karmapravacanīyayukte dvitīyāvibhakti* because it is found in association with the indeclinable '*anu*' called *karmapravacanīya*, which facilitates the designation of object to the *saṁhitās* by expressing the action of listening not used in the sentence.

Now, as regards the technical definition of the terms *upapadanimittaka dvitīyā*¹ and *karmapravacanīyayukte dvitīyā* : Patañjali does not explain the term *upapada* as such. However, under the rule '*karmani dvitīyā*' (p. ii. 3.2), he enumerates certain *upapadas* such as '*abhitas*', '*paritaḥ*', '*samayā*', '*nikaṣā*' etc. and states that the accusative should be used in connection with them also. The term '*upapada*' etimologically means a word which is near or close by. Now, since certain indeclinable words such as '*samayā*', '*nikaṣā*' etc. have been enumerated, *upapadanimittaka dvitīyā* can be explained as the accusative added after a word on account of the presence of influence or certain *upapadas* enumerated in grammar. Thus, the accusative case '*am*', found occurring after the words such as '*grāma*' (village) in

1. Mahā Bhāṣya, p. ii.3.2.

'*abhitas parito vā grāmam*' (something exists around or near the village) etc., can be stated to be *upapada nimittaka dvitīyā*.

On the other hand, Patañjali explains the term *karmapra-vacanīya*' (object-denoter) (adnominal) elaborately. While commenting on the rule '*karmappravacanīyāḥ*' (p. i. 4. 8,3) Patañjali states that the long and elaborate technical designation such as '*karmappravacanīya*' is made by Panini on the ground that the same should be meaningful (*anvartha*) and should convey certain ideas as to why such a designation is made. According to him, *karmappravacanīyas* are those words which have expressed the action ('*karmaproktavantah karma pravacanīyāḥ*.) He holds that *karmappravacanīyas* are those words which do not express the present actions, but rather express the action of the verb not used in the sentence (*ke punaḥ karma proktavantah ?*, *ye samprati kriyām nāhuḥ*'). From this explanation of the term, it becomes clear that Patañjali has taken the term *karmappravacanīyas* as expressive of the action of the verb not presently used in the sentence and therefore, facilitating the designation of the object to the '*saṁhitā*' etc.

However, Kaiyaṣa is not in agreement with Patañjali.² He is concerned with the fact that suppose the *karmappravacanīyas* are accepted as the words expressing the action, then the accusatives, which become effective in association with such *karmappravacanīyas*, would become *kāraśa vibhaktis* on account of their expressing the relations that qualify the action. Also, he refutes the suggestion that *karmappravacanīyas* are words which suppose, i.e. imply the verbs expressing the action (*kriyāpadāpeksakah*). According to him, such an implying also makes the *vibhaktis* associated with it *kāraśa vibhaktis* like '*am*' in '*prādeśam viparilikhati*' (he draws a line having measured the ground). Here the word *vi* implies the verb '*vimā*' (to measure); and therefore, the accusative '*am*' in association with such '*vi*' becomes a *kāraśa vibhakti*. Again, for the same reason, he refutes the suggestion that *karmappravacanīyas* are suggestive of some particular action (*kriyāviśeṣa dyotaka*). According to him, the suggestiveness of a *karmappravacanīyas* is possible provided

that the sentence consists of a verb expressing a general action; and once the *karmapravacanīyas* suggest the particular action, the accusative, effected in association with them, would be expressing the *kāraka* relation qualifying such a particular action and thus would become a *kāraka vibhakti*.

Therefore, Kaiyaṭa states that *karmapravacanīyas* must be held to be merely suggestive of *kāraka* relations such as cause and effect relation. For instance, the *karmapravacanīyas* such as 'anu' in '*śākalyasya saṁhitām annu prāvraṣat*' (it has rained following the listening of the *saṁhitās* of Śākalya), suggest the cause and effect relationship between the listening and the raining; and thus, the accusative 'am', in such a case, is a *karmapravacanīyayukte dvitīyā*.

Bhartrhari too seems to hold an identical view. He states 'neither do *karmapravacanīyas* suggest the action, nor do they express any action, nor do they expect syntactico-semanticallly any verb; but they merely suggest the syntactico-semanticall relations conditioned by the verb' (*kriyāyā dyotako nāyam sambanddhasya na vācakaḥ. nāpi kriyāpadāpekṣi sambandhasya tu bhedakaḥ*).

Problem

Since the *upapada vibhaktis* are the case endings added on account of the presence of another noun, the meanings they expresses are non-*kāraka* relations that qualify the other nouns. In this connection, Giridhara³ states that 'the syntactico-semanticall relation of a noun is established in all sentences in only two ways : (i) either through '*sāmānādhikarāṇya* or through *śaṣṭhi*'. (*nāmno dvidhaiva sambandhaḥ sarvavākye vyavasthitah. sāmānādhikarāṇyena śaṣṭhyā vāpi kvacid bhavet*). According to this statement, a noun can be related to another noun either through *sāmānādhikarāṇya*, i.e. relation of identity or through *śaṣṭhi* relation, and therefore, such relations must be admitted as the meanings of *upapada vibhaktis*.

However, there is difference of opinion as to what words exactly form the list of *upapadas* and also as to what kinds of non-*kāraka* relations *upapada vibhaktis* refer to. Khaṇḍadeva

holds that the *upapada* accusatives refer to some peculiar relations, like relational adjunctness; whereas Nagesha and others hold that the accusatives refer to the relation of space etc. Therefore a detailed study of all the *upapadas* becomes necessary.

Also, since *karmapravacanīya vibhaktis* are the case endings effected in association with *karmapravanīyas* that have replaced the verbs and function like unexpressed verbs, the meanings they express must be *kāraka* relations only. Nevertheless, scholars like Nagesha, Gadādhara and others differ amongst themselves as to what is the meaning of the accusative effected in association with *karmapravacanīyas*. While Nagesha firmly believes that *karmapravacanīyas* merely suggest the syntactico-semantic relations and the accusatives actually express such relations, Gadādhara and Khaṇḍadeva usually posit a theory that *karmapravacanīyas* alone express the *kāraka* relations such as cause and effect relations and the accusatives refer to the superstratumness etc. To substantiate these claims, and to critically examine these various theories, we shall provide a detailed account of various *upapada* usages and also *karmapravacanīya* usages in the following pages.

Vārtika ruling accusative in association with 'upapadas'

Under the rule '*karmaṇi dvitīya*' (p. ii. 3.2), Patañjali quotes a Vārtika⁴ which is considered as the standard rule assigning the accusatives in association with the *upapadas*. The Vārtika states that the accusatives should be used in association with '*ubhayataḥ*', '*sarvataḥ*', '*dhik*' and also in association with three repeated words such as '*upari*' etc. Also, it states that accusative is seen elsewhere from the above list of words.

Meaning of accusatives in association with 'ubhayatas and 'sarvatas'

According to above Vārtika, the words '*ubhayatas*' and '*sarvatās*' are *upapads* and the accusative, in association with such words, are *upapada vibhaktis*. Consider for instance, '*ubhayataḥ kṛṣṇam gopāḥ*' (Gopas are on both sides of Kṛṣṇa)

4. *ubhasarvatasoḥ kāryā dhig uparyādiṣu triṣu dvitīyā āmreḍī-tānteṣu tatonytrāpi dṛśyate.*

and 'sarvataḥ kṛṣṇam gopāḥ' (Gopas are on all sides of Kṛṣṇa). Here the 'am', following 'kṛṣṇa', is an *upapada vibhakti* since the same is effected due to the words 'ubhayataḥ' and 'sarvataḥ'.

Both Nagesha⁵ and Giridhara are in agreement that the accusative, in the above case, refers to the relation of space (*sāmbandhitva*). And the indeclinable 'tas' refers to the presence (*vyṛtti*). Thus, one cognizes from such statements that Gopas are present on both sides that are spacially related to Kṛṣṇa and that Gopas are present on all sides that are specially related to Kṛṣṇa respectively.

However, Khaṇḍadeva⁶ holds that the accusative in such cases refers to the relational adjunctness (*pratiyogitva*). And the same is related to the activity (leading to the staying) through the staying conditioning the adjunctness. Thus, according to him, the cognition is that that the activity is leading to the staying of the Gopas which conditions such adjunctness of Kṛṣṇa.

It should be noted that Khaṇḍadeva, due to ritualists peculiar theory that all relations must qualify the activity, holds this position which is contradictory to the notion that *upapada dvitīyas* refer to non-*kāraka* relations.

Meaning of accusative in association with 'dhik'

According to the Vārtika, the word 'dhik' (fie upon or shame on) is also an *upapada*; and therefore, the accusative in association with such an *apadana* is an *upapadavibhakti*. Consider, for instance 'dhik kṛṣṇābhaktaṁ' (fie upon the non-devotee of Kṛṣṇa). Here the word 'dhik' refers to the blame or sensure (*niṇdā*).

According to the grammarians,⁷ the accusative, in association with 'dhik', refers to a non-*kāraka* sense of mere relation. Thus, the cognition is that the censure is in regard to the non-devotee of Kṛṣṇa.

Logicians such as⁸ Jagadīśa too accept that the accusative,

5. Laghumañjūṣā, p. 466.

6. Bhāttarahasya, p. 67.

7. Laghumañjūṣā, p. 1232.

in such cases, refers to non-kāraḥa relation. Nevertheless, they hold that the objectness, i.e., contentness (*viṣayatva*) is the accusative meaning. Thus, the cognition is that the censure has the non-devotee of Kṛṣṇa as its object or content (i.e. censure is with respect to non-devotee of Kṛṣṇa).

However, ritualists, especially Khaṇḍadeva⁹ and others hold that the accusative in such cases refers to the locushood (*ādhāratva*) a kāraḥa relation. And such a locushood is related to the activity through the relation of conduciveness to the shame or censure. Thus, the cognition is that the activity is conducive to the censure occurring in the non-devotee of Kṛṣṇa. Again, since all the relations must qualify the activity in Mīmāṃsā system, the kāraḥa relation of locushood is accepted as the accusative-meaning by Khaṇḍadeva.

Meaning of accusative in association with words of repeated occurrence ('upari' etc.)

Third category of *upapada* word is of repeated occurrence (*āmreḍitānta*). Vārtika mentions three types of '*āmreḍitāntas*'. They are : '*upary upari*' (not far above or the upper side), '*adho'dhah*' (not far below or the lower side) and '*adhy adhi*' (over and above). Therefore, the accusatives in association with such repeated words are *upapada dvitīyās*. Consider, for instance, '*upary upari lokam hariḥ*' (Hari is not far above the world), '*adho' dho lokam hariḥ*' (Hari is not far below the world) and '*adhy adhi lokam hariḥ*' (Hari is just over or above the world).

According to Nagesha,¹⁰ '*upary upari*' refers to 'the occurrence not far above or upper side'. The accusative in association with such words, refers to the non-kāraḥa relation nearness (*sāmipyā*). Thus, the cognition is that Hari is situated towards the not too far above or upper side of the worlds.

Giridhara,¹¹ on the other hand, holds that the repeated words '*uparyupari*' refer to the region which is the locus of the

8. Śabdasaktiprakāśikā, p. 357.

9. Bhāṭṭarahasya, p. 67.

10. Laghumañjūsā, p. 1232.

11. Vibhaktyarthanirṇaya, p. 176.

nearness conditioned by the farness of heaven. And the accusative, in association with such words, refers to the inherence (*samavetatva*) which is related to the farness. Thus, the cognition is that Hari is situated in the region which is the locus of the nearness conditioned by the farness of heaven inherent in the worlds.

However, ritualists state that the accusative, in such cases, refers to the *kāraka* relation of locushood (*ādhāratva*). And such a locushood is related to the activity through the relation of conduciveness. Ritualists are not concerned with the fact that such accusatives are non-*kāraka* accusatives; and therefore, must refer to only non-*kāraka* relations. For them, the qualification of the activity by all the syntactico-semantic relations is of primary importance in a sentence and therefore, violation of a semantic convention like the distinction between *kāraka* and *akāraka vihhaktis* is insignificant.

Meaning of the accusative in association with 'abhitah', 'paritah' etc.

According to the Śloka Vārtika 'tato' nyatrāpi dṛśyate', *upapada* accusatives are found in association with certain other *upapadas* in addition to the three kinds of *upapadas* (*āmreḍitāntas*) already mentioned. The other *upapadas* are generally enumerated to be 'abhitah' (on both sides), 'paritah' (on all the sides), 'samuayā' (in the neighbourhood), 'nikaṣā' (in the vicinity of), 'hā' (fie upon or shameon) and 'prati' (with respect to). This is held to be so, because the Vārtika under p. ii. 3.2 mentions 'abhitah' etc. as the *upapadas* which influences the accusative case endings. Thus, we have the accusative usages such as 'abhitah grāmam' (on both sides of the village), 'paritah grāmam' (on all sides of the village), 'samayā grāmam' (in the neighbourhood of the village), 'nikaṣā grāmam' (in the vicinity of the village), 'hā kṛṣṇābkaktam' (shame on the non-devotee of Kṛṣṇa and 'bubhukṣitam na prati bhāti kiñcit' (nothing appears to (the mind of) the hungry).

Of the six *upapadas*, the first two, namely, 'abhitah' and 'paritah', denote the same sense as that of 'ubhayataḥ' and 'sarvataḥ' respectively. Also, the penultimate *upapada* listed above, namely, 'hā', has the same sense as that of 'dhik'. That

leaves only 'samayā', 'nikaṣā' and 'prati' with newer meanings to be discussed.

Jagadīśa states that both 'samayā' and 'nikaṣā' refer to the nearness. And, the accusative, in association with them, refers to the spacial limits or neighbourhood of a place (*avadhiva*). Thus, the cognition in 'samayā (nikaṣā) grāmam' is that the nearness is conditioned by the spacial limits, i.e. neighbourhood of the village.

However, Khaṇḍadeva holds that the accusative in association with 'samayā' and 'nikaṣā' refers to the conditioning (*nirūpitatva*). And such a conditioning is related to the activity (*bhāvanā*) through the meaning of 'samayā' and *nikaṣā* i.e. nearness. Thus, according to Khaṇḍadeva, the cognition in 'samayā (nikaṣāyā) grāmam' is that the activity is conditioned by the nearness of the village.

Now, as regards the meaning of the accusative in association with *prati*. Giridhara holds that the word 'prati', along with the verb 'bhāti', refers to the contentness of the knowledge. And the accusative, in association with 'prati', refers to the inherence (*samavetatva*). Such an inherence is related to the knowledge with the help of the meaning of 'prati'. Thus, the cognition in 'bubhukṣitam na pratibhāti kiñcit' is that nothing is the content of the knowledge inherent in the hungry.

However, Khaṇḍadeva interprets the statement 'bubhukṣitam na pratibhāti kiñcit' in two ways : (i) 'whatever appears is not to the hungry one' (*yat kiñcit pratibhāti tan na bubhukṣitam*), and (ii) 'whatever appears to the hungry is nothing much' (*yat bubhukṣitam pratibhāti tan na kiñcit*). In both the interpretations, he holds that the accusative, occurring after 'bubhukṣita', refers to the superstratumness (*ādheyatva*); and such a superstratumness is related to the absence referred to by the negative particle.

Both these interpretations are grammatically correct. While the second one connects the meaning of the negative particle with a noun 'bubhukṣita'; and therefore, is a *paryudāsa*, the first one connects with the meaning of the negative particle with the action expressed by the verb 'pratibhāti', and therefore, is a *prasajyapratishedha*. Since in both the interpretations, accusatives are viewed to express the superstratumness, they are *kāraka* relations for Khaṇḍadeva.

Meaning of the accusative in connection with yāvat

Logicians have taken '*tato nyatrāpi dṛśyate*' to govern the accusatives in connection with '*yāvat*' (boundary or limit) and '*rte*' (except) as well. Thus, they explain the accusative usages such as '*naḍim āvan mama puram*' (my city is upto the river), '*vidyām rte naraḥ śocyah*' (man is deplorable without knowledge) as *upapada divtīyā* usages.

Jagādīśa¹² holds that '*yāvat*' refers to the boundary or limit (*maryādā*); and the accusative refers to the conditioning (*nirūpakatva*). Thus, the cognition in '*naḍim yāvat mama puram*' is that my city has the boundary conditioned or delimited by the river.

According to him, '*yāvat*' refers to the complete pervasion (*abhivyāpti*) as well. Thus, in statements such as '*gṛham yāvad dhanam*' (wealth is as much as the home), the cognition is that 'wealth is completely pervading the home.'

Gadādhara¹³ too considers that '*yāvat*' is an *upapada* governing the accusative; and states that boundary or limit (*maryāda*) and complete pervasion (*abhivyāpti*) are the meanings referred to by '*yāvat*'. However, he holds that boundary or limit can be of two types: spacial (*deśarūpa*) or temporal (*kālarūpa*). The temporal limit means being the non-substratum of the action (of worshipping etc.) which occurs after the specified time. Thus, the word '*yāvat*' refers to the temporal limit means it refers to the antecedent absence of what is other than the specified time. And the accusative, added on account of such a word refers to the counter-positiveness. Thus, in statements such as '*daśamīm tu yāvat prapūjayet*' (one should worship upto the tenth day), the cognition is that one has the worship which pervades the antecedent absence conditioning the counter-positiveness of the tenth day.

The spacial boundary or limit means being the non-substratum of the action (of going etc.) which occurs upto a specified space. Thus, the word '*yāvat*' refers to the spacial limit means it refers to the antecedent absence of what is other than

12. Śabdaśakti Prakāśikā, p. 358.

13. Vyutpattivāda, p. 374.

specified space limit. Again, the accusative, added on account of such a word, refers to the counterpositiveness. Thus, in statements such as '*kāśītaḥ kauśikīm yāvat yāti*' (he goes up to Kauśikī from Kāśī), the cognition is that one has the action 'going'—which pervades the antecedent absence conditioning the counterpositiveness of Kauśikī.

List of *karmapravacanīyas*

The *karmapravacanīyas* are eleven, namely, *anu*, *upa*, *apa*, *pari*, *ān*, *prati*, *abhi*, *adhi*, *su*, *ati*, and *api*. Pāṇini, under the governing, rule, i.e., section heading rule '*karmapravacanīyah*', which assigns the designation '*karmapravacanīya*', for the words, rules the following as *karmapravacanīyas*.

- (i) '*anurlakṣaṇe*' (*anu* is a *karmapravacanīya* in the sense of 'sign' '*lakṣaṇa*') (i.4.84);
- (ii) '*upādhike ca*' (*upa* is a *karmapravacanīya* in the sense of both 'superior' (*adhika*) and inferior (*hiha*) (i.4.87);
- (iii) '*apapari varjane*' (*apa* and *pari* are *karmapravacanīyas* in the sense of 'exclusion' '*varjana*') (p. i.4.88);
- (iv) '*ān maryādāvacane*' (*ān* is a *karmapravacanīya* in the sense of limit '*maryādā*') (i.4.89);
- (v) '*lakṣaṇetthambhūtākhyāna bhāga vīpsāsu pratiparyanavaḥ*' (*prati* '*pari*' and *anu* are *karmapravacanīyas* in the sense of sign '*lakṣaṇa*', 'statement of circumstance' (*itthambhūtākhyāna*), 'share' (*bhāga*) and pervasion (*vīpsā*) (i.4.90);
- (vi) '*abhir abhāge*' (*abhi* is a *karmapravacanīya* in the '*pratiḥ*' sense of *lakṣaṇa* etc. excepting 'share' '*bhāga*' (i.4.91);
- (vii) '*pratinidhi pratidānayoḥ*' (*prati* is a *karmapravacanīya* in the sense of 'representative' (*pratinidhi*) and 'exchange' (*pratidāna*);
- (viii) '*adhipari anarthakau*' (*adhi* and *pari* are *karmapravacanīya* when meaningless (i.e. 93);
- (ix) '*suḥ pūjāyām*' (*su* is a *karmapravacanīya* in the sense of respect) (i.4.94);
- (x) '*atir atikramaṇe*' (*ati* is a *karmapravacanīya* in the sense of 'superabundance' (*atikramaṇa*) etc.) (i. 4. 95);
- (xi) '*apiḥ padārtha sambhāvanā nivasarga garha samuccayeṣu*' (*api* is a *karmapravacanīya* in the sense of 'word understood' (*padārtha*) etc.) (i.4. 96).

Meaning of the *karmapravacanīyas* and of the accusatives associated with them

Epistemologists disagree amongst themselves as to the meanings of the *karmapravacanīyas* and also that of the causa-

tives associated with them. While grammarians like Nagesha maintain that *karmapravacañīyas* are merely suggestive of certain *kāraka* relations and the accusatives associated with them actually express the relations, both logicians and ritualists oppose such a view and hold that *karmapravacanīyas* themselves express *kāraka* relations and the accusatives, in association with them, refer to the superstratumness. For instance, consider '*śākalyasya samhitām anu prāvarṣat*' (it has rained following, i.e. consequent upon the listening of the *Samhitās* of Śākalya).

Nagesha¹⁴ holds that the accusative in association with '*anu*' expresses the relation of sign and signed (*lakṣya lakṣaṇa bhāva*) and also the cause (*hetu*); and the *karmapravacanīyas* such as the word '*anu*' are only suggestive of the fact that such a relation of sign and signed and also 'cause' are the meanings of the accusative. According to him, '*lakṣaṇa*' means being the object of the knowledge which causes the knowledge of an event. For instance, the recitations of *samhitās* are the *lakṣaṇas* since they are the object of the knowledge which causes the knowledge that rains follow the *samhitās*. Thus, the cognition in '*samhitām anu prāvarṣat*' is that the raining is the object of the knowledge caused by the knowledge of the *samhitās* which are identical with the cause of raining.

However, logicians such as Gadādhara¹⁵ disagree with Nāgesha and hold that the *karmapravacanīyas* are expressive of the *kāraka* relations such as cause and effect relationship. Gadādhara maintains that the *karmapravacanīyas* such as '*anu*' have been enjoined in the sense of the '*lakṣaṇa*' which is nothing but the *kāraka* sense of cause and effect relationship. According to him, the accusatives, in association with such *karma pravacanīyas*, refer to the superstratumness. Thus, the cognition from '*yajñam anu prāvarṣat*', for instance, is that the raining, the effect, is conditioning the causality that occurs in the *yajña*.

Khaṇḍadeva and other ritualists too support Gadādhara's view. They suggest that the *karmapravacanīyas* express the sense

14. Śekhara, p. 470.

15. Vyutpattivāda, p. 381.

of *kāra* relation. However, they hold that the *karmapravacanīyas* such as 'anu' express the sense of *lakṣaṇa* along with the sense of causation. They too hold that the accusative, in such cases, refers to only the superstratumness. And the cognition from 'japam anu prāvarṣat' for instance, is that activity is conducive to the raining which conditions both the causation and the *lakṣaṇatva* occurring in the recitation.

It can be observed now that while Nagesha, the grammarian, considers the *karmapravacanīyas* such as 'anu' to be merely suggestive of the fact that the raining is the effect of the listening of *samhitās* and the same *samhitās* are the cause of raining; logicians such as Gadādhara and ritualists such as Khaṇḍadeva hold that the *karmapravacanīyas* such as 'anu' actually express such a relation and the accusatives are expressive of only the superstratumness.

Function of 'prati', 'pari' and 'anu'

To illustrate the all important difference between the theories of the *karmapravacanīyas* of the grammarians and that of logicians etc., we may consider few more *karmapravacanīya* accusative usages.

The indicinable words, 'prati', 'pari' and 'anu' have been assigned the designation '*karmapravacantya*' in the sense of sign (*lakṣaṇa*) or indication (*jñāpaka*), the statement of circumstance or particular way (*itthambhūtākhyāna*), the share entitled to (*bhāga*) and pervasion (*vīpsā*) by p. i.4.90. Consider, for instance, 'vrkṣam prati, pari anu vā vidyotate vidypt' (the lightening shines upto the tree). Here the tree is the sign (*lakṣaṇa*) or the indicator (*jñāpa*) and the lightening is 'to be signed' (*lakṣya*) or 'to be indicated' (*jñāpya*).

Nagesha and other grammarians hold that such a relation of sign and signed or indicator and also indicated is the meaning of the accusative following 'vrkṣa'; and the *karmapravacanīyas* such as 'prati' are merely suggestive of the fact that the accusative expresses such a sense.

On the other hand, Gadādhara insists that while the *karmapravacanīyas* such as 'prati' etc. express the relation of

indicator and also indicated, the accusative expresses the sense of the superstratumness or conditioning. Khaṇḍadeva too follows Gadādhara in stating that the *karmapravacanīyas* such as 'prati' etc. express such a relationship and the accusative expresses the superstratumness. The only difference between Gadādhara and Khaṇḍadeva, is, however, that while the former holds that such a meaning is related to the 'lightening', the noun meaning, the later holds that such a meaning is related to the activity ; and this is only a theoretical difference between the logicians and the ritualists.

Consider also, 'sādhur devadatto mātaram prati pari anuvā syāt' (Devadatta is nice to his mother). Here Devadatta is nice to his mother means he acts in such a way that pleases his mother. And the *karmapravacanīyas* 'prati' etc. are used in the sense of 'such pleasing way'.

Nagesha and other grammarians hold again that the relation of pleasing way is the meaning of the accusative following 'mātṛ' and the *karmapravacanīyas* are merely suggestive of such a relation.

On the other hand, Gadādhara and Khaṇḍadeva insist that the *karmapravacanīyas* such as 'prati' etc. express the sense of the relation with respect to the act of pleasing. And the accusative expresses the relational adjunctness or conditioning. Thus, both logicians and ritualists again disagree with the grammarians that *karmapravacanīyas* are merely suggestive of such relations.

Consider, also the statements 'yaḍ atra mām prati syāt' (whatever share might belong to me). Here the share means the ownership of the property and, as usual, Nagesha holds that the *karmapravacanīyas* merely suggest the relationship of ownership which is actually expressed by the accusative ; whereas Gadādhara and Khaṇḍadeva regard the same ownership as the meaning of the *karmapravacanīyas* and the relation of possessing or conditioning as the accusative-meaning.

However, an exception to the theory of the *karmapravacanīyas* is found with respect to the function of the *karmapravacanīyas* assigned in the sense of pervasion (*vīpsā*). Epistemologists of all the three branches of philosophy, namely, grammar, logic and ritualism, hold *karmapravacanīyas* assigned in the

sense of pervasion, to be merely suggestive or meaningless. Thus, Nagesha holds that in '*vr̥kṣam vr̥kṣam prati siñcati*' (he sprinkles water to each and every tree) etc., the '*karmappravacanīyas*', namely, '*prati*' etc. are merely suggestive of the pervasion of sprinkling and the sense of pervasion is conveyed by the repetition (*dvirukti*) of *vr̥kṣam* itself. Gadādhara and Khaṇḍadeva too propose that since the sense of the pervasion is already covered by the *dvirukti*, the *karmappravacanīyas* in such cases are meaningless. However, they hold that since a *kāraka vibhakti* is always stronger than an *upapada vibhakti*, the accusatives found in such cases are *kāraka vibhaktis*.

Critical examination

Pāṇini has recognized two types of usages : (i) usages wherein the syntactico-semantic relation of a *kāraka* item is found qualifying an action and also (ii) usages wherein no syntactico-semantic relation of a *kāraka* is found qualifying any action ; but rather, the relation of a noun is found to be qualifying another nominal item. While '*taṇḍulam pacati*' (he cooks rice grains) is a usage wherein the syntactico-semantic relation of the object *kāraka*, namely, 'rice grains' is found to be qualifying the action of cooking, '*ubhayataḥ kṛṣṇam gopāḥ*' (Gopas are present on both sides of Kṛṣṇa) is a usage wherein the relation of the noun, namely, the sides is found to be qualifying Kṛṣṇa, another nominal item. Consequent upon such usages, he has called the case endings (*vibhakti*), which express the syntactico-semantic relations of a *kāraka* item, as *kāraka vibhaktis* and the case endings, which do not express any such relations, as *akāraka vibhaktis*.

The non-*kāraka vibhaktis*, which can be generally described as case endings added to a noun on account of the presence of another word (other than a verb) are classified mainly into two groups : (i) *upapada vibhaktis* or the case endings that are added on account of the presence of other words listed under p. ii.3.2, and *karmanavacanīya vibhaktis* or the case endings that are added on account of certain words called *karmappravacanīyas* (object denoter) or words employed to facilitate the designation of 'object' by expressing an action (p. i.4.83).

The *upapadas* such as 'ubhayataḥ' etc. represent a unique linguistic phenomenon. They effect accusative cases although the word, to which an accusative is added, does not stand for grammatical object. This phenomenon is to be explained by stating that the accusative cases are used in the language to denote certain functions of the nouns which are other than that of being grammatical object as well. In the case of *ubhayataḥ-kṛṣṇam gopāḥ* (Gopas are on both the sides of Kṛṣṇa) etc., wherein the *upapada* words 'ubhayataḥ' etc. effect the accusative after the words 'kṛṣṇa', the *upapadas* certainly do not denote the function of Kṛṣṇa being the grammatical object; on the contrary, they denote merely the function of Kṛṣṇa being near to the *Gopas* spacially. This fact has been technically stated by grammarians and other epistemologists as the *upapada vibhaktis* expressing the non-*kāraka* relations. Thus, Nagesha and Giridhara have stated that the accusative in association with the *upapada*, namely, 'ubhayatas', refers to the relation of space (*sambandhitva*). And the same relation of space is related to the sides, another nominal meaning.

It should be observed here that ritualists like Khaṇḍadeva too recognize the fact that *upapadavibhaktis* are non-*kāraka vibhaktis*; and therefore, the same cannot refer to any syntactico-semantic relation of a *kāraka* item to the action. Nevertheless, due to the peculiarity of their theory, namely, that all the parts of speech must be related to the productive activity (*bhāvanā*), referred to by conjugational ending, they try to postulate certain unconventional meanings like relational adjunctness (*pratiyogitva*) for the *upapada* accusatives, which can be related to the activity.

Now, as regards the listing of various *upapadas*. Obviously there has been a great confusion regarding what forms the exact list of *upapadas*. Vārtika lists 'abhitāḥ', 'paritāḥ', 'samaya', 'nikaṣā', 'hā' and 'prati' as *upapadas*. However, others have found that, in addition to the above words, accusative is used with certain other words some of which are synonymous with such words as 'abhitāḥ'. Thus, they added *ubhayataḥ*, 'sarvataḥ', 'dhik' etc. to the list. Following the same principle, Gadādhara too has listed 'yāvat' etc. as *upapadas* effecting accusative. Therefore, Vārtika listing of the *upapadas* need not be taken to

be restrictive ; but merely indicative of *upapada* status for some words.

Sanskrit has accusative usages such as '*śākalyasya samhitām, anu prāvarṣat*' (it has rained following the listening of the recitation of the *samhitās* of Śākalya). Here, the word '*samhitām*' occurs in the accusative case ending and thereby facilitates the cognition of the sentence meaning such as 'the rain has been effected following the listening of the *samhitās*'. In such a cognition, the *samhitās* function as grammatical objects of the action of listening. Nevertheless, there occurs no verb such as '*ṣṛṇvan*' (listening) which can express the action of listening and thereby facilitate the function of the *samhitās* as the grammatical object with respect to listening and also thereby facilitate the accusative case ending after the word standing for *Samhitās*. And, unless some word expresses the action of listening, the function of the *Samhitās* as the grammatical object and also the accusative case after the word '*samhitā*' cannot be explained. Now, in view of this fact, it might be admitted that the indeclinable word '*anu*', which is found immediately after '*samhitām*', expresses the action of 'listening' for which there is no word in the sentence, and thereby facilitates the object status of the *samhitās* in connection with listening.

Recognizing this all important linguistic fact, Pāṇini has ruled that '*anu*', '*prati*', '*pari*', etc. are *karmapravacanīyas*, i.e., are those which facilitate the status or function of certain items as the being grammatical objects by expressing the action for which there is no word in the sentence; and then stated that accusatives are to be used in association with such *karmapravacanīyas*.

Patañjali too recognizes this fact, and therefore, states that *karmapravacanīyas* are those words which express the action of the verb not presently used in the sentence. Although, he does not directly state that *karmapravacanīyas* are the words which facilitate the status or function of certain items (like *samhitās*) being the grammatical object, he makes it abundantly clear that *karmapravacanīyas* do facilitate the function of such items as the grammatical object by expressing the action of listening etc. for which no words are used in the sentence.

However, Kaiyaṣas interpretation of the function of the *karmapravacanīyas* has totally changed the outlook of the later epistemologists and has revolutionalized the concept of the *karmapravacanīyas*. His theory that *karmapravacanīyas* are merely suggestive of the syntactico-semantic relations such as cause and effect relationship is based on the ground that suppose the *karmapravacanīyas* are held either to imply the verbs expressing the action or to suggest a particular action for which the verbs are not used, then the accusative associated with such *karmapravacanīyas* would become *kāraka vibhaktis*; and such an eventuality must be avoided at any cost. His theory does recognize the fact that, in cases like '*samhitām anu prāvarṣat*', no verbs, expressing the action of listening etc. are present; and therefore, the *karmapravacanīyas* have to facilitate the objecthood of the *samhitā* etc. Nevertheless, he does not accept the direct denotation for the *karmapravacanīyas* in the action of the verbs unused in the sentence due to the fear of accusatives becoming the *kāraka vibhakti*; but rather, he tries to accommodate the objecthood of the *samhitā* etc. by holding that the *karmapravacanīyas* are merely suggestive of the syntactico-semantic relations such as the cause and effect relation conditioned by the action of listening etc. for which the verbs are not used. Thus, Kaiyaṣa has established the concept that the *karmapravacanīyas* are merely suggestive of the relation of cause and effect etc.

Bhartṛhari too has proposed an identical theory and states that *karmapravacanīyas* neither suggest an action, nor do they express an action, nor do they expect any verbs but they are merely suggestive of the relation conditioned by the action.

This had led most of the grammarians, including Nagesha, to hold that *karmapravacanīyas* are merely suggestive of the syntactico-semantic relations such as cause and effect relation conditioned by the action of listening etc. in '*samhitām anu prāvarṣat*' etc. and also to hold that the accusatives in association with such *karmapravacanīyas* are actually expressive of such a relation. However, it must be observed here that this theory leaves much to be desired as the same does not satisfactorily explain how the objecthood of the *samhitā* etc. can be facilitated unless either a verb or a *karmapravacanīya* expresses

the action of listening etc. Also, this theory does not explain how the accusatives can express the syntactico-semantic relations conditioned by an action unless an action is either implied or expressed by *karmapravacanīyas*.

In view of this epistemological difficulty, Gadādhara and also Khaṇḍadeva have tried to establish the theory that the *karmapravacanīyas* themselves express the syntactico-semantic relation of cause and effect etc. Probably, they, have reckoned that when the *karmapravacanīyas* express the *kāraka* relations, the same *karmapravacanīyas* imply an action as well and thereby the objecthood of the *samhitās* etc. can be facilitated. Consequently, they have also held that accusatives in association with *karmapravacanīyas* express the superstratumness etc. which can be related to the objecthood of the *samhitās* etc. Thus Gadādhara and Khaṇḍadeva have proposed a theory which comes very close to the original intention of Panini that *karmapravacanīyas* facilitate the objecthood of the 'samhitās' etc. by expressing the action not represented by any verb in the sentence.

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