

**EPISTEMOLOGY,
LOGIC AND GRĀMMAR
(ANALYSIS OF SENTENCE-MEANING)**



VOL. I

Dr. V.P. BHATTA

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EPISTEMOLOGY, LOGIC AND GRĀMMER IN THE ANALYSIS OF SENTENCE-MEANING

Vol. I

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Sanskrit Dictionary

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PREFACE

Words have traditionally been accepted as the means of communication. However, as the science of linguistics, epistemology and logic developed, the philosophers of both East and West were confronted with the problems of the analysis of sentence and its meaning : the functions of words in conveying the meanings, the syntactico-semantic relations between the individual word meanings, the nature of the total sentence meaning and its constituent parts etc. In India, three systems, namely, grammar (*Vyākaraṇa*), ritualism (*Mīmāṃsā*) and logic (*Nyāya*) have dealt with these problems.

Indian grammar, especially Paninian grammar, has laid the foundation for the analysis of sentence and its meaning. It has recognized that words, when correctly used, convey the intended meaning and hence are the means of communication. Besides the derivative techniques of words, Panini's grammar has established the theories of syntax and semantics. It has analysed the basic parts of speech such as *kāraṇas* (syntactico-semantic items) and *kriyā* (action); and defined various grammatical categories such as agent, object, instrument etc. It has recognized that each grammatical category has a particular grammatical function and accordingly assigned a particular grammatical status for each of the grammatical categories.

However, both *Mīmāṃsā* and *Nyāya* have further enriched the theories of sentence meaning. The ritualists have considered the words as errorless means of knowledge. They have established the theories of sentence meaning based on the inherent capacity of words to denote the connected and syntactico-semantically related meanings. Also, they have established the theory of the sentence meaning based on the comprehension of

the syntactico-semantical relations obtained through *sāṃsarga-maryādā*. According to the ritualists, the productive or accomplishing activity (*bhāvanā*) is the chief qualificand (nucleus) of sentence meaning, and hence all the *kāraṅkas* are qualifiers or modifiers of it. Thus they have provided a fundamentally different analysis of sentence meaning.

The rise of Navya Nyāya logic brought about a qualitative change in the analysis of sentence meaning. Epistemology and logic were incorporated into the analysis of sentence meaning. It was considered as the knowledge or cognition derived from words, '*śabdabodha*'. Also, Nyāya introduced the logical process into the analysis of word and meaning and accepted only such things which are not obtained otherwise as the word meanings. Logicians analysis of grammatical categories, focussed on the epistemological and logical function of the same. Thus, the three systems, viz. grammar, ritualism and logic combined together have presented theories of sentence meaning which are divergent and based on grammar i.e. linguistic principles, ritual interpretation, epistemology and logic.

Further, individual epistemologists, within each of these systems, such as Patañjali, Kaiyata, Jagadīśa, Gadādhara, Maṇḍana, Khaṇḍadeva etc., have developed their own analysis of sentence and its meaning by proposing different analysis of various grammatical categories, the constituent parts of sentence meaning. However, the analysis of sentence meaning, as represented in Indian classical grammar, Mīmāṃsā and Navya-nyāya logic, are not available in modern languages. Although some Eastern and Western scholars have presented the analysis of the sentence meaning of the grammar and also that of the logic to a limited extent, a systematic account of the analysis of sentence meaning presenting the view points of all the three different systems viz. grammar, ritualism and logic is very much needed.

The purpose of the present volume is, therefore, to provide a comprehensive account of Indian theories of sentence and its meaning according to all the three different systems viz., grammar, logic and ritualism. Also, the purpose of the volume, is to provide a systematic account of the arguments of individual epistemologists regarding various grammatical categories i.e.

constituent parts of sentence. The present volume, besides, providing the accounts of the arguments of different epistemologists, makes a critical examination of the arguments so that a definite conclusion regarding the different theories can be arrived at.

Importance of the study of Indian analysis of sentence meaning cannot be stressed too sufficiently in the context of Indian philosophy of language. Indian epistemologists have proposed different theories of noun-verb relationship emphasizing either the noun or the verbal action or the verbal activity as the nucleus or chief qualificand of various syntactico-semantic relations. Also, they have analysed the syntactico-semantic relations between various constituent parts such as nouns, verbal action, activity, *kāraṅgas*, adverbs etc. and defined the nature and function of the same constituent parts. Thus, the Indian analysis has presented the most sophisticated theory of sentence meaning comparable to the modern theories of syntax and semantics.

I would like to express my gratitude and indebtedness to my teachers : namely, Prof. N.S. Ramanujatatacharya, K.S. Vidyapeetham, Tirupati, Prof. T.S. Shrinivasa Sastri, Deccan College, Pune, Professors N.S. Ramabhadracharya and A. Venkannacharya both of Maharaja College Mysore, who have taught me Nyāya and explained the intricacies of Navya Nyāya logic. Also, I would like to thank Prof. S.D. Joshi, General Editor, Sanskrit Dictionary, Deccan College, Pune, for his valuable suggestions on many issues. I am greatly indebted to Prof. Nilmadhav Sen and Dr. Achyutananda Dash, both of Deccan College, Pune, for going through the manuscript very carefully and suggesting many important corrections. My sincere thanks are also due to Dr. Shiv Kumar Sharma, CASS, University of Poona, for his moral support, and constant encouragement, and to Mr. Shyam Lal Malhotra of Eastern Book Linkers, Delhi, for bringing out this work very nicely.

Deccan College, Pune
May, 1991

V.P. Bhatta

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Word and its Meaning in India —A Historic Outlook

India has been a centre of linguistic activity. Language as the means of communication and bearer of meanings was recognised in India as early as the Vedic times. The seers, instructed man to reach speech (*vāk*) which is the highest form of reality. The Upaniṣads state very clearly that words can convey the external objects like water, fire etc., despite their inability to denote Brahman who is beyond description. Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad states that the sound 'om' symbolizes reality.

As early as in the Śāthapatha Brāhmaṇa, we find an attempt to derive the word '*indra*' etymologically and explain its sense. Nevertheless, the etymology as a science and as a separate branch of linguistics developed in India with Prātiśākhya and also Nirukta of Yaska. Prātiśākhya give etymological explanation of words and also the statements regarding the phonetic laws. The R.K. Prātiśākhya maintains that sentence has words as its basic units (*padaprakṛtiḥ samhitā*). And this has been the very basis of the analysis of sentence and its meaning in India.

Yaska, besides being the first lexicographer in both East and West by composing '*Nighaṇṭu*' which arranged words systematically and explained their meanings, can rightly be said to be the first author to treat etymology as the science most essential for the understanding of language. He had the notion

very fundamental to the understanding of the language that all words can be reduced to their primordial elements i.e. the verbal roots. According to him, every word can be traced to an original root; words are preferred to other modes of expression such as gestures because they can designate their objects. Thus Yaska states that origin of the words should always be traced with the help of the science of etymology and should never give up a word as underivable. The Nirukta of Yaska divides the language into four parts i.e. nouns, verbs, prefixes and particles (*nāmākhyāte upsarga nipātaśca*). This division of language had a far reaching consequence and almost all the epistemologists have accepted this as the very basis of their propositions.

Grammarians contribution

However, linguistics as a science and as a distinguished branch of philosophy took shape upon the advent of Panini and his grammar. It is generally becoming known that Panini's grammar, *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, is not merely restricted to derivative and generative aspects of grammar, but it deals with the syntax and also the semantics.

Panini's theories of *kāraka*, his analysis of action (*kriyā*) etc. clearly establish that he was not merely concerned with derivations of words and their parts. He was aware of the underlying deep syntactico-semantical relations of words and the meanings they refer to. Katyayana and Patañjali have presupposed that the relations between the words and also the meanings they refer to are already established by usage (*siddheśabdārtha sambandhe*). According to them, one understands the relation between the words and their meanings by properly observing the elder's usage as how and in what sense a particular word is used. Patañjali further explains that a universal (*jāti*) a particular (*vyakti*) and individual characteristics (*ākṛti*) are the word-meanings according to different scholars.

Patañjali has interpreted Panini's *sūtras* by explaining both Panini's theories of syntax and also that of semantics with respect to words and their meanings. It is Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* and commentaries on it which have truly focussed on the problem of Paninian syntax and semantics in language.

While theories of words and their derivations are purely linguistic, theories of *kāraka*, *kriyā* etc. are purely semantic in nature and have contributed immensely to the development of the analysis of sentence meaning.

The advent of Bhartṛhari has revolutionized the linguistic philosophy in India. The word absolute of the *upaniṣads* was incorporated into linguistic philosophy and was considered the ultimate reality of language. He established that the words we speak cannot bear meanings since they are momentary and only a manifestation of real words or '*śphoṭa*' is the true bearer of meaning.

According to Bhartṛhari, sentence (*vākya*) alone is the true unit of language and words etc. are unreal manifestations of sentence which is purely mental. Thus, sentences are prior to words and words are unreal abstractions of the real sentence. Later writers, especially Kaiyata and Nagesha, were profoundly influenced by Bhartṛhari and therefore analysed sentence and its meanings based on his theory of word absolute and *śphoṭa*.

Ritualists contribution

The ritualistic aspect of the *Samhitās* and Brāhmaṇs has led the scholars of *Mīmāṃsā* to undertake systematic interpretations of Vedic rules. The application of Vedic hymns in the rituals needed a systematic explanation of Vedic hymns and also the arrangement of the Vedas. Thus they have proposed the divisions of the Veda as *vidhi* (injunction), *mantra* (hymns), *nāmadheya* (names), *niṣedha* (negations) *arthavāda* (explanatory passages) on the basis of the linguistic function of the Vedas.

The *mīmāṃsā sūtras* of Jaimini clearly state that the duty (*dharma*) is the injunctian prompting humans to undertake the Vedic rites (*codanālakṣaṇortho dharmah*). Jamini and other ritualists have attached the greatest importance to the word (*śabda*) as the means of understanding since the same alone is free from any error by being *apauruṣeya*; whereas perception, being dependent on sense contract, can be erroneous due to the error in the sense contact. Also, inference, analogy etc., being dependent on perception, can be erroneous.

Ritualists especially Bhāṭṭas and also Prābhākaras have developed the sophisticated theories of sentence meaning. They

have analysed the nature of sentence and also the nature of what constitutes a unit of sentence that contributes towards the understanding of sentence-meaning. They held that sentence is a connected utterance of words and proposed two distinct theories of meaning : that (i) words first convey their individual word-meanings through power of words and then the same meanings are perceived to have syntactico-semantic relations with each other (*abhihitānvaya vāda*) and also that (ii) words convey their meanings which are already connected with each other through syntactico-semantic relations and thus relations are also word meanings (*anvitābhidānavāda*).

Ritualists, especially Maṇḍana Mishra and others have established that word-impellent force and end-efficient force in the form of *iṣṭasāadhanatājñā* and *bhāvanā* (productive activity) respectively must be held to be the meaning of the conjugational endings and also that all the other word-meanings must primarily modify or qualify such an activity. They were concerned with the question that how Vedic statements such as 'svargakāmo yajeta' etc., despite having no human agents uttering the words, prompt the qualified persons to undertake the actions which result in heaven etc. Thus, they have assumed that *iṣṭasāadhanatājñā* and *bhāvanā* which prompt the persons and produce an effect respectively are inherent in every verb, and such senses are denoted by the verbal ending. Khaṇḍadeva, one of the later ritualists, on the other hand, had the advantage of studying the other two systems of Indian Philosophy, namely *vyākaraṇa* and *Navyanyāya* and analysed carefully their theories of meaning. He could critically examine the analysis of sentence meaning as proposed by grammarians and logicians and then establish his own theories of the sentence meaning by refuting other theories.

Logician's contribution

Besides *Vyākaraṇa* and *Mīmāṃsā*, the system that has contributed to the development of language and the analysis of sentence and its meaning is *Nyāya-vaiśeṣika*. From the very beginning, the *Nyāyasūtras* of Gautama have ruled that word (*śabda*) is an independent means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*) like perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*) and analogy

(*upamāna*). (According to Vaiśeṣika Sūtras however, words are to be included under the inference). Both Kaṇāda and Gautama, following their philosophy of realism, hold that words are non eternal (*liṅgāccānityaḥ śabdaḥ*. Vaiśe sū. ii. 2. 32). They hold further that word-meanings are comprehended owing to the strength of the instruction (usags) of reliable elders (*āptopadeśasāmarthyāt śabdārthasampratyaḥ*). Thus, despite Kaṇādas inclusion of *śabda* under inference, both Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika can be said to have accorded a special status for words as the most efficient means of communication and to have recognized the fact that words are the conveyers or bearers of meanings.

The advent of Gangesha and his Navyanyāya treatise, namely, *Tattvacintāmaṇi* has heralded truly a new era in the field of Indian Philosophy in general and in the field of Epistemology and linguistics in particular. His work gave a new thrust and a scientific outlook to the sagging moral of Nyāya realism. *Tattvacintāmaṇi* established that words become means of verbal knowledge of cognition provided that the same are used with the clear understanding of what word refers to what meaning. And therefore, it states that only the words, which are produced i.e. uttered from the understanding of the real nature of meanings they convey which in turn cause the usage, are *pramāṇas*. (*Prayogahetubhūta arthatattvajñāna janyaḥ śabdaḥ pramāṇam*).

Tattvacintāmaṇi was followed by Raghunathasiromaṇi's commentary of *Didhiti* and a host of sub-commentaries. It gave an impetus to the rise of activity of linguistic exercise and was the primary source of the most advanced linguistic analysis i.e. syntactico semantic theories proposed by Indian epistemologists. Besides *Ākhyātavāda* of Raghunatha, several Independent works were composed dealing with the syntax and semantics. The most noteworthy among them are *Śabdaśakti-prakāśikā* of Jagadīśa and *Vyutpattivāda* and *Śaktivāda* of Gadādhara. These works have proposed the most sophisticated theories of syntax and semantics. They have proposed that each word in a sentence refers to a particular meaning item through its power of denotation (*śakti*) or implication (*lakṣaṇā*) etc. They have also proposed that sentence meaning (*vākyaārtha*), which is technically rendered as 'verbal cognition' (*śābdabodha*)

or 'comprehension of syntactico semantical relations' (*anvaya-bodha*), is obtained by carefully analysing the meaning of each word and then relating all the individual word meanings together through syntactico semantical relations (*anvaya*).

Nature and origin of speech, ritualists view

Speech (*vāk*) or word (*śabda*), which is accepted as a means of communication, has been diversely held to be eternal (*nitya*) and non-eternal (*anitya*).

Ritualists, proposed the theory that words are eternal. According to them, no place or time can be found wherein the words are totally absent. Speech is established as eternal by inference as well as *pratyabhijñā* (recognition).

In this theory, the usages such as the sound 'ga' is produced, the sound 'ga' is destroyed etc. are to be explained as referring to the air (wind) which manifests such sounds. Thus, only the manifesting air is produced or destroyed while the actual sound is always existant in its subtle form.

It should be observed here that ritualists are guided in their theory of the eternality of words by the convention that the Vedas are 'not produced by any human agency' (*apauruṣeya*) and therefore words cannot be held to be anything but eternal.

Grammarians view

Grammarians too hold speech to be eternal. However, they have proposed a more scientific theory of eternality. According to them, the speech, despite being one, appears to have different forms or manifestations of different words due to the reflection of different word forms created by the mental impressions of different syllabic combinations (*tattad varṇa-samskāraiḥ pratibimbīta tattad rūpo ananta padarūpatām ivāpannaḥ*).

Also, they traditinally accept four different stages of the speech before it can be communicative. The speech, in the form of pure sound, (*nāda*) reaches the stage of *parā* (highest which is beyond perception) when it originates from the speech base; the same speech in the form of perceptible sound reaches the stage of '*paśyantī*' (perceiving) when it reaches the heart; the same speech in the form of intended to be articulable or utterable

sound, reaches the stage of *madhyamā* (middle) when it reaches the consciousness and finally the same speech in the form of actually uttered sound (*bahir nirgacchati*) reaches the stages of '*vaikhari*' (manifestation) when it reaches points of articulations.

Such a speech when understood by the usage of elders etc. to have a capacity to convey the sense i.e. external objects like cow, becomes instrumental in expressing the objects. Nevertheless, the speech need not always be conveying the sense; it conveys the sense only when it has the form of a word i.e. base, ending indclinable, particle etc. and not when it has the form of syllabic instance such as '*ka*', '*ca*', '*ta*', '*ta*', '*pa*' etc.

According to the grammarians, the words are communicative of only those meanings in which they are derived grammatically. Thus, ungrammatical forms which cannot be derived are not communicative. Also they firmly believe that the correctness of words in expressing meanings can be understood only through the grammer and the understanding of the grammer thus is essential for the understanding of word-meanings.

Nyāya view

Nyāya totally opposes the view that speech or word is eternal. According to them, the inference such as "*śabda* is non-eternal since it is the object of the sense organ of external objects like pot" proves non-eternity of speech. Also, the *pratyabhijñā* such as "this '*ga*' sound is same as the previous '*ga*' sound" proves only the similarity of the previous '*ga*' sound with this '*ga*' sound and hence speech cannot be eternal.

Nyāya explains the origination of speech it two ways : (i) first sound *śabda* gives rise to a second sequence of sound; the second to the third sequence of sound etc. like the first wave gives rise to the second consequent wave and the second to the third etc. (*vicītaranganyāya*); (ii) or the first sound simultaneously gives rise to the ten sound waves in all the ten directions which in turn produce the sounds in all the ten directions like the first *kadamba* flower gives rise to several *kāraṅkas* simultaneously and the *kāraṅkas* expand the flowers in all the directions (*kadambakāraṅkanyāya*).

Speech, which is the means of communication, is one of the four valid means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*). Here valid

means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) should be taken to mean the object of the knowledge of the instrument of the true verbal knowledge (*śabda pramiti karaṇa jñānaviśaya*). This is explained by the Navyas by proposing the theory that only the knowledge of the grammatically correct word and not word as such is the means of sentence meaning (verbal cognition).

The speech is twofold : Vedic speech and ordinary speech. Vedic speech, being uttered by most trustworthy people, is valid always and is further fivefold : injunctim (*vidhi*), invocation or formula (*mantra*), names (*nāmadheya*), negation (*niṣedha*), and explanatory passages (*arthavāda*). However, ordinary speech is valid provided it is uttered by trustworthy. Such a speech is threefold : Injunction such as 'one ought to cook' (*paceta*), negation such as 'one should not kill a Brahmin' (*brāhmaṇam na hanyāt*), and explanatory sentence such as 'Brahmin purifies the world through his power' (*svamahimnā pāvayati*).

Valid speech is divided again into two kinds as of perceptible purpose (*drṣtārtha*) and of imperceptible purpose (*adrṣtārtha*). 'There occurs a pot' is of perceptible purpose; whereas 'There is heaven' is of imperceptible purpose.

While the validity of speech is based on its ability to convey truth, the invalidity is based on lack of its ability to convey the intended sense. The invalid speech (*apramāṇa*) is what lacks semantical competency (*yogyatā*) such as 'he sprinkles with fire' (*vahninā siñcati*); or what lacks syntactical expectancy (*ākāṅkṣā*) such as 'cow, horse, person etc.' (*gaur aśvaḥ puruṣaḥ*); or what lacks juxtaposition or connected sequence (*sannidhi*) such as 'bring...the cow' (*gām...ānaya*). In the first instance, the statement is invalid since the fire has no required semantical competency for sprinkling; in the second instance, the statement is invalid since the cow, horse etc. cannot be syntactically related to each other in any way; and in the third instance, the statement is invalid since the word 'cow' uttered with a long interruption cannot convey a syntactico-semantically related sense.

The invalidity of speech, according to logicians, is based on its lack of capacity to convey the intended sense. The invalid speech is also divided into non-conveying (*abodhaka*), conveying wrong sense (*viparītabodhaka*), conveying already known sense (*jñātajñāpaka*), conveying useless (*aprayojanattvam*), conveying

untended purpose (*anabhimatapravyojanavattvam*), conveying impossible (*aśakyasādhana pratipādana*) etc. since all of them fail to convey the intended sense. Thus, validity and also invalidity of speech are based on their ability to convey truth and also lack of ability to convey intended sense respectively.

Now, it can be stated that the speech or word, which is the means of communication, is eternal according to the ritualists and grammarians, whereas the same is non eternal according to the logicians. The speech which has four different stages becomes instrumental in conveying the sense only when the same has the form of a word. Also, the speech is valid or invalid depending upon whether the same has the ability to convey truth or lacks the ability to convey the intended sense.

Word Meaning (*Padārtha*)—Logicians View

Words are accepted as means of communication. A word communicates means the same word imparts or transmits the knowledge or idea of certain objects to our mind.

And the objects when conveyed to our mind, can be called meanings. Now the word meanings can be stated in general to be what are conveyed by words (*padābhidheya*). However, philosophers are divided over what exactly constitute word meanings. Three distinct entities can be regarded as the meanings is conveyed by words. Consider, for instance, the word 'cow' (*go*) in 'bring the cow' (*gām ānaya*). Here the word 'cow', when uttered, can convey (i) the generic notion of a cow (*gotvā*), the form characterized by the dewlap etc. (*sāsnādimattva*) and the individual consisting of four legs (*vyakti*) etc. That is to say that the word 'cow' conveys an object which possesses the generic property of cowness and which has a form characterized by dewlap etc. and also which is an individual consisting of four legs etc.

Gautama, therefore, holds that generic property, form and individual are the word meanings (*jātyākṛti vyaktayaḥ padārthāḥ* ii.2.68). This rule clearly states that words such as 'cow' (*go*) convey an individual entity such as cow, a generic property such as cowness and a form such as one characterized by dewlap etc. Here the Prācyaś hold that the generic property, form and individual constitute a single word-meaning; whereas

the Navys claim that while the generic property and the individual constitute one word meaning, the form constitutes the other word meaning which represents the aggregate of parts or whole. Jagadīśa, however, holds that the form does not constitute any separate meaning which may represent the aggregate of parts or whole; rather it constitutes a part of the meaning which represents the relation of inherence between the generic property and the individual. According to him, 'form' (*ākṛti*) in the rule means by the instrumental analysis, an entity that describes the aggregate of parts (*avayavasamsthāna nirūpaka*). This view represents the school of thought that no separate form beyond the generic property and also the individual exists; but form is merely the constitution of the individual with generic property.

Vaiśeṣika's view

On the other hand, at times merely the generic property and also the individual should be accepted to be the word meaning. For instance, when the words expressing either the quality or the action such as 'red colour' (*raktam*) or 'going' (*gamana*) are uttered, no form beyond the generic property of the red colour and the individual of red colour or the generic property of the action of going and the individual of going can be referred to. In view of this fact, Vaiśeṣikas have held that only the generic property and the individual constitute the word meaning (*guṇakarmādi vācaka padānām jātivyaktir evārthah*, Upaskāra vii.2.20). Vaiśeṣikas, thus facilitate the reference to merely the generic property and the individual in cases of utterances wherein words are expressive of quality and action.

Grammarians view

Grammarians too can be stated to have accepted the generic property, form and individual as the word meanings. However, they use, only two terms namely '*ākṛti*' and '*dravya*' to cover the generic property, form and individual. Here, the term *ākṛti* can be taken to cover both the generic property and form whereas the term *dravya* stands for individual. According to grammarians, the term '*ākṛti*' actually means the aggregate of parts (*avayavasamsthāna*) which consists of form, action etc. And such an aggregate of parts, is further viewed

as the inferential cause of generic property (*jātiliṅga*) since generic property occurs invariably in an individual with the aggregate of parts etc. Thus, the term *ākṛti* in grammar can be taken to cover both the generic property and form.

The reason for grammarians use of only two terms namely '*ākṛti*' and '*dravya*' to cover the three meanings is not far to seek. The generic property is found in individuals and the individuals are invariably an aggregate of parts consisting of form, action etc. And, thus, when the aggregate of parts are accepted as the meaning, it automatically covers the generic property which is invariably connected with it. And once, the generic property and form are covered by '*ākṛti*', the remaining 'individual' can be taken care of by the term '*dravya*' or substance.

Ritualists position

However, ritualists hold quite a different view. According to them, words should express only those entities that are permanent and economical compared to the many individuals. For instance, the word 'cow' (*go*) should express only the entity which is permanently present in all the cows and economical compared to many individual cows. Such an entity is only the generic property of the cowness. Thus, the ritualists hold that words refer to the generic property which is ever present in the objects such as cow. This view is based on the conviction that generic property is one i.e. common to all the instances of individuals and hence assumption of a single and permanent generic property as the word meaning is much more logical compared to the assumption of innumeral individuals as the word meanings. It should be noted that according to ritualists, individuals, which are, for them, identical with form, are obtained through presumption (*arthāpatti*) or indication (*lakṣaṇā*)

It can be observed now that Indian epistemologists have followed the general principle that word meaning is what is conveyed by words. However, they have differed amongst themselves as to what the words exactly convey. While the logicians have propounded that the words convey both the abstract notions i.e. the generic property and the concrete things such as form and individual, the grammarians stated that the

words can convey only the form (or the aggregate of parts) and individuals and the generic property can be merely inferred through the aggregate of parts. Thus, they subscribe to the view that words should be accepted to convey only the concrete things such as aggregate of parts and individuals. On the other hand, ritualists confirm to the view that only abstract notion i.e. the generic property of cowness etc. should be accepted as the word meaning since the same alone is eternal and common to all similar individual instances. Thus, Indian epistemologists have proposed three distinct theories which are based on the logical analysis: (i) that both abstract notions such as generic property and concrete objects such as form and individuals are recognised by the use of words hence are meanings; (ii) that only the concrete objects like the aggregate of parts and the individual are actually perceived and therefore are the word meanings and also (iii) that only the abstract notion such as the generic property is common to all similar instances and therefore is the word meaning.

An epistemological analysis of word meanings

Word-meanings, epistemologically speaking, can be defined as those that are referred to i.e. conveyed through word-relations or word functions (*śabda vṛtti*). They are primarily two-fold. Those that are denoted (*vācya*) and those that are indicated (*lakṣya*). A third category of word meanings is also accepted by the rhetoricians and grammarians in the form of what is suggested (*vyāṅgya*). For instance, consider the following meanings : 'cow' is the denoted meaning of the word 'cow' (*go*) in 'bring the cow' (*gām ānaya*); bank (*tīra*) is the indicated meaning of the word 'Ganges' (*gaṅgā*) in 'village is on the Ganges' (*gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ*), and also the purity etc. (*pāvanatvādi*) is the suggested meaning of the same word 'Ganges' in the same instance.

It should be noted here that since the meanings are of three types, the words by which one understands such meanings, are also of three types : (i) the word by means of which one understands the denoted meaning, is called the 'denotative' (*vācaka*); (ii) the word by means of which one understands the indicated meaning is called the 'indicative' (*lakṣaka*); and the

word by means of which one understands the suggested meanings, is called suggestive (*vyañjaka*). For instance, consider, the following words: (i) 'cow' (*go*) is the 'denotative' *vācaka* of the 'cow' in *gām ānaya*: (ii) 'Ganges' (*gaṅgā*) is the 'indicative' (*lakṣaka*) of the 'Ganges' in '*gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ*', and the same 'Ganges' (*gaṅgā*) is suggestive (*vācaka*) of the coolness etc. in '*gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ*'.

The meanings such as 'cow', which are denoted, are called primary meanings (*mukhyārtha*). This is so because, the word 'cow' denotes the cow as the cowness delimited etc. through the primary word relation (*vyrtti*) called signification (*sañketa*). The meanings such as 'bank' and 'purity' which are indicated and suggested respectively are secondary or non-primary meanings. This is so because, the words 'Ganges' (*gaṅgā*) etc. indicate 'bank' and suggest 'purify' etc. through secondary word relations such as indication (*lakṣaṇā*) and suggestion (*vyañjanā*).

A fourth category of meaning is, however, accepted by Bhartṛhari. According to him, sentence conveys its meaning in a flash. This flash of understanding is called '*pratibhā*'. Bhartṛhari states that sentence-meaning, which is the unified understanding of all individual word meanings, must be explained by the flash of understanding which is sudden and relates all the individual word meanings together. Thus, according to Bhartṛhari, flash of understanding (*pratibhā*) must be accepted as a separate category of meaning so that the sentence meaning becomes explained.

Word relations or word functions (śabdavyrtti)

Words convey the meanings. However, for words to convey the meanings, the listener of the words must recognise that the words he listens to serve as linguistic expressions of the objects or notions he likes to be conveyed. That is to say that the listener must understand that the words serve as an indication of certain objects, notions etc. he wants to be conveyed. Once the listener understands the fact that the words serve as the linguistic expressions of certain objects, notions etc., the words become the means of communication.

Indian epistemologists have traditionally explained this linguistic expression of words as the relation or function of

words (*śabda vṛtti*). According to them, each word has a certain inherent capacity or power to express i.e. convey certain meaning. Now, this capacity or power of expression (*śabda śakti*) is the relation of words. Word has a particular capacity or power of expression means the word is related to the meaning it conveys through the relation of expression. Upon the understanding of the particular power of expression of a particular word, the same conveys the senses to the listener. The power of expression serves as the link between the words and the meaning. For instance, word-relation is defined as the relation of words to their meanings conducive to the reference to the word meanings which in turn are the cause of verbal cognition (*śābdabodha hetu padārthopasthityanukūlaḥ padapadārthayoh sambandhaḥ*). Word relations, according to logicians, are three types : (i) signification or power of denotation or expression (*samketa* or *śakti*), (ii) indication (*lakṣaṇā*), (iii) and conventional indication (*nirūḍha lakṣaṇā*). Such a word function is facilitated by speakers intention (*tātparya nirvāhikā*). For instance, speakers intention is of three types : (i) general (*autsargika*), (ii) exceptional (*āpavādika*) and (iii) fixed (*niyata*). The first 'general intention' facilitates the word function, namely, capacity or power of expression (*śakti*). For instance, the speaker of the word 'cow' etc. generally intends to convey only the cowness-delimited and hence the capacity of expression is in the sense of cowness delimited only. The second 'exceptional intention' facilitates the word function, namely, indication (*lakṣaṇā*). For instance, the speaker of the word 'Ganges' intends to convey by exception only the bank of the Ganges since the primary sense, namely, the Ganges cannot be cognized to be relating to the village. Hence, with the help of exceptional intention the indication of the word 'Ganges' is established in the bank. The third 'fixed intention' facilitates the word function, namely, conventional indication (*nirūḍhalakṣaṇā*). For instance, the speaker of the word 'mat' (*kaṭa*) 'he makes a mat' (*kaṭam karoti*) intends, to convey parts of mat (despite the absence of any untenability of the denoted meaning, namely, mat). Hence, with the help of fixed intention the conventional indication of the word 'mat' gets established in the parts of 'mat'.

Grammarians hold that word relation (*vṛtti*) is a property

of words conditioned by particular word meanings (*tattadārthanirūpitah śabdadharmah*). According to them, such a word relation produces a mental impression about words which is conducive to verbal cognition. Nevertheless, this theory is restricted to *spṛṣṭavādins* among grammarians and is not therefore subscribed by scholars of other systems.

However, generally, word relation is held to be relation of words. Such word relations can be started broadly to be two fold : namely primary signification (*samketa*) or power of expression (*śakti*) and indication (*lakṣaṇā*), (inclusive of both general indication and conventional indication).

Primary Signification or power of expression (denotation) (śakti)

Primary signification or denotation is the desire or intention of the speaker (either god or any trust worthy person) to express sense such as 'such and such a word should refer to such and such a sense' (*idam padam amum artham bodhayatu*). For instance, the desire that the word 'pot' '*ghaṭa*' should refer to the sense of pot is the signification. Here the signification means the power or capacity of words (*śakti*) to convey a particular meaning. Such a power of words facilitates the reference to the word meaning by reminding one about the word meaning through the principle of relation and related entities. Thus, the knowledge of power or capacity of words to express becomes associate cause in producing verbal cognition by the fact that the same facilitates the reference to the meaning.

Ritualists accept that a separate entity such as denotation (*abhidhā*) which is to be perceived by the signification of the speaker is the power or capacity of words. According to them, the power or capacity of words i.e. denotation is a distinct entity from the word relation, and is the object of the knowledge produced by the signification of the speaker. Thus, in the theory of the ritualists, the power of words is the object of the knowledge of signification which is the associate cause conducive to the verbal cognition by facilitating the word reference.

On the other hand, grammarians maintain that a distinct relation of words which regulates the denotation of words in meanings is the power of words. According to them, the denotation is not itself the power of words; but rather, the relation

perceived between the word and meaning which can regulate the denotation that such and such word refers to such and such meaning is the power of words. Thus, they have distinguished the power of words from the denotation of words.

It can be stated that power or capacity of words have been accepted by all the epistemologists to be the primary word relation or function which causes verbal cognition. While the logicians consider the same as the signification or the desire of the speaker, the ritualists maintain the same as a distinct entity known as denotation. And the grammarians view the power of words to be the relation that regulates the denotation of words in distinct senses. They are guided by the fact that a regulating factor is necessary to regulate the denotation of a word in a specific sense.

Secondary signification or Indication (lakṣaṇā)

Now as regards the secondary signification or indication '*lakṣaṇā*'. It is defined as the relation of indicated meaning with the primary (denoted) meaning (*svaśakya sambandha*). For instance, the relation of the banks of 'Ganges' (*gaṅgā tīra*), in 'village is on the Ganges' (*gaṅgāyām ghoṣah*), with the Ganges, the denoted meaning of the word 'Ganges', is indication. Here the relation could be contact, inherence etc. For instance, the relation of Ganges to the 'bank' (*tīra*) is contact since bank exists in contact with the Ganges.

The reason for assuming the word relation namely, indications is, according to the Prācyas, the untenability of syntactico-semantic relation with the primary meaning. For instance, the village cannot be syntactico semantically related with the Ganges. However, according to the Navyas, the untenability of the speaker's intention is the reason for assuming the indication. For instance, the speaker cannot be held to intend that the village occurs in the Ganges and hence unless the bank is accepted as the indicated meaning, the intention of the speaker of the statement *gaṅgāyām ghoṣah* becomes untenable. Ālaṅkārikas, however, hold that the untenability of the primary sense (*mukhyārthabādha*) is the reason for assuming the indication. This view can be treated as a modification of the Prācyas' theory since they too hold that the untenability of the syntactico

semantical relation is the purpose of assuming the indication.

According to the grammarians, indication is the attribution or superimposition of the denotation on a secondary sense (*śakyatāvachedakāropa*). For instance, when the word 'Ganges' indicates the bank in '*gaṅgāyām ghoṣah*', the indication of the same bank can be stated to be the super imposition of the denotation of word 'Ganges' on the secondary sense 'bank'. Thus, this theory views the indication as an erroneous perception of the denotation.

On the other hand, ritualists maintain that indication is the relation of words with what is to be established (*pratipādyasambandho lakṣaṇā*). For instance, the relation of the word 'umbrella holders' (*chatrin*) in 'umbrella holders go' (*chatriṇo yānti*), with the host of holders of umbrellas is the indication. Here, since the word 'umbrella holders' (*chatrin*) ends in a possessive (*in*) suffix, no denoted meaning in the form of a host of umbrella holders can be established; and hence an indication of the form of the relation of the indicated meaning with the denoted meaning (*śakyasambandha*) becomes impossible.

The indication is mainly of two types : conventional indication (*nirūḍha lakṣaṇā*) wherein indication is based on eternal convention and natural indication (*svārasika lakṣaṇā*) wherein indication is based on today's convention. For instance, in 'chariot goes' (*ratho gacchati*), the ending '*ti*' has conventional indication in the sense of the substratum; and in 'cow lie down in *vata*' (*gāvaḥ vaṭe śerate*), the word '*vaṭa*' has natural indication in the sense of the vicinity of *vaṭa* tree. Pracyas, however, hold that indication is of four types : The first is the indication losing out denoted meaning (*jhat svārtha*). For instances, consider 'cots cry' (*mañcāḥ crośanti*). Here indication is assumed in the people losing out the denoted meaning i.e. 'cot' since the same cannot be related. The second is the indication without losing denoted meaning (*ajahat svārtha*). For instance, consider 'protect curd from the cows' (*kākcbyodadhi rakṣyatām*). Here indication is assumed in the crows that destroy the curd without losing out the denoted meaning i.e. cow. The third is the indication losing and not losing denoted meaning (*jahat ajahat svārtha lakṣaṇā*). For instance, consider the 'recognition', 'this is that Devadatta' (*so'yam devadattah*). Here indication is

assumed in Devadatta losing out 'thatness' but not losing out 'thisness'. The fourth is the indication of the indicated word (*lakṣita lakṣaṇā*). For instance, consider the word 'dvirepha' 'with two RS'. Here the indication is assumed in the sense of black bee by assuming another indication for the word 'dvirepha' in the sense of the word 'bhramara'. It should be noted that this fourth category of indication is not acceptable to Navya logicians.

According to rhetoricians and some grammarians, indication should be classified also as direct (*suddhā*) and indirect due to the qualities (*gauṇī*). Here direct indication means an indication assumed directly with the denoted meaning. For instance, 'ghee is indeed the life' (*āyur ghṛtam*) wherein the indication is assumed directly for the word 'āyur' in the sense of the means of long life. Indirect indication means an indication assumed on account of the similarity of qualities. For instance, consider 'boy is fire' (*agnir māṇavakaḥ*). Here the indication is assumed for the word fire (*agni*) in the sense of the fiery characteristics of boy due to his similarity to fire. It should be noted that ritualists do not accept *gauṇī* as a type of indication. According to them, it is a distinct word-relation. This point will be dealt with later.

Suggestion (Vyañjanā)

Rhetoricians and grammarians accept a third type of word relation in the form of suggestion (*vyañjanā*). They define suggestion as a type of word relation which facilitates the reference to a distinct sense when the other word relations namely, denotation and indication, fail to do so. For instance, consider. If you have to go, O dear, do go, may your ways be auspicious. My birth too would occur in the place where you go' (*gaccha gacchasi cet kānta panthānaḥ santu te śivāḥ, mamāpi janma tattraiva bhūyād yatra gato bhavān*). Here the death of the beloved is conveyed through the suggestion since the other word relations such as denotation and indication fail to convey the same. According to the rhetoricians, the distinct word relation like suggestion is necessary because otherwise the intended sense that "you should not go leaving me behind since in your going my death would occur" cannot be conveyed.

The suggestion can occur either in words or in meaning : The suggestion occurring in words is of two types : (i) based on denotation and (ii) based on indication. For instance, consider the verse 'the hands of the auspicious one became charming i.e. prosperous with the sprinkling of the *dānāmbu*'. (*bhadrātmanah.....dānāmbusekasubhagaḥ satatam karo'bhūt*). Here the suggestion based on the denotation of the word '*dānāmbu sekasubhagaḥ*' conveys the sense that the rutting elephant i.e. elephant in heat was charming.

Now consider the statement 'village is on the Ganges' (*gaṅgāyām ghaṣaḥ*). Here the suggestion based on the indication conveys the sense of the purity, coolness etc. of the village since the same cannot be conveyed either through the denotation or through indication of the word 'Ganges'.

The suggestion occurring in the meaning conveys a distinct sense unknown otherwise. For instance, consider the statement 'the sun has set' (*gato'stam arkaḥ*) etc. Here the denoted meanings is that the day is over. However the suggestion based on such a meaning conveys different senses to different class of people. For instance, it would convey to a thief that the time has come for stealing; whereas it would convey to lovers that time has come to meet each other.

It should be noted here that logicians do not accept suggestion as a separate word relation. According to them, suggestion occurring in the words can be included in the denotation and indication itself. For instance, the suggestion of the rutting elephant i.e. elephant in heat based on the denotation of the sense such as "the hands of the auspicious one became charming etc". can be included in the denotation of such a meaning; and the suggestion of purity etc. based on the indication of the sense of "the purity of the village" in '*gaṅgāyām ghaṣaḥ*' can be included in the indication of such a meaning. Also, the suggestion based on the meaning can be included in the inference. For instance, the suggestion of the death based on the sense that 'If you have to go, O dear do go...etc.' can be included in the inference based on such a sense. On the other hand, grammarians hold that suggestion is an impression originated from the imagination and also the knowledge of poetic cleverness etc. (*yakrādivaiśiṣṭya jñāna pratibhād, udubddhaḥ samskāra viśeṣaḥ*). Thus, whether the

suggestion is to be included under denotation etc. or not, the same is a powerful word relation or function which facilitates the conveying of an exceptionally charming and poetic sense.

Metaphorical relation (gaunī)

Ritualists accept a fourth type of word relation in the form of the metaphorical or figurative relation (*gaunī*). They define the same as a word relation facilitating a metaphorical or figurative sense due to the similarity of the quality. For instance, consider the statement 'fire is the boy' (*agnir māṇavakah*) or 'lion is the boy' (*simha māṇavakah*). Here, the words 'fire' (*agni*) or lion (*simha*) convey the boy as fire and lion respectively due to the similarity of the qualities such as the hotness in temper and swiftness in gait respectively. Thus, the word relation which represents the boy as fire or lion by possessing such characteristics must be conceded as a distinct metaphorical one.

It should be noted that this word relation is included by rhetoricians under indication. According to them, there is no need to concede metaphorical function as a separate word relation; but it can be considered as an indirect indication. Nevertheless, scholars are in agreement that words do convey metaphorical sense and therefore metaphorical relation is a word relation.

Now as regards the word relation or function in general. Indian epistemologists have visualized that words have certain power or capacity to reach out to the senses in conveying the same. The words, unless conventionally established to have relations with the meanings, cannot convey any meaning. Thus, while words are the means of communication, the same require a particular power or capacity i.e. relation in reaching out to the senses. Thus, word relations such as denotation, indication etc. constitute an important part of the analysis of sentence meaning by serving as a linguistic link to the meanings.

Epistemology in the analysis of sentence meaning i.e. verbal cognition (śābdabodha)

Epistemology, logic and grammar are inseparable from the analysis of sentence meaning i.e. verbal cognition (*śābdabodha*). They form an integral part of the analysis of sentence meaning since the epistemological theories, the logical analysis

of syntactico-semantic relations and grammatical categories constitute the very basis of sentence meaning. Thus, the epistemology logic and grammar have each contributed to the development of the analysis of sentence meaning in India.

Epistemology developed in India on the grounds of the knowledge derived from the valid means of knowledge '*pramāṇas*'. Traditionally, '*pramāṇas*' have been considered to be four fold, namely, means of perception (*pratyakṣa*), means of inference (*anumāna*), means of analogy (*upamāna*) and means of verbal cognition (*śabda*). And the knowledge derived from such means too are four fold, namely, perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumiti*), analogy (*upamiti*) and verbal cognition (*śābdabodha*). The perception is a knowledge produced from the contact between the senses and sense organs; it helps to understand the real nature of objects without being verbal, it is not erroneous and at the same time is of the form of determinate. Inference is a knowledge led upto by perception and is produced by the consideration of the *hetu* that the same is qualified by invariable committance and is a property occurring on the *pakṣa*. The analogy is a knowledge produced by the similarity to a known object and helps to understand the relation between a '*samjñā*' and a '*samjñin*'. Finally, verbal cognition. It is a knowledge produced from the understanding of the words. Such a verbal cognition is the understanding of the total sentence meaning i.e. the understanding of the various underlying syntactico-semantic relations (*anvayabodha*).

Knowledge is basically categorized as indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*) and determinate (*savikalpaka*). Indeterminate knowledge is without conceptualization, nominalization and externalization etc. and therefore is not associated with the assumption of any attributes or qualifications. For instance, the knowledge such as 'this is something' (*idaṃ kiñcit*) is an indeterminate knowledge. Such a knowledge cognizes the mere existence of things without the assumption of any attributes, qualifications etc. According to the Buddhists and others, only indeterminate is valid since the same is devoid of any unreal assumption.

On the other hand, the determinate knowledge is characterized by conceptualization, nominalization, externalization etc.

and therefore is associated with the assumption of attributes, qualifications etc. For instance, the knowledge 'This one is Dittha' (*dittho'yam*) is a determinate knowledge. Such a knowledge is characterized by the assumption of the name Dittha etc. and therefore, assumes the generic property of humanity etc. in Dittha. The determinate knowledge is a qualificative cognition i.e. involves the qualification of the qualificand (*viśiṣṭavaiśiṣṭyāvagāhi jñānam*) and conditions the qualificerness of certain attributes (*prakāratā nirūpakam*). For instance, consider the determinate knowledge 'The person is a staff-holder' (*daṇḍi puruṣaḥ*). Here, such a knowledge involves the qualification of Dittha by the staff-holderness and conditions the qualificerness of the attribute the staff-holderness.

Now, as regards the sentence meaning i.e. verbal cognition. It can be considered to be a type of qualificative cognition. For, it too involves the qualification of the qualificand and conditions the qualificerness of certain attributes. For instance, consider, the statement 'Caitra cooks rice grains' (*caitraḥ pacati taṇḍulam*). Here, the verbal cognition produced is that 'Caitra is the agent i.e. abode of the effort conducive to the cooking conditioning the objecthood of the rice grains'. In such a case, the cognition involves the qualification of the qualificand, Caitra, by the agenthood and also the conditions i.e. describes the agenthood of Caitra and also the objecthood of the rice grains.

Epistemology, thus becomes an integral part of the analysis of sentence-meaning i.e. verbal cognition. Philosophers of India have conceived sentence meaning as a form of knowledge derived from one of the four established means of knowledge, namely, words (*śabda*). They have conceived that all types of knowledges are to be produced by certain means of knowledge and sentence meaning, being an effect of words, is produced from (the knowledge of) words.

Grammar in the Analysis of sentence meaning

Indian analysis of sentence is based on the notion of what is already accomplished (*siddha*) or static and what is yet to be accomplished (*sādhya*) or non static (continuous). Indian grammarians have visualized the substance (*dravya*) as static

or accomplished while the action (*kriyā*) as non static or to be accomplished. For instance, consider the sentence 'he makes a mat' (*kaṣam karoti*). Here, the 'mat' (*kaṣa*) represents the substance and is static since it is already accomplished; whereas the 'making' represents the action and is non static i.e. continuous since it is yet to be accomplished.

In the Indian analysis of sentence, the most significant point to be noted is the concept of accomplishment. The things i.e. factors which are already accomplished and function as instruments towards the accomplishment of action and also the action which is to be accomplished through the instrumentality of others are the two major divisions of sentence analysis. The factors that contribute towards the accomplishment of the action are called '*kāraṅkas*' and the action which is to be accomplished is called '*kriyā*'.

Now action (*kriyā*) is the primary element in the sentence analysis since the same is the primary goal to be achieved through various means. One strives for the accomplishment of the action in various ways. Hence, the action has been accorded of the primary status in the analysis of sentence meaning. The *kāraṅkas* represent the next most important element in the sentence analysis since it is through these *kāraṅkas*, that one accomplishes the action. While the action is the goal to be strived for, the *kāraṅkas* are the means of accomplishing the goal such a action. It should be noted that according to Panini, *kāraṅkas* are already accomplished (*siddha*) and are useful in so far as the accomplishment of the action is concerned. They are not the goals to be accomplished in themselves. Thus, *kāraṅkas* have only a secondary function in the total accomplishment of the action. Consider, for instance, 'Caitra cooks rice grains by woods in the vessel' (*caitraḥ sthālyāṁ kāṣṭhaiḥ odanam pacati*). Here, the action to be accomplished is the cooking (of rice (grains)); while the *kāraṅkas* such as the agent 'Caitra', the instrument 'woods' and the locus 'vessel' function as various means of accomplishing the action of cooking. Thus, the action of cooking is the primary element and the *kāraṅkas* such as 'Caitra' are secondary elements.

The analysis of *kāraṅkas* as 'accomplished' (*siddha*) and that '*kriyā*' as to be accomplished (*sādhya*) by Indian epistemologists

corresponds roughly to the subject-predicate analysis of sentence in modern linguistics. While the *kāraḥas*, especially the agent '*kāraḥa*' such as 'Caitra' in the above sentence may be considered as the subject, the *kriyā*, namely, the action of cooking may be considered as the predicate. However, an important distinction that should be noted is that while the 'agent' among the *kāraḥas* may be viewed as the subject, the other *kāraḥas* such as 'object', 'instrument', 'indirect object' etc. can by no means, be considered as the subjects. They are merely contributory factors in the accomplishment of the action and hence may be called the 'extension' of the predicate. Indian epistemologists were primarily guided by the notion of '*siddha*' and '*sādhya*' and therefore the classification of the parts of speech as the *kāraḥas* and *kriyā* are only roughly corresponding to the subject-predicate analysis of sentence in modern linguistics.

On the other hand, the analysis of '*siddha*' and '*sādhya*' is favourably comparable to the analysis of 'noun' (*nāman*) and verb (*kriyāpada*). While the nouns can be stated to be expressing the static or accomplished things (*siddha*), the verbs can be stated to be expressing the non-static i.e. continuous or to be accomplished (*sādhya*) things. Consider, for instance, the sentence 'he' brings the pot '*saḥ ghaṭam ānayati*'. Here the words '*saḥ*' and '*ghaṭam*' are nouns and they convey the static substances namely an individual like Caitra and the pot; whereas the word '*ānayati*' is a verb and therefore conveys the non-static thing namely the action of bringing. The substance such as pot does not change and therefore is static whereas the action such as bringing is continuously changing and therefore is non-static. Thus, *kāraḥas* and *kriyā* which are comparable to nouns and verbs constitute the most basic parts of speech in the Indian analysis of sentence.

Logic in the analysis of sentence meaning

The logic adopted in the analysis of sentence meaning i.e. verbal cognition is that sentence meaning is an effect produced by words and each word in a sentence contributes to the total sentence meaning by referring to an individual word meaning. And then, the individual word meanings would be cognized as syntactico-semantically related to each other. Thus, the sentence

meaning is the cognition of the syntactico-semantic relations between various individual word meanings due to the syntactical expectancy etc. (*padārthānām ākāṅkṣādīvaśāt parasparānvayibhāvāpanorthaḥ*).

Grammarians analysis

Grammarians analyse sentence meaning as the cognition of the mutual relation of individual word meanings such as of the form of the relation of qualifier (or modifier) and also the qualificand (or modificand) (*padārthānām mithonvayarūpaḥ uddeśya vidheyabhāvasambandhaḥ*). Consider, for instance, the sentence '*caitraḥ taṇḍulam pacati*' (Caitra cooks rice grains). Here the sentence meaning (i.e. verbal cognition) produced, according to grammarians, is that the action of cooking is the chief qualificand (i.e. nucleus of all the syntactico-semantic relations) which conditions the agenthood of Caitra (by occurring in him) and also which conditions the objecthood of rice grains (by being conducive to the swelling of parts or softening of rice grains).

In this analysis of sentence meaning, the syntactico-semantic relations cognized are as follows : (i) the occurrence (*āśrayatā*) between the grammatical category of the agent 'Caitra', and also the action of cooking; (ii) the conduciveness (*anukūlatā*) between the action of cooking and also the effect 'softening' and (iii) the relation of occurrence between 'softening' and also the object 'rice grains'. Here, basically four grammatical categories have been cognized, namely, (i) the action of cooking, (ii) its effect 'softening' (iii) the agent 'Caitra' and also (iv) the object 'rice grains'. While the first two categories have been cognized as the meanings of the verb '*pacati*' (cooks), the last two have been cognized as the meanings of the nominative '*caitraḥ*' and accusative '*taṇḍulam*' respectively.

Now, the most significant aspect of the analysis of sentence meaning is the analysis and definition of various grammatical categories. Grammar has provided with the analysis and the definitions of grammatical categories involved in the sentence meaning. The grammatical categories can be classified basically as follows : (i) the *kāraṅkas* or syntactico-semantic items such as 'agent', object, instrument etc., (ii) the non-*kāraṅkas* or non-

syntactico-semantic items such as adnominals (*kāmapravanīyas*), (iii) action (*kriyā*) and adverbs (*kriyāviśeṣaṇas*). Indian analysis of sentence-meaning deals primarily with the analysis and definition of these grammatical categories and their syntactico-semantic function in the total sentence-meaning. Mahābhāṣya, for instance, explains the *kāraḥ* as that which functions as an instrument in bringing about the action (*karoti kriyām nirvartayati iti kāraḥ*). Also, grammar defines the agent as the *kāra* who is independent in his action (*svatantraḥ kartā*), the object as the *kāra* which is sought most to be obtained through actions (*kartur īpsitatamaṁ karma*), the adnominals as those which have already expressed the action and therefore do not condition the objecthood (*karma proktavantaḥ karmapravanīyās*), the action as something which is perceived either to be accomplished or already accomplished (*sādhyaṁ siddhaṁ etadanyatara rūpeṇa pratiyamānarthah*) : and adverbs, as those which qualify the action, which is to be accomplished, either through identity or non-identity. These classification and definitions form the very base of the analysis of the sentence meaning. Since they provide the most fundamental concepts of the grammatical categories, other epistemologists have built their theories on the basis of such definitions.

Ritualists analysis

Sentence meaning or verbal cognition, which is stated to be the cognition of the syntactico-semantic relations between various word meanings, is produced from words. However, ritualists insist that words refer to both the word meanings and the syntactico-semantic relations. According to them, words refer to their respective individual word meanings along with the syntactico-semantic relations involved. That is to say that words convey their proper or respective meanings as syntactico-semantically related to each other. And since words convey their meanings as related to each other, even the syntactico-semantic relations, which relate the meanings together to bring out the totality of sentence meaning, become the word-meanings or word-referents (*prakāra*). For them, only those entities which are referred to by words could be the constituents of verbal cognition; and therefore, nothing which is not

referred to by words could be considered as part of verbal cognition. For instance, consider, the statement 'bring the pot' (*ghaṭam ānaya*). Here the cognition produced is that the activity is conducive to the action of bringing which in turn is conditioning the objecthood of the pot. Now, according to the *prābhākara-Mīmāṃsakas*, the word such as '*ghaṭa*' refers to the pot as the abode of the objecthood through the knowledge of the denotation such as the pot, as related with the objecthood referred to by the accusative case ending (*am*), is the meaning of the word 'pot' (*ghaṭa*). Also similarly, the verbal stem '*āni*' too refers to the action of bringing as related with the activity through the knowledge of the denotation that the action of bringing, as related with the activity referred to by the verbal ending '*a*', is the meaning of the verbal stem '*āni*'. Thus, all the words in a sentence convey their respective meanings as related with other meanings.

In this theory, sentence, apart from individual words, is also conceived to have a separate denotation in the sentence meaning as such. It can be stated therefore that besides the word meanings, even the syntactico semantical relations, which relate various word meanings together and therefore present a coherent and symentically related sentence meaning, are also conveyed by words.

The most significant contribution of ritualists to the field of the analysis of sentence meaning is, however, accomplishing their theory of the productive activity (*bhāvanā*) as the chief qualificand of verbal cognition. They have proposed that the activity, which is referred to by the verbal ending such as '*a*' in '*ānaya*' (bring) etc., is the most important element among the various constituents of verbal cognition, and hence deserves to be the chief qualificand. Besides the analysis of sentence meaning and also the function of the activity, ritualists have proposed their own theories regarding the function of the constituent parts of verbal cognition. They have established how constituents such as the *kāraṇas*, the adjectives of *kāraṇas*, the actions, the adverbs etc. qualify directly or indirectly the activity and therefore function as subordinates or subsidiaries to the activity.

Also, another outstanding contribution of ritualists is the

definition and analysis of the nature of the grammatical categories i.e. constituents of verbal cognition such as the agent, the object etc. They have proposed that agents (objects) etc. could be analysed as the possessors of the actions (possessors of the effects produced by the actions) etc.; nevertheless, the same should be defined only as the possessors of the indivisible properties (*akhonḍopādhi*) such as the agenthood, (the objecthood) which are co-extensive (*samaniyata*) with the possession of the action (or with the possession of the effect) etc. Thus, ritualists have provided an interesting alternative to the definitions of grammatical categories provided by the grammarians and logicians and hence have enriched the analysis of sentence meaning.

Logicians analysis

Navya logicians brought a new dimension to the science of sentence analysis. They developed the idea of Bhāṭṭamīmāṃsaka that syntactico semantical relations (*samsargas*) are mere relations i.e. are not referent qualifiers (*prakāras*). They have proposed that while individual words convey the individual word meanings with the help of *ākāṅkṣā* etc. through word relations, the relations that relate them together need some thing else to obtain them since no word relation is ever established in any of the relations. According to them, they syntactico semantical relations such as superstratumness (*ādheyatā*) are understood between the two word meanings through the principle or force of relations (*samsarga maryādā*). And once the syntactico-semantical relations are understood, the independent words such as 'pot' (*ghaṭah*), which are perceived to have word relations in the 'pot' etc., will lead to cognition of total sentence meaning with the help of '*ākāṅkṣā*' etc. Hence, there occurs no need to accept a further sentence relations, besides word relations, to cognize sentence meaning.

Navya logicians have introduced the methodology of new logic to the analysis of word meaning and to the definition of grammatical categories. They have analysed word meanings adopting the principle of "whatever meaning is not otherwise obtained through other sources is the word meaning" (*ananya labhyaḥ śabdārthah*). For instance, consider the statement

'*grāmam gacchati*' (he goes to the village). The cognition produced here is that the person is the abode of the effort conducive to the action of going which produces the contact in the village. Here, according to the logicians, the accusative, enjoined in the sense of the objecthood, refers to the superstratumness (*ādheyatā*) since the other constituents of the objecthood of the village i.e. the 'village' and the effect 'contact' are referred to by the accusative base *grāma* (village) and the verbal base '*gam*' (to go) respectively. Similarly, they have proposed that all word meanings are to be decided on the basis of whether or not the same are referred to by any other word. This methodology of logicians has brought forward sharp distinctions between the theories of logicians and other epistemologists regarding the word meanings such as the nominal base-meanings, the case meanings, the verb meanings etc.

Also, the logicians have defined the grammatical categories i.e. the constituent parts of sentence such as *kāraṅgas*, the verbs, the adnominals etc. on the basis of their epistemological, logical or syntactico-semantic function. For instance, Jagadīśa defines *kāraṅgas* as those that are cognized as the qualifiers or modifiers of actions expressed by verbs. According to him, the syntactico-semantic entities that qualify a particular action in a particular way is the particular *kāraṅga* with respect to the particular action. Similarly, logicians have defined other grammatical categories like, the verbs, adnominals etc., on the basis of their epistemological, logic or syntactico-semantic function. This has led to the newer definitions of such grammatical categories and brought out the epistemological and other characteristics of the categories. Thus, while the analysis of sentence meaning was established as a separate science of research by grammarians, by providing the analysis and the definition of various grammatical categories (the parts of speech) etc., the ritualists and logicians developed the same further by providing alternative theories of verbal cognition and also the definitions and analysis of the grammatical categories on the basis of epistemological, logic and/or syntactico-semantic functions.

1. See chapter I for more details.

CHAPTER I

THEORY OF WORD, SENTENCE AND SENTENCE-MEANING

(*Śabda-Vākya-Śābdabodha-Vicārāḥ*)

Introduction

Indian epistemological systems, especially grammar (*vyākaraṇa*), ritualism (*mīmāṃsā*) and logic (*nyāya*) have analysed word (*śabda* or *pada*), sentence (*vākya*) and their meaning (*padārtha* and *vākyārtha*) in the most scientific way. These systems have shown a keen interest in the epistemological problems of word, sentence and their meaning. Despite that Panini's grammar, Jaimini's ritualism and Gautama's logic are primarily concerned with the generative grammar (i.e., technique teaching how to produce the words), ritual interpretation of the Vedas and syllogism respectively, they deal also with the syntactical and semantical aspects of the language and analyse the sentence and its meaning. Also, the newer schools of these systems (Navyas) have contributed many a significant theories of sentence and meaning which are comparable to the modern scientific theories of linguistics and philosophy.

Indian epistemologists have approached the problem of meaning on both word (*pada*) (which includes even morphemes) and sentence (*vākya*) levels. They have developed theories which recognize both words and sentence as having potentiality to denote meaning. Thus meaning can be classified as either word-meaning (*padārtha*) or sentence-meaning (*vākyārtha*). However, the main difference between 'word-meaning' and 'sentence-meaning' is that while the former stands isolated i.e., 'unrelated' with respect to other items and hence does not convey a complete idea, the latter is related to other items and hence conveys a syntactically complete idea.

For instance, consider the sentence 'caitraḥ taṇḍulam pacati' (Caitra cooks rice). This sentence consists of the three words namely 'caitraḥ', 'taṇḍulam' and 'pacati'; and the three words convey the subject i.e. agent (*kartṛ*) 'caitra', the object (*karman*) 'rice' and the predicate (*kriyā*) 'cooking' respectively. However, none of the three words independently, on word level, convey any complete idea since their meanings are unrelated to each other; whereas the sentence consisting of the same three words conveys the complete idea of 'Caitra cooking the rice' since all the three meanings are related to each other. This phenomenon of why only sentence conveys a complete idea is explained by Indian epistemologists by their theory of verbal cognition (*śābdabodha*). According to the Indian theories of meaning, the individual words first denote their respective meanings and then the individual word-meanings are comprehended i.e., grasped as having syntactico-semantic relations with each other. The first stage is called the verbal cognition in parts (*sakhaṇḍa-śābdabodha*) and the second stage is called verbal cognition in totality (*akhaṇḍaśābdabodha*). Thus, the verbal cognition (*śābdabodha*), really speaking, can be described as the comprehension of the syntactico-semantic relations of the various word-meanings (*vākyaṛthānvyaya bodha*).

Problem :

However, what are the syntactico-semantic relations that exist among different 'word-meanings' (i.e., referents) that bind or relate them together into a coherent 'sentence-meaning' so that syntactically connected and semantically competent idea is produced? Also, what is the exact nature of 'sentence-meaning' (verbal cognition) produced? Indian epistemologists differ amongst themselves as to what are the syntactico-semantic relations involved among the different referents or 'word-meanings', as well as to what is the exact nature of sentence-meaning or verbal cognition. This is so because, in comprehending such syntactico-semantic relations, only one of the referents is perceived to be principal or chief qualificand (i.e., nucleus) (*mukhyaviśeya*), whereas all other referents are

perceived to be directly or indirectly qualifiers of (i.e., subordinate to) (*viśeṣaṇa*) such a chief qualificand. And grammarians hold that only the action, denoted by the verbal root, is the chief qualificand; whereas the ritualists propose that the activity (*bhāvanā*), denoted by the conjugational ending, is the chief qualificand; on the other hand, the logicians propound that only the grammatical subject (i.e., substantive) of the surface structure denoted by the nominative word, is the chief qualificand. Accordingly, they have postulated three different linguistic theories regarding the chief qualificand nucleus of verbal cognition. Also, they have differed as to whether the syntactico semantical relations are themselves 'word-meanings' (referents) or not i.e. obtained by the principle of relations (*samsarga-maryādā*). Moreover, epistemologists hold contrasting views regarding the nature of words (*śabda* or *pada*), sentence (*vākya*) and the necessary conditions of verbal cognition. Since these theories and propositions are the most significant contribution of Indian epistemologists to the field of linguistics and philosophy, we shall endeavour to give the accounts of these theories of word, sentence and sentence-meaning.

Word (*śabda*)

Word (*śabda*) has been recognized to be the means of verbal cognition (*śabābodha*). Such a word, however, must be uttered by a trustworthy or authoritative person if the cognition produced is to become valid. Vātsyāyana,¹ therefore, defines word as an instruction of a trustworthy person (*āptopadeśa*) intended to convey the sense understood from elders. nevertheless, etymologically speaking, word (*śabda*) can be analysed as 'that from which meaning is sounded' (*śabdyate anena arthyḥ*).

It may, however, be noted here that among the logicians, only the scholars belonging to the early school of thought or Prācya regard the words to be the means of verbal cognition; whereas the scholars belonging to the new school of thought or

1. Nyāyabhāṣya on i. 1.1

Navyas, regard the knowledge of words to be the means of verbal cognition. Consequently, only such Prācyas scholars as Jayanta view words to be the means that produces verbal cognition. (*śābdapramiti karaṇatvam śabdaḥ*). According to them, words of trustworthy people, when understood correctly, become directly responsible for the generation of verbal cognition and thus assume the status of a peculiar or unique cause (*asādhāraṇa kāraṇa*). This theory can be explained by the fact that the listener comprehends meaning of sentence only after correctly understanding the functional relation (*vṛtti*) of word and meaning between words such as 'pot' (*ghaṭa*) and also its meaning such as 'an entity having shell neck' etc. (*kambugrivādimān*). Thus, Prācyas conclude that words are those from which valid verbal cognition arises (*pramopadhāyakaśśabdaḥ*). However, Navyas disagree with the view of the Prācyas and propose that it is knowledge of words and not words themselves as such, which is the means of producing verbal cognition. According to them, verbal cognition is possible through even the verse of silent person (*maunīśloka*) or hand-gesture (*hastaceṣṭā*) provided that one is able to recollect the words uttered earlier and thereby obtains the meanings. Consequently, it is necessary that the knowledge of the words alone be considered as the unique cause of verbal cognition. Thus, Navyas such as Gangeśa define words as those which are produced from the correct understanding (i.e., knowledge) of the exact nature of the referents which, in turn, produce the utterance (*prayoga hetu bhūta artha tattva jñāna janyaś śabdaḥ*).

Almost in a similar vein, Laugākṣibhāskara¹ too defines 'word' to be that which is the object of the knowledge of that which functions as the means of verbal cognition (*śābdapramiti karaṇa jñāna viṣayaḥ*).

However, grammarians (*vaiyākaraṇas*) propose the theory that words, in reality, are nothing but syllables which are eternal (*nityavarṇas*). Nevertheless, syllables assume the form of various words due to the reflection of various word forms in them. And these reflections are made possible by the

impressions of various sequences of syllables. Once the syllables assume the form of individual words, the same become meaning-revealing force (*arthābhidhāna śakta*). And when meaning-revealing force is properly understood, i.e., when the potentiality of a particular word to reveal a particular meaning is understood through the every day usage of elders etc., the words can be used to convey the same meanings so that verbal cognition is produced.

However, Bhartṛhari and his followers hold quite a different view : that the word which alone has the capacity to reveal the meanings, should be accepted to be verbal essence (*sphoṭa*) (*artha bodhaka śabdaḥ sphoṭaḥ*). And such a '*sphoṭa*', which bursts forth or is manifested from syllables (*varṇābhivyāṅgya*) and is eternal (*nitya*), must be viewed to be quite different from syllables (*varṇānātmaka*). This theory is necessitated by the fact that otherwise every individual member of a cluster of syllables, considered to be word, is momentary and therefore cannot be perceived. Consequently, the recollection of referents, which is the primary cause of verbal cognition, becomes impossible to explain from such a word.

On the other hand, when '*sphoṭa*' which differs from syllables and remains eternal is held to be revealing the meaning, such a difficulty could be overcome since the same does not perish before revealing the meaning and can be said to be unique with respect to each meaning. Thus, it can be observed now that according to Bhartṛhari and his followers, the *sphoṭa*, which bursts forth or manifests from the syllables (*sphuṭyate vyajyate varṇaih*) and from which meaning is revealed (*sphuṭatyartho'smat*) alone is word.

Ritualists (*mīmāṃsakas*) maintain that eternal words are manifested from the eternal syllables through the efforts of the speaker with the help of manifesting ether. And such words, while assuming the form of the Vedas, are impersonal (*apauruṣeya*) as the same (Vedas) are not composed by any one. Ritualists further maintain that the functional relation (*vṛtti*) between word and meaning is eternal as one learns the natural usage of words from elders who, in turn, learn it

from their elders. Thus, since the functional relation of word and meaning is eternal, the same inheres in the words themselves. And such a functional relation helps the words to signify generic property (*jāti*) as their meaning which is one and common to all the substances such as pots and hence economical (i.e., the generic property such as potness is common to all the pots and hence by assuming such a generic property as the meaning of words ritualists claim economy in the references to meanings).

Inflected Word (pada)

Sanskrit language has two terms, namely '*śabda*' and '*pada*' which represent words in two distinct stages of linguistic development. Pāṇini defines *pada* as that which ends in either declensional or conjunctive affix (*sup tiṇantam padam*). And according to Vātsyāyana, a non-inflected word (*apada*) should never be used in language (*apadam na prayuñjita*). That is to say that only an inflected word (*pada*) and never simply a nominal base—word (*śabda*) should be used in language. These notions are prompted by the fact that a mere base—word, unless accompanied by inflections, has no standing at the syntactical level and therefore cannot be used in the language as a syntactical unit. Pāṇini and following him Vātsyāyana have clearly distinguished nominal base—word from an inflected word and hence are very careful in using the term '*pada*' in the sense of only an inflected word that is competent to be used in language as a syntactical unit expressing such syntactical relations as subject, object etc. Thus they have reserved the use of the term '*śabda*' for expressing the base which may either be conjunctive or declensional and the term '*pada*' for expressing the inflected word.

Gautama too¹ explains '*pada*' to be one that ends in an inflection (*te vibhaktiāntāḥ padam*). And Annambhaṭṭa² holds that '*pada*' is that which is endowed with the power of functional relation such as denotation etc. (*śaktam padam*).

1. Nyāyasūtra ii. 2.80

2. Tarkasamgraha p. 4

This definition is a pointer to the fact that only an inflected word, and not merely an uninflected base—word, is competent to refer to meaning since the same is endowed with the power of denotation etc.

In view of the above facts, it could be stated that the two terms, namely *śabda* and *pada*, represent word at two distinctly separate levels or stages. While the term *śabda* represents word at the lexical level, the term *pada* represents the same at the syntactical or paradigmatic level. When a word remains at the lexical level, the same can only be considered to be potentially a meaning—bearing vehicle, but not competent to refer, in actuality, to any meaning. On the other hand, when a word comes to the syntactical level, i.e., takes the inflectional endings, the same becomes actually competent to refer to its meaning.

Also, it might be observed here that grammarians and logicians approach the problem of word from two different angles, but arrive at almost an identical conclusion. While grammarians approach the problem of word from the view point of a syntactical entity and hence conclude that only *pada* i.e., word which has inflectional or conjugational endings, can be used in the language as it can refer to syntactical relations, the logicians approach the same problem from the view point of a semantical entity and therefore conclude that only *pada*, i.e. the word which refers to meaning, can be considered to be the cause of verbal cognition.

Sentence (vākya)

In Sanskrit, sentence (*vākya*) is a cluster of words (*pada-samūha*). Such a cluster of words can be either (i) a cluster of nominals such as *trayaḥ kālāḥ* (there are) three times), where two nominals namely 'three' and 'times' form a sentence with the implied verb 'are'; or (ii) a cluster of verbs such as '*pacati bhavati*' (cooking occurs), where the two verbs, namely 'cooking' and 'occurs' form a sentence by functioning as the subject and predicate respectively or (iii) a cluster of nominals and a verb such as '*caitraḥ taṇḍulam pacati*' (Caitra cooks rice grains), where the two nominals, namely 'Caitra' and 'rice

grains' along with the verb 'cooks', form a sentence by functioning as the subject, object and predicate respectively.

However, different epistemologists define sentence variously by highlighting different aspects of a given sentence. Grammarians hold that a sentence must consist of only one single predicate (*eka tiṅ*). For instance, according to them, 'Devadatta goes' (*devadatto gacchati*) is a sentence as it consists of only a single predicate in the form of 'goes' (*gacchati*). They firmly believe that presence of more than a single predicate in a sentence is a cause of split of sentence (*vākyabheda*) and therefore must be avoided by any means. Thus, in a sentence such as 'cooking occurs' (*pacati bhavati*), where two verbs, namely *pacati* and *bhavati* are used, only the later 'occurs' (*bhavati*) is to be construed as the predicate, whereas the former 'cooking' (*pacati*) is to be construed as the subject.

A section of grammarians, headed by Bhartṛhari, however, accept an indivisible sentence-essence (*akhaṇḍa vākya sphoṭa*) in place of simple sentence. According to them, only such indivisible sentence—essence is real and all other varieties of verbal¹ essence (*sphoṭa*) such as syllable-essence (*varṇasphoṭa*), word-essence (*pada sphoṭa*) are its subsidiaries. And such a sentence-essence is manifested in the mind of the listener through the knowledge of the utterance of the last syllable which is pregnant with the impression created by the succession of preceding syllables such as *cai + tra. ḥ + pa + ca + ti*. They hold that assumption of such a unique sentence-essence is necessitated by the fact that words, which are mere combination of syllables (*varṇasamūha*), are momentary (i.e., instantly perishing) in nature and therefore cannot be held to be real. And also since quickly perishing entities are impossible to perceive, words become incompetent of possessing any functional relation (*vyṛtti*) through which they can refer to meanings.

1. Verbal essence (*sphoṭa*) is actually of eight types : *varṇasphoṭa*, *padasphoṭa*, *vākyasphoṭa*, *akhaṇḍayadasphoṭa*, *akhaṇḍa vākya sphoṭa*, *varṇa jāti sphoṭa*, *padajāti sphoṭa* and *vākya-jāti sphoṭa*,

Thus, only indivisible sentence-essence has the competence to possess functional relation so that the same can reveal the meaning to the listener.

It must be noted, however, that according to Bhartṛhari, meaning is understanding or intelligence (*pratibhā*). And intelligence is described as the knowledge that blossoms over and over fresh (*nava navonmeṣa śāliai prajñā*). By this Bhartṛhari means that each sentence (essence) has a peculiar ability to create a newer and newer awareness.

Nevertheless, none of the epistemologists, barring Sāṅkhyas, accept the theory of sentence-essence. They argue that there is no real necessity for accepting such a sentence-essence. Manifested by the knowledge of the utterance of the last syllable which in turn is associated with the impression of the succession of preceding syllables. It is equally efficient to accept that the knowledge of the last syllable, along with the impression of the succession of preceding syllables, itself reveals the meaning. Besides, if the knowledge of the last syllable uttered is held incompetent in revealing the meaning on the ground that words or syllables are quickly perishing and therefore unreal, then even verbal-essence, manifested through the same (knowledge of the last syllable) cannot be claimed to be competent in revealing meaning either.

Ritualists on the other hand, propose as follows: that sentence i.e., syntactical connection is nothing but connected utterance of words (*samabhivṛyāhāra*). Connected utterance can be defined as the enunciation together of two things which are really principle and subsidiary to each other (*śeṣaśeṣinoḥ sahoccāraṇam*) although there are no case forms such as accusative etc. to indicate such relationships as object (*sādhyatva*) (i.e., accomplishability). Thus, in the statement 'one who has a ladle made of *parṇa*-wood, hears no evil sound, (*yasya parṇa-mayī juhūr bhavati na sa pāpam ślokaṁ śṇoti*), the connected utterance i.e. mere mentioning together) of the words 'ladle' and 'being made of *parṇa*-wood' indicates the fact that being made of *parṇa*-wood' is subsidiary to (i.e., qualifies) the ladle.

This is in spite of the fact that such a statement does not consist of any accusative case form that could have expressed the subsidiary nature of being made of *parṇa*-wood to ladle directly. Thus, sentence (i.e., syntactical connection) is nothing but mere connected utterance of words.

Logicians define sentence from the view point of verbal cognition. Thus, Gaṅgeśa, in his *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, states that a sentence consists of words which are intended to produce the qualificative cognition (*viśiṣṭārthaparaśabdatvam*). For instance, the statement '*nilo ghataḥ*' (pot is blue) can be considered to be a sentence as the same is intended to produce the cognition of pot qualified by blue colour.

Jagadīśa, too, almost in a similar vein states¹ that whatever cluster of words has whatever syntactical expectancy for the cognition of whatever referents, the same cluster of words constitutes the sentence for the same cognition. For instance, since the cluster of words such as *gām ānaya* (you be the agent of bringing the cow) has the syntactical expectancy for generating the cognition that 'you should be the agent of bringing the cow that conditions the objectness of the cow', the same constitutes the sentence for the same cognition.

From this examination of various views of epistemologists it becomes clear that grammarians, since they attach greater importance to the action expressed by a predicate, define sentence as a syntactical unit consisting of a single predicate. And, ritualists, since they consider a sentence to be a particular syntactical connection, view the same to possess a peculiar capacity to indicate the subsidiary nature of an *aṅga* even without an accusative case-form etc. On the other hand, logicians, since they approach sentence from the view point of the means to verbal cognition, describe the same as the statement intended to produce verbal cognition.

1. *yādṛśārtha viṣayitāka śābdabodham prati anukūlā paras-parākāṅkṣā tādrśa śabda stoma eva tathāvidhārthe vākyaṁ*).

Definition and Nature of śābdabodha

Verbal cognition (*śābdabodha*) can be defined to be a cognition that has the knowledge of the words as its unique cause, i.e., that results from the knowledge of words. And such a cognition should be distinguished from perception, analogical understanding etc. Therefore, Jayanta states¹ that verbal cognition is a comprehension (*dhī*) which is devoid of the property (of being an analogical understanding) which (property), in turn, is not deviating from the comprehension produced from the words; and also which (comprehension) is devoid of the property (of being a perception etc.) which (property) is both not pervading the experience in general and deviating from the property of being an effect of the knowledge of words which in turn, is produced.

Etimologically speaking, verbal cognition (*śābdabodha*) can be explained as the cognition resulting from the words that are being heard (i.e. uttered) (*śabdāc chrutāj jāyamāno bodhaḥ*). This is in conformity with the fact that verbal cognition is indeed produced from the words when they are uttered. However, this explanation can be taken to support the Prācya theory that words form the unique cause of verbal cognition. For, Navyas and also most of the modern scholars on logic, as explained earlier, have held that knowledge of words, and not mere words, form the unique cause of verbal cognition. Thus, Viśvanātha states, in his *kārikāvali*, (i) that the knowledge of words is the primary or unique cause (ii) that the knowledge of the reference to the meanings is the intermediate cause, (iii) that the knowledge of the functional relation of word and its meaning (i.e., denotation) is the associate or auxiliary cause, and also (iv) that the verbal cognition is effect.²

1. *janyapada dhī janyatva vyabhicāriṇi anubhavatva vyāpikā ca yā jātiḥ pratyakṣatvādīḥ taccūnyatve sati padaviśayakatvā vyabhicāriṇi yā jātiḥ upamitivam tacchūnyatyām.*
2. *padajñānam tu karaṇam dvāram tatra padārthadhiḥ śābdabodhaḥ phalam tatra śaktidhiḥ sahakāriṇi.*

Process of obtaining Verbal Cognition

Process of obtaining verbal cognition can be described as follows : At first one perceives words as such and then he recognizes the same as possessing the functional relation of word and meaning. Once the words are cognized to possess the functional relation, the same can be used to refer to the particular meanings and thereafter, with the help of the recollection of the meanings referred to, verbal cognition can be obtained. For instance, consider the verbal cognition of bringing a cow. At first, one perceives the words 'gām' (cow) and 'ānaya' (bring) as such and then he recognizes the same (words) as possessing the functional relation of word and their meaning. Once the words *gām* and *anaya* are cognized to possess the functional relation, the same (words) can be used to refer to the 'cow individual' and to the action of bringing respectively and thereafter with the help of the recollection of the meanings referred to (i.e., cow individual and bringing), the verbal cognition of bringing the cow can be obtained.

It should be noted here that epistemologists hold that verbal cognition by parts (*sakhaṇḍa śābdabodha*) is to be effected (i.e. perceived) before verbal cognition by unity (*akhaṇḍa śābdabodha*) can be produced. For instance, consider '*caitro grāmam gacchati*' : Here, the word '*caitras*' consists of two morphemes, namely the nominal base *caitra* and the nominative-ending *as*. The two morphemes denote the agent *Caitra* and the 'singular number' respectively. And the word *grāmam* also consists of two morphemes, namely the nominal base *grāma* and the accusative ending *am*. The two morphemes denote the object 'village' and the 'objectness' respectively. Also, the verb *gacchati* consists of two morphemes, namely the verbal base 'gaccha' and the conjugational ending *ti*. These two morphemes denote the action 'going' and 'conducive activity' respectively. Perception of the meanings of such individual words as such is considered to be verbal cognition by parts (*sakhaṇḍa śābdabodha*). On the other hand, when one understands such meanings of individual

words as related to each other, the same is considered to be verbal cognition by unity (*akhaṇḍa śābdabodha*).

Description of Verbal Cognition (śābdabodha)

Annambhatta, in his Tarkasamgraha, describes verbal cognition as the comprehension of sentence-meaning (*vākyārthajñānam*). What he means to say by this description is that verbal cognition is the comprehension of the syntactico-semantic relations between referents of different words of a sentence. For instance, consider the sentence *caitra grāmam gacchati* (Caitra goes to the village). Here according to logicians, the verbal cognition produced is that 'Caitra' the agent, is the substratum of the activity conducive to the action of going that in turn, conditions the objectness occurring in the village' (*grāmaniṣṭha karmatā nirūpakā gamanānukūla vyāpārāśrayaḥ*).

This verbal cognition can be said to be the comprehension of the syntactico-semantic relations between the referents of different words such as (i) between the object i.e., village, and the objectness, (ii) between the same (objectness) and also the action i.e., the 'going', (iii) between the same (action 'going') and also the activity, and also (iv) between the same (activity) and the agent i.e., Caitra. Now, the relations involved in such a verbal cognition can be illustrated as follows: (i) since the objectness occurs in the village (i. e. the object), the relation between the village and also the objectness is that of occurrence or superstratumness (*niṣṭhatā*); (ii) since the action 'going' conditions or describes the objectness of the village, the relation between the objectness and also the action 'going' is that of conditioning or describing (*nirūpakatā*); (iii) since the activity of Caitra is conducive to the generation of the action 'going', the relation between the same (action 'going') and also the activity is that of conduciveness (*anukūlatā*); (iv) and since Caitra is the substratum of the activity, the relation between the same (activity) and also Caitra is that of substratumness (*āśrayatā*).

Samsargatāvāda and paakāratāvādā

The analysis and also the description of verbal cognition raises the most significant epistemological question as to whether the relations comprehended in a verbal cognition are merely relations (*samsarga*) or they too are referent-qualifiers (*prakāra*) like the 'village' etc.

The logicians hold that syntactico-semantic relations, comprehended between the referents of two words, are merely relations (*samsarga*) and are obtained in verbal cognition through the principle of syntactico-semantic relations (*samsarga maryādā*).¹ According to them, words refer to only those meanings in which the same (words) have been perceived to have the functional relation of word and meaning (i.e., denotation, indication, etc.) They do not accept that any thing which is not perceived to have the functional relation, can be understood through any word. Since, the words such as *gramam* have been perceived to have the functional relation in the sense of the 'village' and also the 'objectness' (here the nominal base *grāma* has the functional relation in the 'village' and the accusative '*am*' has the same in the 'objectness'), the same can refer to the 'village' and also to the 'objectness'. However, the same cannot refer to the relation of superstratumness which is comprehended between the village and also the objectness as no functional relation is perceived there. Thus, since there exists no other alternative, relations such as superstratumness must be accepted to have been apprehended through the principle of syntactico-semantic relations only.

It may also be pointed out here that Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka too, like logicians, subscribes to the theory that individual words, occurring in a sentence, have a capacity to refer to just individual word-meanings such as village and not to any syntactico-semantic relations that may be involved. It is not necessary that individual words should refer to syntactico-semantic relations as well; for, such relations can be obtained i.e., apprehended through the principle of syntactico-semantic

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1. *śābdabodhe caika padārtha aparapadārthasya samsargah samsarga maryādayā bhāṣate, Vyutpattivāda*. p. 1.

relations. According to him, individual words, assisted by the knowledge of individual functional relations, refer to their respective meanings which are then related to each other through the principle of syntactico-semantic relations. Thus, he rejects the theory that the words should be assumed to have functional relations in the semantic relations along with their individual meanings, and also that separate power of sentence, independent of functional relations of individual words, be accepted to facilitate the apprehension of syntactico-semantic relations between various referents of individual words that are found in a sentence.

It may here be noted that Prabhākara Miśra and his followers establish a theory which accepts even such syntactico-semantic relations as superstratumness etc. as referent—qualifiers or *prakāra* (i.e., as referred to by words).

According to them, no item, unless it has been perceived to have the functional relation of word and meaning, can be allowed to be apprehended in verbal cognition. Consequently, suppose the syntactico-semantic relations such as superstratumness are not perceived to have functional relation of any word in them, then the same cannot be allowed to be apprehended in verbal cognition. Thus, words must be accepted to have functional relation even in such relations as superstratumness so that the same can be apprehended. And such a functional relation can be described as the word 'village' *grāma* has the denotation in the village as related with the objectness etc. These ritualists, further hold that it is necessary that, a separate power of sentence, independent of functional relations of individual words, be accepted so that all the meanings of individual words in a sentence can be apprehended as related together in a sentence-meaning form which is verbal cognition.

Gadādhara, in his Vyutapattivāda, however, rejects such a theory. According to him, ritualists have to assume that inflectional endings such as *ti* in *gacchati* and *am* in *grāmam* etc. refer to such relations as 'conduciveness', 'superstratumness' etc.; and therefore heaviness of assumption (*gaurava*)

cannot be avoided. This is so because, when syntactico-semantic relations such as superstratumness are accepted to have been referred to by inflectional endings, they too become referent-qualifiers (*prakāra*) like any other meaning such as the 'village' etc. which are referred to by the nominal bases such as *grāma* and therefore require a separate relation such as self-linking relation (*svarūpa*) for relating them, in turn, with other referent-qualifiers i.e., objectness etc. Nevertheless, ritualists insist that their theory involves economy in the assumption (*lāghava*) of the assembly of causes of verbal cognition that prevents inference or perception. For instance, since the assembly of causes of verbal cognition, consisting of the reference to the meanings by the word *grāmam*, contains the reference to the 'superstratumness' as well, the same can automatically be considered to be the preventing factor of the perception or inference of the superstratumness of the objectness in the village at the time when the verbal cognition of the same is being produced by the same assembly of causes. However, logicians need to assume additionally that such an assembly of causes of verbal cognition is the preventing factor of the inference or perception of the superstratumness in the objectness in the village since the same assembly of causes, according to their theory, does not consist of any reference to superstratumness; and therefore cannot automatically prevent the perception wherein the superstratumness is a qualifier unless the same is held to be the preventing factor.

It may be observed now that despite that both logicians and ritualists are at great pains to establish relative economy in the assumption of the assembly of causes of verbal cognition in their respective theories, the real reason for their support to two diametrically opposing theories is their adherence to two distinctly different epistemological conventions. While, logicians follow the epistemological convention that the inflectional endings are not enjoined in the sense of any syntactico-semantic relations and therefore cannot be held to refer to the same relations; the ritualists hold the view that Vedic statements being *apauruṣeya*, must not be conceded to be insufficient in any respect and

therefore the words found in the same statements ought to be referring to even syntactico-semantic relations.

Śābdabodha a metalinguistic description

Verbal cognition can be identified as the meta-linguistic description of certain truth conditions i.e., logically possible syntactico-semantic relations. That is to say that when Indian epistemologists hold that such verbal cognitions as 'Caitra is the substratum of the activity conducive to the going that conditions the objectness occurring in the village' is being produced from the statement '*caitra grāmam gacchati*' (Caitra goes to the village), the same (cognition) can be said to be the explanation of logically possible syntactico-semantic relations such as (i) occurrence or superstratumness between the village and the objectness, (ii) conditioning between the objectness and the action 'going', (iii) conductiveness between the action 'going' and the activity and (iv) substratumness between the activity and Caitra. And such an explanation is described by epistemologists in Sanskrit as *grāmaniṣṭha karmatā nirūpaka garhānānukūla vyāpārāśrayah*. Now, this description is only a metalinguistic description of the various semantic relations between different referents and not the actual comprehension of ideas.

It should be noted here that when a speaker utters such sentence as 'Caitra goes to the village' (*grāmam gacchati caitraḥ*) he intends that the listener should comprehend the idea that Caitra is the agent of going to the village by acquiring the village through his action of going. However, the speaker can not be held to intend that the listener should cognize various syntactico-semantic relations among referents; nevertheless Indian epistemologists insist unanimously that the speaker apprehends all the syntactico-semantic relations that are logically possible between various referents and then describe the same relations in a meta-linguistic form as given above. Thus, it can be concluded that the expression of verbal cognition (*śābdabodha*) in such forms as '*grāmaniṣṭha...*' etc. is nothing but the meta-linguistic description of the logically possible relations.

Necessary conditions of verbal cognition

The necessary conditions of verbal cognition are enume-

rated to be three, namely (i) syntactical expectancy (*ākāṅkṣā*), (ii) contiguity (*āsatti*), and (iii) semantical competency (*yogyatā*). Some consider knowledge of the speakers intention (*tālparya*) also to be a necessary condition.

Ākāṅkṣā

Gaṅgeśa defines '*ākāṅkṣā*' to be incompleteness of utterance (*abhidhānā paryavasānam*). That is to say that the juxtaposition or presence of the word without which the sentence meaning is impossible to construe. Thus, for instance, the statement 'cow, horse, man, elephant' (*gaur arśvaḥ puruṣo hasti*) produces no verbal cognition as there is no juxtaposition of the verb indicating the predicate etc. without which the sentence meaning is impossible to construe.

Jagadīśa in his *Tarkāmṛta* defines '*ākāṅkṣā*' as being an utterance inherently potent and also producing the verbal cognition that is not yet produced (*svārūpayogyatve sati ajanitā nvaya bodha janakatvam*). Thus, in the utterance 'pot, the objectness, the bringing, the activity' (*ghaṭaḥ karmatvam ānayanam kṛtiḥ*), the cognition of the activity conducive to the bringing that conditions the objectness occurring in pot' is not produced as such an utterance, being devoid of any of the inflected word-forms, is not inherently potent and so is not producing the same the cognition.

Nevertheless, grammarians hold that *ākāṅkṣā* means lack of ability of words to produce cognition of their own referents without the required declensional endings, roots, conjugational endings and *kāraṅkas*. Thus, from the same utterance (i.e. pot, the objectness, the bringing, the activity), cognition need not be produced as they lack such required declensional endings etc.

However, majority of epistemologists are of the opinion that *ākāṅkṣā* is the utterance of words in a sequence (*samabhi-vyāhāra*). That is to say, the utterance of whatever word, in company of whatever word, is found to be generating whatever cognition, the same is the '*ākāṅkṣā*' for the same (cognition). Thus, the utterance of the word '*ānaya*' ('bring') in the company of the word '*ghaṭam*' ('pot'), is the '*ākāṅkṣā*' for producing the cognition of bringing what conditions the objectness occurring in the pot.

It should be noted that some, albeit very¹ few, how defined *ākāṅkṣā* in terms of a desire to cognize the referent that is reminded of by the word uttered' (*samabhivyaṅṛta padasmāritā rthajināsā*). For instance, the desire to cognize the object such as a pot or a piece of cloth after the utterance of the verb 'bring', or the desire to cognize the predicate such as to bring or to see after the utterance of the object 'pot' constitutes '*ākāṅkṣā*' for the cognition of ones bringing the pot etc.

Āsatti

Contiguity (*āsatti*) is the utterance of words in a sentence form by a single person without abnormal delay (*padānam avi-lambena uccāraṇam*). The knowledge derived from such an utterance causes verbal cognition. Thus, when some one utters the word '*gām*' (cow) in the morning and '*ānaya*' (bring) in the evening, the cognition of bringing the cow, that conditions the objectness of cow, is not produced as such an utterance lacks contiguity.

Annambhatta, in his *Dīpikā* explains that 'utterance of words without abnormal delay' should be interpreted to mean the reference to the meanings produced by the words uttered without delay. Therefore, when reference to meanings produced by the words, uttered with abnormal delay, fails to produce any cognition, no harm need be assumed.

However, the Navyas hold that contiguity (*āsatti*) is the speakers intention to utter the words without delay and not the actual utterance of the same; and speakers intention to utter the words can be described as such and such words should be uttered after such and such words. According to the Navyas, only the knowledge of such speakers intention to utter the words causes verbal cognition. Thus, in the case of the verse of the silent, verbal cognition is possible as we can explain the contiguity in the form of the speakers intention to utter the verse. This is despite that in such a case, no actual utterance ever takes place. It should be noted here now that this interpretation of *āsatti* is in keeping with the Navya theory that it is only the knowledge of the words (and not the words as such) is the

means of verbal cognition and therefore even the verse of the silent can produce verbal cognition.

Nevertheless, some of the later writers on logic including even Annambhaṭṭa, as shown earlier, do not show much interest in such a theory on the ground that the same (theory) is not quite pragmatic.

Yogyatā

Semantical competency (*yogyatā*) is probably the single most important necessary condition of verbal cognition. This has been variously defined by different epistemologists.¹ Jayanta defines semantical competency as the possibility of the syntactico-semantical relation of one referent to the other. And such a competency, when understood to be present renders the statement semantically competent to produce the valid verbal cognition; whereas the same when understood to be absent, excludes the statement from being considered to be semantically competent to produce the valid cognition. To state the stock example, the statement '*gām ānaya*' ('bring the cow') possessess the semantical competency as the relation of conditioning the objectness between the cow and also the bringing action is quite easy to establish; whereas the statement '*vahninā sincati*' ('he sprinkles with fire') lacks the semantical competency as no relation between the fire, and also the sprinkling action can be established. Thus, the knowledge of the presence of the competency renders the first statement to be semantically competent to produce the valid cognition of bringing the cow; whereas the knowledge of the absence of such a competency excludes the second statement from being considered as semantically competent to produce any valid cognition.

Gaṅgeśa, however, defines semantical competency (*yogyatā*) in a different manner. He states² that semantical competency should be understood as the syntactico-semantical relation of one referent, that delimits the qualificandness of another referent, being the non-substratum of the knowledge wherein the

1. Nyaymanjari.

2. *itarapadārtha samsarge apara padārthniṣṭhātyantāblāvapratiyogitva pramāviśeṣyatvābhāvaḥ*, Tattvacintāmaṇi.

counter-positiveness, conditioned by the constant absence occurring in the other referent, is the qualifier. Thus, since in the statement 'he sprinkles with fire', the conditioning of the instrumentality of fire, the syntactico-semantic relation that delimits the qualificandness of sprinkling, the other referent, is only the substratum of the knowledge such as 'the conditioning of the instrumentality of fire, does not occur in the sprinkling', wherein the counter positiveness of the conditioning of the instrumentality of fire, is the qualifire, the same statement lacks semantical competency.

In simple terms what Gangeśa means to say is that '*yogyatā*' is the knowledge wherein syntactico-semantic relation between two referents is viewed to be non-contradictory, i.e., not incompatible or not untenable. Keeping this point in view, Gadādhara modifies the definition by stating that *yogyatā* is the word's reference to the meanings which are semantically not contradictory i.e. are compatible (*abādhitārthakatvam*).

This pattern of definition is followed by most of the epistemologists including even ritualists. Thus, Prabhākara Miśra and his followers state that '*yogyatā*' is either the absence of the property contradictory to the syntactico-semantic relation (*anvayivirodhirūpavirahah*) or the presence of the property conducive to the same syntactico-semantic relation (*anvyaprayojaka rūpavattvam*). Thus, since water has the absence of the property that is contradictory to the syntactico-semantic relation of the water to the sprinkling, or since water has the presence of the property of the liquid substanceness that is conducive to the relation of the water to the sprinkling, the statement such as '*jaleṇa siñcati*' ('he sprinkles with water') is semantically competent to produce the valid cognition of the sprinkling action that conditions the instrumentality of water; whereas since fire does possess the property that is contradictory to the syntactico-semantic relation of the fire to the sprinkling, the statement 'he sprinkles with fire' (*vahninā siñcati*) is semantically incompetent to produce the cognition of sprinkling action that conditions the instrumentality of the fire.

Tātparya (speakers intention)

In the case of the statements such as '*saindhavam ānaya*'

wherein, the word '*saindhava*' refers to more than one meaning such as 'a type of horse' or 'salt', verbal cognition becomes impossible unless the listener knows exactly what the speaker intends to convey, i.e., whether the horse or salt. Also, since in the case of the statements such as '*ayam eti putro rājñah puruṣo pasāryatām*', the word '*rājñah*' (of the king) can be construed with either the word '*putrah*' ('son') or '*puruṣah*' ('man'), exact knowledge of the speakers intention as to which word '*rājñah*' should be construed with, becomes absolutely necessary. Thus, the knowledge of the speakers intention (*tātparya*) to convey a certain meaning (or construction) is also considered to be an associate cause of verbal cognition. *Tātparya* thus, is defined as the utterance of the word with the intention to make known a certain meaning (*tadarthapratīticchayā uccaritatvam*)

However, Gaṅgeśa explains the same as being the intention of the speaker to produce a knowledge of syntactico-semantic relation of a particular referent by a particular word. (*itarapadasya itarapadārtha samsargajñāna paratvam*). Following Gaṅgeśa, Jagadīśa too defines '*tātparya*' to be the intention of the speaker to produce, through words, the comprehension of sentence meaning (*vākyārtha pratīti janakatayā abhipretatvam*). And such an intention can be described as a desire that such and such a word should cause the comprehension of such and such a relation of one referent with another.

However, rhetoricians hold that *tātparya* is a functional relation between word and meaning (*vṛtti*). And accordingly, *Sāhityadarpaṇa* states that such a '*vṛtti*' should be identified with the suggestion (*vyañjanā*). That is to say, words refer to intended meanings through *tātparya* or *vyañjanāvṛtti* and thus become necessary condition for producing verbal cognition from words.

However, it should be noted that many epistemologists mainly grammarians and a section of ritualists do not accept '*tātparya*' to be a separate necessary condition. According to them, it is unjustified that '*tātparya*' be considered universally as a necessary condition on the basis of a few statements such as '*saindhavam ānaya*', wherein the word '*saindhava*' has more than one meaning. Also, *Tarkaprakāśa* states that in the case of '*ayam ...*', which is uttered with the intention to cause the comprehension of the relation of the 'king' with the son, the

word 'puruṣaḥ' ('man') should be prevented from being construed with the word 'rājñāḥ' (of the king); and therefore, it becomes absolutely necessary to assume the knowledge of syntactical expectancy, which includes even the speaker's intention such as 'whatever word (i.e. rājñāḥ), without the association of whatever word (i.e. 'putraḥ'), is incapable of causing verbal cognition of king's relation with son, the same word (i.e. 'rājñāḥ') has syntactical expectancy for being construed with the same word (i.e. putraḥ), to be the cause of verbal cognition of the king's relation with son.'

Thus, 'tātparya' ceases to be an independent cause of verbal cognition in general, and must be conceded to be indirectly causing verbal cognition through syntactical expectancy (ākāṅkṣā).

*Principal or chief qualificand (i.e. nucleus)
in verbal cognition*

Since verbal cognition has been established to be the comprehension of syntactico-semantic relations between the different referents of words in a sentence (anvayabodha), the epistemologists of India, namely grammarians, ritualists and logicians, have proposed three main linguistic theories regarding the principal or chief qualificand (i.e. nucleus) of such relations (mukhyaviśeṣya) in verbal cognition.

*Grammarians theory that verbal root-meaning is chief
qualificand (kriyāmukhya viśeṣyakabodha)*

According to grammarians, chief qualificand of syntactico-semantic relations (mukhyaviśeṣya) in verbal cognition is always the meaning referred to by the verbal root. This theory is based on the fact that verbs are held to refer to root-meanings as the principal element (bhāva pradhānam ākhyātam). Therefore, in statements such as 'caitra grāmam gacchati' ('Caitra goes to the village'), the action 'going', referred to by the verbal root 'gam' ('go'), is the chief qualificand of all relations. Consequently, all other meanings, referred to by various words in the sentence, relate directly or indirectly to the action 'going'. For instance, the village, referred to by the accusative word 'grāmam', is related to the 'object' or abode, (āśraya), referred to by the

accusative¹ case-ending (*am*) through the relation of identity. And the same (object) is related to the effect 'contact', one of the two meanings referred to by the 'root' '*gam*'² (go), through the relation of occurrence. Again, the contact is related to the action 'going' the second of the two meanings referred to by the same root (*gam*) through producing; whereas Caitra, the meaning referred to by the nominative word '*caitrah*', is related to the agent (*karṭṛ*) one of the two³ meanings referred to by the conjugational ending (*ti*) through identity. Further, the abode is related to the action 'going' through occurrence. Thus, the cognition is that the action 'going', which produces the contact, occurring in the object 'village', has Caitra, the agent, as its *abode*'. (*grāmābhinnāśrayavṛttisamnyogajanaka vyāpāraḥ ekacaitrābhinna karṭṛvṛttiḥ*).

Grammarians hold that such a theory is necessitated by the fact that in impersonal passive statements such as '(it is) slept by Caitra' (*caitreṇa supyate*), all, including even logicians, have accepted the verbal cognition such as 'the action sleeping' has Caitra as its agent' (i.e. is the conditioning factor of the agentness occurring in Caitra)' wherein the action 'sleeping' is the chief qualificand.

Also, it should be noted that only grammarians theory explains satisfactorily the verbal cognition produced from the statement consisting of two verbs. For instance, consider the statement 'behold the animal is running' (*paśya mṛgo dhāvati*). Here the two verbs, namely 'behold' (*paśya*) and 'runs' (*dhāvati*) express the action 'beholding' and 'running' respectively. And the action 'running', which has the animal as its agent, functions as the object; whereas the beholding functions as the chief quali-

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1. According to the grammarians, accusative case-ending (*am*) refers to the 'object' or abode and not to the objectness as held by the logicians.
 2. Grammarians hold the theory that roots such as '*gam*' (to go) refer to both the effect and the producing action (*phala vyāpārayor dhātuh*).
 3. The other meaning of the conjugational ending is number (singularity etc.) and is related to the agent itself.

ficand. Thus, the cognition produced is that the beholding has the running as its object which, in turn, has the animal as its agent.

However, logician's primary objection to such a theory, is that in statements such as '(here are) three times' ('*trayaḥ kālāḥ*'), it is not possible to supply any copula as the three times (i.e. past, present and future) can never coexist at any one given time. And consequently, since there exists no verb, either expressed or implied, verbal root-meaning cannot be held to be the chief qualificand. Logicians further, argue that in statements such as 'behold the animal is running' ('*paśya mṛgo dhāvati*'), the animal itself needs to be construed as the object with the running and hence requires an accusative case-ending after the word expressing the same (i.e. *mṛga*). They do not subscribe to the view that in such statements animals running itself can function as the object of beholding. And since running is the meaning expressed by the verb (*dhāvati*), the same (i.e. *dhāvati*) cannot have an accusative case ending; for, according to them, the running, being an action expressed by the finite verb, lacks syntactical expectancy for functioning as an object.

Ritualists theory that 'bhāvanā' is the chief qualificand in verbal cognition (bhāvanā mukhya viśeṣyakabodha)

Ritualists hold that in injunctive and other statements, optative and other verbal affixes (*ākhyāta*) must be accepted to refer to a productive activity (*bhāvanā*). Also, they hold that finite verbs such as 'he ought to make oblations' (*yajeta*) must be analysed as 'he ought to do the making of oblations' (*yāgam karoti*). Consequently, each finite verb refers to an action such as 'making oblations' and activity (*bhāvanā* or *vyāpāra*) such as 'doing' or 'making'.

Ritualists maintain that since such productive activity must be considered to be the central point or chief qualificand in verbal cognition produced from sentences as well. And all other meanings referred to by the words in a sentence are directly or indirectly related to the productive activity. For instance, consider the sentence 'Caitra goes to the village' (*caitra grāmam gacchati*) again. Here, according to the ritualists, the nominal base (*grāma*) refers to the village; however, the accusative case-

ending (*am*) refers to the power called objectness (*karmatva śakti*) which is an undivisible property. And the other nominal base, namely '*caitra*' refers to the agent Caitra and the nominative case-ending refers to the number (singularity etc.). Similarly, the root '*pac*', in the finite verb '*pacati*', refers to the action 'cooking' and the conjugational ending '*ti*' refers to the productive activity. Now the syntactico-semantic relations involved in the referents can be described as follows: The meaning of the accusative base, the village, is related directly to the objectness through the relation of occurrence and indirectly through the objectness to the activity. And the same objectness is related directly to the action 'going' through the relation of conditioning and indirectly through the action to the impellent force. It should be noted here that according to this theory, even the action is considered to be an object produced through the impellent force or productive activity and therefore the same action (i.e. going) is related to the activity through the relation of conduciveness. Whereas the meaning of the nominative base, i.e. Caitra, is directly related to the activity through the conditioning of agentness occurring in him. Thus, the cognition produced from the statement is that the impellent force or productive activity is conducive to the action 'going' which is conditioning both the objectness occurring in the village and the agentness occurring in the single Caitra.¹

It can be pointed out now that both grammarians and ritualists consider only the verbal elements i.e. the action in the case of grammarians, and productive activity in the case of ritualists, to be the chief qualificand in verbal cognition and hence both follow the same linguistic principle that predicate is the most important factor in the analysis of a sentence meaning. However, the difference is that whereas grammarians follow strictly the literal interpretation of Yāskas rule '*bhāva pradhānam ākhyātam*' ('*ākhyāta*' refers to '*bhāva*' i.e. verbal action as the chief qualificand); the ritualists however, establish a different theory by interpreting the rule in the following manner: *ākhyāta* i.e. verbal endings refer to the productive as the chief quali-

1. *ekābhinna caitravṛtti kartṛtā nirūpikā grāmanisṭha karmatā nirūpikā ca yā kriyā tadanukūlā bhāvanā.*

ficand. This interpretation of the ritualists, in fact, confirms to the established convention that between the meaning of base and inflectional endings, only the latter is the qualificand; for the activity, which is held to be the chief qualificand is the meaning of the optative and other conjugational endings.

Logician's theory that meaning referred to by the nominative is the chief qualificand (prathamānta mukhyaviśeṣyakabodha)

Logicians hold that agent (*kartā*) is the most important element in the analysis of sentence-meaning as the same is the only independent (*svatantra*) *kāraka* with respect to action and others. Since all other *kāraḥ* and action are dependant on him, they must be related directly or indirectly to the agent only. Accordingly, logicians have proposed the theory that the chief qualificand in verbal cognition is the meaning referred to by the word ending in nominative (*prathamānta*). Thus, the cognition from the sentence 'Caitra goes to the village' (*caitro grāmam gacchati*) is that Caitra, the agent is the substratum of the activity conducive to the 'going' which in turn, is conditioning the objectness (i.e. conducive to the effect 'contact') occurring in the object 'village'.¹ It should be noted that according to logicians, conjugational endings refer to the productive activity only in the cases where the agent happens to be an animate such as Caitra. However, in the case where the agent is an inanimate, such as a chariot in 'chariot goes' (*rātho gacchati*), the same refers through established indication to only an operation (*vyāpāra*). Thus, in such a case the cognition is that the chariot has an operation that is conducive to the action of 'going'.

In the passive construction too, logicians hold that the chief qualificand is the meaning referred to by the nominative word. Consider for instance, 'village is gone to by Caitra' (*caitreṇa grāmo gamyate*): Here the instrumental case 'ena' after the word 'caitra' refers to the activity i.e. the agentness. And, the root 'gam', (to go) as usual, refers to the action 'going'. And the conjugational ending ('te') refers to the objectness, which is,

1. *grāmanistha samyoga janaka gamanānukūla vyāpāraśrayaḥ caitraḥ*,

in this case, the effect 'contact' : whereas the nominative base 'grāma' refers to the object 'village' and the nominative case-ending (*aḥ*) simply refers to the number 'singularity'. Again the relations between the referents is obtained through the principle of syntactico-semantic relations. Thus, the cognition produced is that the village, has the objectness (i.e. possesses the effect 'contact') that is produced by the action 'going' that, in turn, is resulting from the productive activity (i.e. agency) occurring in Caitra'.

Logicians disagree with the theories of grammarians and also ritualists on the ground that in the statement, not involving any predicate, such as the three times' (*trayaḥ kālaḥ*), neither action nor productive activity, can be cited; and therefore they cannot be explained to be the chief qualificand in verbal cognition. They insist that no predicate can be supplied in such statements as all three times (i.e. past, present and future) can never coexist. Logicians further argue that in negative statements involving the mutual absence between two entities such as 'pot is not a piece of clothing' (*ghaṭo na bhavati paṭaḥ*) only the meaning referred to by nominative word, namely pot, can be cognized to be the chief qualificand in verbal cognition such as 'pot has the mutual absence conditioning the counter-positiveness of the piece of clothing'. This is so because, in such statements, the copula can not be held to be the chief qualificand of the relation of mutual absence.

Again, according to the logicians, in the cases such as 'O Lakṣmaṇa behold the crane, the most virtuous, in the Pampā river, (*paśya lakṣmaṇa pampāyām bakah paramadhārmikah*), the cognition produced is that Lakṣmaṇa should be the agent of beholding that conditions the objectness of the crane qualified by great virtues. However, since such objectness of the crane qualified by great virtues is the meaning of the total relative clause, and not the meaning referred to by any individual word as such, contingency of the accusative case after the word 'crane' (*bakah*) stands avoided.

Similarly, in the case of the statements involving two verbs such as '(you) bring, the horse (which) is going' (*aśvo gacchaty ānaya*), logicians can explain the cognition as that the horse, which functions as the agent in respect to the action 'going', is

the object of the action 'bringing'; whereas the grammarians are at a disadvantage as they need to explain that the action 'going' which conditions the agentness of the horse, is itself the object of the action 'bringing'. However, since the action 'going' cannot¹ be construed as the object of the action 'bringing', the verbal cognition, wherein the horse is perceived to be the object of bringing and the second person (you) is construed to be the chief qualificand, must be accepted by one and all.

Nevertheless, logicians cannot explain the cognition from the statements such as 'cooking occurs' (*pacati bhavati*) wherein the statement has only a finite verb (here *pacati*) functioning as the substantive. And they must concede that only an action such as 'cooking' functions as the chief qualificand; also they must concede that in impersonal statements such as 'the sky exists' (*gaganena sthīyate*), wherein the statement has no nominative word, meaning of the nominative word cannot be considered to be the chief qualificand. In such cases, only the 'action' or the productive activity, conducive to such an action, must be accepted, by the logicians, to be the chief qualificand.

Now it can be pointed out that logician stands single in his theory that meaning of nominative word is the chief qualificand. This is so because he transgresses the age old grammatical convention that in the analysis of sentence, action, referred to by root or productive activity referred to by conjugational ending, is the most important element as the same first conditions all the *kāraṅkas* by its productive force and then connects them through its binding link. However, according to the logician, sense (i.e. substantive) expressed by the nominative is the most important as in most cases, the same possesses the action and acts independently of any other *kāraṅkas*.

Conclusion

It can be observed now that word ('*śabda*') has been viewed variously by the scholars belonging to the three different branches of Indian epistemology : Logicians have defined word mainly from the view point of verbal cognition i.e. that word (or knowledge of word depending upon whether Prācya or

1. This is so because the same action (going) is a predicate.

Navyas are speaking) is the unique cause of verbal cognition since the verbal cognition is the ultimate goal of human utterance. However, the grammarians, mainly Bhartṛhari and his followers, have defined the same (word) from the view point of production of meaning, i.e. that word is an eternal entity that can burst forth the meaning to its listener since nothing but an eternal entity that is distinct from the instantly perishing syllabus, can produce the meaning. On the other hand, the ritualists have defined the word from the view point of impersonal and eternal *Vedas*; i.e. the words are nothing but the impersonal and eternal syllables which assume the form of the word through the efforts of the speaker with the help of the manifesting wind since only the impersonal *Vedas* can be authoritative in impelling the people to undertake various rituals etc.

Now, as regards the use of the term '*pada*' : Indian epistemologists hold the unanimous view that the term '*pada*' is used in the sense of only the 'finished word' with inflectional endings etc., whereas '*śabda*' can be used in the sense of base as well. However, while grammarians approached the problem of '*pada*' from the view point of only the syntactical entity and hence stated that the same is what ends in either declensional or conjugational affixes (*suptiñāntam padam*); logicians approached the problem of '*pada*' from the view point of a semantical entity as well and hence stated that the same is what is endowed with the functional relation such as denotation. (*śaktam padam*).

Sentence (*vākya*) is a cluster of meaningful words (*pada-samūha*). Nevertheless, what kind of cluster constitutes a sentence is a point of great controversy. Grammarians insist that a sentence must contain only a single predicate (*ekatiñ*) since otherwise split of sentence (*vākya bheda*) would become a necessity. According to them, since action, expressed by the predicate, is the most important element of all the constituents of a sentence and binds together all the individual word meanings into a single coherent idea, more than one predicates would not be desirable in a single sentence.

On the other hand, ritualists consider the sentence to be connected utterance of words (*samabhivyāhāra*) which is nothing but enunciation together of two things which are principal and subsidiary. According to them, enunciation of two things to-

gether itself conveys the principal and subsidiary nature of things without even accusative and other case endings: and hence sentence must be admitted to have an inherent capacity to convey such nature of things i.e. syntactico-semantic relations.

For logicians, however, sentence is only a statement consisting of words which produce verbal cognition i.e. comprehension of syntactico-semantic relations between word-meanings. They hold so because they have approached the sentence from the view point of only a means to verbal cognition.

Indian epistemologists have used the term 'verbal cognition' (*śbādabodha*) to explain the comprehension of the syntactico semantic relations among various individual word meanings (*vākyārthānvayabodha*). Such a verbal cognition is obtained by first recollecting the individual word meanings and then comprehending the relations among them. Thus, verbal cognition is a result of the knowledge of the words and hence is different from perception etc. While the logicians hold that the syntactico semantic relations between referents are obtained through the principle of such relations (*samsargamaryādā*), the ritualists insists that even such relations as superstratumness (*ādheyatva*) are referred to by the words. Logicians are guided by the fact that words are not perceived to have functional relations in the sense of relations and hence the same cannot be word meanings. On the other hand, ritualists are guided by the fact that the Veda must be conceded to be self-sufficient in every respect and hence even the syntactico semantic relations are referred to by the words only.

Now, as regards the necessary conditions of verbal cognition : Indian epistemologists hold that syntactical expectancy (*ākāṅkṣa*), contingency (*āsatti*) and semantic competency (*yogyatā*) constitute the necessary conditions. Syntactical expectancy can be said to have been defined both ways negatively and positively. While Gaṅgeśa and grammarians have held *ākāṅkṣa* to be incompleteness of utterance i.e. juxtaposition or presence of the word without which the sentence meaning is impossible to construe or the lack of ability of words to produce cognition of their own referents without the required declensional endings etc., others like Jagdīśa etc. have defined the same (*ākāṅksā*) to be the inherent potency of words to produce the

verbal cognition. Nevertheless, what they mean is that the *ākāṅkṣā* is the utterance of words without which the sentence is incomplete and hence is incapable of conveying the intended sense.

Contiguity (*āsatti*) is utterance of words without abnormal delay. This is despite Navyas holding the same as merely speakers intention to utter the words. For sentence, '*gām ānaya*' wherein words are uttered with abnormal delay, does not produce the intended cognition and hence only the actual utterance of words without abnormal delay should be considered as 'contiguity'.

Semantical competency (*yogyatā*), according to the Pracyas like Jayanta, is the possibility of the syntactico-semantical relation of one referent to the other. However, Navyas, from Gaṅgeśa to Gadādhara, propose that the knowledge of referents wherein the relation between the two referents is viewed to be non-contradictory. They hold so on the ground that merely the possibility of the syntactico-semantical relation is not enough, but rather, the knowledge that the same is not contradictory is absolutely necessary.

Speakers intention that a particular word should convey only a particular meaning alone (*tātparya*) is also deemed necessary by logicians. They hold so on the ground that otherwise, in cases where words can convey more than one sense, it becomes impossible to grasp any particular sense as syntactico-semantically related. Grammarians, and some ritualists do not recognize *tātparya* as a separate necessary condition. According to them, syntactical expectancy (*ākāṅkṣā*) itself can determine as to which of the several senses should be related. It should be pointed out now that precisely for this reason, some epistemologists have viewed (*ākāṅkṣā*) in terms of a desire to cognize the referents that are reminded of by the word. Thus, at least for some, *tātparya* is not a separate necessary condition.

Verbal cognition, which is the comprehension of the syntactico-semantical relations between the different referents, can have only one referent as the chief or principle qualificand i.e. nucleus (*mukhya viśeṣya*). However, grammarians, ritualists and logicians are divided in their opinion, due to their adherence to three different linguistic principles, as to what constitutes the

chief qualificand. Grammarians have followed the linguistic principle that only the meaning expressed by the verbal predicate is the most important element in the analysis of the syntactico-semantic structure of sentence and hence have held that only the action expressed by the verbal root might be construed as the chief qualificand. They are guided by the linguistic fact that syntactico-semantic notions (*kāraṅgas*) assume the special designation of 'ablation' (*apādāna*) etc. depending on what way they contribute towards the accomplishment of action (*kriyā*); and hence only the action becomes the centre or nucleus of all the syntactico-semantic relations of various *kāraṅgas* in the analysis of sentence meaning. Thus, for grammarians all other constituents of sentence-meaning are secondary and subordinated to the action and action alone is to be construed as primary.

Ritualists too, like grammarians, follow the same linguistic principle that only the meaning expressed by the verbal predicate is the most important element in the syntactico-semantic structure of sentence and hence same should be the chief qualificand. Nevertheless, they are guided by the analysis of verbs such as '*pacati*' (he cooks) as *pākaṁ karoti* (he does cooking); and hence propose the theory that since the activity (*bhāvanā*), expressed by the optative and other verbal endings, accomplishes even the action, the same must be construed as the chief qualificand. Thus, they attach greater importance to the meaning expressed by the verbal ending i.e. activity, rather than to the meaning expressed by the verbal root, i.e. the action.

Logicians are greatly influenced by the linguistic fact that the grammatical agent (*kartr*) alone is the independent *karaka*. According to them, the agent conditions all the *kāraṅga* relations through his action, and hence the same (grammatical agent) must be construed as the chief qualificand of all the syntactico-semantic relations in the analysis of sentence-meaning.

However, it must be noted here that logicians, instead of strictly adhering to the linguistic fact that the grammatical agent, in the deep structure alone, is the chief qualificand, have generalized their theory as the meaning referred to by the nominative-word is the chief qualificand. Of course, they are guided, in this generalization, by the fact that the agent is always referred to by the nominative word (in the active construction);

nevertheless, logicians theory leaves much to be desired, since object etc., which are the meanings referred to by the nominative words in the passive construction etc., cannot be justified as being the chief qualificand.

Now, it can be concluded that while, grammarians can rightly claim that they have analysed the syntactico-semantic structure of sentence-meaning from the view point of linguistic principle and therefore regard only action to be the chief qualificand; the ritualists have modified the grammarians theory to suit their need and have held that the activity expressed by the verbal ending is the chief qualificand. On the other hand, logicians have visualized a syntactico-semantic structure totally dependant on the grammatical agent and hence have held that only meaning of the nominative word is the chief qualificand. Therefore to pronounce one theory is superior to other two, would be to fail to appreciate the significance of the other two theories. All the three theories, as shown earlier, have their own advantages and disadvantages, and are based on different linguistic principles.

CHAPTER II

TWO KINDS OF VERBAL COGNITIONS

(*bhedābhedānvayabodha*)

Description of verbal cognition of identity and also that of non-identity

Verbal cognition, which has been described as the apprehension of syntactico semantical relations between different referents, is of two types : that of identity (*abhedānvayabodha*) and also that of non identity (*bhedānvayabodha*). Verbal cognition of identity means the comprehension of the (syntactico-semantical) relation of identity between two different referents. Similarly, verbal cognition of non identity means the comprehension of the (syntactico semantical) relation of what is other than identity between two different referents.

The statement 'pot is blue' (*nīlo ghaṭaḥ*) is a typical example from which the verbal cognition of identity is produced. Here the nominal base '*ghaṭa*' refers to the pot delimited by the potness and the nominative case ending (*h*) refers simply to the number singularity. And the other nominal base '*nīla*' refers to the blue colour delimited by blue colourness and the nominative case ending (*h*) refers to the singularity as well. However, the relation of identity between the blue colour and also the pot is obtained through the principle of syntactico semantical relation (*samsarga maryādā*). Thus, the cognition produced from such a statement is that the single pot, delimited by the potness, is identical with the single blue colour, delimited by the blue colourness.

The statement '(he is) king's person' (*rājñāḥ puruṣaḥ*) is a typical example from which the verbal cognition of non identity

is produced. Here, the genitive base '*rājan*' refers to the king, delimited by kingship; and the genitive case ending '*as*' refers to the master servant relation (*svatva*). And the other nominative base '*puruṣa*' refers to the person delimited by the personness. However, the relation of possession between the '*svatva*' and also the person is obtained by the principle of syntactico semantical relations. Thus, the cognition produced is that the person, delimited by the personness, possesses the master servant relation which is conditioned by the king'.

The basic difference between the cognition of identity and also that of non identity is that whereas the former is produced between the meanings of two nominal bases, i.e. between the two nouns or a noun and its adjective, and also sometimes between the action and an adverb, the latter is produced between the meaning of a nominal base and that of its declensional ending or between the meaning of a verbal root and that of its conjugational ending or sometimes between the meaning of a nominal base and that of a particle. For instance, consider the following three statements : (i) 'the Vedas (collectively form) an authority' (*vedāḥ pramāṇam*), (ii) 'pot is blue' (*nīlo ghaṭaḥ*) and (iii) 'cooking is little' (*stokam pacati*). Here, in the first instance, both the Vedas and the authority are nouns referred to by the nominal bases '*veda*' and *pramāṇa* respectively. And the relation of identity between them is comprehended through the principle of syntactico semantical relations, so that the cognition of identity such as 'the Vedas are identical with the authority' is produced. In the second instance, the pot is a noun referred to by the nominal base '*ghaṭa*' and the blue colour is its adjective referred to by the nominal base '*nīla*'. And the cognition produced, as explained earlier, is that 'the pot is identical with the blue colour'; whereas, in the third instance, 'cooking' is an action

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1. It is a matter of great controversy that whether such relations as '*svatva*' should be accepted to be the meanings referred to by case endings, especially by genitive case endings. However, ritualists firmly hold that genitive case ending must refer to the '*svatva*' etc., whereas grammarians oppose such a theory; Nāvyā logicians seem to follow ritualists in this respect.

referred to by the verb '*pacati*' and 'little' is its adverb referred to by the word '*stokam*'. And, the relation of identity between the cooking and also 'little' is obtained through the principle of semantical relations. Thus, the cognition produced is that 'the cooking is identical with little'.

Problem

Verbal cognition of identity (*abhedānvayabodha*), which is established between the meanings of two nominal bases, requires semantical competency (*yogyatā*), contiguity (*āsatti*) and syntactical expectancy (*ākāṅkṣā*). However, logicians differ amongst themselves as to what way syntactical expectancy should be defined. While Navyas define *ākāṅkṣā* positively as reference to the qualifier and also to the qualificand by the words that end in the cases of same class, prācya define the same negatively as the reference to the qualifier and also to the qualificand by the words that are not delimited by different case endings. Also, ritualists and logicians differ with respect to the nature and status of identity (*abheda*) as to whether the same is a referent-qualifier (*prakāra*) or a syntactico-semantical relation (*samsarga*).

Further, verbal cognition of non-identity (*bhedānvayabodha*), which is established between the meanings of a nominal base and also that of its suffix etc., too requires the necessary condition such as syntactical expectancy. However, according to the ritualists, the necessary condition for the cognition of non-identity is the reference to the master-servant relation (*svatva*) etc. by the genitive and other case endings; whereas, according to the logicians, such a reference to the master-servant relation etc. need not be assumed to be the necessary condition since the cognition of non-identity in nominative statements can be avoided due to non-establishment of such a cognition itself.

Also, ritualists and logicians hold divergent views regarding the status of master servant relations (*svatva*); while ritualists hold that the *svatva* is a referent-qualifier (*prakāra*) like any other syntactico-semantical relation, logicians hold that the same is merely a relation (*samsarga*) obtained by the principle of syntactico-semantical relations (*samsargamaryādā*). In the following pages, we shall explain these various points of debate

alongwith the epistemological convention regarding verbal cognition of identity and also the that of verbal cognition of non-identity so that the exact nature of verbal cognition of identity and also that of non-identity as presented by Indian epistemologists can be ascertained.

Epistemological convention regarding verbal cognition of identity

Verbal cognition of identity is established, by epistemological convention, between only two things that are referred to as possessing two mutually different properties (*virūpopasthita*). Thus, verbal cognition of identity is possible between a pot and also a substance as they are referred to as delimited by two mutually different properties, i.e. potness and substanceness respectively. However, verbal cognition of identity is also established, by convention, between the two things that are referred to as delimited by the same property such as staffness provided that the qualifier possesses an additional qualification (*vidheyāmśe adhikāvagāhi*). Consequently, it is possible to explain the cognition of identity between the red staff-holder and also the staff-holder as the qualifier, namely the red staff-holder, has the red colour as an additional qualification.

The reason for the two epistemological conventions is not far to seek with. It would be absurd and illogical to accept that cognition of identity is produced between the two pots etc. that are referred to independently by the words '*ghaṭaḥ*' and '*ghaṭaḥ*'; for, the two pots being one and the same (i.e. non-different), do not serve any purpose in being cognized as identical.

On the other hand, verbal cognition of identity should be explained as possible between the two things such as the pot and substance that are not delimited by the same property; for, unless such a cognition is possible, the reference to the two things (i.e. meanings) by the words having the grammatical agreement would become, pointless.

Consequently, to cognize identity between any two things, the difference between the delimiting properties (*tad dharma-bheda*) of the two things must be accepted to be the cause.

Also, verbal cognition of identity is justified between the

two things, of which the qualifier is referred to as having an additional qualification; for, unless one cognizes the identity between the two things, the same cannot be understood to be identical. Thus, to cognize identity between the two similar things, the knowledge of the reference to the qualifier as having an additional qualification must be conceded to be the cause.

Now, these conventions facilitate, further, the cognition of identity between the two things of which one is referred to as particular one (i.e. the pot) and the other is referred to as general one (i.e. a pot). Consequently, the statement such as 'that pot is a pot' (*sa ghaṭaḥ*) can generate the cognition of identity.

However, when two things such as pots are referred to as either only particular pots or only general pots, the cognition of identity between the same (two pots) is impossible. Consequently, the statement such as 'that is that' (*sa saḥ*), wherein 'that' and 'that' refer to two particular pots or two general pots, cannot generate the cognition of identity between the two pots.

Positive definition of syntactical expectancy, the most important necessary condition for verbal cognition of identity

Besides semantical competency of words (*yogyatā*) and contiguity of utterance of words (*āsatti*), the most important necessary condition for verbal cognition of identity is syntactical expectancy (*ākāṅkṣā*). Such a syntactical expectancy can be stated generally to be a reference to the meanings (i.e. to the qualifier and also to the qualificand) by the words, namely, nominal¹ bases, that end in the same case affixes and also the occurrence² of the same (words) immediately after each other. Consequently, the verbal cognition of identity can be explained in the statements such as 'pot is blue' (*nīlo ghaṭaḥ*) as the 'pot' and 'blue colour' are referred to by the nominal bases 'ghaṭa' and 'nīla' that end in the nominative cases and also as such words occur immediately after each other. However, since such a reference is lacking in the genitive statements such as 'pot

1. *samāna vibhaktikatvam*.

2. *svāvyarहितottaratvam*.

belongs to the blue colour' (*nīlasya ghaṭaḥ*) and '(he is) king's person' (*rājñāḥ puruṣaḥ*), the verbal cognitions of identity such as 'pot is identical with the blue colour' and 'king is identical with person' are not produced. Here, in the first instance, the blue colour is referred to by the word '*nīla*' that ends in the genitive affix (*syā*), whereas the pot is referred to by the word '*ghaṭa*' that ends in the nominative affix (*ḥ*); and in the second instance, the king is referred to by the word '*rājan*' that ends in the genitive affix (*aḥ*), whereas the person is referred to by the word '*puruṣa*' that ends in the nominative affix (*ḥ*). Here, what we mean by the phrase 'reference to the meanings by the words that end in the same case affixes' is that the reference to the meanings is effected by the words of which the one (referring to the qualifier) possesses the case-ending that is of the same class as that of the case-ending of the other (referring to the qualificand) (*svasamānavibhaktikatvam ca svaprakṛtika vibhakti sajā-tīya vibhaktikatvam*).

And the sameness of class is to be determined by the delimiters of cases such as nominativeness etc. Thus, in the statements such as 'the Vedas (collectively form) an authority' (*vedāḥ pramāṇam*) and '(there are) a hundred Brahmins' (*śatam brāhmaṇāḥ*), a verbal cognition of identity between the Vedas and the authority and also between the Brahmins and the number one hundred can be explained as the words referring to the qualifiers (i.e. the '*pramāṇam*' and '*śatam*') possess the case endings that are of the same class (i.e. nominativeness) as that of the case endings of the words referring to the qualificands (i.e. *vedāḥ* and *brāhmaṇāḥ*) respectively. Here the agreement in number between the words denoting the qualifier and also the qualificand is an additional necessary condition for the verbal cognition of identity. Thus, in incorrect statements such as 'pots (is) blue, (*ghaṭāḥ nīlaḥ*)' verbal cognition of identity between the pots and also the blue colour need not be produced as the words '*nīlaḥ*' and also '*ghaṭāḥ*' which denote the qualifier (blue colour) and the qualificand (pot) respectively do not agree in number (actually, the word '*nīlaḥ*' is a nominative singular, whereas the word '*ghaṭāḥ*' is a nominative plural).

In fact, agreement in number between the words denoting the qualifier and also the qualificand is considered to be a neces

sary condition for the verbal cognition of identity provided that disagreement in number is not allowed by the rule of exception. Thus, inspite of the fact that the word '*śatam*', denoting the qualifier (i.e. the number hundred) does not agree in number with the word '*brāhmaṇāḥ*', denoting the qualificand (i.e. the Brahmins), the verbal cognition of identity can be explained from the statement '(there is) a hundred (of) Brahmins' (*śatam brāhmaṇāḥ*). This is so because, the exceptional rule that 'numerical terms denoting twenty and above are always used in singular number only' allows the disagreement in number between the words '*śatam*' and '*brāhmaṇāḥ*' as the former (i.e. *śatam*) denotes the number above twenty (i.e. hundred).

Also, thus, dispite that the word '*pramāṇam*', denoting the qualifier (i.e. the authority), and the word '*vedāḥ*', denoting the qualificand, (i.e. the Vedas), do not agree in number, the cognition of identity can be explained from the statement 'the Vedas collectively form an authority, (*vedāḥ pramāṇam*). This is so because the exceptional rule that 'the agreement in number between the words denoting the qualifier and also the qualificand is necessary only in the case where they are of same gender' allows the words '*pramāṇam*' and also '*vedāḥ*' to disagree in number as the same belong to different genders.

Further, it should be pointed out that agreement in number between the words denoting the qualifier and also the qualificand is necessary only in the cases where the qualifier is not intended to have a number that is different from the number referred to by the case-affix occurring after the word denoting the qualificand. Consequently, in the statements such as 'the three (i.e. natural ability, skill and study) combined together form the cause (of poetry)' (*trayaḥ samudītā hetuḥ*) and 'Purūravas and Mārdravas are, Viśvedevas' (*purūravo mārdravasau viśvedevāḥ*), verbal cognition of identity namely, 'the three (i.e. natural ability, skill and study) are identical with the cause (of poetry)' and 'Purūravas and Mārdravas are identical with Viśvedevas' can be tenable even as the words '*hetuḥ*' and '*viśvedevāḥ*', denoting the qualifiers (i.e. the cause and Viśvedevās sespectively) do not agree with the words '*trayaḥ*' and '*purūravomārdravasau*' denoting the qualificands (i.e. the three and Purūravas and Mardravas). This is so because, in these cases, the quali-

fiers (i.e. the cause and Viśvedevas) are intended to have a singular and plural number respectively that are different from the plural and also the dual number referred to by the case affixes occurring after the words 'trayaḥ' and 'purūravomārd-ravasau' denoting the qualificands (i.e. three and Purūrvas and Mādravas).

Also, in the case of the statement 'the Vedas (collectively form) an authority' (*vedāḥ pramāṇam*), the singular number as against the plural number of the qualificand (i.e. the Vedās) is intended in the qualifier, namely the authority and therefore, the singular ending has been used after the word denoting such a qualifier; whereas, a plural number is intended in the qualificand, namely the Vedas, and therefore, only the plural ending has been used after the word denoting such a qualificand. And such a singular number is related to the state of being an authority, the delimiting property of the authority, the qualifier; and since the same (state of being an authority) is common to all the Vedas, there can be no lack of semantical competency in comprehending the relation of singular number in verbal cognition.

However, in the statements such as 'Pitṛs are gods' (*pitaro devatāḥ*) and 'perception, inference, analogy and verbal testimony are valid means of cognition' (*pratyakṣānumānopamāna śabdāḥ pramāṇāni*), the words 'devatāḥ' and 'pramāṇāni' denoting the qualifiers (i.e. the gods and valid means of authority) are found to agree in number with the words 'pitṛs' and 'śabdāḥ' denoting the qualificands (i.e. the pitṛs and...verbal testimony). This is so because, the qualifiers such as gods and valid means of cognition are not intended to have a number that is different from the plural number referred to by the case affixes occurring after the words denoting the qualificands.

This is inspite of the fact that the words, denoting the qualifiers, namely 'devatā' and 'pramāṇa' and also the words, denoting the qualificands, namely 'pitṛ' and 'śabda', do not belong to the same gender (here 'devatā' is feminine whereas the 'pitṛ' is masculine; and 'pramāṇa' is neuter, whereas 'śabda' is masculine) and therefore the same need not agree in number to produce the verbal cognition of identity.

Negative definition of Syntactical expectancy

A section of logicians, headed by Laugākṣibhāskara,¹ however, define the syntactical expectancy for verbal cognition of identity in negative terms. That is to say that instead of defining the syntactical expectancy positively as the reference to the qualifier and also to the qualificand by the words that end in the case affixes of similar class, they define the same negatively as the reference to the qualifier and also to the qualificand by the words that are not delimited by (i.e. ending in) opposing or different case affixes. Such a definition has an additional advantage of covering both compound as well as non-compound statements. Thus, for instance, the verbal cognition of identity such as 'blue colour is identical with lotus' can be explained from both compound and non-compound statements: 'this is a blue lotus' (*nilot palam*) and 'lotus is blue' (*nīlam utpalam*). This is possible because, the reference to the qualifier (blue colour) and to the qualificand (lotus) is effected here by the words that are not delimited by (i.e. ending in) opposing or different case-affixes. Here, in the first instance, the reference to the qualifier and to the qualificand is produced by the compound '*nīlotpalam*' which has the word '*utpalam*' denoting the qualificand, ending in the nominative case-affix and the word '*nīla*', denoting the qualifier, ending in no case-affix (i.e. without any case-ending); and hence both the words can be claimed not to end in mutually opposing case-affixes. Whereas, in the second instance, reference to the same is produced by the words '*nīlam*' and '*utpalam*' which end in the same nominative case-affixes i.e. do not end in any opposing case-affixes.

Śrīkaṇṭha² too defines the necessary condition (i.e. syntactical expectancy) in the similar terms. He states that the necessary condition for the verbal cognition of identity is the absence of the case-affix, after the words denoting the qualifier, that is different from the one occurring after the word denoting the qualificand. According to such a definition, even the cognition of identity between an adverb and an action can be explained. For instance, consider the statement '(he) cooks little' (*stokam*

1. Nyāyasiddhāntamanjarī prakāśa, p. 48.

2. Tarkaprakāśa, p. 46147.

pacati). Here, the verbal cognition that is produced can be described as 'the cooking is identical with little'. This can be explained by the fact that the word '*stokam*', which denotes the adverb '*little*', has the absence of the case affix that is different from the one occurring after the word '*pacati*' which denotes the qualificand i.e. the action of cooking. However, according to the definition of necessary condition in positive terms, the word denoting the qualifier, needs to possess a case affix that is similar to the one occurring after the word denoting the qualificand; and since, word denoting the adverb, being nominal in nature, can possess only a declensional affix which is not similar to the conjugational affix occurring after the verb, verbal cognition of identity between an adverb and also an action becomes difficult to explain.

*Opposition to generalization by negative definition
of syntactical expectancy*

Gadādhara paraphrases such an absence of dissimilar case-affix as the word, denoting the qualifier, being a non-base of a case affix that does not have the word, denoting the qualificand, as its base. However, he is against such a generalization of syntactical expectancy necessary for the verbal cognition of identity. He states that the word denoting the qualifier such as '*nīla*' in '*nīlo ghaṭaḥ*' can never be considered to have the absence of the dissimilar case-affix. This is so because, a dissimilar case-affix, being a case-affix that has the word expressing the qualificand as its non-base, should be defined as either (i) that which does not occur after such a word expressing the qualificand; or (ii) that which is not cognized to be occurring after such a word. In both the cases, the case affix occurring after such a word denoting the qualifier, namely '*nīla*' (in '*nīlo ghaṭaḥ*'), would become only a dissimilar case affix from the affix occurring after the word '*ghaṭaḥ*' as it is not exactly the same one.

Also absence of dissimilar case-affix cannot be claimed to be the absence of the case affix that possesses a property

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1. *veśeṣaṇa padasya viśeṣya vācaka padāprākṛtika vibhaktyapra-kṛtitvam. Vyutpattivāda.*

such as the accusativeness, (which is) not found in the case affix occurring after the word denoting the qualificand. For, in such an explanation, the person, who does not recognize a particular case affix(s) as nominative, accusative etc., would not be able to cognize the distinguishing property of case affixes (i.e. nominativeness etc.) and hence verbal cognition in general becomes untenable.

According to Gadādhara, the necessary syntactical expectancy, conducive to the verbal cognition of identity should be particularized. For instance, the sequence of nominative '*nīlaḥ*' followed by the nominative '*ghaṭaḥ*' is the syntactical expectancy necessary for the verbal cognition of identity between the 'pot' and 'blue colour' in the uncompound statement (such as *nīlo ghaṭaḥ*); whereas the sequence of either the nominative '*ghaṭaḥ*' immediately following the nominal base '*nīla*' or the same ('*nīla*') immediately preceding the nominative '*ghaṭaḥ*' is the syntactical expectancy necessary for the verbal cognition of identity in the compound statement such as '*nīlaghaṭaḥ*'.

On the basis of the explanation of syntactical expectancy in compound and uncompound statements, it can be assumed now that syntactical expectancy required for the cognition of identity between an adverb and an action is the sequence of the words denoting the same (adverb and the action) occurring immediately after one other. Thus, in 'he cooks' little', the syntactical expectancy, required for the cognition such as 'cooking is identical with little', can be described as the sequence of the words '*stokam*' and '*pacati*' occurring immediately after one another.

Observation

It could be observed here now that logicians consider that besides the regular necessary conditions such as semantical competency of words (*yogyatā*) and contiguity in the utterance of words (*āssati*), the single most important necessary condition for the cognition of identity is the syntactical expectancy; and such a syntactical expectancy is the particular sequence of words such as '*nīlaḥ*' immediately preceding '*ghaṭaḥ*'. The generalization process of such syntactical expectancy as reference to the qualifier and qualificand by the words that end in the same

nominative case affix etc. is not appreciated by Gadādhara on the ground that one cognizes the identity even as one does not recognize the words, denoting the qualifier and also the qualificand, as possessing the same nominative case affix etc., provided that the same sequence of (words) are understood as conducive to such a cognition. Also, since each of the identity-statements differs in its form (i.e. whereas '*vedāḥ pramāṇam*' has the word denoting the qualifier ending in the nominative singular affix and the word denoting the qualificand ending in the nominative plural affix, '*pururavomārdravasau viśvedevāḥ*' has the word denoting the qualifier ending in the nominative plural affix and the word denoting the qualificand ending in the nominative dual affix), only the particular sequence of words found in each of the identity statements can be regarded as conducive to the verbal cognition of identity produced from the same statement. Thus, it can be concluded that particular sequence of words such as nominative singular '*niḥ*' preceding immediately the nominative singular '*ghaṭaḥ*' etc. is the syntactical expectancy required for the verbal cognition of identity.

Status of identity in verbal cognition of identity

In compound and non-compound statements such as 'bring the blue pot' (*nīlaghaṭam ānaya*) and 'pot is blue' (*nīlo ghaṭaḥ*), the verbal cognition of identity between blue colour and also pot has been established. However, both logicians and ritualists disagree regarding the status of identity in such verbal cognitions.

Logicians theory that identity is a relation

Logicians hold that identity, being merely a syntactico-semantic relation (*samsarga*) between an adjective such as 'blue colour' and a qualificand such as 'pot', can be obtained through the principle of syntactico-semantic relations (*samsarga maryādā*). Therefore, they claim that, such an identity need not be referent-qualifier (*prakāra*) i.e. a meaning referred to by the adjective case-ending.

Ritualists theory that identity is the meaning

However, ritualists hold that identity should be accepted

to be a meaning referred to by the case-ending occurring after the adjectives such as 'nila' in the statements such as 'nilo ghaṭah'. According to them, this theory is necessitated by the fact that otherwise the sameness of case-ending i.e. the absence of dissimilar case ending after the adjectival word becomes pointless.

Also according to ritualists, in compound statements, such as 'bring the blue pot' (*nīla ghaṭam ānaya*), verbal cognition of identity is to be explained by reinstating the lost nominative case ending after the adjective word 'nila' so that identity may be viewed to be the meaning of the reinstated nominative case ending (i.e. referent-qualifier) in such cases.

Rejection of ritualists theory

However, logicians reject such a theory on the ground that absence of dissimilar case ending has been ruled out from being a necessary condition for the verbal cognition of identity in accordance with the statements such as 'he is rich by grains' (*dhānyena dhanavān*) from which the cognition of identity that 'he possesses wealth identical with grains' is produced. Also, even suppose, the absence of dissimilar case ending is accepted to be the necessary condition for the verbal cognition of identity then too the identity cannot be held to be the meaning of the adjectival case ending. This is so because, the identity cannot be properly defined : If identity is defined as the absence of difference (i.e. mutual absence), delimited by differenceness, then there would occur failure as every entity has only the mutual absence of some other entity. If the same (identity) is defined as the absence, the counter-positiveness of which is conditioned by the difference, then even the incorrect statement such as 'water is blue' (*nīlam jalam*) would also become valid as the water can be claimed to possess the absence of the mutual absence of both the blue colour and some other property such as pot, and hence the same (water) would need to have the identity of blue colour. And if the absence of mutual absence of blue colour etc., delimited by mutual absenceness, is held to be the meaning of the adjectival case-ending, then the blue colour, meaning of the adjectival base would remain unrelated to the absence, the meaning of the adjectival case ending. For, since,

case ending itself refers to the absence of the mutual absence of blue colour, the absence would be only a part of the meaning of the adjectival case-ending; and hence the blue colour would lack speaker's intention (*ākāṅkṣā*) to relate again.

Alternative theory

Ritualists, as an alternative, suggest that adjectival case ending may be accepted to refer to both absence and mutual absence individually. And the two independent meanings are cognized to be related to each other due to specific speakers intention. Since, in this explanation, mutual absence is an independent meaning, the same can be related to the stem meaning, namely blue colour and yet avoid any occasion for the violation of the epistemological convention that a meaning is related with the meaning of another word and not to a part of the meaning of another word.

Ritualists further suggest that when adjectival case ending is held to refer to identity in the form of two independent meanings, namely an absence and also a mutual absence, the verbal cognition of identity can easily be prevented from the incorrect statement such as 'to blue pot' (*nilam ghaṭaḥ*). This is so because, according to the established convention that 'to cognize identity from the accusative of an adjective, the word expressing the qualificand too must have an accusative ending', the accusative case ending becomes obligatory after the word 'ghaṭa' if the identity of the blue colour with the pot is to be cognized from such a statement; and since no such case ending occurs after the word 'ghaṭa' in the statement, the cognition of identity cannot be imposed there.

Refutation of alternative theory

Logicians, however, reject such a suggestion of ritualists on the ground that an uneconomical property (*gurudharma*) which is colimited in its occurrence (*samānīyata*) by an economical property (*laghu dharma*) can never be considered to be the delimitor of the counter-positiveness conditioned by an absence. Consequently, the counter-positiveness conditioned by the mutual absence, cannot be established to be delimited by the state of possessing the shell-neck (*kambugrivādimattva*) which is uneco-

nomical compared to the state of being a pot etc. in the statement such as 'pot is the possessor of the shell-neck etc.' (*kambugrīvādimān ghaṭaḥ*).

Further, it should be noted that suppose the absence and also the mutual absence are held to be the meanings of adjectival case endings, then the verbal cognition from the incorrect statement such as 'pot is blue' (*nilo ghaṭaḥ*), where the word 'blue' (*nila*) is meant to denote blue piece of clothing, would also become valid since the absence of the mutual absence of a piece of clothing, delimited by the blue colourness, can very well be established in blue pot. On the other hand, suppose identity is held to be mere relation, then it is possible to prevent the cognition from such a statement as the blue piece of clothing referred to by the adjectival word (*nila*) cannot be related to the pot, referred to by the noun (*ghaṭa*), through the relation of identity.

Gadādhara's position

Gadādhara however, differs from the rest of the logicians regarding the status of identity. According to him, identity (*abhe da*) should be analysed as the sameness of nature (*tādātmya*). And such sameness of nature is a unique property occurring in oneself. Here, uniqueness (of property) means occurrence in a single entity. Consequently, such an occurrence should be defined as being other than what is qualified by the mutual absence of oneself through the relation of the community of locus (*svasāmānādhikarāṇya*) and also through the relation of occurrence in one's own counter positive (*sva-pratīyogī vṛttitva*). The unique property, however, must be grasped as generalized as a property that occurs in a single entity by means of apprehensional connection characterized by universals (*sāmānya lakṣaṇā pratyāsatti*).

Also, according to Gadādhara, identity can be considered to be the meaning of the adjectival case ending in the non-compound statement such as 'pot is blue' (*nilo ghaṭaḥ*) so that the cognition derived from the same statement can be explained to be the qualificative cognition. This is necessitated by the fact that the cognition of an absence, qualified by its counter-positive, does not surpass the limits of the qualificative cognition; and suppose the identity, analysed as the absence of the mutual

absence, is not the meaning of the case ending of an adjective, then the same cannot be related to the blue colour through the relation of counter positiveness which is delimited by its own delimiting property, namely such unique property.

Gadādhara, however, maintains that identity, whether it is a syntactico semantical relation or the referent-qualifier, must be grasped only as generalized above (i.e. as the property that occurs in a single entity by means of apprehensional connection characterized by universals). For, suppose the multitude of the mutual absences of such individual absences is held to be the identity, then only the non-generalized (i.e. particular) absences of individuals, namely blue colour, etc., the counter positives of which are delimited by such non generalized identity i.e. multitude of absences, would be required to be perceived in the cognition produced from the negative statement 'pot is not blue' (*ghaṭo na nilaḥ*) etc. This is so because, the cognition of both an absence and also its counter positive have the same governing rule of semantical relations operating on them. Thus, only a single absence of blue colour occurring in blue pot would become impossible to be perceived in the cognition produced from the negative statement (pot is not blue).

Observation

Now, it can be observed as follows : Following the general convention of verbal cognition, logicians hold that, like any syntactico semantical relation, identity between a qualifier such as blue colour and a qualificand such as pot, must also be analysed as a relation obtained through the principle of syntactico semantical relations. According to them, recognition of the relation of identity as a referent qualifier is unwarranted and adds to heaviness of assumption as once such relations become referent qualifiers they need again other relations to relate them with pot etc. However, ritualists maintain that all the items, that are perceived in verbal cognition, must be referred to by one or other word (or its part in a sentence) and hence even syntactico semantical relations such as identity must be considered as a meaning referred to by the case ending occurring after an adjective word. For them, if adjectival case endings are not accepted

to refer to syntactical relations, then the very use of them after the adjective words becomes unjustified.

On the other hand, Gadādhara, despite not opposing the logicians theory stated above, prefers the ritualists position. However, for him, the most important point is that identity should be generalised as a unique property that occurs in a single entity by means of apprehensional connection. This is despite that he has argued in favour of the identity as meaning referred to by the case ending of the adjective in accordance with the non-compound statements such as '*nilo ghaṭaḥ*' so that the cognition produced can be explained to be qualificative type of cognition.

Instances of verbal cognition of non-identity (bhedānvaya bodha)

Verbal cognition of non-identity (*bhedānvaya bodha*) is produced between the meaning of a nominal base and that of its suffix or between the meaning of verbal base and that of its suffix, or sometimes between the meaning of a nominal base and also that of a particle. For instance, verbal cognition of non-identity is produced between 'the village', the meaning referred to by the nominal base '*grāma*' and 'the objectness', the meaning referred to by the accusative case suffix '*am*' occurring after the same base ('*grama*') through the relation of occurrence, a relation of non-identity. Thus, one cognizes, from the statement 'he goes to the village' (*grāmam gacchati*), that 'one possesses the activity conducive to the act of going that conditions the objectness occurring in the village.'

Or, for instance, the cognition of non-identity is produced between the cooking, the meaning of verbal root '*pac*' (to cook), and also the present time etc., the meaning of the conjugational affix '*ti*', through the relation of occurrence. Thus, one can cognize from the statement 'he cooks rice grains' (*taṇḍulam pacati*), that 'the person possesses the activity, conducive to the act of cooking occurring at the present time and conditioning the objectness of rice grains'. Or for instance, the verbal cognition of non-identity is produced between the ground, the meaning referred to by the nominal base '*bhūta*', and also the absence, the meaning referred to by the negative particle '*na*', through the relation of adjunctness identical with the ground itself. Thus,

one can cognize from the statement 'pot does not occur on the ground' (*bhūtaḥ na ghaṭaḥ*) that 'the absence of the pot has its adjunctness conditioned by the occurrence on the ground'.

Now consider the statement 'he is king's person' (*rājñāḥ puruṣaḥ*), a stock-example which is given traditionally to explain all nuances of verbal cognition of non-identity. Here the 'king' is referred to by the nominal base '*rājan*' and the 'master-servant relation, (*svatva*) is referred to by the genitive case ending (*ñas*). Between the two meanings, the base meaning 'king' is related to the meaning of the case ending, the '*svatva*', through the conditioning, a relation of non identity. Thus, one cognizes, from such a statement that 'the person is the possessor of the master servant relation conditioned by the king'.

Non-instances of cognition of non-identity

It should be noted here that verbal cognition of non-identity is not produced directly between the meanings, other than what are mentioned above : i.e. between the meanings of two nominal bases or between the meanings of a nominal base and also a conjugational base. Hence, for instance, despite the presence of the complex of causes such as semantical competency, reference to the meanings etc., one does not cognize the non identity directly between the king and also the person through the master servant relation or the same non-identity between a pot and a ground through the occurrence, a relation of non identity. Thus, the incorrect statements such as 'king is a person' (*rājā puruṣaḥ*) and 'pot is ground' (*bhūtaḥ na ghaṭaḥ*) cannot be imposed with the intention that the 'person possesses the master servant relation conditioned by the king, or that the pot has the occurrence on the ground.

Also, for instance, one does not cognize the non identity directly between the rice grains, the meaning referred to by the nominal base '*taṇḍula*' and the cooking, the meaning referred to by the verbal base '*pac*' (to cook) through the relation of the objectness. Thus, the incorrect statement such as 'rice grains cook(s)' (*taṇḍulaḥ pacati*) cannot be imposed with the intention that 'the cooking conditions the objectness of the rice grains'.

Semantical convention regarding non-identity

Since verbal cognition of non-identity can be possible between the meanings of even the two nominal bases or between the meanings of a nominal base and a conjugational base indirectly through the meaning of a case ending, the semantical convention is formed as 'the verbal cognition of non identity is not possible between the meanings of two nominal base etc. directly' (*nipātātirikta dhātvartha nāmārīhayoḥ sākṣād anvaya bodhasya avyutpannatvāt*). Consequently, we can explain the cognitions of non identity that 'the person has the activity, conducive to the cooking that, in turn, conditions the objectness occurring in the rice grains' and also that 'the person has the master servant relation conditioned by the king' from the statements 'he cooks rice grains' (*taṇḍulam pacati*) and 'he is king's person' (*rājñah puruṣaḥ*) respectively. This is so because, in the first instance, the non-identity is perceived between the rice grains, the meaning of the nominal base ('*taṇḍula*') and the act of cooking, the meaning of the verbal base '*pac*' (to cook) indirectly through the meaning of the accusative case namely, the objectness, and also because, in the second instance, the same is perceived between the person, the meaning of the other nominal base namely (*puruṣa*), and the king, the meaning of the nominal base, '*rājan*', indirectly through the meaning of the genitive case, namely, the master servant relation.

Also, since the verbal cognition of non identity can be possible between the meaning of a particle such as an absence, and also the meaning of a nominal base such as the piece of clothing, the semantical convention of non identity has been qualified further as being 'other than the particles' (*nipātātirikta*). And thus, we can explain the cognition of non identity that 'pot has the mutual absence conditioning the counter-positiveness of the piece of clothing' from the statement 'pot is not a piece of clothing' (*ghaṭo na paṭaḥ*) and also that 'the face has the similarity conditioning the adjunctness of the moon' from the statement 'face is like the moon' (*mukham candra iva*) respectively.

Observation of some logicians

A section of logicians make here the following observation : That in the compound statment such as '(he is) royal

person' (*rājapurush*), the king, referred to by the word '*rājan*', is not related to the person, referred to by the word '*puruṣah*', through the non-identity, namely master-servant relation; rather, the king's relation (i.e. the master servant relation conditioned by the king), which could be the meaning of the term '*rājan*' plus the lost genitive case ending, is related to the person through identity only. Therefore, there occurs no violation to the established semantical convention (that meanings of the nominal bases are not related directly to each other through the non-identity).

Also, in the metaphorical statement such as 'face is moon' (*mukham candrah*), the word 'moon' (*candrah*) itself should be accepted to refer to moon-like by indication. And hence, 'moon-like' can be related to the face through the identity. Consequently, it is not necessary that the moon, the referent of the nominal base, '*candra*', should be related to the 'face', the referent of the other nominal base, '*mukha*', through the similarity, a relation of non-identity; and so there occurs no violation to the same semantical convention.

Necessary condition for the verbal cognition of non-identity

It can be argued that since reference to the meanings such as the king and the person are present, verbal cognition of non-identity, wherein the king qualifies the person, should be generated from the statement 'king is a person' (*rājā puruṣah*). And the assembly of causes, consisting of the syntactical expectancy in the form of the sequence of the nominative of '*rājan*' followed by the nominative of *puruṣa*, cannot be ruled out to be insufficient to produce the verbal cognition of non-identity wherein the king qualifies the person through the master servant relation; for, the knowledge of the sequential arrangement of '*rājan*' preceding '*nas*' and the nominative '*puruṣah*' could not be insisted to be the necessary precondition for the generation of such a cognition of non-identity as such a sequence would be needed only for the cognition wherein the king qualifies the master-servant relation and not for the cognition wherein the king qualifies the person.

In this connection, epistemologists differ among themselves.

as to what forms the necessary condition that causes the verbal cognition of non-identity.

Ritualists theory

According to the ritualists, the reference to the master servant relation etc., by the case ending, occurring after a nominal base by way of equal qualification (i.e. whatever is referred to as the qualificand must be cognized as the qualificand) should be assumed to be the necessary condition that causes the cognition of non-identity wherein the meaning referred to by a nominal base is the qualifier. And since such a reference to the master servant relation is absent in the nominative statement such as 'king is a person' (*rājā puruṣah*), the cognition of non-identity wherein the king, the meaning of the base '*rājan*', qualifies the person, the meaning of the other nominal base, '*puruṣa*', through the master servant relation, cannot be imposed. Also, since such a reference to the master servant relation is very much present in the genitive statement 'he is king's person' (*rājñah puruṣah*), the cognition of non identity wherein the king qualifies the master servant relation, which in turn, qualifies the person can very well be explained.

Refutation of ritualists theory

Logicians hold that the ritualists position that 'the reference to the master servant relation by the case-ending, that occurs after a nominal base, is the cause of the cognition of non-identity, wherein the meaning of the nominal base is the qualifier' cannot be accepted. For, according to them, in such a theory, when one has an illusion that the word 'relation' (*sambandha*), in the statement 'king's relation is a person' (*rāja sambandhah puruṣah*), is the genitive case ending (*ñas*), the cognition of non identity, wherein the king is the qualifier of the 'relation', the qualificand, would become a necessity as the 'relation' is referred to by the genitive case ending. Also, on the other hand, when one has an illusion that the genitive case ending (*ñas*), in the statement 'he is king's person' (*rājñah puruṣah*), is the word 'relation' (*sambandha*), the cognition of non identity, wherein the king qualifies the relation, the quali-

ficand, would become an impossibility as the relation is not referred to by the genitive case ending.

Logicians theory

According to logicians, the cognition of non identity, wherein the king qualifies the person through the master servant relation, has never been established before in the statement 'king is a person' (*rāja puruṣah*); and hence, for this reason alone, such a cognition can be avoided. Thus, the assumption that 'the reference to the master servant relation etc. by the case ending is the cause of the cognition of non identity, is not necessary. However, when the genitive case ending (*ñas*) in (*rajñah puruṣah*) refers to the person, due to either illusion or illusion of denotation, the cognition of non identity, wherein the king qualifies the person, has been established. And in order that such a cognition be explained, the assembly of causes, consisting of the reference to the person by the genitive case ending (*ñas*) in co-operation with the syntactical expectancy such as the specific sequence of the term '*rājan*' preceding the genitive case ending (*ñas*), could be considered to be the necessary condition for the cognition of non identity; and since such a necessary condition is absent in 'king is a person' (*rāja puruṣah*), the cognition of non identity cannot be imposed there.

Again, despite that the verbal cognition of non identity, wherein the king qualifies the person through the master servant relation, is accepted from the genitive statement, namely '*rajñah puruṣah*', the same (cognition of non identity) need not be feared from the nominative statement, namely, *rāja puruṣah*. For, the assembly of causes, consisting of the genitive word '*rajñah*' immediately preceding the nominative word '*puruṣah*' would alone be considered as the necessary condition for such verbal cognition of non identity. And, since such an assembly of causes is absent in the nominative statement (*rāja puruṣah*), the cognition of non identity cannot be imposed there.

Also, it is not necessary to accept that, in the compound statement 'he is royal person' (*rāja puruṣah*), the word '*rajan*' expresses king's relation and such a relation is perceived to be qualifying the person through identity. For, nothing would be lost if the cognition of non identity, wherein the king qualifies

the person through the master servant relation, a relation of non identity, is accepted from such a compound statement. However, it should not be feared that suppose such a cognition of non-identity is accepted from the compound statement, then the same can be insisted from the uncompounded statement (*rāja-puruṣah*) as well. For, since the uncompounded statement, lacks the syntactical expectancy namely, the sequence of the word 'rāja' immediately preceding the word *puruṣah*, the assembly of causes required for the cognition of non identity is absent; and hence such a cognition cannot be generated from the uncompounded statement.

Conclusion

It can be concluded now as follows : verbal cognition of non-identity is produced directly between only the meaning of a nominal base and that of its affix, or between the meaning of a verbal base and that of its affix, or sometimes between the meaning of a nominal base and that of a particle. And in all these cases, verbal cognition of non identity is produced directly between the meanings of a nominal base and also that of a case ending etc. However, since the verbal cognition of non-identity is produced indirectly between the meanings of even the two nominal bases etc., the semantical convention of non identity has been qualified as 'directly between the meaning of a nominal base and that of a case ending etc.' And, also since the verbal cognition of non identity is produced between the meaning of a negative particle and that of a nominal base etc., the semantical convention has been qualified further as 'other than the particles'.

Now, as regards the necessary pre-conditions: The ritualists have proposed that the reference to such non identical relations as master servant relation by the genitive case is a necessary pre-condition for the verbal cognition of the non identity wherein the meaning referred to by the nominal base is the qualifier'. This convention, according to ritualists, is necessary as otherwise the cognition of the non identity, wherein king, the meaning of the nominative base 'rājan', qualifies the person, the meaning of the other nominal base 'puruṣa', can be imposed even in the nominative statement such as 'king is a person' (*rājā puruṣah*). How-

ever, this proposition has been rejected by the logicians on the ground that the cognition of non identity can be prevented from being imposed in the nominative statement as such a cognition has never been established before there. Also, according to the logicians, the cognition of non identity is not possible to impose in the nominative statement as the assembly of causes consisting of the genitive of 'rājan' is absent in such a statement.

From the logicians point of view, the position that the genitive case ending refers to the master servant relation is contradictory to the established convention of grammar; and therefore is unacceptable. And that is why they do not approve of the ritualists claim that the reference to such relations of non identity as master servant relation is a necessary condition for the cognition of non identity. This fact will become clear in the following section on the status of the master servant relation.

Status of Master-servant relation (svatva)

Ritualists theory

Ritualists hold that, master servant relation (*svatva*), like any other syntactico semantical relation, must be accepted to be the referent qualifier, '*prākara*' i.e. a meaning referred to by a case ending such as genitive. They deem such a position to be necessary on the ground that otherwise the absence of the master servant relation cannot be cognized to be relating to the person in the negative statement such as 'he is not the king's person' (*puruṣo na rājñah*). It is not possible to accept, that, in such negative statements, only the absence of the king, the counter positiveness of which is delimited by the master servant relation, is cognized to be relating to the person, therefore, that the absence of such master servant relation of the king is not cognized to be relating to the person. For, the master servant relation, not being an occurrences exacting relation, cannot be considered to be the delimiting relation of the counter positiveness. Thus, an absence, the counter positiveness of which is delimited by such a master servant relation, can never be established.

Theory of a section of Navyas

It should be pointed out here that even a section of Navya

logicians, as Gadādhra states, accept the master servant relation to be the meaning of the genitive case ending. They have recognized the fact that the master servant relation, despite being a relation, is unlike other relations. It is not merely a syntactico-semantic relation that binds together the two base meanings etc.; rather, it is a qualifying entity (*prakāra*) and hence needs, like any qualifier, another relation to relate it to other entities. They have also recognized the fact that unless the master servant relation is accepted to be a referent-qualifier, the cognition of non-identity between the 'king', meaning of the nominal base, and also 'the master servant relation', the meaning of the genitive case affix, would become impossible to explain in '*rājñah puruṣah*'.

Further, they refute the position that the master servant relation is a meaning referred to by the genitive case ending in only the negative statements such as (*puruṣo na rājñah*) as otherwise the absence of the king, the counter-positiveness of which is conditioned by such a master servant relation, cannot be cognized; whereas the same master servant relation is merely a relation, obtained through the principle of syntactico-semantic relations, in the positive statement such as (*puruṣo rājñah*) as here the king can be considered to be relating to the person through the master servant relation obtained as a relation. This is so because, in that case, the general semantic convention that whatever referent (qualifier) is cognized to be qualifying whatever qualificand through whatever semantic relation in whatever statement without the negative particle, the absence of the same qualifier, the counter-positiveness of which is delimited by the same semantic relation, is cognized to be relating to the same qualificand in the corresponding negative statement* would be contradicted. Thus, '*svatva*' should be accepted to be the meaning of the genitive case ending in positive and negative statements.

Objection to the ritualists theory

Main objection of logicians, however, to the ritualists position that 'such semantic relation as master servant relation is a referent-qualifier' is that the same involves the heaviness of assumption; that is to say that when the master servant

relation is considered to be the meaning of the genitive case, the same would have to be assumed to be relating to the person through yet another relation, namely the substratumness (*aśrayatva*); and thus the heaviness of assumption results.

Ritualists defence

When the cognition from the positive statement such as 'he is king's person' is produced, the cognition from the corresponding negative statement such as 'he is not king's person' should not be allowed to be produced. And such a goal can be achieved automatically in our ritualists theory as the cognition from the negative statement wherein the absence of the master servant relation conditioned by the king, is related to the person, is directly contradictory to the cognition from the positive statement wherein the master servant relation, conditioned by the king, is related to the person. However, in your logicians theory, since the cognition from the positive statement does not involve the perception of the master servant relation, conditioned by the king, the same cannot be said to be directly contradictory to the cognition from the negative statement which, however, involves the absence of the master servant relation, referred to by the genitive and conditioned by the king. Thus (you) logicians have¹ to assume additionally that the assembly of causes, conducive to the cognition from the positive statement that consists of the words '*rājñah*' and '*puruṣah*', is a preventing factor of the cognition from the negative statement such as '*puruṣo na rājñah*'; and hence, the heaviness in the assumption of the preventing factor results.

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1. According to the ritualists, in both the positive and the negative statements, master servant relation is referred to by the genitive and hence the presence and also the absence of the same is cognized to be relating to the person in cognitions from positive and negative statements respectively; whereas, according to logicians, the master servant relation is a meaning of the genitive in the negative statement, and the same (master servant relation) is merely a semantical relation obtained by the principle of syntactico semantical relations in positive statement.

Logician's reply to ritualists defence

Suppose the master servant relation is a meaning referred to by the genitive case ending, then, the assembly of causes, that prevents the perception of a pot etc. at the time of the verbal cognition from (*rājñah puruṣah*), will have to include both the reference to the master servant relation from the genitive and the knowledge of the absence of the contradictory perception such as the person has the absence of the master servant relation conditioned by the king'. Thus, due to this additional assumption heaviness cannot be avoided. On the other hand, in our logicians theory, such a reference to the master servant relation and also the knowledge of the absence of such a contradictory perception are not parts of the assembly of causes that is conducive to the cognition of non identity from the statement '*rājñah puruṣah*'. And therefore, there is no need that the reference to the master servant relation etc. should be included in the assembly of causes. Thus, there occurs economy. According to us, logicians, it is unnecessary that the verbal cognition of identity such as 'royal relation is identical with the person' be accepted from the compound statement '*rājapuruṣah*' by analysing the same statement as a *karmadhārya* compound (i.e. 'royal relation is a person' *rājā puruṣah*) where (in the analysis) the word *rājan* is held to have an indication in the sense of royal relation. This is so because, nothing would be lost if a cognition of non identity such as 'the person has the king's relation' is accepted from the compound statement by analysing the same (compound) as a genitive *tatpuruṣa* (i.e. 'king's person') (*rājñah puruṣah*).

Conclusion

It can be concluded now that according to the ritualists, master servant relation is a meaning referred to by the genitive case-ending and hence is a referent qualifier. A section of Navya logicians also seem to be toeing the lines of the ritualists on the ground that otherwise the cognition from such negative statements as 'he is not king's person' etc. would be difficult to explain. That is to say that if master servant relation is merely a relation, then the absence of the king would have to be related to the person through the same master servant relation; and since

such a relation is not an occurrence exacting relation, the cognition would become impossible. On the other hand, suppose the same relation is held to be the meaning of the genitive in only the negative statements, then the semantical convention that whatever qualifier is cognized to be related to whatever qualificand from the positive statement, the absence of the same is cognized to be related to the same qualificand from the corresponding negative statement gets violated. However, *prācya* and other logicians strictly adhere to the position that master servant relation is merely a relation obtained by the principle of syntactico semantical relations. According to them, the grammatical theory that such case endings as genitive are used for obtaining the grammatical correctness of the word is to be followed by all means and hence the violation of the semantical convention with respect to the cognition from the negative statement is not an important issue. Thus, the only point on which the status of the master servant relation should be decided is the relative economy or heaviness in the assumption of perventing factor of the perception of a different object at the time of the cognition from the positive statement such as '*rājñah puruṣah*'. And, in this respect, logicians can be judiciously claimed to score over ritualists as they have to assume one item less, i.e. the reference to the master servant relation from the genitive in the assembly of causes that prevents the perception of other objects etc.

General Conclusion

Verbal cognition has been distinguished as that of identity and also as that of non identity. The basic criterion adopted by epistemologists to distinguish them is the type of syntactico semantical relation involved in the individual word meanings i.e. referents. If the relation involved is identity, then the cognition resulting would be that of identity; and if the relation involved is non identity, then the resulting cognition would be that of non identity. While the cognition of identity is produced between the referents of two nominal bases such as 'blue colour' and 'pot'; the cognition of non identity is produced between the referents of a nominal base and that of its suffix etc. such as 'the king' and also 'the master servant relation'.

Epistemologists have established the convention that the

cognition of identity is produced between only those referents that possess mutually different properties such as the potness and also the substanteness. This is to prevent the cognition of identity between the two pots etc. which does not serve any purpose in conveying a new idea. Also, they have established another convention that the cognition of identity is produced between identical referents provided that the qualifier has an additional qualification. This is to allow cognition of identity between a staff holder and a red staff holder etc. which serves the purpose of making one understand the staff holder as a red staff holder etc.

Despite semantical competency (*yogyatā*), contiguity (*āsatti*) and syntactical expectancy (*ākāṅkṣā*) constituting the necessary conditions for verbal cognitions, only the last (i.e. *ākāṅkṣā*) plays the most crucial role in determining where the cognition of identity and where the cognition of non identity is produced. Thus, epistemologists have discussed at length the problem of *ākāṅkṣā* with respect to the cognition of identity.

Navya logicians have generally perceived the syntactical expectancy required for the cognition of identity as the reference to the qualifier such as 'blue colour' and also to the qualificand such as 'pot' by the words ending in the same class of case affixes such as nominative affixes etc. in '*nīlo ghaṭah*' etc. Consequently, they have generalized the syntactical expectancy as the reference to the qualifier and also to the qualificand by the words ending in the case affixes of the same class (nominative etc.). Nevertheless, such a definition does not cover the instances of compound statements such as '*nīlaghaṭah*' etc. wherein no case affix is found to occur after the word referring to the qualifier (i.e. *nīla*). In view of such a difficulty, some logicians namely Laugāksibhāskara and Śrīkantha have defined the expectancy negatively as 'the reference to the qualifier and also to the qualificand by the words that do not end in the opposing case affixes' and 'the absence of the case affixes after the word denoting the qualifier, that is different from the one occurring after the word denoting the qualificand' respectively. Such a syntactical expectancy covers compound and non-compounded instances since no case affix, that is different from the one occurring after the word

denoting the qualificand, occurs after the word denoting the qualifier (i.e. *nila*) in either compound or uncompound expressions.

However, Gadādhara firmly opposes such a generalization of syntactical expectancy on the ground that one cognizes identity even as one does not recognize the words as ending in the case affixes of the same class or as not ending in the opposing class of case affixes. For Gadādhara, each identity statement differs mutually from other; and hence only a particular sequence of words found in each of the identity statements should be regarded as the necessary condition of each instance of the cognition of identity. Thus, Gadādhara prefers to particularise the syntactical expectancy.

Now as regards the status of identity : Both logicians and ritualists agree that identity is a syntactico semantical relation (*samsarga*) between the qualifier and also the qualificand in cognitions of identity. Nevertheless, ritualists are guided by the convention that only those entities, that are referred to by some words, are cognized in verbal cognition; and hence hold that even relations like identity are referent qualifiers. i.e. meanings referred to by some words. According to them, adjectival case endings should be regarded as referring to identity in identity statements. On the other hand, logicians are guided by the convention that all syntactico semantical relations are obtained by principle of syntactico semantical relations (*samsarga maryādā*); and hence, hold that even identity is obtained by the same principle. They oppose the ritualists theory on the ground that identity, as meaning, would be required to be analysed as an absence and also a mutual absence and; that adjective case endings would be required to refer to only such an absence and also mutual absence; and such a reference makes the verbal cognition valid from even the incorrect statement '*nilo ghaṭah*' where the word '*nila*' means 'blue clothing'.

Gadādhara, supports the ritualists theory that identity is the meaning of the adjectival case endings. According to him, adjectival case endings could be regarded as referring to identity since the nominative and other adjectival case endings cannot be said to refer to any special *kāraka* relations such as *apādāna*.

Also, according to him, identity can be analysed as same-

ness of nature (*tādātmya*) which is a unique property occurring in oneself. Thus, there is no difficulty in admitting such an identity as the meaning of an adjectival case ending.

Verbal cognition of non identity is produced between the meaning of a nominal base and that of its affix etc. only. However, since the verbal cognition of non identity can be produced between even the meanings of two nominal bases etc., the semantical or epsitemological convention that "the verbal cognition of non identity is produced between the meanings of two nominal bases etc. directly" is established; and such a convention allows the cognition of non-identity between the king, the genitive base meaning, and also the person, the nominative base meaning, through the master servant relation, the genitive meaning, in *rājñah puruṣah* etc. Also, since the cognition of non identity is produced between the meaning of a nominal base and also that of a particle, the convention is further qualified as 'other than the particles'. Such a qualification allows the cognition of non identity between the face, the nominal base meaning, and the similarity, the particle meaning in 'face is like moon' (*mukham candra iva*) etc. Thus, the observation of a section of logicians that "the word such as 'moon' itself should be accepted to refer to the 'moon like' and hence 'moon like' itself can relate to 'the face' without violating the convention" is rather uncalled for.

Now as regards the preconditions of the cognition of non identity. Ritualists were greatly influenced by the theory that only those meanings which are referred to by the words are cognized to be qualifiers and qualificand. Thus, they have proposed that the reference to the master servant relation etc. by the genitive case ending etc. is the necessary precondition for the cognition of non identity between the king and also the person. By this proposal, they have avoided the imposition of the cognition of non identity in nominative statements such as '*rājñah puruṣah*'. On the other hand, logicians, strictly adhere to the theory that all syntactico semantical relations are obtained through the principle of syntactico semantical relation; and therefore, hold that even the master servant relation is obtained by the same principle. They have avoided, nevertheless, the imposition of such a cognition in the nominative statements be-

cause the required assembly of causes consisting of the genitive and other case endings is absent.

It should be noted here that this very basic difference between the theories of the (obtainment of) the syntactico semantical relations has led ritualists and logicians to two mutually contrasting conclusions regarding the status of master servant relation as well. While ritualists, following the theory that all meanings cognized must be referred to by words, hold that master servant relation is referred by the genitive case ending and hence is a referent qualifier (*prakāra*); logicians, especially the Prācyas, follow the theory that syntactico semantical relations can be obtained through the principle of syntactio semantical relations, and hence, hold that the master servant relation is merely a relation (*samsarga*).

Nevertheless, Navyas, at least a section of them, have recognized the fact that master servant relation, although a relation, is unlike other relations (*samsarga*). It is not merely a syntactico semantical relation that binds two nominal base meanings etc. together. It is a qualifying entity (*prakāra*) and hence needs another relation to relate it with other meanings. Also, they have recognized the fact that unless the master servant relation has the status of a referent qualifier, the cognition of non-identity between the meaning of a nominal base and also that of a case affix would become impossible to explain in '*rāñah puruṣah*'. Thus, despite heaviness in assumption, they have conceded that master servant relation has the status of referent qualifier i.e. a meaning referred to by the genitive case ending.

CHAPTER III

THEORY OF THE MEANING OF THE VERBAL ROOT AND ALSO THAT OF THE VERBAL ENDING

Introduction

Meaning of verbal the root and also that of the verbal ending are the most important aspects of the analysis of verbal cognition (i.e. sentence meaning). They occupy the most crucial place among all the meanings that form the constituent parts of verbal cognition. This is so because, according to the epistemological conventions, all the *kāraḥ* as well as the meanings expressed by the *kāraḥ* case endings are related directly or indirectly to the meaning of the verbal root such as the action of going or to the meaning of the verbal ending such as the producing activity. For instance, consider the verbal cognitions of the statement '*caitra grāmaṃ gacchati*': (i) Caitra is the substratum, i.e. abode of the action of going that produces the effect contact that, in turn, occurs in the object 'village'; (ii) the action of going, that produces the effect 'contact' occurring in the abode identical with the object 'village', is occurrent in the agent identical with Caitra'; (iii) the activity that produces the action of going, delimited by the goingness, conditions the objectness of the village as well as the agentness of Caitra. In such cognitions, the action of going expressed by the verbal root 'go' (*gam*) or the activity (*bhāvanā*) expressed by the verbal ending (*ti*) is perceived to be the centre of all the syntactico-semantic relations of *kāraḥ* such as Caitra and *kāraḥ* case meaning, such as the objectness. Of course, it is a matter of great controversy that whether the root meaning, the action of going etc. or

the activity expressed by the verbal ending or the nominative meaning such as Caitra is the chief qualificand; nevertheless, the meaning of the verbal root and also that of the verbal ending occupy the most important place in the analysis of the sentence meaning. Therefore, the understanding of the exact nature of the meaning of the verbal root as well as that of the verbal ending is essential to the understanding of the analysis of the verbal cognition i.e. sentence meaning.

Problem

However, epistemologists, belonging to the different systems of Indian Philosophy, hold divergent views regarding the exact nature of the meaning of the verbal root as well as that of the verbal ending. According to the grammatical convention, the verbal roots refer to two separate meanings, namely an effect such as contact and also an action such as going : whereas the verbal endings refer to the grammatical agent (*kartā*), the object (*karma*) or the action itself (*bhāva*) depending upon whether they are used in active, passive or impersonal construction. However, according to the logicians, the verbal roots refer to the action as delimited by a particular effect such as contact; whereas the verbal endings refer to the agentness (*kartṛtva*), identical with the *kṛti*, or the objectness (*karmatva*), identical with the effect. On the other hand, ritualists, hold that the verbal roots refer to the entities delimited by indivisible properties such as goingness, (*gamanatva*), cookingness (*pākatva*) etc. and also that the verbal endings refer to a conscious effort or producing activity (*bhāvanā*). Therefore, to understand the exact nature of the meaning of verbal roots and also that of the verbal endings, the understanding of the various theories of the meaning of the same roots and also that of the endings becomes essential. In the following pages, we shall present a brief account of the theories of the meanings of the roots and also the endings which differ not only as the individual school of Indian Philosophy differs but also as the individual thinker of the same school differs.

Grammarians theory

The verbal roots, have been defined by Panini as those which belong to the class of 'become' (*bhū*), 'blow' (*vā*) etc. They

are listed in the 'list of roots'. In addition, he has considered desiderative, denominal and other bases too as roots. The verbal endings, on the other hand, are mainly of two types : those that are classified as *parasmaipada* and as *ātmanepada* endings. The difference between the *parasmaipada* and *ātmanepada* endings, is that whereas the former were used originally to express the effect accruing to somebody else, the later were used to express the effect accruing to oneself. This is despite that such a distinction is no longer valid.

Kaiyata,¹ while explaining the statement 'he cooks rice' (*odanam pacati*), suggests a theory of verbal denotations as follows :

The root 'cook' (*pac*) can express two things namely an action (*vyāpāra*) such as cooking, which consists of several activities such as putting rice in a pot, putting the pot on fire etc., and an effect (*phala*) such as 'becoming soft' (*viklitti*) which is brought out by such an action.

This theory of verbal denotation of Kaiyata has greatly influenced all the later grammarians beginning from Kaundabhatta to Nagesha and was taken to mean that verbal roots, in general, have two senses to convey namely an action (*kriyā* or *vyāpāra*) such as cooking or going and an effect (*phala*) such as becoming soft or contact (*phalavyāpārayor dhātuh*). Based on this theory verbal denotation, they have further developed the theory of the meaning of the verbal endings and that of the meaning of the accusative and other case endings.

Thus, according to the grammarians, verbal roots refer to two entities : namely an action such as cooking and also to an effect such as softening. Now, what is meant by the statement that 'verbal roots such as 'cook' (*pac*) have two senses to convey, (*phala vyāparayoh dhatuh*) is that simply an action like cooking is not the meaning of the verbal roots; rather, that both an action and also its effect should be accepted as the meanings of the verbal roots. Thus, in the active and passive statements such as '*odanam pacati*' (he cooks rice), and '*odanam pacate*' (rice is cooked) etc., the entire operation of producing an effect from the action of cooking etc. is conveyed by the

1. On Mahābhāṣya on p. i.4.49.

verbal root '*pac*'. The verbal endings such as '*ti*', '*te*', etc. on the other hand, refer to the agent (*kartā*), in the active construction, to the object (*karma*) in the passive construction and to the action (*bhāva*) itself in the impersonal construction. Such a reference to the agent etc. by the verbal endings is termed technically by the grammarians as a reference to the substratum i.e. abode of the action, or as a reference to the substratum i.e. abode of the effect etc. For, an agent of the action means the abode of the action and also an object of the action means the abode of the effect produced by the action.

Grammarians, further, strictly oppose the ritualists view that the root-meanings (actions) are produced through the producing activity, expressed by the verbal endings. According to them, the actions such as cooking have an inherent capacity to produce themselves without the help of the distinct activity; and hence, it is unjustified that the verbal endings should refer to the distinct producing activity (*bhāvanā*). Thus, they hold that the endings refer to only '*kartā*' or *karma* etc.

Denotations of verbal roots and verbal endings

Grammarians accept two separate denotations for verbal roots. According to them, verbal roots have the denotations in the sense of the effect as well as the action; whereas the verbal endings have the denotation in the sense of the substratum (i.e. abode) of the action. For instance, in '*pac*' (he cooks), the root '*pac*' (cook) has the denotations in the sense of the effect 'softening' as well as the action 'cooking'; whereas the verbal ending (*ti*) has the denotation in the substratum (i.e. abode) of the action of cooking.

Grammarians accept two separate denotations for verbal roots in the sense of the action as well as the effect since only the meanings which are obtained independently through the separate denotations can be considered to be the qualificand of verbal cognition (i.e. can be considered to have been qualified by some other meaning); and the action, one of the two meanings of the roots, is indeed perceived to be the chief qualificand of all the syntactico semantical relations in verbal cognition by grammarians.

According to the Grammarians, the action of cooking is denoted as a particularized action such as 'blowing', 'lighting below' etc. For, the action of cooking etc. are established by experience to be only as particularized actions such as 'blowing' etc. Again, since the verbal roots are accepted to have denotations in such particularized actions as only adventitiously qualified (*upalakṣita*) by the particularity of concepts such as 'blowing' etc. of the speaker, no difficulty of considering the verbal roots as polysemous (*anekārtha*) would arise. And this instance is similar to the instance of accepting denotation as adventitiously qualified by the particularity of concepts such as potness delimited etc. and consequently not considering the pronoun 'that' (*tat*) etc. as Also, since the verbal endings are ruled to refer to the substratum of action, the substratumness conditioned by the possession of the action should be accepted to be the delimiting property of the denotation.

Now, as regards the denotation of the verbal endings : Grammarians hold that the endings have a denotation in the sense of the agent or the object. They hold also that, despite the possibility of analysing the verbs such as 'he cooks' (*pacati*) as 'he does cooking' (*pākam karoti*), the verbal endings should not be accepted to have the denotation in the sense of the conscious effort (*kṛti*). This is so because, the chariot, in the context of 'chariot moves' (*ratho gacchati*), would become ineligible for being considered the agent since the same, being inanimate, cannot be claimed to possess such an effort.

It should be noted that according to the grammarians,¹ action is expected to be the object of the usage such as 'the action is to be achieved (wherein the state of being what is to be achieved appears as the qualifier). And such a usage should not be caused by the association of another word such as 'effort' or 'activity'. That is to say that the action of cooking etc., which can be analysed as the placing of the vessel etc., should itself be perceived as something to be achieved without the involvement of some other effort or activity. Also, the root meaning, 'action' should not be perceived to be the operation conducive

1. *Padāntarasamabhivyaṅhārā Prayojya sādhyatva Prakāraka abhidhāna viṣayatvam vyāpāratvam.*

to the production of the effect. For, in that case, despite that the action of going can be perceived to be an operation conducive to the effect 'contact', since the same action produces the effect 'contact', the operation of the inanimate means, namely, 'staff' in 'Devadatta cooks by means of staff' (*Devadattah dandena pacati*), would also become the action by producing effect. And consequently, since the substratum of the action is the agent 'staff' (*danda*) would also get the nominative case ending.

Observation

Thus, it must be observed now that the verbal roots denote both the effect such as 'softening' etc. and also the action such as 'cooking'; and the verbal endings denote the substratum of the action. Therefore, even the grammatical convention that 'the roots like 'cook' (*pac*) have two senses to convey' also gets established.

For, grammarians, the verbal roots have denotations in the effect as well the action wherein the action is cognized to be the chief qualificand.

One of the most important epistemological contributions of the grammarians is that the action is cognized as the chief qualificand of all other elements including even *kāraṅgas*. Another equally important contribution is that the action, which produces the effect is itself cognized to be a product of inner relation or operation. Lastly, their proposal that the verbal ending has the denotation in the substratum (of the action) and not in the conscious effort is based on the fact that inanimate agents such as the chariot are considered to be the agents due to their possession of an action such as movement and not due to any conscious effort that produces the *vyāpāra* which in turn, produces the effect; and therefore, suppose the verbal ending is accepted to have the denotation in the sense of the conscious effort, then the inanimates such as the chariot would be excluded from being the agent in 'chariot moves' etc.

Objection

It should be noted here that the logicians oppose the grammarians theory that the verbal roots such as '*pac*' 'cook'

denote the action 'cooking' particularized as 'blowing', 'placing of the vessel' etc. They do so in order to establish the effort or 'activity' in general, to be the meaning of the verbal roots. According to them, their theory has the advantage of the economy of assumption over the grammarians theory because the same assumes the denotation of the verbal roots only once in the activity generalized as the activity: whereas the grammarians theory needs to assume several denotations of the verbal roots in the actions since the same (actions) are particularized as 'blowing' etc. However, Kaundabhaṭṭa rejects logicians argument on the ground that the heaviness of assumption is not a fault since the action such as cooking is cognized only as particularized as blowing etc.

Further, Kaundabhaṭṭa holds that suppose it is necessary to accept that the roots such as 'pac' (to cook) denote the action of cooking etc. generalized as an action in general, then the same roots must be accepted as denoting the action in general which includes even the activity. For, the verb '(he) cooks' is usually analysed in general as 'he does cooking' etc. wherein '(he) does' refers to the action as producing activity.

Now, since effort or activity (*kṛti*) is also included in such an action, the statement such as 'it has happened due to me but not done by me' (*matto bhūtam na tu mayā kṛtam*) should be explained in this theory by holding that in such cases, only a passive act of 'happening' is intended and not an intentional 'doing' which is an action or effort.

However, he suggests that suppose the action, particularized as 'blowing', etc. is also cognized in some instances, then such a cognition should be explained by accepting indication of the roots in such particularized action.

Logicians theory

Like grammarians, logicians too have analysed the meanings of the roots and also that of the verbal endings. They have propounded number of significant theories of the meanings of the verbal roots and the verbal endings. Scholars belonging to both *prācya* and Navyas schools as well as many great thinkers such as Raghunātha and Gadādhara have enriched the Philosophy of the meaning of the verbal root and the verbal ending by their

individual contributions. Since Scholars belonging to different schools of logic and also individual thinkers have proposed different individual theories, no single theory can be cited as the logicians theory in general; nevertheless, Navya theory that the verbal roots refer to an action such as 'going' delimited by its effect such as contact and also that the verbal endings refer to the agentness (*kartṛtva*) in active construction, to the objectness (*karmatva*) in the passive construction and also to the action itself (*bhāva*) in the impersonal construction' may be exemplified as the model theory of the logicians.

In the following pages, we shall deal with the various theories proposed by different scholars as well as different schools of logic separately one by one.

Prācya theory

According to the Prācya, the verbal roots such as 'go' (*gam*) refer to merely an action such as going and the verbal endings such as 'ti' refer to the *kartṛtva*. They follow Pāṇini (iii.4.69) in accepting that verbal ending (*ti*) refers to the sense of *kartṛtva* analysable into *kṛti*. The accusative case ending (*am*), occurring after *grāma* etc., in *grāmam gacchati* etc. however, refers to the effect 'contact', 'separations' etc. Thus, the sense of the action of going that produces the effect 'contact' is obtained through the help of the verbal root 'go' (*gam*) and the accusative ending (*am*) in a statement like '*gramam gacchati*' ('he goes to the village').

It should be noted here that this theory of root-meaning is in direct contrast to the theory established by the grammarians; which assumes two separate denotations for the roots in the sense of the effect (contact etc.) and the action of going etc. For, the prācya assume only one single denotation in the sense of the action.

Even at the risk of contradicting the grammatical convention that '*phalavyāpārayoh dhātuḥ*' prācya propose a single denotation for verbal roots in the action so that the epistemological convention that 'action is root-meaning' (*bhāvo dhātvarthah*) is established. And, they propose so because Pāṇini has ruled that the accusative is used in the sense of the objectness (p. ii.3.2); and since the actual object such as the 'village' is already expres-

sed by the accusative base 'grāma', only the remaining part of the objectness¹ namely the effect such as contact, should be considered the accusative case meaning. Thus, for Prācyas, nothing except the action of going etc., can be accepted to be the root meaning.

Objection

One of the difficulties in the Prācyā theory is that suppose the roots are accepted to have a denotation in merely the action, then the roots such as 'go' (*gam*) and 'leave' (*tyaj*) would become synonymous; for, both the roots would denote mere action (i.e. movement) without referring to the effect aspect : namely the contact in the case of going and separation in the case of leaving. Consequently, the incorrect statement such as 'he leaves the village' (*grāmam tyajati*) instead of the statement 'he goes to the village' (*grāmam gacchati*) can be imposed when the sense intended is that some one makes a contact with the village (i.e. when the effect contact is related to the action). This is so because, since the roots refer to the action in general in all cases, there cannot be any criterion as to when the specific effect such as contact should be related to the action, and when the specific effect such as separation should be related to the action.

Observation

Prācyas can be said to have persued an independent path in establishing the denotation for verbal roots in the sense of mere action. They were least influenced by the grammatical convention that 'roots refer to both an action and an effect' (*phalavyāpārayoḥ dhātuḥ*). They have based their theory on the twin factors namely, the epistemological convention that pure action is considered the verbal root meaning and also the grammatical rule that the accusative is used in the sense of the objectness (i.e. the effect). However, this theory has the difficulty that since all the verbal roots refer to mere actions, such as movements, incorrect statement such as 'he leaves the village' (*grāmam*

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1. Objectness means the possession of the effect produced by the action of going etc.

tyajati) can be imposed with the intention that one goes to the village'. Prācyas have tried to overcome such a difficulty by proposing that the reference to the action by a particular root would be considered as the cause of the relation of a particular effect to the action. Nevertheless, Prācyas should admit the difficulty that since all the roots are accepted to denote merely the action, the roots become synonymous. Now as regards the prācyā theory of the meanings of the verbal endings. Prācyas have established their theory by modifying the Paninian theory that the endings refer to the *karṣṭva* or *karmatva*. According to them, *karṣṭva* and *karmatva* are analysable into *kṛti* and *pala* respectively; and therefore, the same must be the meanings of endings.

Navyas theory

According to Navyas verbal roots such as 'go' (*gam*) refer to the action of going delimited by a particular effect such as contact. And the accusative case (*am*) refers to the superstratumness (*ādheyatā*). Further, they accept that the same (superstratumness) is related to the effect such as contact through conditioning. Navyas hold that since the epistemological convention such as 'the referent of a word is related to the referent of another word and not to the part of another word'¹ is to be restricted any way in accordance with certain instances as 'rice grain(s) is (are) produced' (*sampanno vrihiḥ*), the superstratumness can be related to the effect, 'contact' despite the same is the part of the meaning of the verbal root 'gam'.

A major difficulty in the Navya's theory of the root-meaning is that the incorrect statement such as 'going is not the movement' (*gamanam na spandah*) cannot be avoided. This difficulty is based on the fact that the mutual absence (i.e., difference) of the movement can be related to the effect such as 'contact', which is the delimiter of the action of going, and hence forms a part of the root-meaning of the root 'go' (*gam*). However, Navyas explain away such a difficulty as follows: The reference to the effect 'contact' etc., as the qualificand, produced by the knowledge of the denotation such as 'the effect 'contact'

1. *Padārthah padārthena anveti na tu tadekadeśena.*

is the meaning of the root 'go' (*gam*) would be assumed as the cause of the verbal cognition, wherein the effect 'contact' is perceived as the qualificand of the mutual absence of the movement. And since the effect 'contact' is referred to here only as the delimitor (i.e. as the qualifier) of the action going, and not as the qualificand of any thing, the mutual absence of the movement cannot be related to the effect 'contact'. Consequently, such an incorrect statement as 'the going is not the movement' cannot be imposed.

Now, as regards the Navya theory of the meanings of the verbal endings: According to the Navyas, the verbal endings refer to the conscious effort (*yatna*) that produces the action of cooking etc. They hold so on the ground that the verb '*karoti*' (he does), which is synonymous with (*yatna*), is used to explain the meanings of the verbal endings in the analysis of the finite verbs '*pacati*' (he cooks) etc. as '*pākam karoti*' (he does cooking), etc. They hold also that the endings merely indicate the inanimate operations (*vyāpāra*) in expressions such as '*ratho gacchati*' (the chariot moves) etc. wherein inanimates 'chariot' etc. are used as agents. Also, they explain that in intransitives such as '*jānāti*' (he knows), the endings merely indicate the substratum of the action of knowing etc. (*jñānāśraya*). The Navyas were obviously influenced by the ritualists concept of the productive activity (*bhāvanā*) in their theory of the meanings of the verbal endings. However, while the ritualists insist that the productive activity is the meaning of the verbal endings in all finite forms, the Navyas modify their theory by stating that the conscious effort is the meaning of the endings in transitive usages.

Observation

It can be observed now that Navya theory of the root meaning is a modification of the theory presented by Grammarians. They have accepted the basic theory that the verbal roots denote the effect as well as the action. However, they have modified the grammarians theory by stating that the verbal roots have a single denotation in the sense of the action delimited by the effect. This has an advantage over the grammarians theory; for, when a word is assumed to have only a single deno-

tation, unlike the words 'puṣpavantau' (this word has two separate denotations: one in the sun and the other in the moon) etc., the same can never be insisted to be polysemous. An objection to the Navya theory is that the syntactico semantical relation of the accusative meaning with the effect, is against the epistemological convention since the same effect is only a part of the root-meaning. However, the logicians explain away such an objection by restricting the epistemological convention (*vyutpattivaicitrya*); and thus allow the relation of the accusative meaning to even a part of the meaning. Thus, it can be concluded that the Navyas have proposed a modification to the grammarian theory of the root meaning so that the difficulty of polysemy for verbal roots can be avoided without actually contradicting the grammatical convention.

Gadādhara's view

Gadādhara can be said to have endorsed the grammarians view in general. He states that both the action and the effect must be accepted to be the meaning of the verbal roots alone. However, he seems to have no preference as to whether the roots must be accepted to have two separate denotations or a single denotation in the sense of the action and also the effect. According to him, since the effect cannot be accepted to have been cognized twice i.e. once as the accusative meaning and also again as the delimiter of the action, the roots alone must be conceded to have the denotation in both the senses. Nevertheless, it does not matter as to whether the roots have two separate denotations or a single denotation in the two senses.

Thus, for Gadādhara, the roots can be accepted to have either a single denotation like 'the root should generate the cognition of the effect as delimiting the action' or the same can be accepted to have two separate denotations like 'the root should generate the cognition of the effect' as well as the action. In either case, the effect becomes an independent meaning of the root; and therefore, when the other referents, like the superstratumness, are related to it, no violation of the semantical convention that 'referent of a word relates to only the referent of another word and not to a part of the referent of another word' occurs.

Ritualists theory

Ritualists have proposed various significant theories of the verbal roots and that of the verbal affixes. They were in the fore-front of the analysis of the verbal roots and affixes since the majority of sentences they dealt with in Mīmāṃsā consisted of the optative and other verbal forms. According to them, the verbs such as 'he cooks' (*pacati*) are analysed as 'he does cooking' (*pākam karoti*). And since, in such an analysis, the word 'cooking' (*pāka*), referring to the action of cooking, represents the meaning of the verbal root 'cook' (*pac*), the same root must be held to refer to the action of cooking delimited by the cookingness (*pākatva*); and since the word 'does' (*karoti*), referring to the productive activity represents the meaning of the verbal affix (*ti*), the same affix must be held to refer to the activity such as blowing, that produces the action of cooking. Ritualists maintain that the action of cooking etc., the root meaning, is related, in verbal cognition, to the productive activity the verbal affix meaning, as the qualifier. They further maintain that the root meaning functions either as the object or as the instrument with respect to the productive activity. For, the word, 'cooking' (*pāka*), repressing the verbal root 'cook' (*pac*), has either an accusative case ending, which denotes the objectness such as *pākam karoti*, or the same word 'cooking' (*pāka*) has an instrumental case ending, that denotes the instrumentality, such as 'he achieves boiled rice through cooking' (*odanam pakena bhāvayati*) in the analysis. Thus, according to ritualists, the root meaning is only the qualifier and the productive activity is the chief qualificand.

However, in cases like 'he who desires cattle should make offerings with *godoha*' (*godohena paśukāṃsya pra nayet*), the root meaning, namely the offering, cannot be related to the activity either as the instrument or as the object. For, since the '*godoha*' functions as the instrument with respect to activity, the same has no syntactical expectancy for another instrument; also since the cattle (*paśu*) functions as the object with respect to the activity, the same has no syntactical expectancy for the object either. Therefore, the root-meaning, in such cases, should be accepted as unrelated to the productive activity. Nevertheless, in cases like 'he should make offerings with soma' (*somena*

yajeta) the root meaning, namely the offering, can be related to the activity as the instrument (*yāgena somam bhāvayet*). This is despite that there occurs a separate instrumental word in 'somena'. For, we can accept, here, the word 'soma' as having an indication in the sense of the 'soma-qualified' offering; and such a 'soma-qualified offering' can be related to the activity as an instrument. To suggest that the word 'soma' has an indication in the 'Soma-qualified offering', which is an instrument, the word 'soma' has an instrumental case ending.

Khaṇḍadevas view

Khaṇḍadeva, the best known modern epistemologist of the Mīmāṃsā system of thought, proposes yet another theory of the verbal root and also that of the ending. According to him, since verbs such as '*pacati*' are analysed the *pākam bhāvayati* etc. the verbal ending should be held to refer to only the effort or the activity which is entirely different from the root meaning i.e. action of cooking. And since such an effort or the activity is expressed by the ending the same becomes the qualificand of the root meaning, i.e. the action of cooking etc.

Here, only the conscious effort or activity, and not mere movement, that may produce a quivering, should be accepted as the verbal ending meaning. For, in spite of the fact that Caitra may have a movement due to paralysis which (i.e. movement) can cause a quivering inside his body, the statement 'Caitra moves' (*caitrah spandate*) is never made; and therefore, only the conscious effort or activity and not mere movement is the determining factor of the statement 'he moves' (*spandate*) etc. Thus, since the conscious effort or activity alone is the determining factor, the same should be held the verbal ending meaning.

Now, this conscious effort or activity called *bhāvanā* functions only as the qualificand. And all other *kāraṅkas*, including the root meaning relate to it. In cases like 'he cooks rice' (*odanam pacati*), the action of cooking, the root meaning relates to the effort indirectly through the conditioning of the objectness of rice which in turn conditions its own instrumentality.

Observation

It can be observed here that Khaṇḍadeva, like other ritualists, holds the action of cooking etc. to be the root-meaning. However, according to him, verbal ending should be accepted to refer to only a conscious effort or activity and not to any movement. Also, according to him, verbal root-meaning is not an instrument with respect to the effort; but rather it is so only with respect to the accomplishment of the object such as the boiled rice. Thus, he has differed from other ritualists in this respect. Nevertheless, he agrees with that the ritualists the root meanings are objects, of the verbal ending meaning. Thus, he accepts that in 'he cooks' (*pacati*) etc., the action of cooking functions as the object of the effort or activity. Also, in accordance with such a theory, he holds that the meanings of the verbal ending is always transitive; it has verbal root meaning as its object in transitive cases like 'he cooks' (*pacati*), and it has the desire or intention to undertake an activity as the object in intransitive cases like 'he who desires health, should sleep' (*svāस्थ्यakāmah śayīta*).

Maṇḍana's contribution

Among the ritualists, Maṇḍana was a great thinker and was responsible for establishing the ritualists theory of verbal the roots and that of verbal ending. According to him, verbal roots such as 'cook' (*pac*) refer to merely an effect such as 'becoming soft'; whereas the verbal affix (*ti*) refers to the activity (of blowing etc.) which produces the effect. He states that their theory is supported by the fact that the statement such as 'he is cooking' (*pacati*) is made only when the activity which produces the effect of softening etc. is going on; whereas the same statement is not made suppose the effect of 'becoming soft' is already accomplished. Thus, he was of the opinion that the verbal roots are meant to convey only the process of producing the effect. In such a reference, the root-meaning, effect, is cognized to be the qualifier of the productive activity such as blowing expressed by the verbal ending.

Refutation

However, other ritualists such as Khaṇḍadeva are opposed

to Maṇḍana's theory of the root meaning. They point out that since the verbal roots are said to refer to merely the effect, the root 'go' (*gam*) would have to refer to mere contact, the effect. And consequently, since 'going' (*gamana*) would mean the effect 'contact', the expression such as 'the village is the abode of the effect contact produced by going' (*gamana janya saṁyogāśrayo grāmah*) would become untenable. On the contrary, since 'going' means the effect 'contact', the expression such as 'the village is the abode of going' (*gamanāśrayo grāmah*) becomes unavoidable. Further, Khaṇḍadeva points out, that in this theory, suppose the effect such as softening exists, but the activity, producing such an effect exists no longer, then the statement '*pāka* exists' (*pāko vidyate*) becomes impossible to avoid, because the (*pāka*) namely the effect, exists.

Observation

Maṇḍana's theory of the root meaning, although rejected by other ritualists themselves, deserves a special place in the history of the analysis of the root meaning. He was greatly influenced by the phenomenon of the effect being produced by an activity. For instance, when the activity of offering oblation was undertaken by the Brahmins with an intention to accomplish heaven, the production of the effect 'heaven' was of paramount importance since the same would lead to the final goal of heaven. Accordingly, he has analysed the verbal root meaning from the view point of the effect such as 'the heaven' (or 'becoming soft') etc. and the verbal affix meaning from the view point of the productive activity. For, him, it did not matter that he was going against the established conventions of semantical analysis; what mattered to him was that he should explain the reference to the production of the effect from the verbal root plus the ending.

Objection

Both logicians and grammarians object to the ritualists theory of the meaning of the verbal root and that of the verbal ending.

Logicians point out that suppose the verbal root meaning, namely, the action of cooking, is held to be related to the pro-

ductive activity, by being the means of the production of the effect, then the statement such as 'he goes to the village' (*grām-am gacchati*) and 'he cooks rice grains' (*taṇḍulam pacati*) become untenable. This is so because, the village and the rice grains, being already established, cannot be considered to be entities to be produced. And, consequently, the action of going and the action of cooking cannot function as the means of the production the village and the rice grains. Also, in ritualists theory, the incorrect statements such as 'he offers the heaven' (*svargam yajate*) becomes impossible to avoid. For, since the heaven is to be accomplished (i.e. is not yet produced), the same can be related to the productive activity: and therefore, such an incorrect statement can be imposed with an intention that the heaven should be accomplished.

Grammarians such as Kaunḍabhaṭṭa also reject the ritualists theory on the ground that suppose the verbal ending is held to refer to the productive activity, then the incorrect statement such as 'he becomes the pot' (*ghaṭam bhavati*), like the correct statement 'he accomplishes the pot' (*ghaṭam bhāvayati*), becomes a possibility. For, since the object is what is produced by the productive activity, the pot can be claimed to be the object due to its possession of accomplishment; and therefore, the accusative case would become necessary after the word expressing the pot. Kaunḍabhaṭṭa rejects the theory also on the ground that the conjugational endings cannot be held to denote productive activity. According to him, the verb 'karoti' (he does), used in the analysis of the finite verbs such as 'pacati' (he cooks) etc. as 'pākam karoti' (he does cooking) etc., must be accepted as the analysis of only the meaning of the verbal roots such as 'pac' (to cook) etc. and not that of the endings. For, in the analysis of the derivatives such as 'pakvavān' (he has cooked) as 'pākam kṛtavān' (he has done cooking), the derivatives of 'kr' (to do) are used to explain the meanings of only the verbal roots such as 'pac' and not that of the endings.

Observation on ritualists theory in general

It can be observed now that ritualists have proposed the most fascinating theory of the meaning of the verbal roots and also that of the verbal ending. They have perceived that the

verbs such as 'he cooks' (*pacati*) are to be analysed as 'he does-cooking'; and therefore, the roots refer to an analysable entity such as the action of cooking, delimited by the cookingness, which can be brought into being (i.e. produced) by a conscious effort or productive activity (*ārthī bhāvanā*). The verbal ending then, refer to such an activity which can be explained as the particular activity of the doer conducive to some thing being brought about. Such an activity is conceived by ritualists to be referred to by all the verbal endings irrespective of the moods; whereas a specialized activity called, 'impellent activity' (*śābdī bhāvanā*), which induces people to undertake an action, is conceived to be an additional meaning referred to by the verbal ending in optative and other potential moods.

Ritualists have conceived the twofold activities because they would like to explain the production of the action of cooking etc. as well as the inducement of the agent towards undertaking an action in vedic statements which lack of human inducers. Of course, this theory, due to its peculiarity and also unconventional approach, has attracted quite severe criticism from both the sides of logicians and grammarians as outlined earlier. However, such criticism cannot take away the real credit of ritualists contribution. What ritualists tried to convey was that cooking and other types of actions are not produced without an inner conscious effort or activity and also without verbal inducement. And therefore, verbal endings should be held to refer to such productive activity and also to verbal inducement.

View of Raghunātha

Raghunātha holds here as follows : Verbs such as '(he) coooks' (*pacati*) are analysed as '(he) does cooking' (*pākam-karoti*). And since, in such an analysis, the verbs are analysed with the *kṛ*-forms such as *karoti* which refer to an effort or activity such as doing, the verbal affixes (or endings) must be accepted to denote an effort or activity. Also, since the questions like 'what does he do' (*kim karoti*) are answered with the verbs expressing an activity such as 'he cooks' (*pacati*), the verbal endings must be accepted to refer to the activity (*kṛti*) which leads to the action of cooking. And such an activity is found

in all the sentient beings such as Caitra, Maitra etc. who are agents; and therefore, the convention that the abode of the activity is the agent also holds good. In the case of the statements such as 'chariot moves' (*ratho gacchati*), where a non-sentient being such as chariot is the agent, however, the verbal ending (effix) should be accepted to indicate a movement (*vyāpāra*) that is conducive to the effect contact. And therefore, even the non-sentient being such as chariot can be explained to be the agent by possessing such a movement.

It may be argued now that mere movement etc. producing an effect is the meaning of the verbal ending in general. For, in such statements as 'he does going' (*gamanam karoti*) and 'shoot etc. are produced by seed etc. (*bijādinā aṅkurādih kṛtah*) the derivatives of *kr* (i.e. *karoti* and *kṛtah*) are used without intending to refer to an activity inherent in a sentient being. And also, the experience of the people to cognize an activity that leads to the action of cooking, in the case of 'he cooks' (*pacati*) can be explained away by inferring an activity that leads to the action of cooking on the basis of the invariable concomitance of the activity with the action of cooking.

However, this argument is not tenable. For, the verbal endings must be accepted to refer to an effort or the activity that is conducive to the action of cooking etc. Otherwise, suppose the verbal endings are accepted to refer to mere movement etc. leaving out the activity part, then the statement such as 'Caitra cooks' (*carah pacati*) becomes possible to be imposed even as Caitra does not undertake any activity of cooking; but rather, by chance, happens to bring about the action of cooking by moving.

According to Raghunātha, verbal roots such as 'go' (*gam*) refer to the action delimited by their respective effects such as contact. And the accusative case refers to the superstratumness which relates to the part of the verbal root-meaning namely the effect. However, suppose the relation of the superstratumness to the effect, which is only a part of the root meaning, is against the established semantical convention, then the verbal roots can be accepted to refer to both the action and also the effect independently so that the accusative-meaning can relate to the effect, the independent meaning. In this connection, Raghunātha

points out that the transitivity of verbal roots depends upon their ability to refer to actions delimited by their respective effects. For instance, since the root 'go' (*gam*) refers to the action of going delimited by the contact, its effect, the same may be considered as transitive. Also the roots, referring to the knowledge, (i.e. *jñā* etc.) must be considered transitive only by convention since the same do not refer to the action delimited by any effect. (They refer to mere knowing etc. which cannot produce any effect like contact etc.)

Refutation of Raghunāth's theory

Raghunāthas theory that the verbal roots denote merely the action of knowing etc. in the instance of 'he knows' (*jānāti*) is not tenable. For, in that case, only the action of cooking, leaving out the effect part would become the verbal root meaning; and consequently, since the root 'know' does not denote the action which does not share the locus with the other root meaning, namely the effect, the convention that the root 'know' (*jñā*) is transitive 'would become impossible to justify. Also, the transitivity of the root 'know' cannot be termed to be merely conventional; for, in that case, passive conjugational endings would become impossible to justify after the same.

Observation

Raghunātha was the most ardent supporter of the Nyāya theory of the verbal root and that of the verbal ending. However, his analysis of the meaning of the verbal ending clearly points out that he was influenced by the ritualists methodology of the analysis of the sentence meaning. Further, his statement that verbal affixes or endings refer to activity that produces the action of going, cooking etc. is a pointer to his conviction that only the sentient beings, who possess such activities, are actually the agents; and when non sentient beings, such as chariot, are used in the language, as agents of moving etc., the same should be explained by accepting an indication for the verbal endings in the sense of mere movement. Also, Raghunāth's statement that verbal roots refer to the actions as delimited by their effects clearly betrays his idea that verbs express an entire process of operation beginning from inner effort or activity that

culminates in the production of the effect such as the contact.

Nāgeśa's view

Some later grammarians too were greatly influenced by the ritualists theory of the meanings of the verbal root as well as that of the verbal ending. Ritualists, and also to some extent logicians, held that an effort or activity which is quite distinct from the action of cooking etc. is necessary to produce the action of cooking etc. And such an effort or activity is the meaning expressed by the verbal ending.

Nāgeśa, obviously influenced by such a theory, holds that the root meaning includes even an effort (*yatna*). According to him, the root such as 'cook' refers to the action of cooking that produces the effect softening and also is coupled with an effort. He recognized the fact that the action of cooking etc. need an effort or activity to produce itself. However, the difference between him and also the ritualists is that whereas they consider the activity to be the meaning of the verbal ending, he holds the view that the effort is also a part of the meaning referred to by the root. He shares, with other grammarians, the view that the verbal endings refer to the abode or substratum of the action. Thus, Nāgeśa can be said to have held a view which is a compromise between the views of the ritualists and also that of the grammarians.

Conclusion

Epistemologists of India have shown a keen interest in the analysis of the meaning of the verbal roots as well as that of the verbal endings. They were interested in the analysis because the meaning of the verbal roots and the endings form the most important constituent parts of verbal cognition i.e. sentence meaning; while the grammarians consider the root-meaning to be the chief qualificand in verbal cognition i.e. principal substantive of all the syntactico semantical relations, the logicians maintain that the abode of the root meaning is the grammatical agent and the ritualists insist that the meaning of the verbal ending alone is the principal substantive.

Grammarians have perceived that the actions are meant to produce an effect; thus they have proposed that the verbal

roots refer to two entities, namely an action such as cooking and also to an effect such as softening. According to this theory verbal roots have two separate denotations in the sense of the action and also that of the effect. This is necessitated, according to them, by the fact that otherwise *kāraṅgas* and also other constituents of verbal cognition cannot relate to the action (of cooking etc.), which is accepted to be the chief qualificand; since only the meaning which is obtained through an independent denotation of a word can be accepted to have syntactico semantical relation with the meaning of other words.

However, grammarians theory faces a real danger of making verbal roots polysemous. For, according to them, verbal roots have separate denotations in the actions which are particularized as 'blowing', 'lighting below' etc.; and since any word, which has denotations in several particular meanings becomes polysemous, the verbal roots too become polysemous due to their denotations in many particularized actions. Grammarians have tried to avoid this difficulty by stating that actions are qualified only adventitiously by particularity of concepts and not really. However, this suggestion avoids the difficulty only partially and not satisfactorily. Among the logicians, Prācyaś, Navyaś and Raghunātha can be said to have proposed three distinct theories. Prācyaś had an independent attitude and proposed that the verbal roots refer to mere actions like going. According to them, the roots refer to only actions because effects should be accepted to be the meaning of only the accusative and other *karmapratyayas* since Pāṇini has ruled that accusative is used in the sense of the object; and only effect part of the object needs to be referred to.

However, this theory contradicts the grammatical convention that 'roots have two senses to convey'. Also, since here only pure action is the root meaning, the roots 'leave' (*tyaj*) and 'go' (*gam*) would become synonymous.

Prācyaś suggest that a convention such as 'reference to an action by a particular root i.e. 'go' (*gam*) is the cause of the cognition wherein a particular effect i.e. contact is related to it' could be assumed to overcome the difficulty. However, such a suggestion is effective in so far as avoiding the imposition of the incorrect statement such as 'he leaves' (*tyajati*) when intended

to convey the sense that 'he goes' but not in avoiding the synonymity of the roots.

Navyas were greatly influenced by the grammarians theory and therefore, did not contradict the grammatical convention that roots such as 'cook' convey two senses. Accordingly, they too have accepted the denotation for verbal roots in the sense of an action and also the effect. However, Navyas accepted only a single denotation in the action as delimited by a particular effect such as contact so that the difficulty faced by Prācyas that "all the roots become synonymous due to their reference to an action and an effect", is effectively avoided. Also, since this theory assumes only a single denotation in the sense of the action, as delimited by a particular effect, the same can avoid the difficulty of polysemy for verbal roots as well.

Nevertheless, Navyas theory contradicts the epistemological convention that meaning of a word relates to the meaning of another word and not to a part of the meaning of another word since the same theory requires that the superstratumness etc. be related to the effect 'contact' etc., which is only a part of the root meaning. Therefore, some Navya scholars like Gadādhara accepted two separate denotations for roots in the action as well as in the effect. But, in comparison to the innumerable difficulties associated with the theory that assumes two separate denotations for roots, the original Navya's theory despite transgressing the epistemological convention is much more acceptable.

As far as the meaning of the verbal ending is concerned, Prācyas and Navyas agree with each other that the agentness, analysable into *kṛti*, or the objectness analysable into the effect or superstratumness would be held to be the meaning.

This view is not essentially different from that of grammarians; whereas grammarians hold that verbal endings refer to the abode of the action i.e. the agent or the effect i.e. the object, the logicians hold that the generic property, namely the agentness and also the objectness is the meaning.

According to Patañjali, the action of cooking etc. meant different things to different agents. When we say that the agent, Caitra cooks, we mean that he is carrying out the activity of blowing the wind etc. However, when we say that woods cook', what we mean is that they burn. Thus, each action can be

analysed into different activities depending on who is considered as the agent. It should be noted here that, at the time of Patañjali, the theory that any given action like cooking needs different individual activities to produce it had not taken concrete shape. Nevertheless, an idea that actions like cooking involve several individual activities in themselves seems to have been prevalent. Bhartṛhari held the view that different activities which form the constituent parts of an action (*kriyā*), manifest themselves one by one and when the aggregate of such activities, is conceived to be one, the same is designated as an action.

Bhartṛhari classifies the action as either accomplished (*siddha*) or to be accomplished (*sādhya*). For instance, when we say 'Caitra has cooked' (*apākṣit*), the same is accomplished; whereas when we say 'Caitra is cooking' (*pacati*), the same is to be accomplished. In both cases, since the individual activities comprise the action, the same is super imposed on the individual activities.

Later grammarians can be said to have been divided in their opinion as to whether the activity causes the action or not while Nāgeśa held that the activity or effort produces the action of cooking etc. and therefore they are mutually different from each other, Kaṇḍabhaṭṭa firmly opposed the view that the activities are different from the actions or that the activities are needed to produce the action. According to him, effort (*vyāpāra*) and activity (*bhāvanā*) mean one and the same and they are synonymous with the words 'production' (*utpādanā*) and 'action' (*kriyā*). He substantiates his claim by stating that the verbs like 'he cooks' (*pacati*) etc. are explained variously as 'he produces the cooking', 'the activity is conducive to the cooking' and 'producing is nothing but an activity'; and therefore, establishes that effort and activity are one and the same and also that the activity and action are nothing but synonyms.

Ritualists, and some logicians like Raghunātha, have conceived a cause and effect relationship between the activity i.e. conscious effort and also the action. According to them, activity precedes action since each action needs some conscious effort or activity to produce it. They have based their theory on the ground that verbs like 'he cooks' (*pacati*) are analysed as 'he does cooking' (*pākam karoti*); and such an analysis clearly

shows that an effort or activity is necessary to bring an action like cooking in to being. Thus, they have clearly distinguished the activity from the action since the former constitutes the cause whereas the latter constitutes the effect.

Accordingly, ritualists held that the verbal roots refer to an indivisible property such as the cookingness analysable into the state of being either an instrument or an object of the activity; whereas, the verbal endings refer to the effort or activity analysable into either a productive activity found in all verbal moods or impellent activity found in optative and other moods. Thus, ritualists have presented a theory of the verbal root and also that of the verbal ending that can explain the production of the actions from activity in Vedic and non-Vedic statements.

Now, it can be stated in fine that ritualists have presented a real alternative to the theories of grammarians and also that of logicians which are more or less identical except the technicality. That is to say that both grammarians and logicians have accepted that verbal roots refer to both an action and also to an effect, the difference being that while the grammarians accepts two separate denotations, the logician accepts only a single denotation in both the senses. Also, as regards the verbal ending meaning, both have accepted that the verbal ending refers to the idea of the abode of the action, the difference being that while one accepts that the verbal ending directly refers to the abode of the action, the other accepts that the verbal ending refers to the agentness which is analysable into the state of being the abode of the action. Thus, only ritualists have come up with a totally different idea that the action needs an activity or effort and such an activity is the meaning of the verbal ending.

CHAPTER IV

THEORY OF KĀRAKA

Introduction

Since Pāṇini's grammar¹ is generative grammar, his grammar teaches how to produce the words formally with the addition of affixes and other grammatical elements. Pāṇini teaches that the words especially the nouns are produced with certain combinations of grammatical elements. These combinations are mainly the case endings. The case endings express certain non-lexical meanings i.e. syntactico semantical relations that relate lexical items i.e. nouns, adjectives, pronouns etc. with the action certain expressed by the verbs. Pāṇini assigns the name '*kāraka*' to such syntactico semantical relations. However, the term '*kāraka*' is also used to refer to any item (person or thing) that participates in any way in generating any action; and also, by extension, to any word used to refer to such relations or such items. For instance, consider the term '*āpadāna kāraka*' which we get when we read p. i.4.24 together with p. i.4.23. This term refers to the syntactico semantical relation of *āpadāna* (ablation) i.e. the relation of a fixed point from which something moves away. Also this term refers to the item *āpadāna* (ablation) or fixed point; and by extension, refers to the word expressing such a relation or such an item.

However, Pāṇini, besides using the term '*kāraka*' as a meaning condition, uses the same term also as a name or designation (*samjñā*). And the designation '*kāraka*' is to be used as a gene-

1. Dr. S.D. Joshi, Vyākaraṇa Mahābhāṣya, 1975.

ral technical designation for the six other varieties of special designations known as 'apādāna' or ablation etc. These six varieties of designations are used to refer to six varieties of syntactico-semantic relations, or to any item participating in an action, by being instrument in bringing about an action, and by extension, these designations are used to words standing for such a relation or for such an item. For instance, Pāṇini has enumerated the six designations as follows : (i) ablation 'apādāna', (ii) indirect object 'sampradāna', (iii) instruments 'karaṇa', (iv) locus 'adhikaraṇa', (v) object 'karman' and (vi) agent 'kartā'.

Consider the following examples which illustrate the special syntactico-semantic items represented by the six designations : (i) 'fruit falls from the tree' (*vṛkṣāt phalam patati*), (ii) 'he gives a cow to the Brāhmin (*brāhmaṇāya gām dadāti*), (iii) 'he plays with the dice' (*akṣaiḥ divyati*), (iv) 'he cooks rice in the 'pot' (*stihālyām odanam pacati*), (v) 'he makes a mat' (*kaṭam karoti*) and (iv) 'Caitra goes to the village' (*caitraḥ grāmam gacchati*). Here, in the first instance, the tree serves as the 'ablation' (*apādāna*) in connection with the action of falling. In the second instance, Brāhmin serves as the indirect object (*sampradāna*) in connection with the action of giving. In the third instance, the dice serves as the instrument (*karaṇa*) in connection with the action of playing. In the fourth instance, the pot serves as the locus (*adhikaraṇa*) in connection with the action of cooking. In the fifth instance, the mat serves as the object (*karman*) in connection with the action of making. In the sixth instance, Caitra serves as the agent (*kartā*) in connection with the action of going. Thus, these designations represent six different types of syntactico semantic items (*kārakas*) in the six samples.

The six designations are meaningful labels. 'Apādāna' means 'taking away', 'sampradāna' means 'handing over', 'karaṇa' means 'means', 'adhikaraṇa' means 'location' and 'kartā' means 'agent'. However, Pāṇini defines each of these six designations with non-linguistic features like 'dhravam apāye' etc.¹ so that the *apādāna* etc. can be sufficiently distinguished amongst

themselves and also that a correspondence between linguistic construction and non-linguistic fact can be established. Following are the definitions of the designations : (i) The fixed point from which something recedes is *apādāna* (*dhruvam apāye apadanam*), (ii) the item as wished to be the recipient of the object of the action is *sampradana* (*karmanā yam abhipraiti sa sampradānam*), the most effective means is *karaṇa* (*sādhakataman karaṇam*), (iv), the location is the *adhikaraṇa*, (v) that which the agent desires to reach (through the action) is the *karman* and (vi) the independent (in actions) is the *kartr*.

As stated earlier, these designations are used to refer to the six varieties of syntactico-semantic relations as well. These relations, in general, are called 'kāraka relations'. And Pāṇini links directly the *kāraka* relations to case endings or post nominal affixes (*vibhaktis*) so that the same can express the *kāraka* relations. According to Pāṇini, case endings recur to express such *kāraka* relations as *apādāna* etc.; and they are known as *dvitīyā* (accusative endings) etc. Pāṇini assigns six different case endings (*vibhaktis*) for expressing the six varieties of *kāraka* relations : They are *dvitīyā* or accusative endings for expressing 'object' (*karman*) (ii.3.2); *caturthī* or dative endings for expressing 'indirect object' (*sampradāna*) (iii.3.13); *tritīyā* or instrumental endings for expressing 'means' (*karaṇa*) (ii.3.18); *tritīyā* or instrumental for expressing 'agent' (*kartr*) (ii.3.18); *pañcamī* or ablative endings for expressing 'ablation' (*apādāna*) (ii.3.18); and *saptamī* or locative endings for expressing 'locus' (*adhikaraṇa*) (ii.3.36).

It must be noted here that accusative and other case endings, expressing the *kāraka* relations, are governed by the rule 'anabhihite' (ii.3.1), and therefore, they can be used in the language only if the 'karman' etc. are not already expressed otherwise by the grammatical elements such as conjugational endings etc. Thus, '*caitreṇa taṇḍulah pacyate*' (rice is cooked by Caitra) and '*caitrah taṇḍulam pacati*' (Caitra cooks rice). Here, in the first instance, the word, expressing the object namely '*taṇḍulah*' does not have accusative case endings (it has only nominative case¹

1. vide chapter on the theory of nominative case endings.

endings) since the sense of the object (*karman*) has already been expressed otherwise by the conjugation ending (*te*); whereas the word expressing the agent namely '*caitreṇa*' has the instrumental case ending (*ena*) since the sense of the agent (*kartr*) has not been already expressed otherwise. In the second instance, the word expressing the agent namely '*caitraḥ*' does not have the instrumental ending (*ena*) (it has nominative case ending since the sense of the agent (*kartr*) has already expressed otherwise by the conjugational ending (*ti*), whereas the word expressing the object (*karman*) namely '*taṇḍulam*' has the accusative ending (*am*) since the sense of the abject (*karman*) is not already expressed otherwise. Thus, Pāṇini restricts the use of the accusative and other case endings to the sense of the 'object' etc. that are not expressed otherwise (*anabhihita*).

Pāṇini does not assign the nominative case endings in the sense of any particular '*kāraka*' or syntactico semantical relation. However, as seen in the above exmples, the nominative case endings occur after the word whose *kāraka* senses have already been expressed otherwise (*abhihita kāraka*).

The rule '*prātipadikārtha*' (p. ii.3.1) prescribes that the nominative case endings refer to *abhihita kārakas*; and therefore they do not express any particular *kāraka* relation a new as such, rather they express gender and number as occurring in the base meaning (*prātipadikārtha*). Also, the genitive case endings, unless intended to express a particular *kāraka*, are out as far as expressing any *kāraka* relations are concerned, since the same (genitive case endings) are not used in the sense of any *kāraka* relations.

Thus, while the accusative etc. are *kāraka vibhaktis* i.e. *vibhaktis* expressive of *kārakas*, the nominative and genitive are a *kāraka vibhaktis* i.e. *vibhaktis* non expressive of *kārakas*.

Pāṇini's rule '*kārake*' (p. i.4.23), governing the general designation of *kāraka* for various syntactico semantical items or notions is to be read along with the rules *ā kadārād ekā samjñā* (p. i.4.1) and *vipratīṣedhe param kāryam* (p. i.4.2) which restrict only one designation for one item at a time. Thus, in '*krūraṁ abhikrudhyati*' (he is angry with the cruel man), *krūra* has only the designation of *karman*, which does not have any other

scope (*avakāśa*) and does not have the designation of *sampradāna* which has other scope (*sāvakāśa*) elsewhere.

Despite Pāṇini linking six different varieties of syntactico-semantic (*kāraka*) relations to six different case endings respectively, as an exception one and the same *kāraka* relation may be linked to two different case endings or one and the same ending may be expressive of two different varieties of *kāraka* relations. For instances, the syntactico semantic (*kāraka*) relation of *karman* is linked to the accusative case endings in the active construction by the rule *karmaṇi dvitīya* (p. ii.3.2), whereas the same is linked to the nominative case endings by the rule '*prātipadikārtha*' (p. ii.3.1). Thus, '*kaṭam karoti*' (he makes a mat) and '*kaṭah kriyate*' (mat is made) are justified. Also for instance, the accusative case endings are expressive of the syntactico semantic (*kāraka*) relation of the '*sampradāna*' in connection with the actions signified by '*krudh*' preceded by an *upasarga*, whereas the same accusative case endings are expressive of the syntactico semantic (*kāraka*) relation of '*karman*' in construction as indicated above. Thus, we can account for the active usage *krūram abhikrudhyati* (he is angry with the cruel one) and '*krūrāya krudhyati*' (he is angry with the cruel one). Hence, while the syntactico-semantic relations (*kāraḥ*) represent the underlying deep structural relations, the *vibhaktis* express the same *kāraka* relations in the surface structure of a sentence. Almost in a similar vein Professor P. Kiparsky and J.F. Staal¹ have argued that *kāraka* relations comprise such notions as "logical subject of", "logical object of" etc. and correspond to the 'underlying' or 'deep' syntactic relations of transformational grammar. Also, thus, it can be stated that Pāṇini was aware of the distinction between deep structure and surface structure of sentences and hence used the terminology of '*kāraka*' for the syntactico semantic items such as *apādāna* and also for the syntactico semantic relations of nouns, adjective etc. to the action expressed by the verb in the deep structure and the terminology of *vibhakti* (case endings) for the representation of the same relations in surface structure of a sentence.

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1. Kiparsky P. and J.F. Staal, 1969. Syntactic and Semantic relations in Pāṇini Foundation of Language (1969).

However, before we analyse the various definitions, and discuss the theories that could thereby be posited, it must be pointed out that the post-nominal affixes, which are seven in number, are of two types: (i) *kāraka vibhaktis* or nominal affixes which express the *kāraḥ*, and (ii) *akāraka-vibhaktis* or nominal affixes which express something other than the *kāraḥ*. For instance, consider the statement 'Caitra cooks rice' '*caitraḥ pacati taṇḍulam*'. Here, the nominative and accusative found occurring after the nouns *caitra* and *taṇḍula* express the agentive and the objective *kāraḥ*. Thus, they are the *kāraka vibhaktis*. The nominal affixes expressing the non-*kāraḥ*, on the other hand, are of again two types : (i) *upadana vibhakti* or the post nominal affix added to a noun on account of the presence of another word (other than the verb), and (ii) *sambandha vibhakti* or the nominal affix expressing the mere relation. In both these cases, the relations expressed by the affixes are not connected with the actions expressed by the verb; rather, they are connected syntactically with the ideas expressed by another noun phrase. Consider, for instance, the statements : (i) 'generic property occurs in every staff, (*anudaṇḍam jātiḥ*) and (ii) 'he comes from the neighbourhood of the village' (*grāmasya samīpād āgacchati*). Here, in (i), the accusative affix found occurring after the word '*daṇḍa*', is an *upadana vibhakti* since the meaning expressed by it is connected with the generality of the meaning of the word *anu*, which is not a verb. Also, in (ii), the genitive occurring after the word *grāma*, is a non-*kāraka vibhakti* since the relation expressed by it is syntactically connected with only the meaning of yet another nominal word, namely, the neighbourhood.

Problem

However, what needs to be investigated is the analysis of the term *kāraka* on both logical and syntactico-semantical levels. While Kātyāyana has taken the rule '*kārake*' (i.4.23) to be a technical designation in general (*samjñātvena adhikāra*), Patañjali, following him Kaiyata, explain the rule both ways, as a technical designation in general (*samjñātvena adhikāra*) and a restrictive meaning condition (*viśeṣaṇatvena adhikāra*). Also, Patañjalis explanation of the term '*kāraka*' as '*karoti iti kāra-*

kam' (that which brings about or accomplishes an action) has led Bhartṛhari and Nāgesha to analyse *kāraḥ* on logical level and to argue that (i) *kāraḥ* are the basic capacity to produce an action that (ii) *kāraḥ* are the things or items that possess the basic capacity to produce the action respectively. On the other hand, logicians and ritualists namely Jagadīsha etc. and Bāttas have analysed the *kāraḥ* on the syntactico semantical level and developed two contrasting theories such as (i) *kāraḥ* are the meanings expressed by the post nominal affixes and (ii) *kāraḥ* are syntactico-semantical relations that relate to the *bhāvanā* etc. Thus, Indian epistemologists have provided most fascinating theories of *kāraḥ* based in logical and syntactico-semantical levels. In the following pages we shall give a brief account of all these various theories so that a final conclusion regarding different theories can be arrived at.

Kātyāyana's theory

Kātyāyana raises the difficulty that suppose the term '*kāraḥ*' is not defined by mentioning the *saṃjñā* i.e. the item which receives the designation '*kāraḥ*', then there would occur the danger of misusing the same term for non-*kāraḥ* as well. Thus, he states that when the object designated is not mentioned, the term *kāraḥ* can be applied to non-*kāraḥ* such as the '*grāma*' (village) in '*grāmasya saṃjñā āgacchati*' (he comes from the vicinity of the village). Here, the '*village*' is merely the relation of the vicinity from which some one comes; nevertheless, since the *kāraḥ* is not defined as the producer of an action (*nirvartaka*), even the '*village*', which serves as the fixed point from which somebody moved away, has the possibility of obtaining the designation of *āpādāna* (*kāraḥ*).

Also, he states that when the term '*kāraḥ*' is not defined, there occurs the undesired possibility of applying the designation '*kārman*' (*kāraḥ*) to an item which is not specified (*akathita*) in cases like '*brāhmaṇasya putram pathānam prcchati*' (he asks the son of the Brāhmin way) and applying the term *āpādāna* (*kāraḥ*) to non-*āpādāna* like *vrkṣa* (tree) in '*vrkṣasya paṇam patati*' (the leaf falls from the tree).

Nevertheless, Kātyāyana answers this difficulty by stating that the term '*kāraḥ*' need not be defined; rather, the same can

be taken literally. For, the definitions of the terms 'apādāna' etc. as the fixed point from which something recedes i.e. moves away etc. themselves contain limitations of their application. Consequently, since, in such cases, the tree etc. are not intended by the speaker to express the *apāya* 'moving away', the same (tree etc.) do not get the designation of *apādāna kāraka* etc. despite their functioning as the fixed point with relation to moving away.

In this connection, Kātyāyana states also that there can be no difficulty in taking the term *kāraka* literally: i.e. as meaning the agent who is defined as the item which is independent in (bringing out) the action. For, since action differs according to each *kāraka*, the agenthood of the *karana* (instrument) and the *adhikaraṇa* (locus) can be established with respect to the actions like cooking (*pāka*) etc. Here, the agenthood of the main i.e. actual agent such as Caitra with respect to the action of cooking means *adhiśrayaṇa* (putting the pot on), *udakāsecana* (pouring water), *taṇḍulāvapana* (putting the rice), *edhopakaṛṣaṇa* (supplying fuel) etc.; whereas the agenthood of the *adhikaraṇa* (locus) such as pot with respect to the cooking means the action of *dhāraṇa* (holding so and so much) as in '*dronam pacati*' (pot cooks a *drona*), and the agenthood of the '*karana*' (instrument) such as firewood means the action of *jvalana* (burning) as in '*edhāḥ pakṣyanti ā viklitter jvaliṣyanti*' (the sticks of firewood will cook i.e. burn untill the rice become soft).

Kātyāyana states further that the agenthood of the *apādāna* (ablation) etc. can also be explained due to the independence and dependence. The independence of the *apādāna* in bringing about the action of moving away is the agenthood of the *apādāna*, whereas the dependence of the same is the *apādānatva* of the *apādāna*.

Observation

It can be stated now that Kātyāyana holds that the term '*kāraka*' can be taken literally and need not be defined by providing a *saṃjñin*. And, since the definitions of the '*apādāna*' etc. themselves contain the limitations of their application, there cannot be any danger of applying the designation to any non-*kāraka* such as the Brahmin etc. who merely serve as the relation

with respect to the son in 'brāhmanasya putram panthānam prcchat' etc.

Another significant contribution of Kātyāyana is that when *kāraka* is taken in its literal sense, (the term is a *ṇvul* derivation from the root 'kr' (to do) and hence means 'that which brings about'), the designation '*kāraka*' becomes applicable to only the agent that brings about an action. He justifies such an application of the designation to only the agents on the ground that all the *kāraḥ* such as '*kāraṇa*' (instrument) *adhikaraṇa* (locus) etc. too are agents in their own capacity of burning, holding etc. Nevertheless, he has the difficulty in explaining the agenthood with respect to the *apādāna* and *sampradāna* since they are not participating in the action. However, he removes the difficulty by introducing the notions of independence and also dependence. According to him, all the six *kāraḥ*, including *apādāna*, *sampradāna* etc. have independence in one respect and dependence in another respect. When the notion of dependence is taken into account, the designation *apādāna* etc. are applied, whereas when the notion of independence in their own minor contribution is taken into account, the designation *kāraka* is applied.

Patañjali's theory

While from the beginning Kātyāyana took '*kāraka*' to be a *samjñā* (designation), Patañjali first states that the rule is an *adhikāra* since the same does not prescribe anything new. Further, he states that when '*kārake*' is an *adhikāra*, the same can be either a technical designation which is to be defined subsequently, or a restrictive meaning condition regarding the application of the designations such as '*apādāna*' etc. introduced by the next set of six rules. Patañjali takes the rule to be a *samjñā* since the same is read in the *ekasamjñā* section and also takes the rule to be a general technical designation (*samjñātvena adhikāra*) since the same is used in the locative.

Patañjali states that Pāṇini usually makes short economic *samjñās* such as '*ti*', '*ghu*' etc. However, the designation '*kāraka*' unlike other designations is quite a lengthy one. And this indicates that *kāraka* is a significant designation. Therefore, the term '*kāraka*' must be analysed as '*karoti iti kārakam*' or 'that

which brings about i.e. accomplishes (the action)'. Thus, *kāraka* can be admitted to be a designation signifying only the agent which brings about or accomplishes (the action). Now, in the case of the statements such as '*brāhmaṇasya putram panthānam prcchati*' (he enquires the son of the Brahmin the way) and '*grāmasya samīpād āgacchati*' (he comes from the vicinity of the village), the Brahmin and also the village need not be considered to be *kāra*kas. For, they don't contribute in any way towards bringing about i.e. accomplishing the actions namely 'enquiring' and 'coming' and hence are not the agents of the same actions. And, since they are not the *kāra*kas, they cannot be called '*karman*' and '*apādāna*' respectively. However, one may object here as follows : Since only the agent of action is to be considered a *kāraka*, how could the cases which are non agents such as the 'instrument', 'locus' etc., become *kāra*kas ? Anticipating this objection, Patañjali states that action differs in relation to each case and therefore even the cases such as 'instrument' 'locus' etc., can be considered to be the agents of different actions and thereby as *kāra*kas. For instance, in the statement 'Caitra cooks' (*caitrah pacati*), the root 'to cook' (*pac*) refers to kindling fire, pouring water, setting up the vessel etc. Consequently, "Caitra is the agent of cooking" means he is the agent of kindling fire etc. So, Caitra accomplishes the action of cooking by possessing the act of kindling fire etc.

In the case of the statement 'the pieces of wood cook' (*kaṣṭhāni pacanti*), the root 'cook' refers to the 'burning' (*jvalana*) etc. which are found in the wood. Consequently, "the pieces of wood are the agents of cooking", means they are the agents of burning' etc. So, woods accomplish the act of cooking by virtue of possessing the burning. Similarly, in the statement, 'the vessel cooks' (*sthāli pacati*), the root 'cook' refers to the act of possessing rice, water etc. Consequently, "the vessel is the agent of cooking" means the vessel is the agent of possessing rice etc. So, the vessel accomplishes the act of cooking by possessing rice etc. Thus, it has been established that non-agentive cases such as 'instrument', 'locus' etc. too are the agents of different actions and therefore, can be considered to be the *kāra*kas. From this it becomes clear that, according to Patañjali, all those cases, which contribute in some way or other

towards the accomplishment of the action, are *kāraṅkas*. Nevertheless, it must be noted here that Patañjali maintains a clear distinction between the primary agent such as 'Caitra' and secondary agents such as 'woods' and 'vessel' etc. He observes that when a primary agent is present along with the non-primary or secondary agents, the latter are dependent in their function of accomplishing the action on the former. For instance, consider the statement 'Caitra cooks rice gruel in the vessel through wood' (*caitrah toṇḍulam sthālyām kāṣṭhena pacati*). Here, the secondary agents, namely, 'rice', 'vessel' and 'wood' are dependent in their function on the primary agent i.e. Caitra. Consequently, they are to be considered to be only the 'object', 'locus' and 'instrument' respectively. However, when the primary agent is not present, the secondary agents are intended to be independent in their function of accomplishing the 'swelling of rice' and other actions and therefore are to be considered as agents only. Hence, the statements 'rice cooks', 'vessel cooks' etc.

Also, according to Patañjali, the designation '*kartṛ*' (agent) and special designations such as '*apādāna*' (ablation) etc. are applied to an item depending on whether the same item is intended to be independent in the action or not i.e. when the speaker intends an item to be independent, the designation '*kartṛ*' is applied, whereas when the speaker intends an item to be dependent, the special designations '*apādāna*' etc. are applied. Thus, to illustrate this theory Patañjali provides the examples '*balāhakah vidyotate*' (the cloud is lightening) '*balahakad vidyotate*' (it is lightening from the cloud) and '*balāhake vidyotate*' (it is lightening in the cloud). Here, in the first instance, the cloud is intended to be independent in the action of lightening and hence gets the designation '*kartṛ*'; whereas in the second and third instances, the same cloud is not intended to be independent in the action of lightening and hence gets only the special designation of *apādāna* etc.

Finally Patañjali proposes another alternative explanation of the rule '*kāraṅke*'. He states that since Pāṇini has introduced the term in the locative singular '*karake*', and not in the locative plural '*karakaṣu*', the same should be taken only as a restrictive meaning condition (*viśeṣaṇatvena adbhikāra*) and not a general technical designation (*saṃjñatvena adbhikāra*). He further ex-

plains that the locative singular 'kārake' should be taken to mean *kriyāyām* or 'when there is connection with the action'. Thus, according to this explanation, the rule i.4.23 means that the designations 'apādāna' etc. are applied to an item provided that the same item meets the restrictive condition of being connected with the action.

Theories based on productive capacity

Now, it must be pointed out that Patañjali's explanation of the *kāraka* has given rise to two different interpretations on which are based the two theories mainly supported by Bhartṛhari and Nāgeśa. Bhartṛhari is the chief advocate of the theory that *kāraka* is only the capacity or power that produces the action, whereas Nāgeśa is the chief advocate of the theory that *kāraka* is the things which possesses such powers.

Bhartṛharis theory

As stated earlier, Bhartṛhari is the chief advocate of the theory that *kāraka* is the capacity to produce an action. He states in his *Vākyapadīya*, that a basic capacity to bring about an action, which is inherent either in its own locus or in some other locus, is considered to be the instrument. What he means by this statement is that the capacity or the power which is found inherent and therefore inseparable from things is to be considered as the *kāraka*. For instance, in 'Caitra cooks', the capacity found inherent in Caitra, which produces the action of kindling, fire etc. is the *kāraka* known as *karṭṛ*. Or, for instance, in 'he cooks rice gruel', the capacity found inherent in the rice, which produces the swelling in the rice, is the *kāraka* known as *karman*.

¹According to this theory of Bhartṛhari, Patañjali's statement that 'qualities constitute the instrument' (*guṇāḥ sadhanam*) under the rule (*anabhihite*) ii.3.9, can be taken to be a pointer to the fact that Patañjali meant only the power to be the *kāraka*. It can be argued now as follows: suppose the thing possessing the power is considered to be the *kāraka*, then the diversity of the effect cannot be maintained; since the thing that produces the

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1. *Svāśraye samavetānām tadvadevāśrayāntare kriyāṇām abhini-spattau sāmāthyam sādhanam viduh*. *Vākyapadīya*, p. 230.

effect is uniformly same under all circumstances. For instance, consider the statement : (i) 'behold the pot' (*ghaṭam paśya*) and (ii) 'bring water through a pot' (*ghaṭena jalam āhara*). Here, the two actions, namely the act of beholding and also the act of bringing water, which are the effects, have nothing in common. However, the thing which produces them, namely the pot, is the same. Consequently, the two mutually different *kāraṅkas*, namely the *karman* and *karāṇa* can never be explained in the form of a single pot. On the other hand, if the power that occurs in the things is considered to be the *kāraṅka*, then the power which produces the act of beholding and also the power which produces the act of bringing water, can easily be distinguished as two separate entities and hence as two *kāraṅkas*.

Commenting on Bhartṛhari, Helārāja points¹ out that the statement, "the basic capacity inherent in things producing an action is the *kāraṅka*" does not contradict, in any way, the statement of Patañjali that "the thing attains the status of an instrument in respect to the accomplishment of an action" (*dravyam kriyābhiniṣṛtim prati sādhanabhāvam upaiti*) under the rule iii.1.68. He notes that Bhartṛhari made the above statement with the intention that the power and the locus in which it inheres are identical. He further states, in support of Bhartṛhari's theory, that Mahābhāṣya passages such as : 'the things or substances are indeed the instruments' (*sādhanaṁ vai dravyam*) and 'the substances have no excellence or decline' (*na ca dravyasya prakarṣāpakarṣau stah*) actually indicate the identity of the power and the locus in which it inheres. Moreover, it must be admitted that any power, which may be considered to be a *kāraṅka*, cannot remain without a locus, and hence there is no point in accepting that the power alone, i.e. without any association to its locus, is the *kāraṅka*.

Vāmana's theory

As stated earlier, Patañjali's explanation of the term *kāraṅka* has greatly influenced the thinking of later grammarians in formulating the theory of *kāraṅka*. The author of Kāśikā, while commenting upon the rule i.4.23, states that *kāraṅka* is a

1. Vākyapadīya, p. 230.

synonym of *nimitta* and *hetu*. Although, he does not elaborate on his theory of *kāraka*, it is quite clear that he takes *kāraka* to be a semantic unit that participates as an instrument or cause in the accomplishment of an action.

Nāgeśa theory

Nāgeśa, in his *Laghumanjuṣā*¹, analysis *kāraka* to be things having the capacity to accomplish an action, which (capacity) is found inherent in things possessing the actual power to produce the action. For him, such a capacity is identical with the operation or *vyāpāra*. For instance, when Caitra cooks, Caitra has the capacity to accomplish the act of cooking, that is to say, he operates so as to set up the vessel, soak the rice etc. and hence can be said to possess the actual power to produce the cooking rice. In the case of '*brāhmaṇasya putram panthānam prcchati*' where someone enquires the son of Brahmin regarding the road, however; one cannot claim that someone has the capacity to accomplish the Brahmin, or that the Brahmin participates in any capacity towards the production of the enquiry. Therefore, he (the Brahmin) cannot be claimed to be a *kāraka* (*karman*).

It must be admitted that all the *kāraḥ* such as the instrument and the locus, contribute towards the accomplishment of the main action indirectly through their own subsidiary actions or operations and they are thus, to be considered as *kāraḥ*. Also, an indirect object or *sampradāna* contributes towards the accomplishment of giving indirectly, i.e. by occupying the giver's mind. Hence *sampradāna* is a *kāraka*. In the case of the statement such as : 'he remembers the pot', the pot is *karma kāraka*, because, it too accomplishes the main action of remembering by becoming the property of thought. Thus, it can be established that all the *kāraḥ* contribute towards the accomplishment of the main action through their individual operations, and depending upon the particular mode of operation, they are variously called as 'instrument', 'locus' etc.

One may object here that a 'village', when it is reached, is

1. *Kāratvam kriyājanakatva śaktyāśraya samaveta vyāpārābhiniṣpatti sāmartyām*. *Laghumanjuṣā*, p. 1163.

not, really speaking, accomplished, such as the 'rice gruel' is, through the efforts of the 'goer'. Also, it cannot be claimed that it participates in the production of the act of going directly in any way. Thus, the 'village' cannot be explained to be a *kāraka* in the sense 'rice gruel' or Caitra can be done. Nevertheless, it must be admitted that when the village is reached, it comes to possess a capacity to be contacted by the goer, and this capacity can be said to help the goer to produce the act of going. Therefore, it can be maintained that the village is also associated with the power to produce the action of going. Thus, it becomes established that the things which are associated with the powers to bring about an action are *kāraḥ*.

Theories based on syntactico-semantic function

As noted earlier, Bhartṛhari and his followers based their theory of *kāraka* on the etymological analysis of the term *kāraka* and therefore held that *kāraka* is a logical cause. However, other epistemologists, mainly logicians and ritualists, based their theory of *kāraka* on the syntactico-semantic function of the different *kāraḥ*. These scholars were guided primarily by the fact that all the *kāraḥ* must relate to an action.

Jagadīśa's theory

Jagadīśa, in his *śabdaśakti prakāśikā* states that whatever¹ meaning is expressed by whatever post-nominal affix that qualifies whatever action, the same is to be considered the *kāraka* in relation to the action expressed by the verb. By this, Jagadīśa means that the meaning expressed by the particular post-nominal affix becomes the *kāraka*, if such a meaning is to be related with the action expressed by the verb. Thus, for instance, in the statement, 'he goes to the village' (*grāmam gacchati*), the superstratumness, expressed by the accusative, occurring after the word *grāma*, becomes the *kāraka* (i.e. *karman*) since the same is related to the action of going expressed by the verb 'gacchati'.

It could also be observed here that in statements such as :

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1. *Yaddhātūpasthāpye yādṛṣe arthe prakāribhūtaḥ yah subar-
thah taddhātūpasthāpya tādṛśakriyāyām tatkārakam.*

Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā, p. 294.

'he cooks the rice gruel belonging to Caitra' (*caitrasya taṇḍulam pacati*), the genitive meaning i.e. ownership, is not a *kāraka*, since it does not relate to the action of cooking, rather it relates to only the rice gruel. However, in the case of the statements such as : (i) 'he is the cook of the rice-gruel' (*odanasya paktā*), (ii) 'the cooking of Maitra' (*maitrasya pākah*), the meanings expressed by the genitive, namely the objectness and the agency are *kāraḥ* as they relate to the action, 'cooking'. This has been sanctioned by the rule ii.3.65 (*karṭṛ-karmaṇoh kṛti*).

According to Jagadīśa, it must be noted that, only the meaning of the post nominal affix, such as separation, and not the meaning of the nominal stem, such as tree, is the *kāraka* : He states that the notion that the things expressed by the nominal stems, for instance, tree, in the statement, 'the leaf falls from the tree' (*vṛkṣāt paṇam patati*) can be a *kāraka*, is unfounded. He states so because, the meaning of the post nominal affix, qualified by the meaning of the nominal stem, should alone be considered as the *kāraka*. Nevertheless, since the meaning of the nominal stems qualifies the meaning of the post-nominal affix, and therefore qualifies, indirectly, the action, the meaning of the nominal stem can be accepted as a secondary *kāraka*.

Giridharas modification

Giridharopādhyāya, the author of *Vibhaktiyarthanirṇaya*, supports, in principle, the theory of *kāraka* as outlined by Jagadīśa. However, he suggests that some modifications in the analysis of *kāraka* are necessary. According to him,¹ the meanings of the post-nominal affixes can be regarded as *kāraḥ* provided that (i) they are invariably related to an action, that (ii) they are never related to the meaning of any nominal stem, and also that (iii) they are not referred to by the post-nominal affixes that are added to a noun on account of the presence of another word. In the above modification, the first condition is suggested to cover the objectness and other *kāraḥ* which relate to the actions; the second condition is suggested to exclude the

1. *Kāraḥ* nāma nāmārthānvaya prayojakatānavacchedakibhūta kriyānvayatā vacchedaka dharmavatvesati padāntārāsamabhivyāhṛta subarṇatvam.

possibility of covering the ownership (*svatva* as a *kāraka*), since it relates to only the meaning of a nominal stem, and the third condition is suggested to exclude the possibility of covering the non-*kārakas* such as generality and others since they are referred to by the nominal affixes whose existence is due only to the presence of another word (*anu*) etc. Giridhara holds that the above modifications are also necessitated on account of the fact that in statements such as : 'she is scared of her husband' (*kāntasya trasyati*), the relation of husband is also related to the action of getting scared and hence otherwise, would become the *apādāna kāraka*.

Some grammarians, albeit very few, have also approached the analysis of the *kāraka* from the syntactico semantical point of view. According to them, as Nāgeśa reports, a *kāraka* is¹ what relates to the meaning expressed by a post nominal affix. That, in turn, relates to the action. For instance, in the statement : 'Caitra goes to the village' (*caitro grāmam gacchati*), both 'Caitra' and 'village' are *kārakas*, since they are related to the agentness and objectness that, in turn, relate to the action of going directly and indirectly respectively.

It must be noted here that according to the above analysis, *kāraka* is only the meaning expressed by the nominal stem and not the meaning expressed by the post nominal affix.

Ritualists theory

Let us now consider the position of ritualists. They too, like Jagadīśa and others, analyse *kāraka* from the view point of a syntactico semantical function. However, as Gokulanatha, in his *Padavākyaratnākara*, states, they, unlike other epistemologists, view *kāraka* to be what relates to the activity or efficient force (*bhāvanānvayi*). According to the ritualists, all the *kārakas* must be admitted to relate to the activity or efficient force expressed by conjugational endings since it produces all the syntactico semantical notions including even actions. Now, how action is produced by the efficient force can be explained as follows : In the *mīmāṃsā* system, a predicate such as '*pacati*' (he cooks),

1. *Kriyānvitapratyayārthānvayitvam Kāraakatvam*.

is analysed as 'pākam karoti' (he does or accomplishes cooking). Such an analysis of a predicate explains the activity or efficient force as the cause leading to action and hence warrants that action be related to it. Further, actions are either instrumental or objective *kāraḥas*. For instance, consider the statement : "Caitra cooks rice gruel". Here, when Caitra accomplishes the cooking of rice gruel through various means, the action of cooking can be considered to be the product and hence the objective *kāraḥa*. Also when the rice gruel is conceived to be the product of the cooking, the same action of cooking can be claimed to be the cause and hence the instrumental *kāraḥa*. Thus, it has been established that actions are either instrumental or objective *kāraḥas* and are related to the activity or efficient forces.

Now as regards the other *kāraḥas* : They are also accomplished through efficient force. For instance, they hold that when an agent like Caitra cooks rice gruel etc., he possesses an activity or efficient force which makes Caitra strive for the cooking of rice and thus becomes the cause of Caitra being the agent and also the rice gruel being the object. Similarly all the *kāraḥas* can also be explained to be accomplished through the efficient force and hence must be admitted to be relating to it.

Conclusion

It can be observed now that, according to Pāṇini, 'kāraḥa' is both meaning—condition and a technical designation. As a meaning condition, it restricts the application of the designation 'kāraḥa' to only those items that are instruments i.e. agents which participate i.e. contribute in any way in bringing out the action. For instance, the fixed point (i.e. tree) from which some thing recedes or moves away, becomes the *kāraḥa* (*apādāna*) in the statement 'vṛkṣāt paṇam patati' since the same item is the instrument i.e. agent by participating as the fixed point in the action of moving away; whereas the relation (i.e. Village) of the vicinity from which one comes does not become the *kāraḥa* (i.e. 'apādāna') in the statement 'grāmasya samīpād āgacchati' since the same item is not an instrument i.e. agent by participating in any way in the action of coming.

As a designation, 'kāraḥa' provides the label 'kāraḥa' to

all the six varieties of syntactico-semantic relations such as 'apādāna' etc., which relate nouns, adjectives, pronouns etc. to the action expressed by verbs, and also to the items (persons or things) that participate in any way in generating the action.

The set of rules, such as the fixed point from which something recedes or moves away is ablation (*dhruvam apāye apādānam*) etc. by which Pāṇini defines the six types of syntactico-semantic relations and also the items, shows clearly that Pāṇini meant *kāra*kas to be the syntactico-semantic properties that participate in some way or other in accomplishing the action. Further, according to Pāṇini, the *kāra*kas are to be identified as one or other *kāra*ka on the basis of what particular way they participate in the accomplishment of the action.

However, the next set of rules starting with 'apādāne pañcamī' (ii.3.28), by which Pāṇini introduces the post nominal affixes (*vibhaktis*) for the expression of the *kāra*kas, correlates these syntactico-semantic properties with the grammatical expressions. Thus, according to Pāṇini, while the *kāra*kas represent the syntactico-semantic relations and the items in the deep or underlying structure of sentence, the post nominal affixes or *vibhaktis* represent the same at the surface structure of sentence in the language.

Kātyāyana takes the rule '*kāra*ke' to be the technical designation (*samjñātvena adhikāra*) only. According to him, the rule, despite not containing the object designated (*samjñin*), assigns the designation '*kāra*ka' to only such syntactico-semantic relations and items that participate in some way in accomplishing the action since the definition of the special designations such as 'apādāna' etc. contain, in themselves, the limitations in their application.

Also, according to Kātyāyana, the term '*kāra*ke' (it is a *kṛt* derivation of the root *kr* (to do) with the agentive *ṇvul* suffix and hence means that which is the agent of accomplishment) can be taken literally; and all the syntactico-semantic notions, including 'apādāna', can be explained to be '*kāra*kas' since all of them are independent in their own minor actions i.e. are agents of accomplishment. Thus, for Kātyāyana, the rule '*kāra*ke' assigns the designation '*kāra*ka' for the syntactico-semantic notions that are independent in the accomplishment of the

action.

Patañjali, on the other hand, takes the rule '*kārake*' to be both a technical designation and a restrictive meaning condition. According to him, since '*kāraka*' is a lengthy designation, the same signifies the agent of accomplishment and hence should be analysed as '*karoti iti kārakam*'. He holds that the designation '*kāraka*' is applicable to only those syntactico-semantic notions that are the agent i.e. that accomplish the action; and not to non-*kārakas* such as that relation 'village' in '*grāmasya samīpād āggacchati*' etc.

Nevertheless, he differs from Katyayana in his theory of independence. According to him, when speaker intends to present a syntactic-semantic notion as independent, the same gets the special designation '*kartr*' (agent); and when speaker intends to present the same notion as dependent, the same gets the special designation '*apādāna*' (ablation) etc. And the designation '*kāraka*' being general, is applicable to such notions in both instances. Thus both '*balāhakah vidyotate*' and '*balāhakād vidyotate*' become possible depending on whether the speaker intends *balāhaka* (cloud) to be independent or dependent.

Patañjali takes the rule to be the restrictive meaning condition as well. Nevertheless, when the rule is to be restrictive condition, he interprets the '*kāraka*' to mean '*kriyāyām*' or 'when there is connection with the action'. Thus, according to this interpretation, the rule means that the designations *apādāna* etc. are applied when the item concerned is connected with the action.

Patañjali wanted to emphasize the role of the action in making the special designations '*apādāna*' etc. applicable to syntactico semantic notions; and hence, despite that a 'nvul derivation such as '*kāraka*' can only be taken to mean the agent of action; he interprets the term in the sense of the action.

Both Bhartṛhari and Nāgesha were greatly influenced by the etimological explanation of the term '*kāraka*' by Patañjali as '*karoti iti kārakam*' (that which brings out or accomplishes action). They have almost perceived a logical cause and effect relationship between the *kārakas* and also the action. Of course, they were aware of the fact that *kārakas* represent syntactico-semantic notions (relations or items); nevertheless, they have

conceived such notions as effective means in accomplishing the action.

The difference between Bhartṛhari's theory and also that of Nāgesha is that while Bhartṛhari has accepted a basic capacity or power to bring about an action, which is inherent either in its own locus or in some other locus, to be the *kāraka*, Nāgesha has perceived the thing having the capacity to accomplish the action to be the *kāraka*.

Bhartṛhari argues that only the power, as opposed to the thing possessing the power, is the *kāraka*, on the ground that otherwise the diversity of the effects such as 'beholding' and 'bringing' cannot be maintained since the thing such as pot that provides such actions is uniformly same.

A point to be noted is that, according to Bhartṛhari, the power or capacity that accomplishes the action of only the agent such as cooking is to be considered as *kāraka*; and such a power can be found occurring in either the agent himself or in the instrument etc. Thus, he has stated that the power inherent in its own locus or in some other locus is *kāraka*. On the other hand, Nāgesha firmly believes that only the things which possess the power or capacity to accomplish the action are to be considered as the *kārakas*. He holds so because the powers, without their locus, i.e. things, cannot be found to be efficacious. Also, according to him, things, without their powers manifested, are not conducive to the accomplishment of the action. Thus, only the things, which have the powers, are the *kārakas*.

Nevertheless, as Helaraja points out, the powers and the things that possess such powers can be viewed to be identical i.e. non-distinct as far as accomplishing the action is concerned. For, neither the powers alone without their locus i.e. things, nor the things, without their power, can be admitted to accomplish the action.

It can be observed now that Bhartṛhari and Nāgesha have based their theory of *kāraka* on the etymological explanation of the term *kāraka*; and hence regarded the productive capacity of the syntactico semantical items to be determining factors of their *kāraka*-hood. That is to say that they have developed the theory of *kāraka* almost independent of sentence structure.

For them, *kāraka* is almost a logical cause that contributes towards the accomplishment of an action.

Quite interestingly, while most of the grammarians analysed *kārakas* on the logical function of the syntactico-semantic notions, the logicians, especially Jagadīśa and following him Gridhara analysed the *kārakas* on the syntactico-semantic function of such notions. Jagadīśa was primarily concerned with the fact that *kārakas* are meanings expressed by the post-nominal affixes and also that they are related directly or indirectly to the action. Thus, his definition 'the meaning expressed by the post nominal affixes that qualifies the action is the *kāraka* in relation to the action' considers *kārakas* to be only the meanings of post nominal affixes (*vibhaktis*) that relate to the action of the sentence. Nevertheless, such a definition considers primarily only the syntactico-semantic relations such as separation etc., to be the *kārakas* and secondarily the syntactico-semantic items (i.e. persons, things etc. expressed by the ablative and other stems), to be the *kārakas*.

Giridhara's contribution is that he has modified Jagadīśa's theory of *kāraka* to the perfection. Thus, his modification namely 'the meanings of the nominal affixes that are invariably related to an action but not related to the meaning of any nominal stem and not referred to by the post nominal affixes added on account of the presence of another word' (*upapadavibhaktis*) covers all the *kārakas* that relate to the action, and excludes all the non-*kārakas* that either relate to the meaning of another nominal stem or are referred to by the *upapadavibhaktis*. Like Jagadīśa's theory, the alternative theory suggested by Nāgesha namely "*kāraka* is what relates to the meaning expressed by a post nominal affix that, in turn, relates to the action" is also based on the syntactico-semantic function of the *kārakas*. However, while Jagadīśa's theory considers primarily only the meaning expressed by the *vibhaktis*, to be the *kāraka* the theory suggested Nāgesha holds only the meaning expressed by the ablative and other nominal stems to be the *kāraka*.

It can be observed now, that Jagadīśa and his followers have analysed the *kārakas* on the syntactico-semantic level and viewed the *kārakas* to be what relates to the action directly or indirectly. For them, the *kārakas* are the constituent parts of

the syntactico semantical structure of a sentence. And *kāraḥas* depend, for their identity, on the particular function i.e. the type of relation they manifest towards the action. Although there is no complete agreement among these epistemologists as to whether the *kāraḥas* are the meanings expressed by the post nominal affixes or those expressed by the nominal stems, it can be fairly well assumed that the meanings, expressed by both (post nominal affixes and the nominal stems) are the *kāraḥas* since the former are nothing but the syntactico semantical relations such as the separation etc. and the latter are the syntactico semantical items (persons or things) such as the 'tree' etc. which too relate to the action by participating in the accomplishment of the action. Now, the main objection to these theories is that such theories do not conform to the etymological explanation of the term '*kāraḥa*'. However, this objection need not be viewed seriously since it merely echoes the most obvious difference between the theories based on the logical function and also theories based on the syntactico semeatical function.

Finally the ritualists position of the *kāraḥa*: It is true that they too have analysed the *kāraḥas* from the view point of syntactico semantical function. However, unlike Jagadīṣa and others, they hold *kāraḥas* to be what relate to the activity or efficient force (*bhāvanā*). According to them, only *bhāvanā*, expressed by the conjugational endings, impells all the *kāraḥas* towards the accomplishment of the final goal and hence all the *kāraḥas* must be admitted to related to the same *bhāvanā*. This position, despite its extremity, confirms to the linguistic principle that the meaning expressed by the predicate is the most important element in the syntactico semantical structure of a senter.ce.

It can be concluded now that while Pāṇini used the term '*kāraḥa*' as both restrictive meaning condition and technical designation and thus meant to represent the syntactico-semantical notions in the deep structure, the later grammarians and other epistemologists enriched the theory of *kāraḥa* by analysing the same on both logical and syntactico-semantical levels.

CHAPTER V

MEANING OF NOMINAL BASE

(*nāmārtha*)

Introduction

Words (*pada*) have been divided twofold into nominals (*subanta*) and verbals (*tiñanta*) by Pāṇini. Both types consists of two parts : Nominal consist of nominals base (*prātipadika* or *nāman*) and a nominal ending (*vibhakti*), whereas verbals consist of verbal base (*dhātu*) and a verbal ending (*lakāra*). Constituent parts of both types i.e. verbals and nominals such as nominal base, nominal ending, verbal base and verbal endings are considered meaningful in Sanskrit.

Pāṇini defines nominal base as a meaningful unit which is different from verbal base, verbal ending and nominal ending (*arthavad adhātur apratyayah prātipadikam*). For instance, 'caitra' in 'caitrah pacati' is a nominal base because the same conveys the sense of Caitra and is different from verbal base etc. It should be noted that despite being in agreement with the general convention that nominal base is a meaningful unit, Pāṇini was more concerned with the formative or derivative aspect of the language and therefore, has provided only a technical definition of the nominal base as what is different from other types of formations.

However, other epistemologists define nominal base from the epistemological i.e. syntactico semantical point of view. Yāska, for instance, states that nominal base is what has its meaning subservient to i.e. qualifier of the verbal action. This definition is based on the syntactico semantical consideration of the grammarians that nominal base meaning such as 'Caitra' in

'Caitra goes' (*caitra gacchati*) is related to the action of going as a qualifier. Of course, it is to be noted that Yāska has based his definition of the nominal base on the etimological explanation of the term *nāman* as 'that which is subservient to something else' (*namati iti nāman*). Nevertheless, the definition is in accordance with the syntactico semantical convention.

Now, according to logicians, the meaning of the nominal base, especially that of nominative base, is considered to be the chief qualificand of all syntactico semantical relations. Therefore, Jagadīśa states that nominal base or rather more aptly noun (*nāman*) is what requires a nominative case to produce the cognition wherein its own meaning constitutes the chief qualificand of syntactico-semantical relations.

For instance, the word 'Caitra' (*caitra*) is a nominal base because the same requires the nominative case ending 'su' after it to produce the cognition such as 'Caitra is the agent of going' wherein Caitra, its own meaning, constitutes the qualificand of going.

Problem

However, epistemologists, belonging to different systems of Indian philosophy are divided in their opinion as to what exactly constitutes the meanings of a nominal base.

Logicians hold that generic property (*jāti*), individual (*vyakti*) and form (*ākṛti*) can be the meaning of the nominal base; whereas grammarians opine that generic property, individual and gender (*liṅga*) number (*saṁkhya*) and *kāraka* relations constitute the meaning of the nominal base and the ritualists consider that only generic property is the meaning of the nominal base. In addition, different scholars within each system have divergent views regarding the meaning of the nominal base. In the following pages, we shall give a brief account of what constitutes the nominal base meaning according to various schools and various thinkers and why they differ in their views.

Logicians theory

Gautama holds that a generic property (*jāti*), an individual (*vyakti*) and also a form (*ākṛti*) constitute the meaning of a word i.e. nominal base (*jātyākṛtivyaktayah padārthah*). For,

when one utters a nominal base such as 'pot' (*ghaṭa*), in '*ghaṭam jānāti*' etc. one understands an individual entity such as pot, which is distinct from both similar and dissimilar entities as having a particular form of shell-neck etc. And, such an understanding necessitates that (i) a generic property namely potness, (ii) an individual namely the pot and also (iii) the form namely shell-neck, be conveyed by the nominal base so that the pot can be distinguished from the similar and dissimilar entities while being identified with an individual which has the form of shell-neck etc.

It should be noted here that generic property (*jāti*) is defined by Gautam as a property that is capable of producing the knowledge of things in general (*samānaprasavātmika jātiḥ*). For instance, the generic property such as the potness is capable of producing the knowledge of pots in general as 'this is a pot', 'this is a pot' etc.

This concept of generic property was the most significant event in the history of Indian philosophy. This has facilitated the understanding of individuals as belonging to a particular class despite particular cognition of each individuals. This concept has also facilitated the identification of things either as belonging to a particular class or as distinct from another class of things.

It should be noted, however, that Buddhists oppose the concept of generic property or universal. According to them, generic property which is eternal and common to all individuals of same class cannot be accepted since things are momentary (*kṣanika*). They replace Nyāya concept of generic property by their theory of unique particulars (*svalakṣaṇa*). They explain that there is no use in accepting a generic property like cowness to distinguish the cow as distinct from another class of things. The same purpose can be achieved by understanding the cow as different or excluded from the non cows (*taditara vyāvṛtta*). They argue that accepting an eternal generic property like cowness poses the problem of explaining the same before and after an individual is produced or destroyed.

Logicians and ritualists reply to such an objection by stating that without admitting a positive entity like cow, the understanding of the same as excluded from the non cows is impossi-

ble. Also, they state that Buddhist must admit the concept of the generic property in spirit since the function of *apoha*, namely 'the exclusion of an entity from other than what actually it is' that of generic property.

Now, as regards the individual or *vyakti*: Gautama defines that individual is a corporal element (*mūrti*) that is the abode of a particular quality (*guṇaviśeṣā murtih*). Thus, cow etc. which are the abode of the particular from such as *sāsnā* are the individuals.

However, Vātsyāyana and others have provided another definition of the individual based on the etimological explanation of the term *vyakti* itself. According to them, individual is that which has a manifestation that is perceptible to sense-organs (*vyajyata iti vyaktih*). This definition is applicable to only earth, water, power and wind since they have a manifestation perceptible to sense organs due to their possession of such qualities as form (*rūpa*), liquid (*rasa*), odour (*gandha*) and touch (*sparsa*). However, yet another definition of the individual, which has a wider application, is also provided by logicians. According to this definition, individual is any substance that functions as the abode of the quality that is different from the number and also shares the same locus as that of the form and generic property.

The most general definition of the individual is, however, found in Gautama sūtra vṛtti. According to this work, individual is an object of knowledge (*prameyatva*). Such a definition covers all the categories under its application since all the categories are the objects of knowledge according to logicians.

Now as regards the form or *ākṛti*: Gautama, in his Nyāyasūtras, defines form or shape (*ākṛti*) as the inferential cause of the generic property. That is to say that since the form such as shellneck causes the inferential knowledge of the generic property namely the potness in the pot the same functions as the inferential cause of the generic property. And such a form occurs indirectly in the substance like pot: for the form is a quality of the various limbs which constitutes the substance.

Now, the same form must be understood as being non-distinct from the orderly arrangement or aggregate of the limbs or parts of the whole; for, it is only through the orderly arrange-

ment of limbs or parts of a substance that one infers the generic property of the substance. For instance, through the head, tail and feet do the people infer the cow. Thus, the form or shape should be understood as non distinct from such orderly arrangement of limbs.

Thus, according to Gautama, a nominal base like 'cow' denotes a generic property like cowness, the form like the dewlap and an individual like cow.

However, later logicians like Jagadīśa and Gadādhara have modified the theory to a certain extent each. According to Jagadīśa the word 'form' (*ākṛti*), in the Nyāyasūtra, does not signify the aggregate of limbs; but rather it signifies the relation between the generic property and also the individual. Thus what constitutes the nominal base meaning is the generic property, individual and also the relation between the former and also the later. Almost echoing the same idea, Gadādhara too holds that the nominal base has denotation in the sense of the generic property, its aboce i.e. individual and also their relation (*taddharma tadvaiśiṣṭya tadāśrayeṣu śaktih*). This modification has been suggested on the ground that the individual automatically includes a particular form as no individual can be cognized without its form; and hence, there is no need to accept any separate denotation in the sense of 'form'.

Viśvanātha presents the most significant interpretation of Gautama's theory of nominal base meaning. According to him, nominal base has a single denotation in the individual as qualified by the generic property and also the form. His interpretation is based on the fact that Gautam has used a singular ending after the word '*padārtha*' in '*padārthah*' and therefore, generic property, form and individual constitute a single sense of the nominal base. Also, since accepting more than one denotation for a single nominal base is against epistemological convention, only Viśvanatha's interpretation that the nominal base signifies the individual as qualified by both the generic property and form is most non controversial.

Observation on logicians theory

It can be observed now as follows :

Logican's theory of the meaning of the nominal base stems

from the fact that only an entity and also its essential characteristics should be viewed to be the referent (*pādartha*) of any given word. And since (i) the generic property like cowness, (ii) the form like dewlap and also (iii) the individual like cow itself form the essential characteristics of the entity known as cow, Gautama has stated that the same three (i.e. generic property, the form and also an individual) constitute the meaning of the nominal base. According to Gautama and other logicians, gender (*liṅga*), number (*saṁkhyā*) and *kāraka* relations do not form the part of the nominal base meaning because the same are not the essential characteristics of an entity. As it will be shown later, Pāṇini too has ruled that singular and other expressions (*eka vacana* etc.) are used to express the number singularity etc. and the case endings are used to express the *kāraka* relations; and thus he has indirectly supported the logicians view that only the entity and its essential characteristics constitute the nominal base meanings.

Now, the later logicians like Jagadīśa and Gadādhara have modified the basic theory profounded by Gautama that the generic property etc. constitute the base meaning. They have suggested that the term '*ākṛti*' in the rule suggests the relation between the generic property and also the individual since the individual itself includes the aggregate of the limbs as well. This suggestion is of course open to question because whether part and whole are one and the same or different from each other are open to discussion. Nevertheless, their suggestion points to the age old problem of the distinction between the part and whole. Now as regards Viśvanatha's interpretation : since the individual, the generic property and form constitute one single meaning (i.e. since generic property and form can be said to qualify the individual), Viśvanatha has interpreted Gautama's rule as meant to convey one single denotation of the nominal base in the sense of an individual as qualified by the generic property and form. And this interpretation successfully avoids the difficulty that when a word is accepted to have several denotations in different meanings, the same (word) becomes polysemous.

Grammarians theory

Patañjali in *paśpaśāhnikā*, gives an account of five different theories regarding the meaning of the nominal base which may be illustrated as follows :

Theory that jāti is the meaning

According to this theory, generic property, which produces the cognition of entities such as individual cows generalized and universalized as cows (*anugata ekākārabuddhijanana samartha*) should be accepted as the meaning of the nominal base. Otherwise, suppose only the individual is accepted as the meaning of nominal base, then endless individuals will have to be conceded as the meaning. And consequently, a common form of cows such as possession of horn etc. would be difficult to explain. Thus, the generic property, such as cowness, which facilitates the cognition of all cow instances generalized and universalized as cows, is the nominal base-meaning. Further, it should be noted that such a generic property becomes suggested in all individual instance (of cows etc. if expressed to occur in one single individual instance of cow. Since it is common to all the individuals and does not need to be repeated.

Theory that jāti and vyakti are the meanings

Some other grammarians like Vyāḍi hold that, in addition to the generic property, an individual such as cow should also be accepted as the meaning of nominal base. According to them, statements such as 'he gives a cow' (*gām dadāti*) become untenable unless an individual such as cow is also accepted as the base meaning; since generic property alone cannot be the object of giving. These scholars are of the opinion that individuals such as cow which are the abode or substratum of qualities like odour which occur in the same abode as that of generic property and form, must be differentiated from the generic property and therefore, constitute a separate meaning of the nominal base.

Theory that jāti, vyakti and līṅga are the meanings

Yet some grammarians hold that gender (*līṅga*), in addition to generic property and individual constitute the meaning of the nominal base. According to them, statements like 'salu-

tations to the goddess 'Umā' (*umadevyai namah*) become untenable unless the gender such as feminine, masculine and neuter are accepted as the meaning. For, in such cases, only the female goddess such as Umā is the recipient of ones regards and not any other type of god.

It should be noted that Pāṇini considers the gender as the property of only the words and not of the meaning in his rule *svamoh napuṃsakāt* (viii. 1.23). This is based on the fact that in 'he loves his wife' (*dārān gacchati*), the masculine gender is contradictory to the sense of wife; and therefore, the masculine gender should be regarded as the property of only the word '*dārān*'. However, modern grammarians insist that gender is the property of only the meaning. They cite, in support of their theory, the statements such as 'she is an individual' (*iyam vyaktih*), 'this is the thing' (*idam vastu*) an 'he is a man' (*ayam puruṣah*) wherein the word (*vyakti*) expressing a female individual has a female gender, the word (*vastu*) expressing the neuter thing has the neuter gender and also the word (*puruṣah*) expressing the male person has the masculine gender.

Theory that jāti, vyakti, līṅga and saṃkhyā are the meanings

Bhartṛhari and other grammarians hold that number (*saṃkhyā*) is also the meaning of the nominal base. According to them, number, which is the sole cause of distinguishing the objects as one, two, three etc., should be accepted as the meaning of nominal base. They establish their theory on the ground that the statements like 'bring a pot' (*ghaṭam ānaya*) induce the person to bring only a single pot (and not two or three pots); and therefore, unless the numbers like singularity are understood through nominal base, the statements would become untenable.

It should be noted here that as against the theory of the number of grammarians that the number is merely the cause of distinguishing the objects, the logicians¹ hold that the number functions as the unique or peculiar cause of counting. Also, they hold that, in the production of numbers, the entities present constitute the inherent cause (*samavāyi kāraṇa*), whereas the qualities such as singularity (*ekatvaguna*) constitute the non-

1. See the chapter on number for more details.

inherent cause (*asamavāyikāraṇa*) and the mental process of counting (*apekṣābuddhi*) constitutes the instrumental or incidental cause (*nimitta kāraṇa*).

However, ritualists firmly oppose the view that number(s) of the objects such as cups (*graha*) are intended to be conveyed to the nominal base since, in the statement such as 'he cleanses cup' (*graham sammārṣṭi*), the singular number is not intended to be related to the cup(s) (here all the cups, and not merely a single cup, are intended to be cleansed).

Theory that, jāti, vyakti, liṅga, saṁkhyā and kāraṇa are the meanings

Again, Bhartṛhari and his followers like Nāgeśa hold that *kāraṇa* relations such as objectness (*karmatva*) are also referred to by the nominal base itself. According to them, this position becomes necessary because otherwise the objectness and other *kāraṇa* relations would become difficult to be conveyed in the curd etc. in the statements such as 'he eats curd' (*dadhi bhikṣayati*) since the words *dadhi* etc. do not consist of accusative case ending that can refer to such a sense. Thus, these scholars maintain that the nominal base itself refers to all the *kāraṇa*² relations as well; whereas, the case affixes or endings are merely suggestive of the fact that the particular base, under a particular circumstance, refers to a particular *kāraṇa* item only.

Theory that state of existence or sattā is the base meaning

However, Kātyāyana, following him Patañjali, have interpreted the base meaning (*prātipadikārtha*) to be the state of being the existence i.e. the mere existence *sattva*. What Kātyāyana essentially means is that the base meaning need not be a substance associated with gender, number and measure. For, otherwise, it won't be possible for indeclinables like 'uccaiḥ' (high), 'nicaiḥ' (low) etc. to have nominative case endings added after them. The indeclinables such as 'uccaiḥ' and 'nicaiḥ' convey the sense of mere existence and not any substance which can be associated with gender, number and measure. Therefore, it becomes obligatory that *prātipadikārtha* or base meaning be

2. See chapter on *kāraṇa* for further details on *kāraṇa* relations.

understood as mere state of existence that includes even the sense conveyed by the indeclinables such as 'uccaih', 'ñicaih' etc.

Now, it should be noted that once the indeclinables such as 'uccaih', 'ñicaih' etc. are accepted to convey the sense of *prātipadikārtha* or base meaning, the nominative case endings can be added to them and thus they get the status of finished word or *padatva*. And once the status of finished word is acquired, the same words facilitate the use of the expressions such as 'grāma uccaih te/tava svam' (high up in the village is your property situated) etc. wherein the enclitic form 'te' substitutes optionally for 'tava'.

Observation on grammarians theory

Now it can be observed as follows :

Acceptance of a generic property, individual and also the form as the meaning of nominal base by logicians had a far reaching impact on all the systems of Indian philosophy in general and on grammar in particular. As Patañjali reports, several individual thinkers in grammar have conceded that generic property and individual constitute the meaning of the nominal base. Even Pāṇini, as Vāmana interprets, meant only the generic property by *prātipadikārtha*...(ii.3.46). Thus, the same (generic property) was universally accepted as the base-meaning by all grammarians.

Since generic property cannot be the object of giving and also since the same cannot occur without an abode, *Vyāḍi* and other scholars have suggested that an individual like cow too must be conceded as the base meaning. Helarāja is of the opinion that Pāṇini meant, by the word *prātipadikārtha*, not only the generic property but also an individual like cow. He seems to hold so because the word *prātipadika* cannot be explained to mean merely the generic property as such as explanation does not serve any practical purpose.

In spite of the fact that no grammarian openly advocates the form as a separate meaning of the base, they accept that the form is also suggested by the nominal base. For, Patañjali while defining generic property, states that the same (generic property) is understood by the aggregate or assembly of limbs of general form. Thus, different grammarians can be stated to have accept-

ed generic property, individual and the form as the nominal base meaning.

Now, as regards gender, number and *kāraka* relations : Opinion is divided amongst the grammarians as to whether the case endings (*vibhaktis*) are expressive of any sense or merely suggestive of the fact that such and such a nominal base denotes such and such a sense. While Pāṇini and others have advocated the theory that case endings denote certain meanings, Bhartṛhari and following him Nāgeśa and others have held that case endings are merely suggestive.

The most fundamental theory of Pāṇini is that case endings must denote certain meanings. For, he rules that the nominative case is to be used in the sense of *prātipadikārtha*, gender, measure and number (ii.3.46), and the accusative and other cases are to be used in the sense of the object *kāraka* etc. For him, case endings, except the nominative case ending which was meant to convey no particular relation, *kāraka* or otherwise, (it was meant to convey only *prātipadikārtha* etc.), were assigned the role of conveying a particular *kāraka* relation like object(ness). However, Bhartṛhari and others were greatly influenced by the fact that no case marker is present in cases like 'he eats curd' (*dadhi bhakṣayati*); and therefore, the same cannot be expressive of any meaning. Consequently, they have suggested that only the nominal base be accepted as expressive of the senses like the gender, the number and also *kāraka* relations.

Nevertheless, the position of Bhartṛhari is not entirely tenable. For, just because case endings are absent or lost in a few cases like '*dadhi bhakṣayati*' etc., the claim that all the case endings are meaningless (i.e. merely suggestive) and only the nominal bases are expressive of all the meanings like gender cannot be justified by any means. Thus, it can be accepted either that, only in cases like '*dadhi paśyati*', the nominal base denotes the gender etc.; or that the lost case ending is reinstated so that the same can denote the gender etc.

Now it can be noted as follows : Despite the contradictory claims by olden and modern grammarians that gender, which is a generic nature like generic property, belongs to the word and also to the meaning respectively, the same should be accepted as

the property of things i.e. meanings alone since only the things can have the distinction of being masculine, feminine and neuter. However, words too are considered as masculine, feminine and neuter due to the fact they have potentiality to refer to masculine, feminine and neuter things. This becomes clear from the fact the adjectival words have no gender of their own but change their gender in accordance with the things they refer to i.e. qualify. Thus, nominal bases, which consists of the stem-vowels or stem-consonants representing different genders of things, could be justifiably explained to denote the gender.

However, nominal base, by no stretch of imagination, can be held to denote the number and also *kāraka* relations. For, it would be against the very basic tenets of Pāṇini's grammar that singular, dual and plural expressions, which are actually different affixes, are meant to convey the singular, dual and plural numbers; and also that the case endings, which represent the syntactico semantical relations or *kāraṅgas* in the surface structure, are meant to convey the same *kāraka* relations in the deep or underlying structure. Thus, only the generic property, individual, which includes the form, and to certain extent gender are the meanings of the nominal base; whereas the number is the meaning conveyed by singular and other expressions and *kāraṅgas* are the meanings conveyed by the case endings.

Ritualists theory

Ritualists, in general, hold as follows : Word (i.e. nominal base) has a single denotation in the sense of the generic property such as cowness; however, the idea of an individual like cow and the form like the dewlap are conveyed through implication (*ākṣepa*).

Bhāṭṭas view

Here, the Bhāṭṭas position can be summarized as follows : Generic property, individual and form are not different from one another. When the individuals are cognized in a general way, the same become the generic property; and when the individuals are cognized as specific limbs or parts, the same become the forms. Thus, all the three together form one single entity and hence are not different from each other. However, since the

generic property is one and common to all the individuals, there is economy of assumption in assuming only a single denotation for the base in the sense of the generic property. On the other hand, suppose the denotation is accepted in the sense of individuals, then, since individuals differ, denotations too would differ and thus heaviness would result in the assumption.

Now, suppose one holds that listener first recognizes the form and not the individual, then it could well be conceded that nominal base produces the cognition of the form itself. And this position need not contradict the basic theory that nominal base has a single denotation in the sense of the generic property alone. For, since the form is not different from the individual, the generic property which implies the individual, can be said to imply the form as well.

It should be noted here that, according to Bhāṭṭas, implication (*ekṣepa*) is nothing but presumption (*arthāpatti*). They hold so because the generic property like the cowness is untenable without an abode such as the cow. And thus, the generic property implies an individual means the same (individual) is conveyed through presumption.

According to a section of Bhāṭṭas, however, only an indication (*lakṣaṇā*) must be accepted in the sense of an individual; and it is not possible to hold that the same is obtained through implication. For, when an implication is accepted in some sense, the same (sense) becomes merely secondary i.e. subordinate or subservient to the primary sense. However, since the individual is cognized to be primary i.e. the abode of the generic property, the same cannot be considered to be merely secondary to the generic property. Thus, whereas the nominal base has a denotation in the generic property, the same base should be conceded to have an indication in the individual.

Prabhakaras' view

According to the Prābhākara, however, the generic property is distinct from the individual. They hold the generic property to be distinct so that at least one of the nominal base-meanings, namely individual, can be related to the activity (*bhāvāna*) (the relation of the generic property to the activity is

not tenable; and even if somehow it is related, such a relation does not serve any useful purpose).

Prābhākaras too hold that the nominal base has only a single denotation in the sense of the generic property; and that the individual is cognized only through implication or *ākṣepa*. However, *ākṣepa*, according to them, means being the object of the same cognition as that of the generic property (*tulyavṛtti-vedyatvam*).

Later followers of Prabhākara, on the other hand hold as follows : The nominal base has a qualified denotation which refers to the individual as qualified by the generic property. However, such a denotation is useful i.e. effective in cognizing the generic property provided that the denotation is recognized as existing in the sense of the generic property; however, the same is effective in cognizing the individual even when the same is merely present in such a sense. That is to say that the nominal base has potentiality to denote the individual although one may not recognize the denotation in such a sense; however, the nominal base is helpful in denoting the generic property only when the denotation is understood as present in the generic property.

Observation

Ritualists too were greatly influenced by the logicians theory that generic property, individual and form constitute the base-meaning. However, they were divided in their opinion as to whether the generic property etc. constitute one single meaning of the base or different meanings.

Bhāṭṭas were of the opinion that since generic property, individual and form together constitute an entity, the same need not be accepted to constitute separate meanings. They were guided by the fact that accepting more than one denotation for the base would lead to heaviness of assumption. Thus, they have assumed only a single denotation in the sense of the generic property; whereas they have accepted the implication, which is of the form of presumption, in the sense of the individual identical with the form.

However, Prābhākaras, were mainly concerned with the analysis of the activity (*bhāvanā*) as the chief qualificand to

which all other parts of sentence meaning are related. Consequently, since nominal base meaning is a part of sentence meaning, and therefore, should be related to the activity, they have held that the individual is distinct from the generic property and is conveyed through *ākṣepa*. That is to say that since the generic property cannot be usefully related to the activity, the individual must be assumed to be different from the generic property so that at least one of the base meanings, namely individual, can be related to the activity. Thus, ritualists, despite agreeing as to what constitutes the base meanings, differ amongst themselves in their regarding as to the nature and function of the base meaning.

Cocclusion

Nominal base (*prātipadika* or *nāman*), like verbal base (*dhātu*), is considered meaningful in Sanskrit. However, as usual logicians, grammarians and ritualists are divided in their opinion as to what constitutes the meaning of the nominal base. Logicians, especially Gautama's proposal that a generic property (*jāti*), individual (*vyakti*) and form (*akṛiti*) constitute the base meaning (i.2.66) forms the very basis of the analysis of the base meaning. An entity, that can be thought of can only be analysed into an individual, a generic property and also a form. For instance, an entity like cow can be analysed into an individual like cow that is an abode of the generic property of the cowness and has the form of dewlap etc. Of course, it has become a matter of great philosophical dispute that whether the generic property etc. are three separate meanings or all the three combined together constitute one single meaning. However, it is fair to assume, as Viśvanātha suggests, that the individual, qualified by the generic property and also the form, constitutes one single meaning of the base. Prācyas too, since Gautama has used a singular ending after *padārtha*, hold that Gautama meant the same.

Many thinkers, in Nyāya as well as in other systems, viewed form (*ākṛiti*) as non distinct from the individual. They have held that no individual can be visualized apart from different limbs and parts. Thus, Jagadīśa and Gadādhara, have suggested that 'form' (*ākṛiti*) in the rule should be taken to convey

the relation between the generic property and also the individual. This suggestion is in conformity with the Nyāya doctrine that the generic property and its relation with the individual are real and eternal.

Now as regards the grammarians theory : Individual thinkers of grammar were greatly influenced by the Nyāya theory of nominal base meaning. Thus, they have held variously as (i) generic property, (ii) generic property and individual and also as (iii) generic property, individual and the form constitute the base meaning. However, real contribution of grammarians to the base meaning is their proposal that the gender (*liṅga*), number (*saṁkhyā*) and *kāraṅga* relations too constitute the base meaning. One may not entirely agree with their proposal that gender and others too are conveyed by nominal base itself and the following affixes, viz. singular and other expressions and case endings are merely suggestive. And except Bhartṛhari, and following him, some scholars like Nāgeśa, no one supports such a theory either. Nevertheless, this proposal has brought into focus successfully the most significant linguistic problem as to whether all the meanings like the gender, number and syntactico semantical relations (*kāraṅga*) should be accepted as the meanings of the base itself or whether the following affixes, viz. expressions and case endings are used for expressing such meanings. Thus, despite stiff resistance from Pāṇiniyans, Bhartṛhari etc., have posed a very pertinent linguistic problem.

Finally, as regards the ritualists theory : Ritualists are basically in agreement with logicians that the generic property, individual and form constitute the base meaning. However, Bhāṭṭas and Prābhākaras disagree with each other as to whether generic property, individual and form constitute one single entity or three distinct entities. While Bhāṭṭas consider all the three as constituting one single entity and therefore, accept a single denotation in the generic property; the Prābhākara's view the generic property as distinct from the individual, As has been observed earlier, this position is held by the Prābhākaras to facilitate the syntactico semantical relation of the nominal base meaning i.e. individual to the verbal activity. Thus, Bhāṭṭas and Prābhākaras can be said to have presented two distinct theories of the base meaning based on ontological and syntactico semantical considerations.

CHAPTER VI

THEORY OF THE USE OF NOMINATIVE CASE ENDINGS AND THEIR MEANING

(*Prathamāvibhaktiyarthah*)

Introduction

The nominal bases, which convey (mere state of existence or) the generic property, individual, form, gender, number and *kāraḥ* should be accompanied, in their use in the language, by certain case endings (*vibhaktis*). According to the grammatical convention, no unfinished word can ever be used in the language (*apadam na prayuñjita*). That is to say that the nominal bases cannot be used without their 'finishings' i.e. case endings due to the convention that 'neither a base nor an affix can be used independently, (*na kevalā prakṛtiḥ nāpi pratyayah*).

Now, the case endings, like nominal bases, too convey certain syntactico semantical notions (*kāraḥ*) besides other things like number etc. Consider, for instance, the statement '*caitraḥ kaṣam karoti*' (Caitra makes a mat). Here the first i.e. nominative case ending (*su*) occurs after the word '*caitra*' and the second i.e. accusative case ending (*am*) occurs after the word '*kaṣa*'. And they, along with their respective bases namely '*caitra*' and '*kaṣa*', express the syntactico semantical notions of Caitra being the agent (of making) and also the mat being the object (of making), besides the number singularity. There are seven case endings (*vibhaktis*) in Sanskrit. They are (i) first or nominative (*prathamā*) also known alternatively as address or (*sambhōdhana*), (ii) second or accusative (*dvitīyā*), (iii) third or instrumental (*trītiyā*), (iv) fourth or dative (*caturthī*), (v) fifth or ablative (*pañcamī*), (vi) sixth or genitive (*ṣaṣthī*) and (v) seventh or locative (*saptamī*).

Pāṇini has enjoined only five out of seven case endings

(*vibhaktis*) in the sense of different syntactico-semantic notions (*kāraḥ*). They are fifth or ablative case endings in the sense of fixed point from which something recedes or *apādāna* (ii.3.28), (ii) forth or dative case endings in the sense of the indirect object i.e. the recipient of the object of the action as wished by the agent or *sampradāna*, (iii.3.13), (iii) third or instrumental case endings in the sense of the most effective means or *karāṇa* (ii.3.18); (iv) seventh or locative case endings in the sense of a locus or *adhikarāṇa* (ii.3.36); (v) second or accusative case endings in the sense of that which the agent seeks most to reach through his actions or *karman* (ii.3.2); (iv) and third or instrumental case endings in the sense of the independent (in his actions) or *kartṛ* (ii.3.18).¹

However, Pāṇini assigns sixth or genitive case endings (*śaṣṭhī*) in the sense of the remaining things (*śeṣe*) i.e. senses that are other than the *kāraḥ* such as 'karman' etc. For instance, 'rājñah puruṣah' (king's person).

Patañjali explains that 'śeṣa' means not intending the *karakas* such as 'karman' (*karmādinām avivakṣā śeṣah*) etc. Thus, in cases like 'king's person' (*rajñah puruṣah*), the genitive case ending can be explained after the word 'king' (*rājan*) even if the same is an agent so long as the king is not intended to be the agent.²

Now as regards the nominative case endings. According to Pāṇini, the nominative case endings (*su* etc.) are used to convey the base meaning (*prātipadikārtha*), gender, (*liṅga*), measure (*parimāṇa*) and number (*vacana*) (ii.3.46). However, many grammarians disagree amongst themselves as to whether the nominative case endings express a *kāraka* notion or not. Kātyāyana thinks they express such notions, *albeit* already expressed.³ Patañjali holds that they are used merely for number. According to Gāgābhāṭṭa both nominative and genitive do not express

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1. See the chapter on *kāraka* for more details.
 2. Nevertheless, suppose the meaning of the genitive is intended to agree with the agent, then, the genitive is also considered a *karaka* case by Jagadīśa and others.
 3. *atra prathamasaṣṭhīvarjam sarvā vibhaktayah kārakāḥ* :
Bhāṭṭa cintāmaṇi 1.1.

*kāra*kas. Nevertheless, other ritualists believe that the nominative case ending can convey the sense of the number, gender and the *kāra*kas and bases are helpful in so far as making such a sense understandable (*tātparya viśeṣagrāhaka*).

Subject predicate relationship

The nominative words are used to convey the sense of the subject in the surface structure. For instance, consider '*caitraḥ ga*cchati' (Caitra goes) or '*kaṭaḥ ka*ṭah' (a mat is made). Here Caitra and mat are subjects (*uddeśya*) since 'going' and 'making' are predicated upon them (*viḥita*). Generally, what is already known to the listener is the subject and what is yet to be known is predicate. Here the fact that Caitra is the agent (of going) and also that mat is the object (of making) is already known; whereas the fact that the action of going and also that of making as relating to Caitra and also mat is not known.

According to logicians, the chief or principal qualificands (i.e. substantives) (*mukhya viśeṣeya*) of verbal cognition are expressed by the nominative words. They have held so on the ground that the senses expressed by the nominative words alone are the subjects in the surface structure and therefore all other senses expressed either by the verbs or by other case endings can only serve as the predicates i.e. qualifiers (*viśeṣaṇa*). Thus, in instances like '*caitraḥ ga*cchati' (Caitra goes), '*kaṭaḥ ka*ṭah' (a mat is made), Caitra and mat, expressed by the nominative words '*Caitraḥ*' and '*Kaṭah*', are the chief qualificands of the action of going and that of making respectively.

Nevertheless, logicians hold that the senses expressed by the nominative words, or for that matter, by any other words, function as qualifiers provided that the same (nominative words etc) are adjectives. In such cases, the nominative case endings express the identity (*abheda*). Thus, in '*nīlo gha*ṭah' (pot is blue), the nominative word expresses the blue colour which qualifies through identity and the nominative case ending(s), occurring after the word '*nīla*', expresses the identity between the blue colour and the pot; and so the cognition is that the pot is identical with blue colour.

Circumstances under which the nominative case is used

Circumstances under which the nominative case is used can be stated as follows: Pāṇini rules that when the *kāraṅgas* i.e. syntactico semantical relationships such as the objectness and the agentness etc. are not referred to by the personal endings etc. i.e. when they do not agree syntactically with the object, agent etc. the accusative the instrumental etc. are used after the words expressing the *kāraṅgas* such as the object, the agent, etc. (*anbhīhite* ii.3.1). Thus, according to him, when such *kāraṅga* relationships as the objectness and the agentness are not referred to by the personal endings etc. i.e. when the *kāraṅga* relationships such as the object and the agent are yet to be expressed, case endings such as the accusative, instrumental etc. are used. Consequently, the nominative case ending can be used only under those circumstances wherein the nominative case need not express any *kāraṅga* relationships such as objectness, agentness etc. For instance, the nominative case ending (*sup*) is used after the words 'caitra' and 'taṇḍula' in the following statements : 'Caitra cooks rice grains' (*caitrah taṇḍulam pacati*) and 'rice grains are cooked by Caitra' (*taṇḍulah pacyate caitreṇa*). Here, in the first instance, the nominative case occurs after the word 'caitra' expressing the agent, Caitra, since the personal ending 'ti' in *pacati* has already expressed the agentness of Caitra and hence there is no need to express the *kāraṅga* relationship of the agentness. In the second instance, the nominative case occurs after the word 'taṇḍula' expressing the object, rice grains, since the personal ending 'te' in *pacyate* has already expressed the objectness of rice grains and hence there is no need to express the *kāraṅga* relationship of objectness.

Agreement of nominative case

It should be noted here as follows : A word in the nominative case ending always agrees grammatically with the expressed or implied verb word or words with 'sat' and 'śānac' affixes. For instance, consider again the active statement 'Caitra cooks rice grains' (*caitrah pacati taṇḍulam*). Here, the word in the nominative case is 'caitrah' and such a word agrees grammatically with the verb namely 'pacati' in singular number (*vacana*), third person (*puruṣa*) etc.

Or, for instance, consider the passive statement 'rice grains are cooked by Caitra' (*caitreṇa pacyate taṇḍuiah*). Here, the word in the nominative case is 'taṇḍulah' and such a word agrees grammatically with the passive form of the verb 'pacyate' in number person etc. Thus, a word in the nominative case always agrees grammatically with the vreb word etc.

Pāṇini's view

Pāṇini has ruled that the nominative case endings are used in the sense of (i) the base meaning (*prātipadikārtha*) only, (ii) gender (*liṅga*) only, magnitude or measure (*parimaṇa*) only and number (*vacana*) only (p. ii.3.46). Thus, according to Pāṇini, the nominative case endings refer to the base meaning¹ such as the state of existence (i.e. generic property, individual etc.), the gender (such as feminine, masculine and neuter), the measure such as *āḍhaka*, *droṇa* and *khāri* and number such as singularity, duality and plurality. Consider, for instance, the expressions (i) 'excessively high' (*uccaiḥ*), (ii) 'young girl' (*kumārī*), (iii) 'measure of *āḍhaka*' (*āḍhakam*) and (iv) 'one' (*ekah*). In these expressions the nominative case endings, found occurring after the words (i) '*uccaiḥ*', (ii) '*kumārī*', (iii) '*āḍhakam*' and (iv) '*ekah*' refer to the base meaning i.e. mere state of existence at high (place), the feminine gender of the young girl, the measure of the *āḍhaka* and also to the number singularity of 'one' respectively.

An explanation of the rule (ii.3.46) according to Mahābhāṣya

The nominative case endings are ruled in the sense of the base meaning (existence etc.) only so that the same nominative case endings can be facilitated after indeclinables such as '*uccaiḥ*' (high), '*nicaiḥ*' (low) etc. This is necessitated by the fact that otherwise in '*grāma uccaiḥ tava svam*' (high up in the village is your property) etc. the nominative case endings would not result after '*uccaiḥ*' etc. which do not convey any substance associated with gender and number, but convey simple 'existence'. The nominative case endings are also ruled in the sense

1. However, as stated earlier kaiyata and others maintain *jati*, *vyakti*, *liṅga*, *saṁkhyā* and *kāraka* as base-meanings.

of the gender only such as the masculine, feminine and neuter so that the same case ending can be used after the words such as 'kumāri' (young girl), *vrkṣah* (tree) and 'kuṇḍam' (pitcher). This is necessitated by the fact that otherwise the feminine gender etc. cannot be conveyed as existing in the young girl etc. since the usage 'kumārah devadattah' (the boy Devadatta) can be made even without the feminine gender.

The nominative case ending is also ruled in the sense of the measure only such as the *drona*, *khāri* and *āḍhakam* etc. so that the same case ending can be used after the words such as *drona* etc. This is necessitated by the fact that otherwise the quantity to be measured etc. cannot be conveyed as existing in a measure of capacity such as 'drona' etc. since the usage such as *dronah* etc. can be made even without perceiving the quality to be measured etc.

The nominative case ending is also ruled in the sense of the number such as the singularity, duality and plurality so that the same case ending can be used after the words 'ekah' (one), 'dvau' (two) and 'bahavah' (many). This is necessitated by the fact that otherwise the singularity etc. cannot be conveyed as belonging to the singular number etc. since the singular number etc. can be expressed by the words 'ekah' (one) etc.

The word 'only' 'mātra' in the rule (ii.3.46) is not used to state that the nominative case endings are used to convey the base-meanings etc. as qualified by the sense of 'karman' 'object' etc. as in *kaṭam karoti* (he makes a mat). For, the accusative and other case endings, which are ruled in such senses, will block the use of the nominative case endings in these senses.

Therefore, the nominative case endings should be accepted to be used in the sense of the base meanings etc. only. However, as an alternative it can be accepted that the word 'mātra' (only) is used to suggest that the nominative case endings are used after the words 'eka' (one) etc. even when the sense of singular number etc. have already been expressed by the base.¹

1. *prātipadikārtha liṅga parimāṇa vacanamātra prathamā-lakṣaṇe pada sāmānādhikarāṇya upasamkhānam kartavyam. Mahābhāṣya on ii.3.46.*

Since nominative case ending is ruled in the sense of the base meaning etc., the same case ending must be ruled after the words which refer to one and the same item i.e. adjective such as 'vīrah' in 'vīrah puruṣah'. Otherwise, it would be difficult to explain the nominative case in the additional sense i.e. *vīratva* or bravery after such an adjective. However, suppose, the bravery etc. can be explained only as a part of the total sentence meaning, i.e. not additional meaning, then the nominative need not be ruled again here.

As an alternative, however the nominative¹ can be prescribed when the things have already been expressed otherwise (i.e. by personal endings, *kṛt* suffix, *taddhita* suffix or by compounds). Thus, in 'vīrah puruṣah', the nominative after the adjective *vīrah* is facilitated by supplying the verb '*asti*' (exists) which conveys the agent *kāraka* and hence no other case ending is necessary. It should be noted that, at this point Patañjali explains that despite the ruling that the nominative case ending occurs after the words when the *kārakas* have already been expressed otherwise, there is no need to rule again that the nominative ending should not be assigned even when the *kārakas* have not already been expressed otherwise. That is to say that even in isolate utterances such as '*vṛkṣah*' (a tree), '*plakṣah*' (a plakṣa tree), we can understand the verbal base '*as*' (to be) as following with the present tense third person singular endings (*astri bhavanti* *parah prathamapuruṣo, prayujyamāno pyasti*); and hence the *kārakas* can always be claimed to have been expressed by the personal endings etc.

Now, another difficulty encountered by Patañjali is that when the nominative case ending is ruled when the things have been already expressed the nominative case ending would result incorrectly in expressions like '*prāsāda āste*' (he sits on a dais) since the sense of *adikaraṇa* or location has already been expressed by the suffix of the verbal base *sad* (to sit). And, in order to overcome this difficulty, he suggests that the nominative case ending should be prescribed only when the word refers to the same item as that of the verbal form ending in *tiṅ* (*tiṅ samānā-dnikaraṇe prathamā*). And, since, in '*prāsāda āste*' (he sits on

1. *abhihite prathamā ityetallakṣaṇam kriyate.*

the dais) etc. the words *prāsāda* (dais) etc. do not refer to the same item as that of the verbal form i.e. the agent (here *prāsāda* refers to the location whereas the verbal form *āste* refers to the agent of sitting), the nominative case ending can be avoided from resulting after the word *prāsāda* etc.

Problem

Suppose we carefully scrutinize the four meanings assigned for the nominative case endings, it is possible to analyse practically all the meanings, with the plausible exception of the number, as obtainable through other sources. That is to say that the base-meaning, whether the state of existence as held by Kātyāyana and Patañjali or the generic property etc. as held by Kaiyaṭa and others, can be obtained through the base and other sources. For, the base-meaning, namely the state of existence or generic property can be obtained through the base such as '*uccaiḥ*' or *ghaṭa* etc., whereas the gender such as feminine, masculine and neuter and also the measure of capacity such as *drona* are nothing but the part of the base-meaning itself. That is to say that the gender may be viewed as the essential nature of an individual, whereas the measure of capacity such as *drona* can be analysed as the form or *ākṛti*. Thus, only the number such as singularity in '*ekah*' (one) etc. can be considered to be the meaning of the nominative case ending.

However, following Pāṇini's rules *karmaṇi dvitīyā* (p. ii. 3.2) etc., which assign accusative and other case endings in the sense of the syntactico-semantic relationships such as *karman* (object) etc., grammarians like Kātyāyana have proposed that nominative case endings too convey, in addition to the number the sense of such syntactico-semantic relationships as *karman* etc.; whereas others like Patañjali have refuted such a proposal and suggested that the nominative case endings refer to merely the number singularity etc.

Logicians, especially Jagadīśa and Gadādhara are divided in their opinion as to what constitutes the nominative case-meaning; while Jagadīśa holds, like Patañjali, the number like singularity to be the nominative case-meaning, Gadādhara, like Kātyāyana, holds the *kārakas* to be the nominative case meaning. On the other hand, Bhartṛhari and some other grammarians

have considered that nominal bases express all the meanings; whereas the nominative and other case endings function merely as suggestive (*dyotaka*) of the base meanings.

Finally, ritualists oppose the theory proposed by Bharṭhari etc. and suggest that the nominative case endings themselves refer to all the base meanings including the *kāraḥ* and the base is simply suggestive (*dyotaka*). In the following pages, we shall give a brief account of these various contrasting theories and the reasons underlying such theories.

Kātyāyana's view

Kātyāyana holds that case endings generally convey two meanings: namely syntactico semantical notions of *kāraḥ* such as *karmān* 'object', 'agent' etc. and also number.

He states that in statements such as 'a mat has already been made' (*kṛtaḥ kaṭaḥ*), the syntactico semantical notion of 'objectness (*karmatva*) of the mat has already been expressed by the suffix '*kta*'. And the principle of the non-use of words for conveying the meanings already expressed (*uktārthānām aprayogaḥ*) prevents the use of the accusative case ending to convey the sense of the objectness. However, the same principle cannot stop the use of the accusative ending to convey the sense of the number singularity since *kta* is neutral as regards number. Thus, now, in order to prevent the use of the accusative ending in the sense of the number, the rule '*anabhihite*' is phrased. That is to say that when the syntactico semantical notions such as 'object', 'agent' etc. have already been conveyed by some other grammatical element other than the accusative and other case endings, the principle of *uktārthānām aprayogaḥ* prevents the use of the accusative and other case endings; however, to stop the same accusative and other case endings in the sense of the number, the rule '*anabhihite*' is phrased.

Now, further, he states that whenever syntactico semantical notions like *karmatva* have already been expressed by other grammatical elements like *kta*, only the nominative case endings are used¹ (*abhihite prathamābhāvaḥ*). According to Kātyāyana, nominative case endings convey the senses that have already

1. Vārtika on p. ii.3.1.

been expressed by some other grammatical element. Thus, since in '*kṛtaḥ kaṭaḥ*' the notion of *karmatva* has already been expressed by '*kṛta*', the nominative case ending (*su*) conveys the sense of the *karmatva* that has already been expressed otherwise.

What Kātyāyana means by such statements is that despite that the verbal endings and other grammatical elements such as '*kṛta*' in *kṛtaḥ kaṭaḥ* etc. refer to the syntactico semantical notions like the 'object', the same 'object' is not specified as the mat being the abode of the effect of entwining produced by the action of making. Thus, the verbal endings and other grammatical elements as '*ti*', '*kṛta*' etc. refer to the *kāraḥ* in a very general way; whereas the nominative case ending refers to the same *kāraḥ* in a particularized way such as the mat being the abode of the effect of the action of making etc. Thus, according to Kātyāyana, the nominative case endings are used to express the *kāraḥ* in a particularized way that have already been expressed by the verbal endings etc. in a general way.

Observation

Kātyāyana's proposal that nominative case endings express the *kāraḥ* that have already been expressed is a radical explanation of the fact that case endings are expected to express the *kāraḥ*; and since nominative case endings are not ruled to express any particular *kāraḥ* like other case endings, the same must be accepted to express the *kāraḥ* that have already been expressed by the verbal endings etc. Also, his proposal explains the fact that *kāraḥ* need to be referred to both generally and particularly; and hence the nominative case refers to the *kāraḥ* particularized which have been referred to generally by verbal endings.

Patañjali's view

Patañjali, the most prolific of writers on grammar, has provided the most significant interpretation of the nominative case meaning which had far reaching consequences. His views can be summarized as follows :

It must be accepted that the nominative case¹ ending are

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1. *avaśyam caitat evam vijñeyam ekatvādayo vibhaktyarthan.*
Mahābhāṣya on ii.3.1.

used in the sense of the numbers such as singularity, duality and plurality. And it must not be accepted that the nominative case endings are used in the sense of the syntactico-semantic notions (*kāraḥas*) such as 'karman', *karṭṛ* etc. For, the *vārtika* (on p. ii.3.1) 'abhihite prathamābhāva', means that 'abhihite prathamāyāh abhāvaḥ' or 'non-use of the nominative case endings when the sense of the case endings has already been expressed'; and suppose we accept Kātyāyana's view that the case endings mainly convey the syntactico semantic notions or *kāraḥas* like 'karman', 'karṭṛ' etc. then the principle of *uktārthānām aprayogaḥ* would itself prevent the use of the nominative case endings in 'vrkṣaḥ', 'plakṣaḥ' etc. and thus such usages become difficult to explain. That is to say that suppose the syntactico semantic notions (*kāraḥas*) such as 'karman' are accepted to be the case meanings in general, then the nominative case endings would become necessary to be accepted as conveying the sense of the *prātipadikārtha*. And since in 'vrkṣaḥ', 'plakṣaḥ' etc. the bases 'vrkṣa', 'plakṣa' etc themselves convey the 'prātipadikārtha', the nominative case ending (*su*) occurring in the words 'vrkṣaḥ', 'plakṣaḥ' etc. would become untenable.

On the other hand, suppose the case endings are considered to convey only the number, then the rule p. ii.3.46 would mean that nominative case endings are used to convey the number belonging to the *prātipadikārtha* when the same number is not already expressed otherwise (*anabhihite*). And, since, the number belonging to the *prātipadikārtha*, the tree, has not been already expressed by *prātipadikas* such as 'vrkṣa', 'plakṣa' etc., the nominative case ending can be used after the words 'vrkṣa', 'plakṣa' etc.

An Objection

Suppose the case endings are used to denote the number and the base meaning, then, the nominative case can become impossible to justify in the case of 'devadattāḥ odanam pacati' (Devadatta cooks rice) since the number element is conveyed by the verbal ending (*ti* in *pacati*) and the base-meaning by the 'devadatta'. Also, the same nominative ending becomes impossible to justify in the case of isolated expressions like 'vrkṣaḥ' (a tree) and 'plakṣaḥ' (a *plakṣaḥ* tree) since the verb with the third

person singular is implied in such cases as well; and therefore, the number can be denoted by the *ti* of the implied verb and the base meaning (tree) by the base 'vrkṣa'.

A counter objection

Suppose the case endings convey the sense of the *kāraḥ*, then the accusative case ending after 'bhīṣman' becomes impossible to justify in 'kaṭam karoti bhīṣmam' etc. (he makes a mat which is huge etc.) since the notion of the *kāraḥ* has already been conveyed by the accusative ending occurring after the word 'kaṭa'.

Defence of the theory

The nominative case endings must be accepted to convey the notion of number. The bases such as 'eka' (one), 'dvi' (two) and 'bahu' (many) refer to only the substance such as numbered (*samkhyeya*); and therefore, the nominative case endings are necessary to convey the sense of the number singularity, (*ekatva*), duality (*dvitva*) and plurality (*bahutva*) belonging to the substance 'eka' etc.

Observation

According to Patañjali, it is not true that since no special meaning, that cannot be expressed by either nominal base or by verbal endings etc., is assigned to the nominative case ending, the nominative case ending refers to the meanings that have already been expressed by others. Consequently, it is not possible to establish that the nominative case ending refers to the *kāraḥ* in a particularized way that have already been expressed by the verbal endings etc. in a general way. Otherwise, the rule 'when the *kāraḥ* are not referred to by the verbal endings etc. the accusative and the instrumental case endings are used' (ii.3.1) becomes impossible to justify. For, the use of the accusative and instrumental case endings after the words, expressing the object, agent etc., can be avoided by the convention that 'the words, when their meanings have already been conveyed, need not be used again' (*uktārthānām aprayogah*); and hence, the composition of the rule (p. ii.3.1) would not be required to avoid the use of the accusative and instrumental case endings

after the words expressing the object and the agent when the objectness and also the agentness have already been expressed by the verbal endings etc.

Thus, it must be conceded that the nominative case ending refers to some meaning which has not already been expressed by others. And such a meaning could very well be number singularity etc. that belong to the *kāraḥ* such as the 'object', 'agent' etc.

This position facilitates the justification of the rule (ii.3.1) as well. For, now the rule can be explained as the accusative and the instrumental case endings are used after the words expressing the object and the agent provided that the number singularity etc. is not already expressed by the verbal endings etc.

Logician's theory

Logician's were greatly influenced by the theory of grammarians regarding the meaning of the nominative case endings. While Jagadīśa has adopted Patañjali's view that the nominative case endings convey the number singularity etc., Gadādhara has supported Kātyāyanas proposal that the same nominative case endings convey the sense of the syntactico semantical notions or *kāraḥ* such as '*karman*', '*kartṛ*' etc. However, both Jagadīśa and Gadādhara have differed from grammarians in their technicality of expressions.

Jagadīśa's view

Jagadīśa has basically agreed with Patañjalis theory that the nominative case convey the sense of the number singularity etc.; however, he has modified Patañjalis theory by stating that only the nominative case, occurring after a noun, conveys the number, whereas the same, occurring after an adjective, conveys the syntactico semantical relation of identity. Also, he holds that when the nominative case refers to the number singularity, the same is cognized only as a qualifier of the base meaning; whereas when the nominative case refers to the identity, the same is cognized as the qualificand of the base meaning. Consider, for instance, the nominative statement *nīlo ghaṭaḥ* (pot is blue). Here the nominative case ending (*sup*) is found after both

the words namely 'nīla' (blue) and *ghaṭa* (pot). And the nominative case ending, occurring after the word *nīla*, which is the adjective, refers to the identity that is cognized as the qualificand of the base meaning namely the blue colour since the same (blue colour) is identical with the pot; whereas the nominative case, occurring after the word *ghaṭa*, which is the substantive, refers to the number singularity that is cognized as the qualifier of the base meaning namely the pot since the number singularity occurs in the pot.

It should be noted here that, according to the established epistemological convention, the meaning, expressed by any case ending, should be cognized as the qualificand of the meaning expressed by the base since between the base meaning and also the case meaning the former is the qualifier of the latter (*prakṛti pratyayārthayoh pratyayārthasya prādhānyam*). For instance, consider the accusative statement 'bring the pot' (*ghaṭam ānaya*). Here, the accusative case ending (*am*) occurring after the word 'ghaṭa', refers to the objectness; and such a meaning is cognized always as the qualificand of the base-meaning namely, the pot—since the pot is related to the objectness through the superstratumness (*ādheyatā*).

In the case of the nominative case meaning, however, logicians have explained the syntactico semantical relation of the number of singularity to the base meaning as the qualifier, by restricting the epistemological convention that between the base meaning and also the case meaning the former is the qualifier of the latter. This is necessitated by the fact that since number is only a quality occurring in a substance like the pot, the same (number) cannot be cognized to be the qualificand of the base meaning such as pot.

Gadādhara's view

Gadādhara follows Kātyāyana that the nominative case endings refer to the syntactico semantical notions (*kāraṅgas*) such as 'object' (*karman*), 'agent' (*kartr*) etc. He surely criticises Patañjali for his theory that nominative case endings convey the sense of the number singularity, duality, plurality etc. According to him, suppose the nominative case endings are accepted to convey the number singularity etc. as belonging to the *kāraṅgas*

such as 'object', 'agent' etc., then it would mean that the same nominative case endings are used when the verbal endings, *kṛt* affixes or other grammatical elements have not already conveyed the sense of the number as belonging to the *kāraḥ* such as 'karman' etc. However, nowhere can the verbal endings etc. be claimed to be devoid of the potential ability to convey the sense of the number singularity etc. as belonging to the *kāraḥ* such as *karman*; and therefore, the use of the nominative case endings would become impossible even in passive future statements such as '*taṇḍulah pakṣyate*' (rice grains will be cooked).

Also, suppose the non reference to the number is held to be the governing factor for the use of the instrumental case endings after the words expressing the agent in the passive statement and that for the use of the accusative case endings after the words expressing the object in the active statement, then the use of the instrumental and the accusative case endings after the words expressing the agent and the object respectively in the statements 'Caitra's ownself is seen by Caitra' (*cāitreṇa svam drśyate*) and 'Caitra sees himself' (*cāitrah svam paśyati*) would become difficult to explain. For, in these cases the verb '*drśyate*' and '*paśyati*' indeed condition the reference to the reference to the knowledge of the syntactical expectancy that can produce the cognition of the number singularity as qualifying both Caitra and rice grains respectively. Thus, it is necessary to accept that what governs the use of the instrumental and the accusative endings after the words expressing the agent and the object respectively is the non reference to the agentness and the objectness by verbal endings etc. And once such as position is accepted, it becomes obligatory on our part to concede that nominative case endings refer to the objectness, agentness etc. which have already been referred to by the verbal endings etc.

Observation

Since Pāṇini has ruled that the nominative case endings are used in the sense of (i) the base-meaning, (ii) gender, (iii) measure and (iv) number, the same nominative case endings do indeed possess the potentiality to refer to the base meaning etc. in active statements. Therefore, it is beyond doubt that they convey the sense of the base meaning etc. However, for Gadā-

dhara, it is not logically justifiable that the non reference to the number singularity etc. by the verbal endings etc. be held as the governing factor for the use of the nominative case endings after the words expressing the 'object', in passive future statement etc. For, verbal ending etc. too possess the grammatical element of singular expression (*ekavacana*) etc. and therefore do convey the sense of the number singularity etc. Again, for the same reason, the non reference to the number singularity etc. by the verbal endings etc. cannot be considered as the governing factor for the use of the instrumental and accusative case endings after the words expressing the 'agent', 'object' in passive and active statements. In such statements too, verbal endings etc. refer to the number singularity etc. Thus, only the non reference to the agentness etc. should be considered to be the governing factor for the use of the instrumental, accusative and other case endings.

Gadādhara holds this position on the ground that Pāṇini has ruled the accusative and other case endings in the sense of syntactico semantical notions (*kāraḥ*) such as 'object', 'agent' etc.; and therefore, the same case endings must be held as denoting the sense of *kāraḥ* when they have not already been referred to by the verbal endings etc. And by the linguistic principle of analogy, the nominative case endings, which too are case endings like accusative and other case endings, can also be held to denote the *kāraḥ* such as the 'object', 'agent' etc. Nevertheless, since Pāṇini, has not ruled the nominative case endings unlike accusative and other case endings, in any particular *kāraḥ* such as the 'object', 'agent' etc., the nominative case endings must be held to refer to the *kāraḥ* that has been referred to already by the verbal endings etc.

Bhartrhari's view

Bhartrhari and following him Nāgasha etc., proposed the theory that the nominative and other case endings are merely suggestive (*dyotaka*) of the 'base meaning' (*prātipadikārtha*) etc. and the *kāraḥ* since the nominative and other bases themselves refer to all the meanings of the case endings (*vibhaktiyārtha*). That is to say that since the nominative and other bases have the potentiality to express the base-meanings' namely (i) generic

property, (ii) individual, (iii) gender, number and (v) syntactico semantical notions (*kāraṅgas*), which make up for the meanings assigned by Pāṇini for all the case endings (Pāṇini has ruled that the nominative case endings are used in the sense of (i) base-meanings, (ii) gender, (iii) measure and (iv) number and accusative and other case endings are used in various syntactico semantical notions (*kāraṅgas*)), the same should be regarded as denoting all the case-meanings; whereas the case endings¹ are merely suggestive of the base-meanings and thus are used only for the grammatical correctness of the word. They have proposed such a theory on the ground that, in expressions such as 'behold the curd' (*daddhi paśya*) etc., no case ending can be found as occurring after the words 'daddhi' etc., and therefore, the same accusative and other case endings cannot be held to be expressing the syntactico semantical notion of the objectness belonging to the curd. And thus, only the nominal base such as 'daddhi' alone should be accepted to be expressing the meanings assigned for the case endings. Further, extending the principle of the case endings being merely suggestive, Bhartṛhari and others have proposed that the nominative base itself expresses the nominative case meanings namely the base meaning (*prātipadikārtha*) such as the existence (or generic property etc.), gender, measure and number as well, and therefore the nominative case endings are merely suggestive of the same meanings.

Observation

Despite Pāṇini's ruling of accusative and other case endings in the sense of syntactico semantical notions (*kāraṅgas*) like 'object', 'agent' etc., and nominative case endings in the sense of the base meanings (*prātipadikārtha*), gender (*liṅga*), measure (*parimāṇa*) and number (*samkhyā*), Bhartṛhari and others have held the view that case endings are merely suggestive (*dyotaka*) and only bases expressed all the meanings. They have done so on the ground that the 'base meaning' (*prātipadikārtha*) includes all the five meanings namely (i) generic property (*jāti*), (ii) indi-

1. *vacikā dyotikā vā syur dvitvādinām vibhaktayah.*

vidual (*vyakti*), (iii) gender (*liṅga*), (iv) number (*vacana*), (v) and syntactico-semantic notions (*kāraka*); and since the bases (*prātipadikas*) have potentiality to denote their own meanings, there is no need that the case endings, such as nominative case endings, should denote any of the meanings.

Bhartṛhari and his followers can be stated to have held this extreme view that 'all the case endings are merely suggestive of the base-meanings; and therefore, are used for only accomplishing the grammatical correctness of the word, for the following epistemological reason: That the purpose of a finished word i.e. nominal base with its case endings is to convey the idea of an individual, qualified by the generic property, gender and number as functioning a *kāraka*. For instance, consider the statement '*caitraḥ kaṭam karoti*' (Caitra makes a mat). Here the finished words namely '*caitraḥ*' and '*kaṭam*' convey respectively the individuals 'Caitra' and 'mat' qualified by the generic property of *caitratva* and *kaṭatva* as functioning the 'agent' and also the 'object' *kārakas*. However, such a purpose could very well be accomplished even when the bases alone convey the base meanings etc. and nominative and other case endings suggest merely the fact that Caitra etc. function as the 'agent' etc. Thus, according to Bhartṛhari and his followers, since the nominative and other bases have potentiality to denote the base meanings, i.e. generic property etc. and therefore, can convey the idea of an individual as functioning a *kāraka*, only the same bases should be regarded as conveying the 'base meaning' etc. and the nominative and other case endings should be accepted as merely suggestive of the base meanings' etc. i.e. as merely used for grammatical correctness of a word.

Ritualists view

Ritualists hold a view which is diametrically opposite to the view held by Bhartṛhari and his followers. While Bhartṛhari has held that all the meanings are expressed by the nominal base and the nominative and other case endings are merely suggestive of the fact that what meanings the bases should express, the ritualists hold that the nominative case endings express all the meanings of the nominal base (*prātipadikārtha*) in addition to the gender, the measure the number and *kārakas* and

the nominative and other bases simply help in grasping speakers intention in a particular 'base meaning' as qualifying the meanings expressed by the case endings. They were greatly influenced by Pāṇini's rule that the nominative case endings are used in the sense of base meanings etc. (p. ii.3.46). They have taken the rule literally and interpreted the same (rule) strictly as assigning the base meanings and others to the nominative case endings. Of course, they justify such a position on the ground that while nominative case endings are limited in number i.e. 'su', 'au' and 'jas' etc. and therefore, are economical, the bases are unlimited i.e. various like 'ghaṭa' (pot), 'kuḍya' (wall) etc. and therefore are uneconomical. Consequently, assuming limited number of denotations for a few of the nominative case endings is preferably any way to assuming unlimited number of denotations for endless bases.

Ritualists arguments can be summarized as follows : The view that the nominative case endings are used merely for the sake of the grammatical correctness i.e. the same are meaningless or the view that the nominative case endings are merely suggestive (*dyotaka*) of the meanings expressed by the bases is not acceptable. For, the nominative case endings are seen definitely to denote the meaning such as addressing (*sambodhana*). Also, it is less cumbersome to accept that only the nominative case endings denote the base meanings such as Caitra etc.; for, in that case, the nominative case endings, in conformity with other case endings, can be assumed to be the cause of the verbal cognition wherein the *kāraṇas* etc. referred to by the case endings, are related, as qualifiers (*prākara*), to the activity (*bhāvanā*) indirectly through the action of offering etc. referred to by the verbal roots 'yaj' etc. Otherwise, suppose the nominative case endings are considered to be merely suggestive of the base meanings or suppose the same are held as used only for the grammatical correctness of the word, then a separate cause and effect relationship involving only the nominative case endings would be needed to be assumed so that the verbal cognition, wherein the nominative base meanings, suggested by

the nominative case endings, qualify the activity through the action of offering etc.

Moreover, suppose, the nominative case endings are held to be merely suggestive, then, the well established epistemological convention that "between the base-meanings and also the case meaning the former qualify the later" would also get contradicted since in such theory the nominative case endings do not convey any sense at all.

Again, the logicians theory that the nominative and other case endings. when occurring after an adjectival words such as 'nīla' (blue) in 'nīlo ghaṭaḥ' (pot is blue) etc., refer to the identity or non difference (*abheda*) is not acceptable. For, such a theory is not essentially different from the theory that the nominative case endings are meaningless or are used only for the grammatical correctness of the word since identity is nothing but the self nature of the base-meaning (*abhedah tādātmyam*). And thus, such a theory would contradict the epistemological convention that the base meanings qualify the meanings expressed by their case endings. Also, such a theory would necessitate that the adjectival nominative bases be expressive of a meaning (blue colour etc.) which qualifies the meaning expressed by the nominative case ending, occurring after the nominative substantive such as 'ghaṭa' (pot). Thus, it is necessary to accept that the adjectival nominative case endings refer to the thing such as 'pot' which is endowed with the qualities such as blue colour etc. the adjectival base meaning.

Observation

Ritualists strictly follow Pāṇinī's rule that nominative case endings are used in the sense of the base-meanings etc. They do so on the ground that the nominative and other case endings must be accepted to denote the base meanings etc. According to them, such a position is necessary for mainly two reasons : that otherwise (i.e. suppose all the meanings are conveyed by the base then) the universally accepted epistemological convention 'that the between the base meanings and the case meanings, the former are cognized as qualifying the later' (*prātipadikārthapratyayārthayoh pratyāyarthasya prādhānyam*) gets violated since the meanings of the nominal base assume

much more prominence i.e. since the case endings do not convey any meanings at all; and also that (when all the meanings are denoted by the nominative and other cases), the cause and effect relationship between the reference to the meanings i.e. base meanings etc. and also verbal cognition would have economy in assumption since only a few of the case endings, instead of innumerable bases such as '*ghaṭa*', would be needed to be assumed as referring to the base meanings. Thus, according to the ritualists, since only the nominative and other case endings, can be cognized as the qualificands of the base meanings and also since acceptance that nominative and other case endings denote base meanings etc. is much more economical, the same should be held as denoting the base meanings etc.; whereas the nominative and other bases simply help in grasping the speakers intention in a particular 'base meanings' as qualifying the meanings expressed by the case endings.

Conclusion

Pāṇini's rule that the nominative case endings are used in the sense of (i) the base meaning only, (ii) gender only, (iii) measure only and (iv) number only (ii.3.46) has laid down the four most basic meanings of the nominative case endings. However, his rule (ii.3.1) that accusative and other case endings are used provided that the *kāraḥ* such as 'object', 'agent' etc. have not already been expressed otherwise i.e. through other grammatical element, allows the use of the nominative case endings only when the use of the accusative and other case endings are restricted. Now, since the use of the nominative case endings is allowed only when the accusative and other case endings are not applicable, grammarians like Kātyāyana and Patañjali, and following them logicians like Gadādhara and Jagadīśa have formulated the theories of the meanings of the case endings which try to explain the use of the nominative case endings in only certain restricted senses.

According to both Kātyāyana and Patañjali, case endings, which include even nominative case endings, can convey only two senses : namely, number and syntactico-semantic notions (*kāraḥ*). They hold so because they recognize that the 'base meaning' (*prātipadikartha*) constitutes the generic property,

individual and gender. This is despite that they have recognized the state of existence (*sattā* or *sattva*) as the base meanings in instances like 'uccaiḥ' (high), 'nicaiḥ' (low) etc. Consequently, only number and *kāraḥ* need to be expressed by the case endings such as the nominative case endings. However, Kātyāyana restricts, further, the use of the nominative case endings in the sense of the syntactico-semantic notions (*kāraḥ*) that have already been expressed by other grammatical elements such as 'iti' etc. According to, Kātyāyana, since nominative case endings, unlike accusative and other case endings, which are assigned in the sense of particular *kāraḥ* like 'object', 'agent' etc. are not assigned in the sense of any particular *kāraḥ* such as 'object', 'agent' etc., the same (nominative case endings) cannot be accepted to express any particular *kāraḥ* as such. Therefore, the same must be accepted to express the *kāraḥ* that have already been expressed otherwise in a general way. The function of the nominative case endings is, thus, to express the *kāraḥ* in a particularized way as the mat being the abode of the effect of entwining produced by the action of making.

While Kātyāyana has held the view that the nominative case endings are used in the sense of *kāraḥ* that have already been expressed, Patañjali holds the view that the same nominative case endings are used in the sense of the number such as singularity etc. that have not been already expressed as occurring in the *kāraḥ* such as 'object', 'agent' etc. According to him, the view held by Kātyāyana is not tenable since, in that view, the rule 'anabhihite' (p. ii.3.1) would become impossible to justify as the convention 'uktārthānām aprayogaḥ' can itself avoid the use of the accusative and other case endings after the words expressing the 'object', 'agent' etc.

Patañjali was not in favour of the view that the nominative case endings are used in the sense of the *kāraḥ* that have already been expressed otherwise because such a view would indirectly concede that the nominative case endings are redundant or meaningless; thus, Patañjali, interpreting the *vārtika*

1. Since there is no alternative, Kātyāyana and Patañjali accept the state of existence as the base meaning in 'uccaiḥ' (high), 'nicaiḥ' (low) etc.

'*abhihite prathamābhāvaḥ*' as '*abhihite prathamāyāḥ abhāvaḥ*' (non-use of the nominative case endings when the number has already been expressed), formulates the theory that the nominative case endings are used when the number singularity etc. are not expressed.

Logicians Jagadīśa and Gadādhara have followed the theories propounded by Patañjali and Kātyāyana respectively. However, Jagadīśa clarifies Patañjali's theory by explaining the exact nature of the syntactico-semantic relation of the meanings of the nominative case endings. He states that when the nominative case endings refer to the number singularity etc., the same is cognized to be the qualifier of the base meanings, namely, pot etc. by restricting the epistemological convention that between the base meanings and also the case meanings, the former qualify the later. Nevertheless, since the case endings, occurring after adjectives, refer to the identity, the same functions as the qualificand of the base meanings, and therefore, there is no need to restrict the epistemological convention.

While Jagadīśa clarifies Patañjali's theory by explaining the nature of syntactico-semantic relation of nominative case meaning, number, Gadādhara reestablishes Kātyāyana's theory of nominative case meaning by strongly refuting Patañjali's theory. According to him, non-reference to number by verbal endings etc. cannot be accepted to be the governing factors for the use of nominative case since nowhere can the verbal endings and other grammatical elements be claimed to lack the potentiality to denote the number. Gadādhara justifies Kātyāyana's view on the ground that Pāṇini has ruled all the case endings in the sense of some *kāraṅkas*; and therefore, by analogy, nominative case endings, which too are case endings, should be accepted to be used in the sense of *kāraṅkas*, albeit already expressed generally by verbal endings etc.

Bhartṛhari and his followers were led by the theory that since base meaning (*prātipadikārthā*) itself includes all the five meanings namely (i) the generic property, (ii) individual, (iii) gender, (iv) number and (v) *kāraṅkas*, no meanings are left for nominative and other case endings to convey; and hence they are merely suggestive (*dyotaka*). They have taken this extreme

position also on the ground that in expressions like 'dadhi paśya' etc. no case endings can be found as occurring after the word 'dadhi' etc.; and hence, the question of the case endings expressing the sense of the *kāraṅgas* etc. does not arise. Needless to state that this extreme position does not find favour in many of the epistemologists. Nevertheless, their view seems to be justified as far as the nominative case endings are concerned.

Ritualists were mainly concerned with the epistemological convention that between the base meanings and also the meanings expressed by case endings and other affixes, the former qualify the later. And unless the nominative and other case endings are regarded to be meaningful, such an epistemological convention cannot be tenable. Thus, ritualists strictly follow Pāṇini in holding that nominative and other case endings are meaningful.

Now, after examining the various views held by different epistemologists, one may also hold the following view : that nominative case endings are used merely for the purpose of accomplishing the grammatical correctness of a word (*padasādhutvārthokaḥ*) and hence have no sense to convey. That is to say that the nominative case endings function in such a way as to bring about the grammatical correctness of the word by making the word 'finished with ending' (*pada*), and therefore, do not have any value as far as conveying some sense is concerned.

And the view, that the nominative case endings have only a zero value as far as conveying any sense is concerned, can be supported by the statement of Kātyāyana that the nominative case endings are to be used in the senses that have already been conveyed otherwise i.e. through other grammatical element (*abhite prathamābhāva*) on (p. ii.3.1). For, this statement may be interpreted to mean that (i) the nominative case endings are used to convey the same sense as the syntactico-semantic notions (*kāraṅgas*) such as 'object' (*karman*) etc. that are expressed by other grammatical element or that (ii) the nominative case endings are used to convey no specific sense such but are used merely for the purpose of accomplishing the grammatical correctness of a word. While, in the first interpretation, the nominative case endings convey the senses (*kāraṅgas*) that have already been expressed otherwise; and therefore, function as

merely conveyer of the already conveyed sense, in the second interpretation, the same (endings) do not convey any sense at all and therefore, function only as what help to accomplish grammatical correctness. Thus, Kātyāyana's statement that the nominative case endings are used in the sense that have already been expressed otherwise, can be assumed to have supported indirectly zero value for the nominative case endings as far as conveying any sense is concerned.

Patañjali too was aware of the problem that the nominative case endings may be relegated to the position of playing secondary role, namely, that they merely help to accomplish the status of a finished word (*padatva*). For, while commenting (on p. ii.3.46), he states, albeit as a pūrvopakṣin's view, that the nominative case endings can be used for accomplishing the status of a finished word (*kim punaratra prathamayā prārthyate padatvam*).

According to the pūrvapakṣin, it can be held that the nominative case endings are added to the indeclinables such as 'uccaiḥ' (high), 'nicaiḥ' (low) etc. so that the same (indeclinables) can be considered as 'finished words' (*pada*) which alone are competent to be used in the language. However, Patañjali rejects such a theory on the ground that the genitive also can be used to facilitate the status of a finished word for the indeclinables which (i.e. genitive), being later, would prevail over the nominative which are prescribed earlier (*naitad asti prayojanam ṣaṣṭhyātra padatvam bhaviṣyati*).

Nevertheless, Patañjali has strictly imposed the restriction that a word should never be used in the language without the proper finishings (*apadam na prayuñjita*). And, in the cases where nominative case endings are used as finishings, for instance, in the cases of adjectives, the same (nominative case endings) are meaningless. For example, consider the statement 'nilo ghaṭah' (pot is blue). Here, the nominative case ending 'as', occurring after the word 'nila', does not convey any sense except functioning as the finishing of the word 'nila'. Gadādhara too, in his Vyutpattivāda, concedes, while discussing the verbal cognition of identity, that nominative case endings found after adjectives are meaningless. This is despite that he has observed alternatively that identity (lit. non-difference) 'abheda' is the

meaning of the nominative case endings when they occur after adjectives.

Thus, it can be observed that along with the views that nominative case endings convey (i) the *kāraḥ*, and that the same convey (ii) the numbers etc., the view that the nominative case endings are meaningless and therefore, they function only as the finishings of adjectives was also prevalent among the epistemologists. Although this view did not have much open support from all quarters and therefore, did not receive the much wider recognition it rightly deserved (except for Bharṭṛhari accepting such a view indirectly); the fact remains that the nominative case endings are used without any specific meaning as such; and therefore have only zero value as far as conveying any sense is concerned. This fact becomes clear in isolated utterances such as '*vrkṣaḥ*' (a tree) '*plakṣaḥ*' (a plakṣa tree) etc. Despite Patañjali's claim that, in such utterances, a verb in third person singular such as '*asti*' etc. is implied, and therefore, the tree etc. are the agent (*kāraḥ*) of existence, we can perceive that such utterances are made with the intention of conveying mere existence of a thing; and thus, since such an existence is only the base meaning (*prātipadikārtha*), the nominative case endings are meaningless or are used only for the grammatical correctness of the word at least in such isolated expressions etc.

CHAPTER VII

AN EPISTEMOLOGICAL STUDY OF NUMBERS, THEIR REFERENCE AND RELATION

(i) *Status of number (saṃkhyā)*

Praśastapāda defines number (*saṃkhyā*)¹ as a particular quality that causes such usages as 'this pot is one' (*eka-tvādivya-vahāra hetu*). What he means by this definition is that number² is a quality and the same causes the faculty of arranging and methodizing entities as 'one, two, three', etc. And such a number which, extends upto *parārdha*, is perceived by either the eyes or the touch or by both.

Annambhaṭṭa too,³ almost in a similar vein defines number as being the peculiar or unique cause that helps the process of counting (*gaṇanāsādharaṇa kāraṇam*) such as 'this pot is one', 'these pots are two', 'those pots are many'. According to him, number is threefold as singular number (i.e. singularity), dual number (i.e. duality) and plural number (i.e. plurality).

Plurality is different from number three etc.

Scholars like Śrīdhara⁴ hold that plural number—(i.e. plura-

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1. Sūtrabhāṣya of Praśastapāda.
 2. According to ritualists, number cannot be accepted to be a quality. They hold that since qualities cannot be accepted to have any other quality in them and also since the qualities are counted to have numbers in them, number must be considered to be a separate category which is quite distinct from being a quality.
 3. Tarkasamgraha.
 4. Nyāyakandali.

lity) or 'bahutva' is quite different from the number three (*tritva*) or the number four (*catuṣṭva*) etc. According to them, plurality is generated from the knowledge of only unlimited (i.e. not fixed) singular numbers such as 'this is a forest', 'this is an army', wherein trees and soldiers respectively are unlimited in numbers. However, the number three, the number four etc. are generated from the mental process of counting the limited numbers (i.e. three singular numbers for three and four singular numbers for four). Such limited amount of singular numbers can be described as, (i) this is a pot, (ii) this is another pot, (iii) this is yet another pot, and therefore, these are three pots, or (i) this is a pot, (ii) this is another pot, (iii) this is yet another pot, (iv) this too is yet another pot, and therefore, these are four pots etc.

Plurality is identical with number three etc.

On the other hand, Shankar Mishra¹ and others hold that plurality is identical with the number three etc. However, according to them, the only difference is that while the numbers generated from the mental process of counting that 'these are two plus one', 'these are three plus one' etc., are called 'three', 'four' etc., the same, when generated from the knowledge that 'these are many brahmins' etc., are considered as the plurality.

It should be noted here that in the knowledge of unlimited numbers such as 'these are many brahmins', 'this is an army', the specific figure of numbers such as 'hundredness', 'thousandness' etc. are not manifested as there exists no factor to manifest the same. The factor that manifests the specific number is the speakers intention to understand the specific number through the mental process of counting which is evident only in such knowledge as 'there are hundred or thousand mangoes and I shall bring them'.

Distinction between the number one and plurality etc.

Indian epistemologists maintain a basic distinction between the number one and plurality on the one hand, and the number two onwards on the other.

The number one and plurality are held to have been generated from the knowledges, 'this is one' and 'these are many' respectively. This is so because, according to these scholars, number one and plurality are the objects of such particular understandings as 'this is one (i.e. a pot)', 'these are many brahmins' etc. And thus, the number one and plurality are qualities that reside in substances and are generated by particular understandings.

Singularity is the very nature of things

However, Kaunḍabhaṭṭa views the¹ singularity to be merely the nature of things. For him, the singularity, found occurring in a pot, is nothing but the very nature of the pot itself. It should be noted that, according to this theory, the singularity is an unnegatable property; and therefore, is common to all the things. Since singularity is found occurring in all the things, Kaunḍabhaṭṭa concludes that such a singularity is only the nature of things themselves.

Singularity as the non-delimiting property

Following a middle path, Gadādhara² states that singularity is to be understood as the non-delimiting property of the mutual absence occurring in a similar second. For example, supposing there are several pots on a ground, then any given pot will have the mutual absence of a similar-second pot; and hence the singularity occurring in the first pot becomes the delimiting property of the mutual absence occurring in the second pot; however, when there occurs only one pot on the ground, the pot cannot be claimed to have the mutual absence of a similar second pot. Thus, the singularity occurring in the same pot becomes the non-delimiting property of the mutual absence. This definition of singularity by Gadādhara points to the fact that singularity is a property occurring in a single entity without a similar second.

Also, the same points to the fact that, according to Gadādhara, singularity is an unnegatable (universal) property cogniz-

1. Vaiyākaraṇa Bhūṣaṇasāra.

2. Vyutpattivāda.

ed along with the cognition of the entity possessing such a property itself and therefore does not need a separate counting process to generate it.

Process of generating duality etc.

On the other hand, the number two, (duality) etc. are generated from the mental process of counting such as 'this is one', 'this is another'; and hence become the objects of such practice of counting as 'these are two' etc.

Ritualists theory

Ritualists reject the theory that the number two etc. are generated from the mental process of counting. According to them, number two etc. are always present in entities in non-manifest form; and when there is a manifesting factor, the same are manifested as occurring in pots etc. Thus, numbers need not be held to be generated from the mental process of counting.

Rejection of Ritualists theory

However, logicians firmly oppose¹ such a view of ritualists. They explain that the number two etc. must be held to be generated from the mental process of counting and destroyed when the same process is lost. They explain, further, that even when a manifesting factor is absent, things are apprehended as possessing the numbers provided that the mental process of counting is operative.

According to logicians, the realization of numbers can be described as follows : At first, things come into contact with sense organs; from such a contact, the knowledge of the singular number in general i.e. the generic property of singularity is realized. Then, the mental process of counting such as 'this is a pot', 'there is another pot' and so 'these are two pots' begins. From such a process, the number two (duality) is generated; again from the same number two, the knowledge of the dual number in general (i.e. the generic property of duality) is realized. Thus, the knowledge of the quality such as the duality is generated which, in turn, leads to the mental impression of the

same. It should be noted now that since number two and others are generated by the mental process of counting, the same are destroyed when the mental process perishes.

Conclusion

It could be concluded now that (*saṃkhyā*) is a particular quality that is caused by the mental process of counting. And despite the fact that Śrīdhara views the plurality to be different from the number three etc. and therefore, disagrees with scholars like Śaṅkara Miśra who hold that the plurality is identical with the number three etc., both the sections of scholars agree to the theory that while the number three etc. are generated from the mental process of counting, the plurality is generated from the knowledge of merely unlimited singular numbers such as 'this is an army' etc.

However, the most important distinction is between the number one and plurality on the one hand, and the number two and other numbers on the other. While number one and plurality are held to be generated from the knowledge 'this is one' and 'these are many' respectively, the number two (duality) and other numbers are held to be generated from the mental process of counting as explained above. The reason for this basic distinction is not far to seek. As Kaṇḍabhāṭṭa explains, the singularity is regarded as the very nature of things and hence does not need the knowledge of the mental process of counting to generate it. On the other hand, the number two and others are qualities that are generated by the mental process of counting. In this connection, the observation that singularity is an unnegatable (universal) property cognized along with the cognition of the entity possessing such a property is very significant. This observation explains the fact that whereas the singularity is universal and ever present as a property in all the entities, the number two etc. are nothing but the mental concepts and therefore, mere notions of the same basic and fundamental number i.e. singularity. This also explains why logicians consider the number two and others as getting destroyed when the mental process of counting perishes.

(ii) *Reference to numbers*

Affixes are threefold such as declensional affix, primary affix and secondary affix. And declensional affix is again two fold as nominal case affix and conjugational affix. A nominal case affix is of seven kinds : viz. nominative affix, accusative affix, instrumental affix, dative affix, ablative affix, genitive affix and locative affix.

Pāṇini has ruled that the plural affixes (or expressions) are employed in the sense of plural number (i.4.21) and dual and singular affixes are employed in the sense of dual and singular numbers (i.4.22) respectively. According to Pāṇini, plural, dual and singular affixes, which are expressions of number, refer to plurality, duality and singularity respectively. These affixes refer to numbers as nominative singular (*su*), nominative dual (*au*), nominative plural (*jas*), (or conjugational singular (*tip*), conjugational dual (*tas*) conjugational plural (*jhi*) etc.) and not merely as the singular ending, dual ending and plural ending.

Gadādhara's view

Gadādhara follows Pāṇini in this respect and¹ holds that singular and other affixes refer to singularity and other numbers. However, according to him, singular and other affixes cannot refer to numbers merely as singular expressions etc. which are common to both the declensional as well as the conjugational affixes. For, singular expressions etc. are hard to define. Suppose singular expression is defined as being one that expresses the singularity, then there would occur self-regression since both what is to be defined and the definition would amount to expressing the singular number. On the other hand, suppose the same is defined as the state of referring to the singularity etc., then it would overlap since even the dual and other expres-

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1. It should be noted here that for Gadādhara nominative case affixes, of the seven case affixes, refer to only numbers which are related with the meanings of their respective base as qualifiers. This position seems to have been influenced from Pāṇiniyan rule that the nominative case affix is used in the sense of mere base meaning, gender, number and measure.

sions can refer to the singularity and vice versa through the illusion of denotation or indication.

Observation

Really speaking, singular and other expressions are quite possible to define as the expressions possessing the potentiality to express the singularity and other numbers through the relation of denotation; however, such an alternative is not acceptable to Gadādhara on the ground that the use of the term 'singular and other expressions' in the phrase singular and other expressions is merely conventional, and therefore, can be explained through the assignation of Pāṇini. Thus, Gadādhara holds that the singular and other expressions have the capacity to express the singularity and other numbers only in the form of particular sequences such as 'su', 'au', 'jas' etc. (i.e. nominative singular affix, nominative dual affix, nominative plural affix etc.).

It should be noted, however, that the singular, dual and plural endings, occurring after the numerals 'one' (*eka*), 'two' (*dvi*) and 'many' (*bahu*) respectively, are not expressive of numbers as there occurs no difference between the delimiting property of the qualificand (i.e. the singularity etc.) and also the qualifier (i.e. the singularity etc.). Also, the nominative plural ending used after the ever-plural words such as 'water(s)' (*āpah*) is meaningless at times as the same words may be used intending only singularity.

Gadadhāra's view on reference to numbers conjugational by endings

Now, with respect to the conjugational endings too, Gadādhara holds the following positions : That the singular conjugational endings need not, strictly speaking, refer to the singularity. This is so because, the singular declensional ending such as 'su' occurring after the word 'ghaṭa' in statements such as 'there is a pot' (*ghaṭo 'sti*) can itself refer to the (number) singularity of the pot' and hence the reference to the same (singularity) by the conjugational ending again does not serve any fruitful purpose. However, he does concede that the singular conjugational ending generalized as singular ending has the potentiality to denote the singularity; whereas, the same generalized merely as singular ending is not useful in generating the cognition of singularity

since the singular endings as such cannot be perceived to have the functional relation of word and meaning in the sense of singularity.

On the other hand, the dual and plural conjugational endings must necessarily refer to the numbers i.e. duality and plurality respectively. This is so because, in statements such as 'Caitra and Maitra go' (*caitra maitraśca gacchataḥ*) and 'Caitra, Maitra and Devadatta all go' (*citra maitro devadattāś gacchanti*), the dual and plural declensional endings that can refer to duality and plurality respectively, are found missing. Also, it is not possible to accept that the singular declensional endings found in those statements themselves refer, by indication, to the duality and plurality; for, it would be against the convention established by grammar that singular endings refer to singularity only.

Grammarians theory

A section of grammarians, headed by Bhartṛhari, however, hold that number is also the meaning of the nominal and other bases themselves. According to them, the singular and other endings are merely suggestive of the fact that the bases should themselves denote the numbers. Thus, for instance, consider the statement 'pot is blue' (*nilo ghaṭaḥ*). Here the nominative singular ending (*su*) occurring after the words '*ghaṭa*' and '*nila*' is merely suggestive of the fact that the bases refer to the 'pot' and the blue colour as qualified by the number singularity.

It should be noted, here, that the above theory of a section of grammarians goes directly against the very grammatical rule that nominative case ending is used in the sense of (i) the base meaning, (ii) gender, (iii) measure and (iv) number.

However, according to these grammarians, economy that 'base itself can refer to both the qualifier and qualificand such as the number singularity and the pot' is of over riding importance to the grammatical convention. They argue that contradiction to established grammatical convention such as the one stated above is immaterial. For instance, consider the statement 'pot is blue' (*nilo ghaṭaḥ*). Here, the nominative singular affix (*su*) merely suggests the fact that the pot and blue colour are referred as qualified singularity by the bases.

Objection

According to logicians (mainly Jagadīśa and Gadādhara), the nominative singular ending etc., when occurring after the word expressing the qualificand, refer to the singularity; whereas the same, when occurring after the word expressing the qualifier, refer to the identity. For instance, consider once, again, the same statement 'pot is blue' (*niḷo ghaṭaḥ*). Here, the nominative singular ending (*su*), occurring after the word '*ghaṭa*' that expresses the pot, the qualificand, refers to the singularity as a qualifier to the pot. However, the nominative singular ending, occurring after the word '*niḷa*', that expresses the blue colour, the qualifier, refers to the identity as the qualificand of the blue colour. Logicians do not accept that the singular ending etc. are merely suggestive of singularity etc. They object to the grammarians theory on the ground that the speaker's intention to interrelate the number, a base meaning, with pot etc., another of the same base meanings, is absent and therefore the number cannot be interrelated with the pot in 'a pot(*ghaṭaḥ*) (exists)'. They point out that suppose a meaning of a base is allowed to related to another meaning of the same base is allowed to relate to another meaning of the same base, then even the two meanings, namely a 'horse' and a 'sun' which can be referred to by the single word '*hari*', can be insisted to be cognized as related to each other so as to produce the cognition that 'sun occurs on the horse' from a single word '*hariḥ*'.

Reply

However, the grammarians reply to such an objection is very typical of them : they hold sa that by restricting the established semantical convention, even the two meanings of the same base can be allowed to interrelate with each other in few of such select nominative statements as '*ghaṭaḥ*', so that the village, the meaning of the accusative base '*grāma*', need not be related with the objectness, even though the latter (objectness) can be argued to be referred to by the same base (*grāma*) in the accusative statement 'he goes to the village' (*grāmam gacchati*).

Rejection of grammarians reply

Logicians, reject such a reply of grammarians as unconvincing. They further object to their theory on the ground that suppose number singularity is regarded as the meaning of the nominal base itself, then the verbal cognition of singularity can be produced from even the nominal base (i.e. word) with a dual or plural ending since the lack of denotation in the sense of the singularity becomes immaterial as the speaker intends such a cognition. Thus, when the speaker intends such a cognition of singularity, the natural use of a word with dual or plural endings becomes impossible to avoid.

Grammerians defence

Grammarians on the other hand, defend their theory as follows : speaker's intention, since the time eternal alone is the determining factor for the natural use of a word with a particular ending in a particular sense. And since such a speaker's intention is absent in the use of a word with a dual or plural ending in the sense of singularity, the cognition of singularity cannot be insisted from the word with a dual or a plural ending; and therefore, the imposition of the natural use of a word with a dual ending etc. can be avoided when singularity is intended to be cognized.

Conclusion

It should be noted here as follows : Grammarians theory assumes that infinite number of nominal and other types of bases have a potentiality to denote numbers; and compared to such an assumption, it would be much more economical to assume that a few of the declensional as well as the conjugational endings refer to number. Also, it should be noted that it is not possible to argue that only the nominal and other bases as such and not the individual bases such as '*ghaṭa*' would be considered to have the potentiality to denote the number and therefore, no difficulty of assuming endless number of individual bases to have the potentiality to denote the numbers would result; for, it is impossible to define what constitutes nominal and other bases. Again, despite the non recognition of the word as a nominal base etc. the cognition of singularity is very much experienced by, one and all from such words as '*ghaṭah*' and therefore, considering

the nominal base alone as possessing the potentiality to denote the numbers would contradict the common experience.

Finally, it could be observed that the theory that 'the nominal and other bases denote number has economy of assumption also stands no scrutiny: For, despite considering the nominal and other bases alone as denoting number, grammarians will have to assume that the knowledge of the sequence of the nominal (or other) base and the inflectional ending is the cause of the cognition wherein number qualifies pot, the meaning of the same base, so that the cognition of the number relating to the pot can be avoided from the sequence of the nominal base 'ghaṭa' without the case endings.

Also it should be observed that the grammarians' position that 'nominative case ending has not been established to have a denotation in any particular sense and therefore, cannot be held to have even the indication, which is a connection with the denoted sense, in number' is also baseless. For, Pāṇini's rule *prātipadikārtha* etc. does indeed enjoin the nominative case in the sense of number etc. and therefore, there is absolutely no need to accept that the base itself indicates the number. Thus, since the nominal bases as such are not established to indicate the number singularity etc. the advocates of the theory, that nominal (or other) base indicates the number, will have to assume that the infinite number of words such as *ghaṭa*, *paṭa*, indicate the number; where as the logicians, who advocate the theory that declensional (or other) case ending denotes the number, will have to assume that only few of the endings such as 'su' refers to the singularity and therefore, economy results.

Resurrection of Grammarians' theory

On a second thought, Gadādhara resurrects the grammarians theory of reference to numbers. He defends grammarians position on the grounds that according to logicians theory, one needs to assume that the assembly of causes of verbal cognition of number is the preventing factor of the inference of the same. And, while assuming the assembly of causes, one needs to include the reference to the pot by the nominal base and the reference to the number by the case-ending occurring after such

a base. Thus, there occurs multiplicity in the assumptions of the preventing factors. On the other hand, according to the theory that nominal base itself indicates the pot, as qualified by the number singularity, the single reference to the pot, as qualified by the number singularity, which is common to both the inference and the verbal cognition, will be included in the assembly of causes of verbal cognition and hence the same automatically prevents the inference of the same at the same time. Thus, economy in the form of a single assumption of preventing factor is quite evident in the theory of grammarians.

(iii) *Numerals and their reference*

Basic theory : While declensional and conjugational endings are restricted in their reference to the three numbers, namely, singularity, duality and plurality, occurring in their stem meanings, numerals, such as 'one' (*eka*), 'two' (*dvi*), 'hundred' (*śata*), are used in Sanskrit to refer to various other numbers as well. Numerals are enumerated from 'one' (*eka*) to 100,000 billions (*parārdhya*). Such numbers refer to cardinal numbers (*saṁkhyā*) which are the means of simple counting that indicates how many entities there are in an assemblage. Sanskrit numerical system makes a basic distinction between numerals beginning from one to eighteen (*aṣṭādaśa*) on the one hand, and from twenty (*vimśati*) to 100,000 billions on the other. While, the numerals one to eighteen refer to only the numbereds (*saṁkhyeya*) the numerals twenty and above refer¹ to both numbers and numbereds. For instance, consider the statements :

- (i) 'there exists one pot' (*eko ghaṭaḥ*),
- (ii) 'there is a hundred of cows' (*gavām śatam*) and
- (iii) 'there are twenty cows' (*vimśati gāvah*).

Since the numerals 'one' to 'eighteen' refer to only numbereds, they are basically adjectives and therefore agree with their subs-

1. In Sanskrit, nineteen is *ūnavimśati* or one less to twenty and so all the rules applicable to twenty apply to nineteen as well.

tantives in gender etc. Thus, 'eko ghaṭah' (here the numbered 'ekah' (one) has the masculine gender and singular ending agreeing with its substantive, 'ghaṭah' (pot). However, since the numerals twenty and above can be used as referring to both the numbers and numbereds, they are nouns when referring to the numbers and adjectives when referring to the numbereds. Thus, 'gavām śatam' (here the numeral 'śatam' (hundred) is a noun and therefore, is in nominative singular, i.e. does not agree with the genitive word gavām) and 'vimśati gāvah' (here the numeral 'vimśati' twenty is an adjective and therefore, has the nominative case ending agreeing with its substantive 'gāvah').

It should be noted here that the numerals twenty¹ and above are always used in only singular number even while they are referring to the numbereds and therefore, are adjectives. Thus, the word 'śatam' is nominative singular even while it qualifies the word 'gāvah' in 'śatam gāvah'.

Some scholars consider that even the numerals 'one' to eighteen can, by indication, refer to the numbers. They support their theory on the ground that there are statements such as 'there are five of pots' (ghaṭānām pañca).

Gadādhara's observation

In this connection, Gadādhara makes the following observation. Some hold that the words 'hundred' (śata) etc. refer to the number 'hundred' and not merely to the numbered i.e. the hundred entities. Accordingly, in the statements such as 'there are two hundreds', 'there are three hundreds', the word 'hundred' refers to the number 'hundred'.

Suppose, on the other hand, the words 'hundred' etc. are held to be referring to the 'numbered' entities, then the duality and plurality, expressed by the dual and plural expressions, namely, 'e' and 'āni' occurring after the word 'śata' (hundred) in the statements 'these are two hundreds' (dve śate) and 'these are three hundreds' (irīṇi śatāni), would be required to be related with the double and triple hundrednesses that are the delimiting properties of the double and triple hundred (entities), the base-

1. *Vimśatyādyāḥ sadaikattve sarvāḥ saṁkhyeya saṁkhyayoh.*

Amarakośa, ii.9.84

meanings. Thus, the convention that 'the inflectional endings have a reference to the meanings related with the meanings of their base meanings, gets violated (here the duality and plurality are related with the double and triple hundrednesses, the delimiting properties, and not with the double and triple hundred entities, the base meanings).

However, when the numeral such as 'hundred' etc. are accepted to refer the numbers, then, the duality etc. can be accepted to relate directly to the double hundred etc., the numbers, and hence, the rule that 'the inflectional endings have a reference to the meanings related with their base meaning' is not violated. Also, since the statements with dual and plural endings such as '*dve śate*' and '*trīṇi śatāni*' are quite commonly made, the convention that 'the numerals 'twenty' and above are used always in singular ending only and all these numerals express the sense of both the numbers and numbereds' gets contradicted. However, when the numerals 'hundred' etc. are accepted to refer to the number hundred etc., we can take resort to the special rule that dual and plural endings are possible in numbers' (*saṃkhyāyām dvibahutve śtah*) and hence, as an exception, we can explain the dual and plural endings after the numeral 'hundred' etc.

Again, suppose the numbereds are considered to be the meanings of the numerals 'hundred' etc. then the superstratumness (or occurrence) referred to by the genitive case-ending in statements such as 'one ought to give away a hundred of cow's (*gavām śatam dadyāt*), becomes difficult to be construed with; for, the hundred entities cannot be claimed to be occurring in the cows and therefore, the occurrence in the cows is contradictory for the numbered entities. On the other hand, suppose the numbers are the meanings, then the same can be construed to be occurring in the cows without any difficulty.

Thus, these scholars conclude that whereas the numerals twenty and above refer to numbers, the numerals beginning from one to eighteen refer to only numbereds. Now, such incorrect statements as 'ten of Brahmins' (*brāhmhñānām daśa*), instead of the correct statement 'ten Brahmins' (*brāhmaṇā daśa*), can be avoided on the ground that occurrence in the Brahmins, the meaning referred to by the genitive word '*Brāhmānām*', cannot be related to the number tenness, which is, in turn, the

delimiting property of the meaning of the numeral ten, and not the meaning of the same numeral as such.

Conclusion

However, this position of some scholars that the numerals twenty and above refer to number only cannot be accepted. For, suppose, the numeral 'hundred' refers to the number 'hundred', then the objectness, conditioned by the act of giving, would not be syntactically compatible for being construed with the number hundred in the statement 'he ought to give away the hundred of cows (*gavām śatam dadyāt*), and hence the same statement would become invalid. On the other hand, when the numerals twenty etc. are accepted to refer to numbereds, the numerals 'hundred', in the said statement, can refer to the hundred entities (of cows). And, since the objectness, conditioned by the act of giving, can now be construed with the hundred entities of cows (i.e. objectness occurs in the hundred cows), the same statement can be explained to be valid. Thus, it is necessary to conclude that the numerals 'twenty' etc. too, just as the numerals one to eighteen, refer to the 'numbereds', that are delimited by numbers, and not that they refer simply to the numbers that are not the qualifiers of their substratums.

(iv) Numbers and their relation(s)

Numbers from one (i.e. singularity) to *parārdha* are considered to be qualities (*guṇa*). And since a quality and its possessor (*guṇin*) are held to be related to each other through the relation of inherence, the singularity etc. can be related to their possessors through inherence. Thus, the statements such as 'pot exists' (*ghaṭah*), wherein the singular ending(s) occurring after the word *ghṭah*, refers to the singularity, produce, according to the logicians, the cognition that 'the pot that possesses the singularity through inherence is the agent of existence.

It should be noted here that the inherence (*samavāya*) is a relation between those two entities which are inseparable. Consequently, the singularity that occurs through inherence in pot etc. becomes inseparable from the pot etc. Also, inherence is a relation through which a property lasts in its possessor till the destruction of the same property possessor (*ayuta-siddha*). Thus,

when the singularity is accepted to occur in a pot, its possessor, through inherence, the same (singularity) lasts in the pot till the destruction of the pot.

Now, this theory, where the number is held to be inseparable from its possessor and also to be one that lasts till the destruction of its possessor, is in accordance with the nature of singularity since the same has been held to be the very nature of numbered entity (i.e. pot etc.) and therefore, to be an inseparable part of the numbered. However, due to the basic distinction between singularity and the rest of the numbers (i.e. number two or duality onwards), it is impossible to accept that the same relation 'inherence' is the relation between the duality and also their possessors. This is so because, according to logicians, the knowledge of the mental process of counting such as 'this is a pot, this is another pot and therefore, these are two pots' produces the duality etc. and therefore, the same (duality etc.) are neither the nature of their possessors (i.e. pot etc.), nor the inseparable parts that last till the destruction of their possessors. Really speaking, since, unlike the singularity, the duality etc. are produced from the knowledge of the mental process of counting, the same (i.e. duality etc.) perish as soon as the knowledge of the mental process of counting perishes. Thus, it becomes imperative that a separate relation that accounts for the special relation of duality etc. be postulated.

The relation of 'paryāpti'

Basic theory : In accordance with the special relation required between the number two (i.e. duality) etc. and their possessors, logicians postulate a separate relation of *paryāpti* or complete unlimited occurrence. They hold that the knowledge of the mental process of counting such as 'this is one, this is another and therefore, these are two' establishes the existence of a distinct relation called *paryāpti*; for, number two or duality etc. being the effect of the knowledge of such mental process of counting, cannot be expected to be the nature of two separate individuals lasting till the destruction of the same (two separate individuals) and hence cannot occur separately in two different individuals. And no entity can be said to occur collectively together through the relation of inherence as the same (inher-

ence) is a relation through which entities can only occur separately in individuals.

Thus, the relation of *paryāpti*, as distinct from inherence, is established on the ground that otherwise the duality etc., produced from the mental process of counting, cannot be explained to be occurring in dual (i.e. two some) etc. collectively together.

Gadādhara's view

Gadādhara too¹ maintains that the relation of *paryāpti*, as distinct from that of inherence, must be regarded as the relation between the number two (duality) etc. and their possessors. According to him, unless such a *paryāpti* is regarded to be the relation of duality etc., the cognition produced from the statement 'there are two skies' (*atrākāśau*) cannot be considered invalid. For, the numbers occur in individual entities separately through the relation of inherence; and suppose cognition from such a statement is held to be involving the relation of inherence of duality, then the validity of such a cognition cannot be refuted as the inherence of duality is always present separately in the sky and in a pot. However, on the other hand, suppose the cognition from such a statement is held to involve the relation of *paryāpti* of duality, then the same (cognition) can be considered invalid; for, since the numbers occur collectively together through the relation of *paryāpti*, the *paryāpti* of duality cannot be said to be present in the sky as it is only a single individual.

Objection

Some scholars object here as follows : it is possible to explain the invalidity of the statement 'there are two skies' (*ākāśau*) even by accepting that inherence of duality concomitant with the delimiting property of its substratum is the relation between a number and its possessor. For, despite the fact that duality, through inherence, can occur in the sky, the same cannot occur in the sky through the inherence concomitant with the skyness, the delimiting property of its substratum (i.e. inherence of duality is concomitant with only a property occurring

1. vyutpattivāda.

in a 'couple' such as sky and a pot). By this position it is possible to explain also the correct statement such as 'there are two pots' (*ghaṭau*); for, despite the fact that the inherence of duality is not concomitant with the property such as potness, the duality itself is concomitant with such a property (of potness) and therefore, the two pots can be cognized to be the possessors of the duality which is concomitant with such a property of potness occurring in its substratum through inherence.

Refutation

However, Gadādhara overrules such an objection as follows : in that case, the duality concomitant with such a property of its substratum through inherence itself would be proper to be considered as the relation. Hence, inherence, in any case, as such would cease to be the relation between numbers and their possessors.

Advantages and disadvantages in accepting paryāpti as the relation

The statement such as 'the sky is not the possessor of duality' (*ākāśam na dvitvavat*) should be prevented from being considered as valid like the statement 'the sky is not two' (*ākāśo na dvau*). Therefore, it is imperative that the mutual absence of the possessor of duality does not occur in the sky alone through inherence. However, suppose the inherence is considered to be the relation between the duality and its possessor, then the mutual absence of the possessor of duality cannot be prevented from occurring as the duality occurs through inherence in sky as well. On the other hand, suppose the complete unlimited occurrence of duality, which is concomitant with the delimiting property of the possessor of duality, is considered to be the relation, then the mutual absence of the possessor of the

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1. For, while the statement that 'the sky is not two' is merely a statement of fact, the statement that 'the sky is not the possessor of duality' involves the reference to the cognition of the denial of the positive quality of duality which may actually occur in the sky through inherence and hence untrue.

complete unlimited occurrence of duality cannot be said to be present in the sky alone since the possessive suffix (*vat*) always refers to the possessor of a relation and in this case the relation of the complete unlimited occurrence of duality is contradictory in a single individual, namely, sky.

Difficulty

Logicians, while accepting that the complete unlimited occurrence of duality, which is concomitant with the delimiting property of its substratum, is the relation between the number duality and its possessor, face certain difficulties while explaining the cognition from the statements such as 'he cuts (one) *Grislea Tomentosa* and (one) *Acacia Catechu*' (*dhava khadirau chinatti*). For, from such a statement one will have to cognize the two separate dualities which are concomitant with delimiting properties of *Grislea Tomentosa* and *Acacia Catechu*. And therefore, it becomes impossible to cognize single duality which has complete unlimited occurrence in both *Grislea Tomentosa* and *Acacia Catechu* together. Thus, when the speaker intends that there is one *Grislea Tomentosa* and one *Acacia Catechu* each, such a statement would become an impossibility. And suppose, to overcome this difficulty, logicians accept that such copulative compounds refer to the unity (*sāhitya*), which occurs in two things and delimits the substratum of duality, then it would be an identical position which ritualists propose (that duality and other numbers are the nature of the object of understanding such as 'these are two' etc).

Avoidance of difficulty

Logicians try to overcome this difficulty by stating that such a complete unlimited occurrence, concomitant with the delimiting property of the substratum of duality, is the relation only in the case where the property occurring in a single entity (i.e. skyness) is the delimiting property of the substratum of duality. And since, in the above statement both *dhavatva* and *kha^udiratva*, occurring in two separate individuals, are the delimiting properties of the substratum of duality, we shall accept that only the complete unlimited occurrence (which is not concomitant with the delimiting property) is the relation. Thus,

without accepting that the unity is the delimiting property of the substratum of duality, the statement 'he cuts (one) *Grislea Tomentosa* and (one) *Acacia Catechu*' can be explained.

Observation

However, it is evident from this explanation that logicians have to restrict their theory of complete unlimited occurrence being the relation of numbers to certain extent as at times the same (relation) is to be assumed as being concomitant with the delimiting property of the substratum of duality and at other times the same is not to be considered the as relation at all. When only a single pot occurs on the ground, the statement 'there are two pots here' (*atra ghaṭu staḥ*) and 'there are many pots here' (*atra ghaṭāḥ santi*) are never made. However, when one single pot occurs on the ground, one may insist on imposing such statements as the duality and plurality can be claimed to be potentially present in the single pot as well through the (*paryāpti*), that is concomitant with the potness. To avoid such a contingency, logicians hold that, in the verbal cognition, wherein the qualificands are delimited by the property of things adhering to each other in their occurrence, the qualifiers should have, as their relations, even the possession of such properties which are, in turn, pervaded by the qualifiers. For instance, in the verbal cognition, produced from the statement 'there are two pots here', wherein the pots, the qualificands, are delimited by the property (such as duality) of things adhering to each other in occurrence, the qualifier, namely, occurrence on the ground, 'should have, as its relation, the possession of the duality which is pervaded, in turn, by itself (i.e. the occurrence on the ground). Now, in the case where the ground has only one single pot, the qualifier (i.e. the occurrence on the ground) cannot be said to have the possession of the duality which is, in turn, pervaded by itself (i.e. occurrence) as its relation since the duality is not present in the single pot. However, on the other hand, when the ground has two pots, the qualifier (i.e. occurrence on the ground) can be said to have the possession of the duality which is in turn, pervaded by itself as its relation since the duality is present in the pots.

In some cases, numbers are cognized to be occurring in the delimiting property of the base meanings. For instance, the singularity, expressed by the singular ending occurring after the word 'hundred' (*śata*) that denotes the contradictory number (i.e. hundred), is invariably related with the property delimiting the base meaning i.e. the hundredness which is one. Therefore, in the statements 'this is one hundred' (*ekam śatam*), 'these are two hundreds' (*dve śate*) and 'these are three hundreds' (*trīni śatāni*), the singularity, duality and plurality are related with the single hundredness, the dual hundrednesses and triple hundrednesses respectively. Thus, the statement such as 'these are several hundreds' (*śatāni*) is never made with the intention that there occurs one hundred or two hundreds. In such cases, the plurality, expressed by the plural ending cannot be syntactically expected to be related with the single or double hundredness(es), the delimiting property of the base meaning. It should not be argued, however, that the single hundred can also be claimed to be competent to possess various hundredness(es) which are produced from a peculiar mental process of counting; and therefore, the single hundredness occurring in a single hundred does not lack semantical competency for being related with plurality. For, only the plurality, which is absent in the two or three separate substratums (i.e. hundredness(es) that share the same locus (i.e. the single hundred), can be considered to be the referent of the plural expressions occurring after the word '*śata*' (hundred). And such a plurality is contradictory in the various hundredness(es) occurring in a single hundred.

Logicians further accept a convention that the duality etc., referred to by the dual conjugational ending, etc.; are related with only those entities that are delimited by the duality etc. Therefore, the incorrect statement such as 'a single pot are present (*ghaṭah tiṣṭhanti*)'¹ cannot be imposed with the intention that there are two pots. This is in spite of the fact that due to the correctness of the statements such as 'Caitra and Maitra go' (*caitro maitraś ca gacchatah*), the finite verb need not necessarily have the same singular ending which is found occurring after the

1. However, when the finite verb has a singular ending, use of only singular ending is grammatically correct after the word

words expressing the substantives, i.e. Caitra and Maitra. It should be noted here that the duality, referred to by the dual conjugational ending such as 'tas' occurring after the verbal stem such as 'gaccha', should be accepted to be qualifying (i.e. occurring in) the substantive(s) such as Caitra and Maitra collectively together through *pariyāpti*: This is inspite of the fact that the substantives are here referred to by two separate (i.e.¹ uncompounded) words namely 'caitraḥ' and 'maitraḥ'; and therefore, the duality can qualify them separately. For, otherwise, when a single Caitra and a single Maitra are intended to go, such a statement would become untenable since the duality would be present in only two Caitras or two Maitra through the relation of *pariyāpti*. Thus, it should be accepted that in the statements such as 'Caitra and Maitra go' (*caitro maitraś ca gacchataḥ*), Caitra and Maitra are cognized to have the duality referred to by the conjugational ending (*tah*) occurs in the substantives together through *pariyāpti*. And, when the duality is related to both Caitra and Maitra together, the same (duality) becomes the qualifier and both Caitra and Maitra together become the qualificand(s). Consequently, the qualificerness of the duality can be said to be conditioned directly or indirectly by the qualificandness of both Caitra and Maitra. Now, since the single unified sentence (*ekavākya*) also means a sentence which is conducive to the reference to the qualificerness (of duality etc.) conditioned by the qualificandness of both (Caitra and Maitra etc.), the same (sentence 'Caitra and Maitra go') can be considered to be a single unified sentence.

Nature of pariyāpti, concluded

It can be observed now as follows : that the basic distinction between the relation of *pariyāpti* and that of inherence is that whereas the numbers such as duality occur in dual (i.e. two some) collectively together through *pariyāpti*, the same (numbers)

expressing the substantive. Therefore, the statement such as the pots is existing' (*ghaṭāḥ tiṣṭhati*) is grammatically incorrect.

1. The absence of compounding, in this case is due only to the compounding being optional in sanskrit.

can occur in the individuals separately through inherence. Such a distinction between *paryāpti* and inherence stems from the fact that while *paryāpti* is a relation between two entities such as the duality etc. and substances that have their parts adhering to each other in their occurrence (*vyāsajyavṛtti*), the inherence is a relation between two entities such as the singular number and the single pot which (i.e. single pot) has no parts that adhere to each other in their occurrence. Consider, for instance, the statement 'there are two pots' (*ghaṭau stah*). Here, the duality, referred to by the dual ending occurring after the word *ghaṭa*, is related, through *paryāpti*, with the dual (i.e. two some) of pots that have their two parts (i.e. two pots) adhering to each other in their occurrence. That is to say that no single pot individually can be considered to be the possessor of the duality and therefore, only the two pots collectively put together can form the parts of the possessors of the duality. On the other hand, inherence is only a relation between two entities that cannot be separated (i.e. that have no parts adhering to each other. Consider, for instance, the statement 'there is a pot' (*ghaṭo 'sti*). Here, the singular number, referred to by the singular ending(s), is related, through inherence, with single pot which has no parts that adhere to each other in their occurrence.

In ordinary Sanskrit, we have statements such as 'these are four 'qualities' (*catvāro guṇāḥ*). Such statements can be taken to produce the cognition of the relation of the number four etc. with qualities. However, according to the logicians convention that no quality can be related with any other quality, numbers, which too are qualities, cannot be said to relate with qualities. Consequently, to explain such statement as 'these are the four qualities', one must interpret the convention as intended to convey the prohibition that no quality can be related with any other quality through inherence'. And from this interpretation too,¹ as Jagadīśa holds, it becomes evident that inherence cannot be regarded as the relation between the numbers such as four and qualities. Thus, it becomes inevitable that the relation of complete unlimited occurrence (*paryāpti*) must alone be regarded as the regulating relation of the occur-

rence of the quality such as the number four in other qualities such as form (*rūpa*). Here *paryāpti* becomes 'the regulating relation of the occurrence of the quality in other qualities' means the relation of *paryāpti* delimits (i.e. produces) the qualificative cognition involving the occurrence of the numbers in other qualities such as the form through *paryāpti*.

It should be noted here that since the duality etc., like the singularity, are numbers, they could be regarded as potentially competent to relate with their possessors through inherence as well. And this fact is never denied by logicians when they state that the duality etc., expressed by dual ending etc. in *ghaṭau stah* etc., are related with their base meanings, (i.e. possessors) through *paryāpti*. However, what is denied by logicians by such a statement is that when the duality etc. are related through inherence, the same numbers (duality etc.) become related with each of the dual etc. individually. And since the occurrence of the duality etc. separately in each individuals of dual etc. is of no use whatsoever in cognizing the duality etc. in dual etc. from such statements as 'there are two pots' (*ghaṭau stah*), logicians merely disregard the necessity of viewing the duality etc. as relating with duals etc. through inherence. Thus, despite the fact that the duality etc. are numbers and therefore, can relate with their possessors through inherence, a distinct relation of *paryāpti* has been established in view of the fact that only the occurrence of the duality etc. collectively in duals etc. through *paryāpti*, a distinct relation, serves the purpose of cognizing the duality etc. collectively together in duals etc. It may be stated now that logicians of the old school support the convention that the entity, which does not occur separately in individual entities, cannot occur collectively together in a group of such entities either'. And therefore, they hold that the theory that 'the duality etc. can occur through *paryāpti* in

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1. It may be pointed out, however, that according to ritualists, since the number is found occurring in qualities as well, the same (i.e. numbers) must be regarded as a separate category other than quality. And hence number can be regarded as relating with the qualities through inherence itself.
 2. Nyāyakośa.

dual etc. collectively together in spite of the fact that the same (duality etc.) do not occur separately in each of the individuals of dual etc.' is contradictory and untenable. However, logicians of the new school opine that the application of such a convention can be restricted to the occurrence of properties through inherence only : that is to say that such a convention pertains to the occurrence of properties such as numbers through inherence only; and therefore, there is no occasion for any contradiction when the numbers duality etc. are held to occur through *paryāpti* collectively in the group of dual etc. despite that the same do not occur separately in each of the individuals of the same group.

As a matter of fact, this position regarding *paryāpti* is nothing but the reiteration or assertion of the very nature of the relation of *paryāpti* : that is to say that whereas the inherence is a relation through which properties can occur separately, the *paryāpti* is the relation through which properties can occur collectively together in a group without first occurring separately in any of the individuals.

Raghunātha, probably,¹ has the last word regarding the status of *paryāpti*. He accepts that *paryāpti* is the relation between the number duality etc. and their possessor 'substance'. However,² he states that since *paryāpti* is the relation between such numbers as duality that are produced from the knowledge of the mental process of counting and their possessors, the same must be regarded as a peculiar type of self-linking relation 'svarūpa' of duality' etc. This position explains satisfactorily the reason for accepting the *paryāpti* as the relation of the duality etc. That is to say that inspite of the fact that logicians have considered the numbers as qualities, they have accorded a special status for the numbers especially for the duality and others. Thus while, ritualists have openly disagreed with the logicians in treating numbers as qualities, some logicians too have echoed the same feeling by inventing a new peculiar relation in the form of *paryāpti* for the occurrence of numbers such as the

1. *Avacchedakatāniruktī*.

2. *apekṣā buddhyā janyah imau dvau ityākāraka pratīti pramānakah dvitva svarupa sambandha viśeṣah.*

duality. When the duality etc. are produced by the knowledge of the mental process of counting, the same cannot be real qualities like form, taste etc. with which they are grouped. Numbers could only be accepted as conceptual or constructional entities assumed by imagination, and since no conceptual or and unreal entity can be related through the relation of inherence, only *paryāpti*, a self-linking relation that is of the nature of the subjunct of relation (i.e. that is not different from what is related with such a pots) can be the relation. In the theory that the relation of inherence is manifold, however, such a *paryāpti* can be viewed to be the inherence of duality itself and therefore the same (*paryāpti*) is neither the self linking relation as Raghunātha claims nor a separate category as ritualists suggest.

CHAPTER VIII

AN EXPLANATION OF THE TWO RULES

p. i.4.49 and p. i.4.50

Introduction

Grammatical object, which occupies the most important place in the sentence involving the transitive use of a verb, can be broadly categorized into three types : (i) that which the agent is interested in or wants to obtain, (ii) that which the agent is not interested in or does not want to obtain, and (iii) that which is not considered to be any other *kāraka* and hence is accommodated as an object. Consider, for instance, the 'village', 'the poison' and the 'cow' in the statements : (i) 'Caitra goes to the village' (*caitro grāmam gacchati*), (ii) 'he eats poison' (*viṣam bhakṣayati*) and (iii) 'he milks cow into milk' (*gām dogdhi payaḥ*). Here, the village, which is the object of going, is what the agent, 'Caitra', is interested in going to ; or wants to obtain by going; and the poison, which is the object of eating, is what the agent (Caitra etc.) is not actually interested in eating, but nevertheless is eating, and the cow, which is actually the ablative *kāraka* since milk is released from the same and yet is not considered to be the ablative *kāraka* and hence is accommodated as the object. Accordingly, Pāṇini has composed three different rules assigning the name 'object' to three different types of objects. They are (i) 'the object is what the agent seeks most to reach or obtain through his action' (*kartur īpsitatamam karma* p. i.4.49), (ii) 'the object is also what the agent does not seek to obtain but, by chance, is associated with the effect' (*tathāyuktam cānīpsitam* p. i.4.50) and (iii) 'the object is also what is not enumerated among the other 'kārakas' (*akathitaṁ ca (kārake)* p.i.4.51).

Problem

Of the three rules, the last one, namely p.i.4.51, assigns the name 'object' to the *kāraka*, which is not spoken of i.e. is not considered to be any other *kāraka* such as the ablative due to the lack of speakers will to consider the same as the ablative etc. Accordingly, the rule is only meant to assign the name 'object' as an exception, to the ablative *kāraka* etc. and is not meant to describe the nature of the object or to introduce the types of objects. However, the first and the second rules, namely p. i.4.49 and p. i.4.50, are meant to describe the nature of the object and then assign the name 'object'. Consequently, a great controversy has broken out as to how to justify the two separate rules describing the nature of the object. Indian epistemologists, especially, grammarians, logicians and ritualists, have adopted various approaches, mainly logical and epistemological, i.e. syntactico semantical in their explanations of the necessity of the two rules. In the following pages, we shall first give a brief account of the various explanations of the two rules and then provide a critical examination of the same (explanations) so that a coherent and logical assessment of the different explanations becomes possible. To begin with, however, we shall provide the traditional explanation of the two rules and the significance of the various terms used in the same rules.

Explanation of the rule P. i.4.49 and significance of various terms used therein

Of the two rules, the first rule namely that 'the object is what the agent seeks most to reach or obtain through his actions' (*kartur īpsitatamam kṛma* i.4.49) is a basic one and hence the most important. Also, it lays down the two logical criteria to consider something as a grammatical object. The two logical criteria are that (i) the object is what is sought 'most' to reach and also that (ii) the object is what is sought to be the abode of the effect 'by the agent'. For instance consider the 'village' in the statement 'Caitra goes to the village'. Here the village is the grammatical object of going since the same fulfills the two logical criteria : viz. being what is sought 'most' to reach and also being what is sought to be the abode of the effect 'by the agent', Caitra. Now, the two criteria are expres-

sed in the rule by the terms 'sought most' (*īpsitatama*) and 'to the agent' (*kartuh*). The traditional explanation of the significance of the use of the two terms as well as that of the term '*karma*' (object) in the rule is as follows :

Suppose the superlative suffix 'most' (*tamap*) is not used in the rule, then the rule would read as 'that which the agent seeks to reach or obtain through his action is the object'. And, in that case, the village, which the agent, Caitra, seeks to reach through his actions, could very well be considered to be the object of going in the statement 'Caitra goes to the village' (*caitro grāmam gacchati*). However, the difficulty would be that even the boy, the object, in the statement 'he prevents the boy from falling into fire' (*agner māṇavakam vāryati*), would become the ablation since the ablation is also defined as that which the agent seeks to reach for the purpose of warding off (p. i.4.27). Also, it is not possible to state that the name 'object' (*karma*) prevents the assigning of the name 'ablation' (*apādāna*) in the said case to the boy since the convention that 'whatever name is earlier and without any other occasion, takes precedence over the later name' prevents the assigning of a later name such as 'ablation'. For, in that case, the name 'object' would prevent the assigning of the name 'ablation' to even the fire, the ablation. Therefore, it is absolutely necessary that the superlative suffix 'most' (*tamap*) be used in the rule (p. i.4.27) so that the boy, since he is the one the agent seeks most to reach through his action, gets the name 'object', as well as the fire, since it is not the one the agent seeks most to reach through his actions, is prevented from being assigned the name object. According to Patañjali, the use of the superlative suffix 'most' (*tamap*) facilitates the statements such as 'I shall eat (rice) with the milk' (*payasā khalu bhuñjīya*). He states that suppose the same suffix 'most' is not used in the rule, then even the milk, by virtue of being sought after by the agent, could be considered to be the object' and hence the instrumental case ending after the word expressing the same would become impossible to defend. On the other hand, suppose the superlative suffix is used in the rule, then the instrumental

case ending, after the word expressing the milk can be depended; for, despite that the agent may indeed seek (i.e. like to consume) the milk, it is only the rice mixed with the milk that is sought (i.e. liked to be consumed) most to reach by the agent by way of food and not the milk as such without the rice; and thus the milk, by virtue of being merely the dressing of rice, can be explained to have the instrumental case ending.

The significance of the use of the term 'to the agent' (*kartuḥ*) in the rule can be explained as follows : Suppose² the term 'to the agent' (*kartuḥ*) is not used in the rule, then the rule would read as 'that which is sought most to reach is the object. And since the '*māṣa*' pulses can be said to be sought most to reach (i.e. consume) by the horses, the same ('*māṣa*' pulses) could be insisted to be the objects in the statement 'he ties the horses in the '*māṣa*' pulless' (*māṣeṣu aśvam badhnāti*). However, suppose the word 'to the agent' (*kartuḥ*) is used in the rule, then the '*māṣa*' pulses can be prevented from being considered as the object; for, despite that the horse is the agent of consuming, the same is merely the object of tying and hence horse's seeking the '*māṣa*' pulses to reach becomes irrelevant from the view point of considering the same as the object. What would be relevant is the agent's (Devadatta's) seeking the *māṣa* pulses to reach; however, since he does not seek the '*māṣa*' pulses to reach, the same cannot be insisted to be the objects. The significance of the use of the term 'object' (*karma*) in the rule can be explained as follows : Despite³ that the term 'object' (*karma*) is not used in the rule, the same term can certainly be supplied from the earlier rule '*adhi śin sthā āsām karmā*' (p. 1.4.46). However, in that case, only the locus which the agent seeks most to reach could be taken to be the 'object' (*karma*) since the rule (p. i.4.46) is meant to enjoin the name 'object' to the locus of occupation etc., i.e. to avoid the continuation of the sense of the locus with the continuation of the object (*ādhāra nivr̥ttyartham*). Therefore, in order to avoid such a mistake, Pāṇini has employed the term '*karma*' separately in the rule. Thus, the rule should be understood as enjoying the

2. Kāśika on p. i.4.49.

3. Bālaṃanoramā p. 272.

name 'object' to the *kāraka*, which the agent seeks most to reach, i.e. which the agent desires very much to obtain through his action. Thus, the first rule can be concluded to assign the name 'object' to those entities which are sought most by the agent to reach through his actions i.e. which the agent desires very much to obtain through his own actions.

Significance of the term 'not sought' in the rule (p. 1.4.50)

Bhairavīkāra explains the significance of the use of the term 'not sought, (*anīpsita*) in the rule (i.4.50) as follows : The rule (i.4.49) assigns the name 'object' to only those entities that are sought most to be the abode of the effect produced by the action occurring in the agent and therefore, the second rule (i.4.50) is necessary to assign the name 'object' to those entities that are not sought by the agent. Now, some may hold that since the rule (i.4.50) is enjoined separately, the entities that are hated by or indifferent to the agent also get the name 'object' automatically by the second rule (i.4.50). And therefore, the word 'not sought' (*anīpsita*) is not necessary in the rule (i.4.50) to assign the name 'object' to the entities that are hated by or indifferent to the object.

However, this position is not correct. For, suppose the term 'not sought' is not included in the rule, then the rule could be interpreted to mean that 'the abode of the effect produced by the action, like the entity which is sought most to be the abode of the effect produced by the action, is the object'. And consequently, even the fire etc., in the statement 'he prevents the boy from (falling into) the fire' etc., would get the name 'object' since the rule (i.4.50) would assign the name 'object' to those entities that are the abode of the effect produced by the action; and the fire is indeed the abode of the effect produced from the action of preventing. Thus, the rule assigning the name 'ablation' (i.e. i.4.27) would be rendered scopeless. To avoid this difficulty, it is absolutely necessary that the term 'not sought' must be included in the rule (i.4.50) so that only those entities that are hated by or indifferent to the agent can get the name 'object' by the rule.

Here the term 'not sought' does not mean an entity that is different from the one that is sought after; rather it means

any entity that is opposite to what is sought most. And the opposition of the entities that are sought most to the entities that are hated by or indifferent to the agent are well known. Thus, the fire etc. in spite of the fact that they are the abode of the effect produced by the action, cannot be assigned the name 'object' since the same is not 'not sought'.

Necessity of the two rule p. i.4.49 and p. i 4 50

The second rule, namely, that the object is also what the agent does not seek to reach i.e. obtain through his actions but is associated by chance, with the effect (p. i 4.50) is composed in order that the poison etc. in the statement 'he eats poison' (*viṣam bhakṣayati*) etc. should get the name object despite that the same is not sought most by the agent to be reached through his actions. That is to say that since the first rule (i.4.49) assigns the name 'object' to only those entities which are sought most by the agent to be reached i.e. obtain through his actions, the poison etc; which can not be claimed to be sought most by the agent to be reached through his action of eating (this is despite that he actually consumes the poison), cannot be assigned the name 'object' by the first rule. And, in order that the entities that are not sought most such as the poison should get the name 'object' (provided that the same are associated with the effect) the second rule (p. i.4.50) is composed. And, once the rule (p. i.4.50) is composed to assign the name 'object' to even the entities that are not sought most but are associated with the effect, the poison in the statement 'he eats the poison' can be assigned the name grammatical object' since the same is indeed associated with the effect namely, the contact with throat despite that the same is not sought most to be consumed by the agent.

Patañjalis explanation

Patañjali, for the first time, has adopted a logical approach to explain the necessity of the composition of the two rules which is as follows : It is possible that the first rule (p. i.4.49) be interpreted to mean that the object is what the agent intends to be the abode of the effect produced by the action occurring in the agent himself. Consequently, the village in the statement 'Caitra goes to the village, can be explained to be the object

since the same is what the agent intends to be the abode of the contact, the effect, produced by the action of going that occurs in the agent, Caitra i.e. Therefore, the contention that the same rule can assign the name 'object' to even the entities such as the poison in 'he eats poison' etc; is erroneous; for, the poison, despite being the abode of the contact with throat, the effect produced by the action of eating that occurs in the agent, Caitra, cannot be considered to be the object since the same is not what the agent intends to be the abode of the effect produced by the action of eating occurring in himself. Thus, while the first rule p. i.4.49 is necessary to assign the name 'object' to the village etc. which are intended, the second rule p. i.4.50 is necessary to assign the name 'object' to 'poison' etc. which are not intended.

Now, it may be argued as follows : When a person is suffering from long illness poverty etc., even the consupition of the poison may be regarded as intended by the agent. And therefore, the poison in the statement 'he eats poison' can be considered to be the object of eating since the same is what is intended to be the abode of the effect. Thus, the second rule is not necessary.

However, this argument is also not sound. Although the poison could be regarded as the grammatical object since the agent intends the same to be the abode of the effect, the thieves etc. in 'he sees the thieves etc. while going to the village' (*grāmam gacchan caurān paśyati*) cannot be regarded as the grammatical object since the same thieves, by no stretch of imagination can be said to be what the agent intends to be the abode of the effect produced by the action of going occurring in himself. Consequently, the second rule is also necessary to facilitate the assigning of the name 'object' to the entities such as thieves which are hated by the agent.

Also, it should be noted that the second rule assigns the name object to even those entities that are indifferent i.e. that are neither sought after i.e. intended nor are hated most, but are simply the abode of the effect by chance. This is made possible by analysing the negative compound 'not intended' (*anīpsita*) as *paryudāsa*; that is to say that by analysing the compound as 'whatever is other than intended'. Thus, even the

roots of the tree, which may become, by sheer accident, the abode of the contact, the effect produced by the action of reaching in the statement 'he reaches the roots of the tree while going to some village' can be assigned the name 'object'.

Bhaṭṭoji's explanation of the necessity of two rules

According to Bhaṭṭojidīkṣita, the necessity of the two different rules is explained as follows : Suppose the object be defined as the being what is the abode of the effect produced by the action occurring in the agent, then all types of objects viz. the village, which is sought most, the thief, who is hated and the roots of the tree, which are neither sought most nor hated but are reached by accident, can be assigned the name 'object' due to their being merely the abode of the effect ('contact' etc.) produced by the action (going etc.). Consequently, it can be argued that the rule should be formed in such a way as not to include either the term 'sought most' (*īpsitatama*) or the term 'not sought' (*anīpsita*) so that a single rule such as 'that which possess the effect produced by the action of the agent' (*kartuḥ kriyayā āptam karma*) would suffice to cover all types of objects. However, this argument is not tenable. The rule 'that which is sought to be prevented from is ablation' (*vāraṇārthānām īpsitaḥ*) (p. i.4.27) assigns the name 'ablation' (*apādāna*) to all those entities that are sought (*īpsita*) to be obtained by the agent through his actions. And, suppose 'sought most' (*īpsitatama*) is not included (i.e. suppose only the term 'sought' is included) in the rule (p.i.4.49) assigning the name object, then it would follow that the rule (p. i.4.27) and also the rule (p. i.4.49) would have simultaneous applicability in assigning the name 'ablation' and also the name 'object' respectively; and also, suppose simultaneous applicability is conceded for the two rules, then the rule (p. i.4.27) would have priority over the rule (p. i.4.49) since the same is an exceptional one. Consequently, the boy etc. in the statement 'he prevents the boy from falling into the fire' (*agner māṇavakam vārayati*) would become difficult to be avoided from being considered the ablation since the same boy, who is sought after by the agent could be assigned the name ablation by the rule (p. i.4.29) taking precedence over the rule (i.4.49). Thus, it becomes absolutely necessary that the word 'sought most'

(*īpsitatama*) be included in the rule (i.4.49) to avoid the simultaneous applicability of the two rules (p. i.4.27 and p. i.4.49) and thereby to avoid the assigning of the name 'ablation' to the boy etc. in such statements. And when the word 'sought most'⁴ is included in the rule (i.4.49), the same rule can assign the name 'object' to only those entities that are sought most by the agent such as the village and not to the entities that are not sought most by the agent such as the thieves. Therefore, in order to facilitate the assigning of the name object to those entities that are not sought most (i.e. that are hated, indifferent etc.), the formation of the second rule (i.4.50) is also necessary.

Nāgesha's explanation

Nageśa was greatly influenced by Patañjalis explanation of the two rules and therefore, accepts that the object is the abode of the effect. However, he was equally influenced by the epistemological and syntactico-semantical function of the object. He states that the first rule should be understood to assign the name 'object' to only those *kāraṅkas* that possess the power of the objectness that is co-occurrent with the qualificandness conditioned by the intention (i.e. desire) of the agent such as the object be the abode of the effect produced by the root-meaning 'action'. Here, the qualificandness of the object is suggested by the use of the word 'sought most' (*īpsitatama*) in the rule (p. i.4.49).

It is necessary here that the object be considered to be the qualificand of the intention (desire) of the agent. For, suppose the object is not considered to be the qualificand of the intention, (i.e. suppose the rule p. i.4.49 is understood to enjoin the name 'object' to all those entities that are the abode of the effect produced by the action), then it would become impossible to explain the use of the word 'with the object' (*karmanā*) in the rule (p. i.4.32) 'that which is sought to be associated with the

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4. When the rule (i.4.49) has the word 'sought most' included in its body, the rule (i.4.29) consisting of the word 'sought' becomes general in its application to all those entities that are sought after by the agent and so cannot be exceptionless.

object is the recipient (i.e. indirect object'). Here, in the rule (p. i.4.32), the word 'with object' (*karmanā*) is used to distinguish the indirect object such as the Brahmin, who is associated with the object namely the cow, from the cow, which itself is the object and hence is not associated with the object, in the statement such as 'he gives cow to the Brahmin'. Thus, it becomes established that the rule (p. i.4.49) assigns the name 'object' to only those entities that are the qualificands of the intention of the agent that such an entity be the abode of the effect produced by his action. And consequently, since the rule (p. i.4.49) assigns the name 'object' to only those entities that are the qualificands of the intention, the objects that are hated and indifferent remain uncovered, and therefore, to assign the name 'object' to those hated and other types of objects, the second (p. i.4.50) and also the third (p. i.4.51) rules become necessary.

It should be noted here that the object is perceived to be the qualificand of the intention means the same as being characterized or distinguished by the state of being what is sought most by the agent. For instance, the village in the case of 'Caitra goes to the village' is perceived to be the qualificand of the intention of the agent such as 'may the village be the abode of the effect 'contact' produced by the action of going'. And such a qualificandness is nothing but being distinguished by the state of being what is sought most by the agent since the agent Caitra does indeed seek most the village to be the abode of the effect 'contact'. This instance is similar to the instance of perceiving a particular house as distinguished by the crow-sitting. Here too, the house is the qualificand of the crow-sitting means being the same is distinguished by the crow-sitting.

It may also be noted here that according to Kaṇḍa-bhaṭṭa,⁵ the qualificandness conditioned by the intention (i.e. the state of being what is sought most by the agent) is not comprehended in the verbal cognition of the statements such as 'he goes to the village' etc. This is so because, it does not serve any specific purpose in comprehending such a state of the object in the verbal cognition. This is not to deny, however, that such a

state of the qualificandness does not exist in the village etc. Since the rule (p. i.4.49) specifically assigns the name 'object' to only those entities that are 'sought most', such a state does indeed exist in the object such as the village.

Gadādhara's explanation

Gadādhara, one of the most important epistemologists of Navya-nyāya logic, also explains the necessity of two different rules assigning the name 'object'. He examines closely the explanation given by Patañjali in his *Mahābhāṣya* and then adopts an epistemological or syntactico-semantic approach to explain the different rules. According to him, Pāṇini has composed different rules assigning the name 'object' to suggest that the objectness should be defined individually to suit the individual cases of subject. Gadādhara's explanation can be summed up as follows : The rule (i.4.49) can be taken to suggest that the objectness (of the village etc.) is the state of being what is the qualificand of the desire such as 'the village should be the abode of the effect 'contact' produced by the action 'going'. However, the rule (i.4.50) is to be taken to suggest that the objectness (of the poison etc.) is merely the state of being what is the abode of the effect 'contact' down below the throat produced by the eating; and not that the same (objectness) is the state of being what is the qualificand of desire. For, the state of being what is the qualificand of the desire cannot be claimed to be present in the objects such as poison that are hated. Also, it should be noted here that despite the objectness, in general, can be stated to be the state of being what is the abode of the effect, the same should not be defined to be so in general. This point becomes evident from the fact that Pāṇini has composed different rules to assign the name 'object' to different types of objects. Therefore, the objectness should be defined only individually as the state of being what is the qualificand of the desire etc. Consequently, it is possible to explain the statement such as 'he does not eat poison' (*viṣam anena na bhuḥjyate*) provided that the same is made when the eating of rice grains is intended but, by chance, the poison is also swallowed. For, in such a case, the poison is not the qualificand of the desire such as 'may the rice grains be the abode of the contact down below the throat, the effect,

produced by the action of eating. This is despite that, in actuality, the poison is the abode of the contact down below the throat produced by the eating. On the other hand, suppose the objectness is defined, in general without involving the desire, i.e. as the state of being the abode of the effect produced by the action, then the above statement would become untenable since the poison is indeed the abode of the effect, 'contact down below the throat', and so the negative particle 'not' (*na*) cannot refer to the absence of the contact down below the throat in the poison. Also, it should be noted here that the inflectional affixes such as conjugational endings should be held to refer to both the types of objectness, i.e. the objectness involving the desire and that without involving the desire. Otherwise, suppose the inflectional affixes are held to denote only the objectness involving the desire, then the statements such as 'he eats poison by chance' (*daivād viṣam bhuḥjyate*), which are accepted by scholars as valid, would become difficult to explain. This is so because, the objectness involving the desire, is contradictory in the poison which is never desired by the agent to be the abode of the effect viz. the contact down below the throat. On the other hand, suppose the inflectional affixes are held to denote the objectness, without involving the desire as well, then the statements such as 'he eats poison by chance' can be explained since the poison is indeed the abode of the effect 'contact down below the throat'. This is despite that the same poison is never desired to be the abode of such a contact.

And once the fact that the inflectional affixes denote both types of the objectness, is accepted, it becomes quite necessary that the two rules (namely p. i.4.49 and p. i.4.50) suggest the denotation of both types of the objectness. Thus, whereas the first rule (p. i.4.49) suggests the denotation of the objectness involving the desire and therefore the correctness of the same, the second rule (p. i.4.50) suggests the denotation of the objectness not involving the desire and therefore the correctness of the same.

Khaṇḍadevas explanation

Khaṇḍadeva, the most vocal of all the epistemologists, has adopted both epistemological i.e. syntactico semantical and logical approaches in his explanation of the necessity of the two

rules. According to him, the inflectional affixes, such as the accusative and conjugational endings, denote the objectness, which is common to all types of objects and hence economical. Such an objectness is of the from of an indivisible property (*akhaṇḍopādhi*) co-extensive with the state of being the substratum of the effect produced by the action. Consequently, since the objectness is one and common to all, the difficulty that different types of the objectness lead to different denotations, stands refuted. One may argue here that when the inflectional affixes are held to denote the objectness, co-extensive with the state of being the abode of the effect, the composition of two different rules, enjoining the name 'object' to different types of objects, becomes difficult to justify. For, all types of objects can be cognized even if the rule is formed in general as that which is pervaded with (i.e. is the abode of) the effect'.

Nevertheless, this argument is not correct. For, it is absolutely necessary that, despite the objectness being an indivisible property and common to all types of objects, the first rule (p. i.4.49) be composed for assigning the name 'object' to only such type of object which is 'sought most by the agent' to be the abode of the effect. Otherwise, as explained in *Mahābhāṣya*, both the boy as well as the fire in the statement 'he prevents the boy from falling into the fire', would become eligible for the name 'ablation' since both of them are sought by the agent to be the abode of different effects. Thus, since the first rule must assign the name 'object' to only such objects as that are 'sought most by the agent' to be the abode of the effect, the second rule (p. i.4.50) becomes necessary assign to the name 'object' to those objects which are not sought most i.e. which are hated or indifferent.

It should be noted here as follows : According to some ritualists, headed by the author of *Nyāyasudhā*, only the first rule, namely 'that which is sought most by the agent to be the abode of the effect, produced by the action, is the object' (p. i.4.49), is to be held as assigning the name 'object'; and consequently the inflectional suffixes such as the accusative case ending have the denotation in the objectness assigned by the same rule (p. i.4.49) alone. This is so because, only the rule (p. i.4.49), being first in enumeration, can assign the name 'object';

whereas the rule p. i.4.50, like the rule p. iii.3.19, being later in enumeration can only suggest the extension of the name 'object' by implication to even those that are hated or indifferent. Thus, these ritualists hold, that only the first rule assigns the name 'object', whereas the second and third rules merely suggest extension of the application of the name 'object' by implication to even those which are hated etc. However, such a position is not acceptable to Khaṇḍadeva. He states that, in accordance with the economy of assumption, it has already been established that the accusative and other inflectional endings must denote only the objectness in general which is an indivisible property and co-extensive in its occurrence with the state of being the abode of the effect. And, such an objectness being common to all types of objects, namely those that are sought most and also those that are not sought most, the rule p. i.4.50 can be held to be assigning the denotation of the accusative and other inflectional endings in the sense of the objectness like the rule p. i.4.49 is held to be doing so. Nevertheless, the rule (p.iii.3.39) 'not enumerated among the *kāraḥ*' must be held to suggest only the indication of the inflectional affixes in the objectness as the denotation of such suffixes in the secondary objects such as the 'cow' in 'he milks the milk (from) the cow' is quite impossible. Thus, Khaṇḍadeva rejects the position of the author of Nyāyasūdhā and others on the ground that both the rule p. i.4.49 and p. i.4.50 can be legitimately held to be assigning the denotation in the sense of the objectness.

Critical examination

It can be observed now that among the epistemologists, Patañjali was the first to justify the composition of the two rules p. i.4.49 and p.i.4.50. He explains that the rule (p.i.4.49) assigns the name 'object' to only those entities that are intended by the agent to be the abode of the effect such as the village in the statement 'he goes to the village'; and therefore, the same rule cannot assign the name 'object' to those entities that are not intended by the agent to be the abode of the effect such as the thieves in the statement 'he sees the thieves while going to the village'. Accordingly, he states that the rule p. i.4.50 is necessary to assign the name 'object' to those entities which are not

intended by the agent i.e. which are hated by to be the abode of the effect or indifferent to him.

In this explanation Patañjali can be said to have brought out the real intention of Pāṇini that there are such objects as the village and the thieves which are totally different in their nature and fulfill different 'wants' of the agent. And therefore, to assign the name 'object' to such different types of objects, two different rules are necessary. However, as Bhaṭṭoji reports Patañjali has come out with yet another explanation of the rule (p. i.4.50) which is a logical one and therefore, much more satisfactory. According to this explanation, it is absolutely necessary that the word 'sought most' be included in the first rule (p. i.4.48). Otherwise, since the rule 'that, which is sought to be prevented from, is ablation' (p. i.4.27) also does not consists of the word 'sought most' (both would consist of only 'sought'), the rule (p. i.4.49) rules have simultaneous applicability with the rule (p. i.4.27); and hence, the same rule (p. i.4.27), being exceptional one, would have priority over the rule (p.i.4.49). Consequently, the boy etc., in 'he prevents the boy from (falling into) fire, could also get the name 'ablation'. Thus, since the inclusion of the word 'sought most' is absolutely necessary in the rule (p. i.4.49), the same (rule) cannot assign the name object to the hated and other objects and therefor the second rule (p. i.4.50) is justified. In this explanation Patañjali has resorted to the logical way of establishing the necessity of the word 'sought most' in the first rule (p. i.4.49) so that the second rule (p. i.4.50) can be held necessary to assign the name 'object' to those that are 'not sought most'.

Nāgeśa can be said to have justified the composition of the two rules adopting an epistemological i.e. syntactico semantical approach. According to him, the term 'sought most' should be taken to suggest the qualificandness of the object conditioned by the intention (i.e. desire) that the object, such as the village, be the abode of the effect such as the contact produced by the action. Otherwise, he states, the use of the term 'with the object' (*karmanā*) in the rule (p. i.4.32) would become difficult to explain since the same is used to distinguish the indirect object from the object as that which is sought to be associated with the object is the indirect object. And, once the

term 'sought most' is taken to suggest the qualificandness of the object conditioned by the intention, the first rule (p. i.4.49) can assign the name object to only those entities which are intended by the agent to be the abode of the effect produced by the action, and therefore, the second rule (p. i.4.50) becomes necessary so that the entities, which are not intended by the agent to be the abode of the effect produced by the action, can also be assigned the name 'object'.

This explanation justifies the composition of the second rule by establishing that the term 'sought most' is necessary in the first rule and therefore only the second rule can assign the name 'object' to hated and other types of objects.

Gadādhara too can be said to have adopted an epistemological or syntactico semantical approach in his justification of the composition of the two rules. He has defended however, the composition of the two rules separately on the ground that the two rules are meant to suggest the fact that the objectness should be defined individually to suit the individual cases of objects. Of course, he has been guided in this endeavour, by the interpretation of the rule (p. i.4.49) by Patañjali that the object is what the agent intends to be the abode of effect produced by the action occurring in the agent himself. However, the credit that Gadādhara has come up with an original idea in defending the two rules cannot be taken away. Also, it should be noted that his suggestion that despite that the objectness can be defined in general the same (objectness) should not be defined so in general.

For, although general definition of the objectness would be helpful in presenting a general or unified view of the objects, such a definition, for the sake of generalization or for the case of achieving economy, would destroy the very purpose of introducing various types of objects. Thus, Gadādhara has taken a very balanced view in justifying the two separate rules.

It can be observed now that Khaṇḍadeva has adopted both logical and epistemological approach to justify the two rules. For, according to him, both rules (p. i.4.49 and p. i.4.50) must necessarily be held to be suggestive of only the denotation of the inflectional affixes such as the accusative ending in the sense of the objectness. He states that there is no justification as

to why only one of the two rules, namely p. i.4.49, and not the rule p. i.4.50, should be accepted to be suggestive of the denotation of such inflectional affixes in the sense of the objectness. Also, he states that it is irresponsible, when Pāṇini has composed two different rules assigning the name 'object', to two different types of objects, to hold that only one of them suggests the denotation whereas the other (namely p. i.4.50) suggests merely the indication of such inflectional affixes in the sense of the objectness.

According to Khaṇḍadeva, the two rules are composed with the explicit intention of assigning the name 'object' to two different types of objects i.e. those which involve the desire and also those which do not involve the desire; and therefore, both the rules must be held to suggest the denotation. However, since in his theory, the objectness is one and common to all types of objects, there will not be any danger that when the denotation of inflectional affixes is accepted in the sense of the objectness, then, due to the multiplicity of the delimiters or the denoted things i.e. the objectness, denotations of the inflectional affixes also multiply.

Conclusion

It can be concluded now as follows : Indian epistemologists, without any exception whether they are grammarians, logicians or ritualists, have unanimously defended the composition of the two different rules to assign the name 'object' to different types of objects. They have shown a very conservative approach to the problem of defending the different rules defining the grammatical object and their classification. In other words, none of them actually discarded any of the Pāṇiniyan rules as redundant or unnecessary. For them, it was almost an 'offence' that any of Pāṇiniyan rules could be termed as 'superfluous'. They have used every conceivable plays and arguments to justify the different rules of Pāṇini and their words. It is not that the thought that two separate rules to assign the name 'object' are futile never occurred to them. Many of them generally perceived the difficulty in defending the two different rules, specially the second rule p. i.4.50. However, instead of terming the composition of the two rules as superfluous or redundant, they have

voiced their difficulty in the form of a 'prima facie' view (*pūrva-pakṣa*) or a doubt (*śaṅkā*). And doing so, they have taken recourse to the traditional methodology of śāstrakāras. However, the most important contribution of these epistemologist which is an out come of their exercise to defend the different rules is that the different rules are meant to suggest the distinct definitions of the objectness to suit the individual case of objects.

CHAPTER IX

THEORY OF THE OBJECTNESS

Karmatva

Introduction

Pāṇini has clearly distinguished the underlying syntactico-semantic notions of the deep structure from the cases of the surface structure. As has been pointed out already, the underlying syntactico-semantic notions are called '*kāraḥ*', whereas the cases are called '*vibhaktis*'. The syntactico-semantic notions or *kāraḥ* are six in number and they are called ablation (*apādāna*), indirect object (*sampradāna*) instrument (*karaṇa*), locus (*adhikaraṇa*) object (*karman*) and agent (*kartṛ*).

Pāṇini has conceived an individual role i.e. function for each of the six *kāraḥ*. He has defined them most logically as 'he who is the independent (in actions) is agent' (*svatantraḥ kartā*) etc. The role or function of the grammatical object (*karman*) is that it is the most cherished or desired thing for the 'agent' (*kartṛ*). Accordingly, Pāṇini defines the 'object' (*karman*) as 'that which the agent seeks most to reach or obtain through his actions is the object' (*kartur īpsitatam karma*) (i.4.49). For instance consider the objects 'mat' and 'village' in '*kaṭam karoti*' (he makes a mat) and '*gramam gacchati*' (he goes to village). Here, the agent desires the mat and the village most (i.e. he wants to make a mat and wants to go to the village); and therefore they are the objects of making and also going respectively.

According to Pāṇini 'grammatical object' '*karman*' is a name or designation (*saṁjñā*) as well. He assigns this name to various other *kāraḥ* under special circumstances, besides to the actual object (i.e. that which the agent seeks most to obtain

through his actions or does not seek so); so that the words expressing the other *kāra*kas too can assume the accusative case endings in the active construction. The *kāra*kas other than the objects, which are assigned the name 'grammatical object' under the special circumstances, are enumerated as follows : In the case of the verbs '*krudh*' and '*druh*', when preceded by preposition, the person against whom the feeling of anger etc. is directed is called object *kāra*ka, (*krudha druhor upasṛṣṭayoh karma* p. i.4.38). That which is especially auxiliary in the accomplishment of the action of the verb *div* (to play) is called object *kāra*ka and instrument *kāra*ka' (*divah karma ca* p. i.4.43). That which is the locus with respect to the actions expressed by '*śi*' (to lie down) '*sthā*' (to stand) '*ās*' (to sit), when preceded by the preposition '*adhi*', is however, called object *kāra*ka (*adhiśiṅ sthāsām karma* p. i.4.46). That which is the locus with respect to the action expressed by the verb *abhiniviś*' (to enter) is also called object *kāra*ka. (*abhiniviśaśca* p. i.4.47).

That which is the locus with respect to the action expressed by the verb '*vas*' (to dwell) when preceded by *upa*, *anu*, *adhi* and *ān* is called object *kāra*ka (*upān vadyān vasaḥ* p.i.4.48).

And, that *kāra*ka which is not mentioned as coming under any of the special *kāra*kas such as ablation etc. is also called 'object' *kāra*ka (*akāthintam ca* p.i.4.51).

Of the verbs having the sense of 'motion' 'knowledge' or 'information' and 'eating', and of 'motion' verbs that have some literary work for their 'object', and of intransitive verbs that which was the agent of the verb in its primitive sense, is called object *kāra*ka with respect to causative state (*gatibuddhipratya-vasānārthaśabdakarmā-karmakāṇām aṇi kartā sa nau* p.i.4.52).

The agent of the verb in its non causative i.e. primitive form in the case of *hr* (to loose) '*kr*' to (make) is optionally called object *kāra*ka when these verbs take the affix. (*hrkror anyatarasyām* p. i.4.53).

Patañjali's explanation

Patañjali states that suppose the word 'most' (*tamap*) is not used in the rule (p. i.4.49), then the rule would mean that 'that what the agent seeks through his actions is the object'; and hence, even the fire (*agni*) is sought (because through the

action of keeping away we mean to keep the fire out of reach of the boy) like the boy, would get the name 'object' (*karman*) in the statement 'he keeps the boy away from the fire' (*agner māṇavakam vārayati*). In order to overcome such a difficulty, 'most' (*tama*) should be used in the rule; and once it is used, only the boy would get the name 'object' since only he is sought most.

Patañjali justifies the name 'object' (*karman*) for rice (*odana*) in the statement such as 'he cooks the rice' (*odanam pacati*) by suggesting that the word 'rice' (*odana*) does not refer to the 'cooked rice' which would imply that it produces something different, but rather the same refers to the rice grains (*taṇḍula*) which are meant for the cooked rice by the principle of the use of one word for other (*ācchobdya*). Thus, since the rice grains are sought most to be cooked for the sake of 'rice', the name 'object' becomes applicable to 'rice' (*odana*).

Also, in the double accusative statements such as 'he cooks rice grains into cooked rice' (*taṇḍulam odanam pacati*), where one is a direct object undergoing a change (*vikārya karman*) and another is a direct object which is to be produced (*nirvartyakarma*), the verb 'cook' (*pac*) has a double meaning namely, the sense of producing (*nirvartana*) and that of 'making soft' (*vikledana*) where the latter is subordinate to the former. Thus, such a statement means 'by making rice grains soft he produces cooked rice' (*taṇḍulān vikledayan odanam nirvartayati*). Here, the rice grains function as the object with respect to the action of making soft and 'rice' function as the object with respect to the action of producing. However, when only a sense of the 'connection with the product' (*vikārayoga*) is meant to be expressed, genitive-accusative statement such as 'out of the rice grains he cooks rice' (*taṇḍulanām odanam pacati*) is made; and such a statement means that he produces cooked rice which is a product of rice grains (*taṇḍulān vikaranayn odanam nirvartayati*).

In the case of 'he eats rice with milk' (*payasā odanam bhunkte*) too, what is 'sought most' is only the rice along with the milk and not milk as such. And therefore, only the 'rice' (*odana*) gets the name 'object' whereas the 'milk' (*payas*) gets the name 'instrument' due to its ability to provide extra qualities such as taste.

Again, in the statements such as 'he eats brown sugar' (*guḍam bhakṣayati*), only the eating the brown sugar is sought most and not just any eating; otherwise he would become satisfied even by eating a piece of mud. Thus, despite that eating too is desired, only the brown sugar (*guḍa*) is sought most and so gets the name 'object' (*kārman*).

Observation

Patanjali does not actually explain the rule as such; however, it is clear that he meant the grammatical object to be the entity that is sought most to obtain by the agent through his actions. According to him, Pāṇini has used the term 'most' (*tama*) to make name 'object' applicable to only the object that is primarily desired. Thus, he avoids the name 'object' to non-objects such as fire, in 'he keeps the boy away from the fire' etc. Also, he makes a fine distinction between the objects such as rice, which are desired most, and also subsidiaries such as milk which are desired simply. According to him, the phrase 'sought most' distinguishes such entities as rice and milk, both of which are desired, by bringing in the element of most desired and thus makes the name 'object' applicable to only the rice which is the actual object.

Finally, the most important contribution of Patanjali is his implied suggestion that the object is what is sought to be obtained through the action, i.e., what is the abode of the effect produced by the action. Thus, he states that in statements such as 'he cooks the rice grains into cooked rice' (*taṇḍulan odanam pacati*) the rice grains are objects since they function as some thing to be made soft and cooked rice is the object since it functions as something to be produced.

Vāmanas explanation

Vāmana explains Pāṇini's rule 'that which the agent desires most to obtain is the object' (*kartur īpsitatamam karma* p.i.4.49) as 'the *kāraka*, which the agent seeks most to reach through his action, is the object' (*kartuḥ kriyayā āptum iṣṭatamam karma*). For instance, consider the object 'mat' and 'village' in the statements '*caitraḥ kaṭam karoti*' (Caitra makes a mat) and '*caitraḥ gramam gacchati*' (Caitra goes to the village). Here the agent,

namely Caitra, seeks most to reach the mat and the village through his actions of making and going respectively; and therefore, the same mat and the village become the object of making and going.

Observation

Vāmana follows Patañjali in his explanation. He was obviously influenced by Patanjali's views that an entity has to be determined as the object due to the function it has with respect to the action. However, Vāmana states clearly in words that the object is what the agent seeks most to reach through his actions, whereas Patanjali had only implied such a sense.

Problem

Grammatical object (*karman*) can be analysed to be either (i) an logical entity, (ii) a syntactical entity, or (iii) a syntactico semantical entity. Most of the Indian epistemologists have analysed the grammatical object as logical entity. They have done so on the ground that the same (grammatical object) is perceived to be the abode of the effect in the verbal cognition i.e. analysis of the sentence meaning. Consider for instance, the grammatical object such as the village (*grāma*) in the verbal cognition of the statement 'Caitra goes to the village' (*caitro grāmam gacchati*). According to the grammarians, the verbal cognition from such a statement is that the action of going which produces the contact occurring in the abode identical with the object village, occurs in the agent identical with Caitra. And according to the logicians, the verbal cognition from such a statement is that Caitra is the abode of the action which produces the contact occurring in the village.

In such verbal cognitions, the grammatical object 'village', is perceived to be the abode of the effect produced by the action of going occurring in the agent; and hence forms an essential part of the verbal cognition.

The grammatical object is a syntactical entity because the same fulfils the syntactical expectancy for an object such as what does one undertake etc. Consider, for instance the same village in the same statement. Here, the village fulfils the syntactical expectancy for 'what does one go to' by providing an object in

the accusative. Therefore, Pāṇini has ruled that when the object is not referred to by the conjugational ending etc., the accusative case endings are used after an object (p. ii.3.1).

The grammatical object is a semantical entity because it is the meaning expressed by the accusative case ending in the active construction and the conjugational and other grammatical element in the passive construction. For instance, consider the object village in the example (*caitraḥ grāmam gacchati*) once again. Here, the accusative ending (*am*) denotes the fact that the village is the object *kāraṇa*. Therefore, Pāṇini has ruled that the accusative case endings are used in the sense of the object (p. ii.3.2). Thus, the grammatical object is, in logical, syntactical and semantical entity.

Both grammarians and logicians adopt logical approach to define the object as the substratum or abode of the effect produced by the action occurring in the agent. Nevertheless, the difference between the approaches of the grammarians and also that of the logicians is that whereas the grammarians follow strictly the explanation of the rule p. i.4.49 provided by Patañjali and others and therefore, define the object individually as what is intended by the agent to be the substratum of the effect caused by the action, the logicians have a general stance and try to define the object generally as what is the substratum of the effect produced by the action without including the element of the agent's desire in the definition. Thus, in later times most of the controversies are centered around the individualization and generalization of the definition of the objectness and also around the various modifications of those definitions and resulting economies.

However, number of Indian epistemologists were greatly influenced by the syntactical as well as the syntactico-semantical functions of the grammatical object.

Among the epistemologists, who were influenced by the syntactical function of the grammatical object, the most important name is that of Khaṇḍadeva. He has defined the grammatical object syntactically and provided a very interesting alternative theory of the grammatical object.

Jaḍadīśa, on the other hand, appreciated both the syntactical and semantical function of the grammatical object.

Consequently, he has defined the grammatical object in terms of syntactico-semantic entity; and thereby provided the most important theory in the history of the definitions of the grammatical object. We shall first undertake to explain various definitions of the objectness based on logical considerations and then undertake to explain the definitions based on syntactical and syntactico-semantic considerations.

Grammarians theories based on logical principle

The grammarians and also the others, who have adopted the epistemological approach to the analysis of the objectness, have formulated their theories of the objectness on the two logical principles (i) that the object is what is desired or sought most by the agent and also (ii) that the object is what is the abode of the effect produced by the action. Here the explanations of the rule p. i.4.49 etc. as 'the object is what the agent seeks most by his actions etc.' has provided the first principle; whereas Patanjali's implied suggestion of verbal denotation that the roots convey two separate senses namely an action and also its effect; and therefore, object is the abode of the effect' has provided the second principle.

Baṭṭoj's theory

Bhaṭṭojidīkṣita, following the explanations of the rule (p. i.4.49), holds that the object should be defined individually as the *kāraka* which the agent desires as being the possessor of the effect, caused directly or indirectly by the action occurring in himself. For instance, in 'Caitra goes to the village' (*grāmam gacchati caitraḥ*), the village, which the agent, Caitra, desires as being the possessor of the effect, contact, caused directly by the action 'going' occurring in himself, is the object.

However, in causative statements such as 'Caitra makes Maitra go to the village' (*caitraḥ grāmam gamayati maitram*), the village, which the agent, Caitra, desires as being the possessor of the effect contact, indirectly caused by the causative action 'causing to go' occurring in himself, is the object.

Nāgesha's theory

Nāgesha too follows the explanations of the rule (p. i.4. 49) in defining the 'object'. However, according to him, the explanation of the rule should be taken to mean that the object is what is intended by the agent to be the abode of the effect, but not occurring in the same locus as that of the effort caused by the action occurring in himself. Thus, for instance, the 'rice grains' in the statement 'Caitra cooks the rice grains' can be explained to be the object since Caitra, the agent, intends that the same (rice grains) be the abode of the effect 'softness' through inherence and also that the same is not occurring in the same locus as that of the effort caused by the action 'cooking' occurring in Caitra himself.

Here too, the effect must be considered to be caused directly or indirectly by the action. Consequently, even the village possessing the effect contact, which is indirectly caused by the causative action, can be considered to be the object 'in Caitra causes Maitra go to the village'. Nevertheless,³ the effect caused directly or indirectly by the action' should be taken to be merely conventional and hence common to even the non produced effects. Consequently, the contentness of pot, which is not caused directly or indirectly by the action 'knowing, can still be considered to be the effect in the statement 'he knows the pot (*ghaṭam jānāti*) since the same (contentness of pot) is conventionally known as the effect the action 'knowing'.

Nāgesha states that 'objectness' (*karmatva*) cannot be defined to be simply what is intended to be the abode of the effect. For, in that case, the statement 'objectness is due to being the abode of the effect' would mean that 'what is intended to be the abode of the effect is due to being the abode of the effect' and thus would become redundant.

2. Manjūśā, p. 1203.

3. In association with the roots referring to certain objects i.e. having a reference to certain contents, the contentness (*viśayatā*) must be regarded to be the effect. However, such contentness are not directly or indirectly caused by the action 'knowing' etc.

Nāgesha states also that the object should be considered to be the abode of the effect through the delimiting relation of the effect. The delimiting relation of the effect is what is viewed to be the relation of the effect in the desire such as 'may the effect, softness, occur in the rice grains through the relation of inherence' etc. Consequently, only the rice grains, which are the abode of the effect, softness, through the inherence, the delimiting relation of the effect, become the object in the statement 'he cooks rice grains', and not the time, which too is the abode of the effect, softness, through the relation of temporal qualification'. For, in spite of the time being the abode of the softness through the temporal relation, the same (time) cannot be the abode of the softness through the delimiting relation of the effect, i.e. the inherence. Thus, the incorrect statement such as 'he cooks the time' (*kālam pacati*) cannot be insisted upon in place of 'he cooks rice grains'.

Observation

Both these grammarians were clearly influenced by Patañjalis implied suggestion of verbal denotation and define the object on logical terms.

Bhaṭṭojis contribution is that he has widened the scope of the object to include both types of objects i.e. the actual object such as the 'village' and the primitive agent who becomes the object such as Caitra in the causative and other statements by stating that the object is what is intended to be the abode of the effect caused directly or indirectly by the action.

Nāgesha includes the phrase "the effect not occurring in the same locus as that of the effort caused by the action occurring in himself" so that the incorrect statement such as 'Caitra goes to himself' (*caitrah svam gacchati*) can be avoided as in such cases effect occurs in the same locus as that of the effort caused by the action occurring in himself.

Also, Nāgesha by including the phrase that the object should be the abode of the effect through the delimiting relation of the effect' avoids the incorrect statements such as 'he cooks the time' (*kālam pacati*); for, the time cannot be the abode of

the 'becoming soft' through the inherence, the delimiting relation (it has the 'becoming soft' through the temporal qualification (*kālika viśeṣanātā*) a non-delimiting relation).

However, these definitions are prompted by the rule (p.i.4.49) and its explanations; and include the phrase 'what the agent desires to be the abode' etc. Consequently, they cover only the objects such as the rice, village etc. that are sought by the agent to be the abode of the effect; they do not cover the objects such as the thief, the grass etc. which are not desired or indifferent.

Logicians theories based on logical principles

Logicians too, like grammarians, have adopted a logical approach to the analysis of the objectness. However, the difference between the two sets of epistemologists is that while the grammarians were mainly concerned with the explanations of the rule p.i.4.49 and therefore, defined the object in terms of an entity that is desired by the agent to be the abode of the effect etc.; the logicians adopted a general stance and have tried to generalize the theories of the objectness that are applicable to all sorts of objects whether they are intended by the agent to be the abode or not. Since the Prācya (the older school of logicians) and the Navyas (the newer school of logicians) differ considerably in their analysis of the object, we shall first undertake to provide the basic theories of the objectness as proposed by the Prācya and the Navyas and then give the accounts of the views of various logicians like Gadadhara, Gokulanātha etc.

Prācya theory

According to the Prācya,⁵ the verbal root such as 'go' (*gam*) refers to the action such as going. And the conjugational ending, occurring after the verbal stems (i.e. *ti* etc.) refers to the possession of the effects (namely the contact etc.) However the relation of producing occurring between the effect and the action is obtained through the principle of syntactico semantical

5. Since, in the Prācya theory, all verbal roots denote action such as going alone, the same become synonymous.

relations. Thus, only the effect such as the contact is the meaning of the accusative and other object denoting affixes.

The Prācyas, therefore, hold that the objectness should be defined as the state of being that which possesses the effect produced by the action.

In this theory, the village, in 'he goes to the village', is the object of going since the same (village) is the possessor of the effect, namely, the contact, produced by the action of going.

Navya theory

According to the Navyas, however, the verbal root does not refer to the action alone as held by the Prācyas; rather, it refers to the action as delimited by its particular effect such as the contact. Since the effect, such as the contact, is perceived to be delimiting the action of going, the same is considered to be the delimiting factor of the root-meaning, 'action'.

Navyas state that the theory that root refers to the action as delimited by the effect is necessitated in view of the fact that at least transitive root must be considered to be referring to the action as delimited by its particular action. They hold that unless the transitive root is held to denote such an action as delimited by the effect, the difficulty of considering the root 'quiver' (*spand*) etc. as transitive, like the root 'go' (*gam*), could never be avoided. This is so because, suppose the root is held to refer to the action alone, then there would not be any criterion as to which of the roots are the transitive (i.e. take an accusative word) and which are intransitive (i.e. do not take an accusative). On the other hand, suppose the root is held to refer to the action as delimited by its effect, then the root 'quiver' can be prevented from being considered as transitive since the same does not have any potentiality to refer to an action as delimited by any effect. Consequently, the incorrect accusative statement such as 'he quivers the village', unlike the correct accusative statement such as 'he goes to the village', can be avoided as the root 'quiver' is not transitive like the root 'go'. Therefore, Navyas hold that the objectness cannot be defined as the state of being that which possesses the effect produced by the action. For, just as the village, in 'he goes to the village', is the possessor of the contact, the effect produced by the action of going,

the region behind the village, too can be said to be the possessor of the separation, another of the effects, produced by the same action of going. And consequently, when some one goes to the village, the statement 'he goes to the region behind the village' can be insisted in place of the statement 'he goes to the village'. Thus, Navyas state that the objectness should be defined as the state of being that which is the substratum of the effect that functions as the delimiting factor of the root meaning, namely the action. Consider, for instance, the same village in the statement 'he goes to the village'. Here, the village is the object because the same is the substratum of the contact, the effect, which functions as the delimiting factor of the action, namely, the going. It should be noted that only the effect that is perceived to be qualifying the root meaning action, can be considered to be the 'delimiting factor, of the action; and hence, the separation, despite being produced from the action of going, is not the delimiting factor since the same is not perceived to be qualifying the action. Thus, the region behind the village, which has the other effect, namely, the separation produced from the going, need not be considered to be the object in 'he goes to the village'.

Here, the effect should be considered to be the deliming factor of the root-meaning, even if the same is indirectly qualifying the root-meaning. For, otherwise, in the double accusative statements such as 'he leads the goat to the village', the village cannot become the abject of leading. This phenomenon can be explained as follows: In double accusatives, the roots 'lead' (*nay*) etc. are accepted to refer to an operation such as (leading) that is conducive to the action (of going) which is delimited by the contact etc. And in such a reference, the action of going directly qualifies the operation leading, the root-meaning. However, the contact can qualify the same operation only indirectly through the action of going. Thus, suppose only the effect that directly qualifies the root-meaning, is considered to be the delimiting factor, then the effect, contact, would not be the delimiting factor of the leading since the same does not directly qualify the leading, rather does so only indirectly through the action of going.

Also, the effect, the delimiting factor of the root-meaning,

should, in turn, be held not to be delimited by its abode. This is necessitated by the fact that otherwise even the fire, which is actually the locus (i.e. the abode) could be insisted to be the object in the statement 'he offers ghee into the fire'. This is so because, in such cases, the root 'offer' (*hu*) is accepted to refer to the operation conducive to the action of putting (ghee) which (i.e. putting) is delimited by the fire contact. And in such a reference, the fire, the locus of putting ghee, can be claimed to be the substratum of the effect, contact, the delimiting factor of the action of putting ghee. However, suppose, the effect, the delimiting factor, is further qualified to be not delimited in turn, by its bode, then the fire can be prevented from being insisted to be the object since the same (fire) is only the substratum of the contact (the effect) which, in turn, is delimited by its abode i.e., the fire, and not that the substratum of the contact (the effect) not delimited by its abode.

Gadādhara's justification of Navya theory

Gadādhara, the celebrated logician, too favours the⁶ Navya theory that the objectness be defined as the state of being the substratum of the effect that delimits the root-meaning action. According to him, since the grammatical convention rules both the effect and the action to be the meaning of the root itself, the prācya theory that the objectness is the state of being the possessor of the effect produced by the root-meaning action' is not acceptable. Nevertheless, he suggests that the Navya theory of the objectness needs some further modifications. Thus, he states that such an objectness should be qualified as not being the substratum of the root-meaning, action. This qualification is necessitated by the fact that otherwise the agent such as Caitra in the statement 'Caitra goes to the village' can also be claimed to be the object of going. This so because, Caitra, like the village, is also the substratum of the effect, contact, delimiting the root-meaning 'going'. However, when the objectness is qualified as not being the substratum of the root-meaning, 'action', then the same Caitra cannot be claimed to be the object since he is only the substratum of the root-meaning,

6. Vyutpattivāda, p. 207.

action, namely 'going' whereas the village, in the same statement can be considered to be the object since the same is not the substratum of the action, going.

Particularization of the definition

Later logicians, especially Gokulanatha, etc., have followed in principle the theory of the objectness as stated by Gadadhara ; however, they have proposed that the definition of the objectness can be particularized.

Thus, Gokulanātha states that the objectness conditioned by the action of cooking can be defined as the state of being what is both the substratum of the effect such as the swelling produced by the action of cooking and the non-substratum of the action of cooking itself and the objectness conditioned by the action of going can be defined as the state of being the both the substratum of the effect such as the contact and the non-substratum of the action of going. Gokulanatha proposes such a theory of the objectness in accordance with the fact that the objectness differs as the individual action differ in different cases. And the objectness must be accepted as differing in different cases as otherwise Caitra, the agent, in the case of the statement 'Caitra goes to (i.e. wrestles with) Maitra,' could be insisted to be the object due to his being the substratum of the effect, namely, the contact, which is produced by the action of both Caitra's and Maitra's wrestling. On the other hand, suppose the objectness is accepted to differ as the actions involved differ, then Caitra, when wrestles with Maitra, cannot be insisted to be the object since he is not the substratum of the effect, contact, produced by the action of wrestling occurring in himself despite that he is the substratum of the effect contact produced by the action of wrestling occurring in Maitra.

Observation

It can be observed now that the logicians, excepting a few, have tried to provide the definitions of the objectness which are common to all types of objects. They are guided by the fact that there are different types of objects such as (i) the village which the agent seeks most to reach through his action in 'he goes to the village' ; (ii) the grass which the agent does not seek

most to reach but nevertheless reaches through his action by accident in 'he touches the grass while going to the village' and (iii) the cow which is not mentioned or enumerated to be the ablative *kāraka* in 'he milks the cow the milk'. And Pāṇini assigns the name 'object' to all those objects by the rules (i) that which the agent seeks the most to reach through his action (p. i.4.49), (ii) that which the agent does not seek most to reach through his action (p. i.4. 50) and (iii) that which is not enumerated to be any other *kāraka* (p. i.4.57).

Logicians prefer that the definition of the objectness should cover not only the object which the agent seeks the most to reach through his action such as the village, but also the objects which the agent does not seek the most to reach through his action such as the grass or poison and the objects which are not enumerated such as the cow. They do not approve of the objectness being defined in terms of a character that is common to only the *kāraka* that the agent desires to be the possessor of the effect. Their preference over the definition of the objectness common to all sorts of objects stems from the fact that only the general description of objectness is useful in providing the over all view of the objectness. This fact becomes clear from the attitude of both the Pracyas and also the Navyas as both of them define the objectness in terms of a general character that is common to both types of objects. Thus, unlike the theories of the objectness provided by grammarians, most of which consider the object as an entity that the agent desires to be the possessor of the effect, the logicians theory of the objectness considers the object as a *kāraka* that has the effect produced by the action and therefore conditioned by the action, the root-meaning.

Gadādhara's own position is also that the object need not be defined in terms of an entity that the agent desires to be the possessor of the effect. This is in spite of the fact that while explaining the recipienthood to the Brahmin in 'he gives a cow to the Brahmin', he states the objectness to be the state of being what is desired by the agent to be the possessor of the effect produced by the action.

What he meant by this statement is that supposing the rule 'that which the agent seeks most to reach through his

actions' (p. i.4.49) is intended to be the basis for the definition of the objectness, then the objectness be defined in terms of a character that is common to only the *kāraka* that the agent desires to be the possessor of the effect produced by the action.

Ritualists Criticism of logicians theory

Khaṇḍadeva, one of the ritualists who holds a unique position in the field of Indian epistemology has shown a keen⁷ interest in the analysis of the objectness. He severely criticizes logicians theory of the objectness as inadequate, untenable and deviating. According to him, logicians definition of the objectness, although aims at covering all sorts of objects, fails miserably in doing so and therefore needs to be individualized. And once the individualized definitions of the objectness are resorted to, all the difficulties associated with such individualized definitions plague them. In order to overcome these difficulties, Khandadeva proposes his own unique definition of the objectness. However, Khaṇḍadevas real contribution to the analysis of the theory of the objectness is his alternative definition of the objectness where he analyses the objectness as a syntactical entity. Following is an account of the Khaṇḍadevas criticism of logicians theory of the objectness and also of his own unique theory.

Logicians define the objectness as the possession of the effect, the delimitor of the root-meaning, action, that, in turn, is inherent in something other than the meaning of the accusative stem (i.e. the agent). According to such a definition, the village', in 'Caitra goes to the village' can be explained to be the object of going since the same is indeed the possessor of the effect, contact delimiting the root-meaning, the action of going, which in turn, is inherent in something other than the meaning of the accusative stem i.e. Caitra. However, such a definition of the objectness does not cover the objects in the instance of the causal statements such as Maitra in 'Caitra makes Maitra go.' For, despite that Maitra is the possessor of the effect, delimiting the root-meaning, i.e. the action of going, he cannot be consi-

dered to be something other than the substratum inhering in the action of going (i.e. the action going is inherent in Maitra, the meaning of the accusative stem).

In order to cover Maitra etc. in causative statements, the definition of the objectness should be individualized by way of including individual actions. Thus, the object must be held to be an entity which is the non-substratum of the individual action and also which (i.e. the entity) is the possessor of the effect delimiting the root-meaning by way of being produced by the same root-meaning, action. According to this definition, Maitra, can be considered to be the object of causing to go since he is both the possessor of the effect, going, delimiting the root-meaning (i.e. the action of causing to go) as well as the non-substratum of the individual action of causing to go. Now, since the objectness and the agentness etc. are held to differ due to the difference in the individual actions such as the causative action (i.e. making some one to go) and the primitive action (i.e. (going) etc., the primitive action of going cannot condition the causative agentness of Maitra ; and hence it is immaterial that Maitra is the substratum of the primitive action of going.

Nevertheless, this theory of the objectness as proposed by logicinns is not tenable. For, the correct statements such as 'you know yourself through yourself,' 'Caitra knows himself' etc. need to be explained. And suppose the objectness and the agentness etc. are held to be differing due to the difference in the individual actions, then the same person (i.e. Caitra etc. in 'Caitra knows himself,' etc.) cannot be considered to be both the agent and the object of knowing as there occurs no difference in the actions (i.e. knowing). Logicians may try to explain that the same person (i.e. Caitra etc.) can be explained to be both the agent and the object of knowing etc. on the basis of the different conditions (i.e. they may state that the state of being the substratum of knowledge, and also the state of being an embodied one who becomes the object of knowing condition the agentness and also the objectness respectively in Caitra). Nevtrtheless, this explanation is also not tenable ; for, in that case, the incorrect statement such as 'Caitra goes to himself', when Caitra actually goes to the village, would become impossible to avoid since the same person i.e. Caitra can be

considered to be both the agent and also the object of going on the basis of being both the substratum of the action of going and also the possessor of the contact produced by going.

Khaṇḍadeva's definition of the objectness

Khaṇḍadeva, therefore, holds that it is necessary to define the objectness in general. And to facilitate such a general definition of the objectness, we must accept that the accusative case ending itself refers to the objectness in general which is of the form of being an indivisible property. Now, such an indivisible property should be accepted to be coextensive (*samanīyata*) with the state of being what is the substratum of the individual effect produced by the individual action which is inherent in something other than the meaning of the accusative stem. Consequently, both the goals i.e. defining the objectness in general and also avoiding Maitra etc. being considered as the agent of causative action of making Maitra to go in the statement 'Caitra makes Maitra to go', are achieved. This can be explained as follows : Since, in this theory, the objectness is considered to be an indivisible property and common to all the objects, the objectness can be defined in general as the accusative-meaning that is an indivisible property ; also since the objectness is considered to be coextensive with the state of being the substratum of the individual effect, Maitra can be avoided from being considered to be the agent of the causative action of making Maitra to go as he is the substratum of only the primitive action of going which happens to be the effect produced by the causative action of making him to go.

Also, since, in this theory, the action is held to be inherent in something other than the accusative stem-meaning, incorrect statements such as 'Caitra goes to himself' can be avoided. This is so because, in such cases, the action of going cannot be claimed to be inherent in something other than the accusative stem-meaning i.e. since the action of going is inherent in Caitra who is both the object and the agent, the same can be claimed to be inherent in the accusative stem-meaning as well as the agent.

Observation

It should be observed now here, however, that this ritualists theory of the objectness, although generalized in form by accepting the objectness to be an indivisible property, becomes practically individualized as the objectness is held to be co-extensive with the state of being what is the substratum of the individual effect produced by the individual action. And, once it is held to be co-extensive with such a state, one needs to know all the individual effects produced by the individual actions to identify the substratum of such effects, and thus, this theory amounts to nothing more than an individualized theory of the objectness.

Theory of the objectness based on syntactical function

Khaṇḍadevas real contribution to the analysis of the objectness is his alternative theory based on the syntactical function of the grammatical objectness. According to this theory, the objectness should be defined as the state of being what fulfills the syntactical expectancy for an object such as 'what does one undertake' etc. For instance, consider the statement 'Caitra cooks the rice'. Here the 'rice' fulfills the syntactical expectancy for an object and hence the same has the state of being what fulfills the syntactical expectancy for an object such as 'what does Caitra cook'.

Also such an objectness can be said to be common to many types of objects such as the village, in 'he goes to the village' etc. For, in the statement 'he goes to the village', the village fulfills the syntactical expectancy for an object such as 'what does he go to'. Thus, this definition of the objectness is common to many types of objects.

Khaṇḍadeva observes, in this connection, that the indivisible property, need only optionally be considered co-extensive in occurrence with such an objectness ; for, considering such an indivisible property to be the objectness does not serve any other purpose except generalizing the objectness and since the objectness is now defined as the state of being what fulfills the syntactical expectancy for the object such as what does one undertake etc., the objectness is already generalized in from,

and hence there is no need that the objectness be generalized again by accepting the same to be co-extensive with such a property.

Observation

It should be noted here that this alternative definition of the objectness of Khaṇḍadeva requires slight modification in its general form. For, in most of the statements involving a transitive verb such as to 'go' etc., the object does indeed fulfill the syntactical expectancy for an object such as 'what' does one undertake etc. However, in accordance with the statements such as 'he stays for a month' etc., where the verb to 'stay' expects syntactically something like 'how long does one stay for' etc ; the object (the month) must be conceded to be fulfilling the syntactical expectancy for 'how long' does one stay for' etc. and not that 'what does one stay for'. Thus, the objectness, should be held to be the state of being what fulfills the syntactical expectancy for an object such as what does one undertake' or 'how long does one stay for' etc.

From the examination of the above two separate definitions of the objectness, it becomes clear that Khaṇḍadeva was guided by two separate criteria, that (i) the objectness be defined in a way which is uniform and common to all, and that (ii) the objectness be defined as a syntactical property. His suggestion that the objectness be accepted as an indivisible property, co-extensive in its occurrence with the state of being the substratum of the effect etc., betrays clearly his intention to generalize the definition of the objectness; whereas his alternative suggestion that the objectness is the state of being what fulfills the syntactical expectancy for an object such as what does one undertake etc. betrays clearly his intention to define the objectness as a syntactical property.

Theory of the objectness based on syntactico-semantic function

Jagadīśa is the most important scholar⁸ among the logicians to have defined the objectness from the syntactico-semantic point of view.

It must be noted here that since a grammatical object is ruled to take an accusative case ending in the active construction, the same (case ending) can refer to the objectness in the active construction; whereas since a grammatical object takes only a nominative case ending in the passive construction, the passive conjugational ending refers to the objectness in such cases. Also, an object is related semantically to the action expressed by the verbal root concerned. This syntactico-semantic function of an object has led Jagadīśa to consider the object as a syntactico-semantic entity and therefore to formulate his theory of the objectness representing a right mixture of both semantic and syntactical functions of the grammatical object.

According to Jagadīśa, objectness should be defined as follows : whatever meaning expressed by the conjugational ending, such as the contact, is related to the action expressed by the passive or other verbal root, the same is the objectness of the object *kāraka* with respect to the same action. For instance, consider the statement 'the village is gone to by Caitra' (*caitrena grāmo gāmyate*). Here the contact, expressed by the conjugational ending (*te*), is related with the action 'going', expressed by the passive verbal *gāmya*, and hence the same (contact) is the objectness of the object *kāraka* with respect to the action 'going'. It should be noted that Jagadīśa defines the objectness instead of the object and therefore the property, delimiting the object such as the contact by its occurrence, is considered to be the objectness of the object *kāraka*.

Jagadīśa points out that the conjugational endings and affixes, that are enjoined in the sense of the objectness (in the passive and the agentness in the active construction) will be accepted to have syntactical expectancy for only the effect delimiting the particular root meanings such as 'going' in association with the particular root such as 'go' (*gam*). Consequently, the conjugational ending, '*ti*' in 'he goes to the village' (*grāmam gacchati*), will be accepted to have the syntactical expectancy for only the effect 'contact' delimiting the particular root meaning such as 'going'; whereas the conjugational ending '*ti*' in 'he leaves the village' (*grāmam tyajati*), will be accepted to have syntactical expectancy for only the effect, 'separation', delimiting the particular root meaning such as

'leaving'. Thus, the statement 'he leaves the village' cannot be insisted in place of 'he goes to the village'. This is inspite of the fact that the conjugational endings and other affixes are accepted to be potentially capable of referring to any effect 'contact' or 'separation'.

Here, the objectness of the '*kāraka*' must be perceived to be different from the agentness. This is necessitated by the fact that otherwise the effort, referred to by the conjugational ending '*te*' in the statement 'the chariot moves by itself' (*ratho gamyate svayam eva*) would also be insisted to be the objectness since the same effort is related with the action 'going' through the conduciveness. However, when the objectness is qualified to be different from the agentness, the effort can be prevented from being insisted to be the objectness since the same is not different from the agentness. This fact suggests that whatever meaning of the conjugational ending etc. is perceived to be the qualificand of the root meaning in the passive, the same, while becoming the meaning of the accusative case ending, is perceived to be the qualifier of the root meaning in the active construction and hence the same should be considered to be the objectness of the object *kāraka*.

Criticism

Really speaking, such a definition of objectness, by Jagadīśa, does not quite cover the primary objectness in the passive of double accusative statements such as 'the cow is milked milk by gopa' (*gāuh payo duhyate gopena*). This is so because, in such cases, the conjugational endings etc. are ruled to refer to only the secondary objectness and therefore, the same can refer to only the effect 'separation' or releasing (*mocana*) from the cow and not to the effect 'releasing' of the milk.

However, Jagadīśa disagrees with the traditional view that in the double accusative statements such as '*gām dogdhi pahah*' ('he milks the cow the milk'), the cow is the secondary object (*gaṇakārman*) whereas the milk is the primary object (*pradhāna karma*). He holds that, in such cases, the cow is the primary object and the milk is the secondary object. He justifies his view on the ground that the cow is the abode of the 'releasing' of the milk caused by the action of milking. Thus, according

to him, the conjugational ending, occurring after the verb 'duh' (to milk) etc., refer to the primary objectness of the cow and hence 'go' has the nominative use ending after it.

Nevertheless,⁹ in view of this difficulty, he states an alternative definition of the objectness that whatever meaning of the accusative case is cognized to be the qualifier of whatever root meaning in whatever sequence, the same is the objectness with respect to the same root-meaning (*yasya dhātor yadarthe yaḥ prakāribhuya bhāsate dvitīyayā smāritorthaḥ tadvyātat karmatocyate*). Now, in the passive construction (*gauh payo duhyate*), the effect 'releasing' (of the milk), which is the meaning of the accusative case occurring after the word 'payas' (milk), is the objectness with respect to the action of 'milking' since the same releasing (of the milk) is the qualifier of the action 'milking', whereas, in the active construction 'he milks the milk the cow' (*gām payo dogdhi*), the superstratumness, expressed, by the accusative case occurring after the word 'go' and the releasing expressed by the accusative case occurring after the word 'payas' are the objectness(es) with respect to the milking leading to the flowing out (*bohīh kṣaraṇa*) since the same qualify the action of milking.

Also, the effect 'contact' (with the village), which is the meaning of the accusative case ending occurring after the word 'grāma', expressing the village in the statement 'he goes to the village' (*grāmam gacchati*), is the objectness with respect to the action of 'going' since the same (contact with the village) is the qualifier of the action 'going'.

Observation

It should be noted here that Jagadisha's two separate defi-

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9. In 'the cow is milked milk by *gopa*' (*gauh payo duhyate gopena*) the root 'milk' (*duh*) refers to the activity leading to the releasing (*mocana*). And the conjugational ending (*te*) refers to the releasing from the cow. The accusative ending after the word 'payas' refers to the releasing of the milk which is related to the activity. Thus, one cognizes that the cow has the relasing of the milk which is produced by the activity of milking caused by *gopa*.

nitions of the objectness are based on two distinct convictions of the reality : that in passive construction of the single accusatives, only the conjugalional endings are ruled to refer to the objectness; whereas, in the passive of double accusatives and also in the active of single and double accusatives, the accusative case endings are ruled to refer to the objectness. Thus, the first alternative definition of the objectness views the meaning referred to by the conjugalional endings in the passive construction to be the objectness, whereas the second alternative definition of the same views the meaning referred to by the accusative case endings in the active construction to be the objectness.

Also, it should be noted here that Jagadīśa views the effect which is a unique property occurring in the objects, to be the objectness; and also that the same objectness to be the meaning of conjugalional affixes and case endings. For him, objects do not have an independent existence except that they are the possessors of such objectness. This view is in accordance with the fact that object etc., are syntactico-semantical entities only in so far as they function as a particular *kāraka* in a sentence and hence are not real entities.

Giridharas generalized theory

Giridhara, a logician of the post Jagadīśa era, too defines the object as the syntactico-semantical entity and firmly opposes the theory that the rule (p. i.4.49) can alone provide the basis of the definition of the objectness. According to him, suppose the rule p. i.4.49 is taken to provide the basis, then the objectness would have to be defined as that which forms the primary entity (i.e. chief qualificand) in the desire which (i.e. desire) in turn, causes the activity of going, the root-meaning. Consequently, the village, in the statement, 'Caitra goes to the village, may be explained to be the object of going since the same is the primary entity in the desire such as 'may the village be associated with the effect, contact, produced by the activity of going'. Also, the milk, in the statement 'he eats the rice along with the milk' can be avoided from being considered to be the object of eating since same is not the primary entity in the desire such as there should occur a contact between the rice along with the

milk and the throat (here only the rice is the primary entity).

However, according to him, such a definition of the objectness is not tenable. For, in that case, it becomes impossible to justify the accusative and other affixes occurring after the words expressing the objects since the same (objects expressed by accusative and other affixes) cannot be the primary entity in the desire. Also, it is not possible to ascertain why the objectness should be considered to be the state of being only a primary entity in the desire.

Keeping in view of this difficulty, he defines the objectness as the being the meaning of the accusative case ending (in the active) or that of the conjugational ending (in the passive) that has a syntactical expectancy for being construed with the root meaning, action. For instance, consider the village, in 'he goes to the village'. Here, the village is the substratum of the contact, the meaning of the accusative case ending, and has a syntactical expectancy for being construed with the action of going, the root meaning. It should be noted that the objectness varies as the objects vary. Whereas the objectness conditioned by going is the possession of the contact produced by going, the same in 'Hari inhabits Vaikuntha' is the state of being the locus of inhabiting that occurs in Vaikuntha. Also in the causative of intransitives i.e. 'he produces the pot', the objectness, conditioned by producing, is the state of being the agent of the primitive root meaning since the same primitive agent (pot) is ruled to be the object in the causatives. Again, there is no danger of conceding the transitive status to the root 'quiver' etc., since the same root ('quiver'), by not expressing the action delimited by an effect, is devoid of any syntactical expectancy for being construed with the accusative meaning. This is, despite that the root to 'make' is construed with an accusative and therefore is transitive and also that the pot is an object of making in the statement 'he makes a pot'.

Observation

It may be observed now that Giridhara's definition of the objectness is an improvement over the two separate definitions of the objectness provided by Jagadīśa. While Jagadīśa uses two separate definitions to cover the objectness conditioned by

actions in passive and active constructions, Giridhara combines the two definitions into one and presents a single generalized form of the objectness as either the meaning of the accusative case ending or the meaning of the passive conjugational ending both of which have a syntactical expectancy for being construed with the action. Such a generalized form of the definition of the objectness has obvious advantage of economy over the individualized form of the definitions of the objectness in the sense that the different types of objects can all be understood as being only the meaning of one or other affix. However, Jagadīśa can be credited to have adopted for the first time the most significant method of syntactico-semantic criterion to define the objectness which others like Giridhara followed :

Nagesha's generalized theory

Following his theory of *kāraka*, Nagesha has suggested that the object, which too possesses the *kāraka* power, be defined as the substratum i.e. abode of the power of the objectness. And such a suggestion is in conformity with the fact that any given type of the object, whether it be desired, not desired or not mentioned, is indeed the abode of the power of the objectness. For, when Caitra cooks the rice grains, the same possess the power of objectness which is conducive to the action of cooking (i.e. it has an inherent ability, for being cooked and thus manifests cooking and also when some one eats poison, the same poison too possess the power of objectness which is conducive to the action of eating and thus manifests eating. Similarly, when some one milks the cow the milk, the cow too possesses the power of objectness which is conducive to the action of milking (i.e. it has an inherent ability for being milked so that the action of milking is manifested).

Observation

This alternative definition of the objectness by Nāgeśa is also based on the syntactico-semantic considerations of the objects and views the object to be a syntactico-semantic entity. However, the difference between the other definitions of the objectness and also this definition is that whereas the other definitions are further extensions of Pāṇini's rule p. i.4.49, and

therefore view the individual entities as objects; the present definition views the objectness to be a distinct entity such as the power and thereby holds that the object is the possessor of such a power of the objectness. Of course, such a definition requires that the power of objectness be an independent entity; but Nāgeśa rightly observes that the accusative case refers to the abode of the power of objectness, the qualifierness of the objectness and also to the relation between the object *kāraka* and the action. This theory is justified on the ground that the accusative is ruled in the sense of the object(ness) (p. ii.3.2) and hence the abode of the power of the objectness can be considered to be an independent meaning of the accusative.

However, logicians object to such an alternative theory of Nagesha as follows : Suppose the possessors of the power of objectness is considered to be the object, then it would become necessary to know as to what is the possessor of such an objectness. And to know the possessor of the objectness, the same (possessor) would need to be identified as the one that is the locus of the effect produced by the action that in turn, is inherent in something other than the object itself. Consequently, since the object needs to be identified in any case, as the one that is the locus of of the effect, it would be quite logical to consider that the object is the locus of the effect produced by the action inherent in something other than the object itself. Thus, it is not appropriate that the object is defined as that which is the possessor of the power of the objectness. This is the say of the logicians.

Nevertheless, it should be accepted that Nāgeśa has shown an independent attitude in defining the object while at the same time, adopting a method which is quite keeping with the nature of the object. Therefore, despite that the object needs to be identified, in this theory, as the locus of the effect etc., the credit that he has defined the object most logically as the possessor of the power of the objectness, cannot be taken away.

Conclusion

It can be concluded now as follows : The epistemologists of India have followed three distinct criteria, viz. logical, syntactical and syntactico-semantical to define the objectness.

The grammarians and also most of the logicians followed the logical criterion. While the grammarians were prompted by the explanations of Pāṇini's rule (p. i.4.49) logically as the *kāraka*, which the agent desires or seeks most to reach by his action, is the object, the logicians were prompted by the fact that the grammatical object is analysed, in verbal cognition, as the abode or substratum of the effect produced by the action occurring in the agent'. Thus, Nāgeśa, the grammarian, defines the object as the logical entity intended by the agent to be the abode of the effect not occurring in the same locus as that of the effort caused by the action occurring in himself i.e. the agent. In this definition Nāgeśa has adopted two separate logical criteria, namely that (i) the object must be intended by the agent to be the abode of the effect' and also that (ii) the effect must not be occurring in the same locus as that of the effort caused by the action occurring in himself. Of the two criteria, the first criterion is a modification of the Paniniyan rule that the object is what the agent seeks most to reach through his actions. And this is the most fundamental and basic idea behind the consideration of an entity as the object since nothing is an object unless and until the agent desires the same to be the abode of the effect; whereas the second criterion namely 'the effect must not be occurring in the same locus as that of the effort caused by the action occurring in himself', is a new aspect introduced with a view to avoid the incorrect statement such as 'Caitra goes to himself'. When the effect is viewed to be not occurring in the same locus as that of the effort, the incorrect statement can be avoided as the effect, viz. contact, occurs in the same locus as that of the effort caused by the action of going in the agent Caitra himself i.e. both the effort and the effect share the same locus in Caitra, the agent. In introducing this new aspect Nagesha is clearly influenced by the logicians theory that the inherence of the effect in something other than the meaning of the accusative stem i.e. object must also be regarded as one of the meanings of the accusative case. Logicians have proposed such a theory with the same view of avoiding the incorrect statement such as 'Caitra goes to himself'. Suppose the inherence of the effect in something other than the meaning of the accusative stem is held to be the accusative

case meaning, then the incorrect statement can be avoided since the effect, namely the contact, is inherent in only the meaning of the accusative stem, namely Caitra himself in such cases.

However, such a definition of the objectness by Nagesha covers only the desired objects such as the village in the statement 'Caitra goes to the village' etc., and not the non desired objects such as the poison in the statement 'Caitra eats poison etc.'

Similarly, the definitions of the object by other grammarians such as Bhattoji Dīkṣita too fall short of covering undesired objects. For, they too define the object in terms of a desired entity such as (i) the object is what is intended by the agent, i.e. the abode of the action expressed by the verb concerned, to be the abode of the effect directly or indirectly caused by the action occurring in the agent, (ii) the object is the *kāraka* which is intended by the agent to be the abode of the effect caused by the action, the root meaning occurring in the agent etc., and hence do not cover all types (i.e. desired and undesired types) of objects.

Thus, only logicians among the scholars adopting the logical criterion, can be said to have defined the objectness in general. For instance, consider the Navyas theory of the objectness as that which is the substratum of the effect that functions as the delimiting factor of the root-meaning namely the action' which is a generalized form of the objectness. This definition covers not only the desired objects such as the village in 'he goes to the village' etc., but also the undesired objects such as the poison in 'he eats poison' etc., since all of them are indeed the substratum of the effects.

The objection however, is that suppose the objectness is defined in a generalized form, then the three rules namely (i) object is that which the agent seeks most to reach by his action, (ii) object is also that which is not sought to be reached by the action, (iii) and object is that which is not mentioned as any other *kāraka*', become difficult to justify; however, such an objection can be answered as follows: suppose Pāṇini¹⁰ rules

10. That is to say that a special rule takes precedence over the general rule when both rules are simultaneously applicable

that the object is what is intended to be the substratum of the effect produced by the action, then the youth in 'he prevents the youth from (falling into) the fire' (*agner manavakam varayati*) would become eligible for being considered as the ablation : and therefore, the rule, enjoining the object would need to include in its body the adjective 'what the agent seeks the most' so that the two rules p. i.4.49 and p. i.4.27 do not have the simultaneous applicability to one and the same *kāraka*. And once the adjective 'what the agent seeks most' is included, the youth, being what the agent seeks most to reach by his action of preventing, becomes only the object and not the ablation. However, then, as a consequence, the undesired objects such as the poison would remain uncovered. So, in order to cover such undesired objects, the other two rules of objects are necessary.

Generally speaking, logicians have accepted that the accusative case refers to the objectness. And by this what they mean is that the accusative case refers to the superstratumness conditioned by the effect and to the difference conditioned by the substratum of the action which are not obtained otherwise. This theory can be explained as follows : Object is to be analysed individually as what is the non-substratum of the individual action and also what is the possessor of the effect that delimits the individual action by way of being produced by the same. And, since here the action and also the effect are obtained through the verbal base and the substratum i.e. entity such as the village is obtained through the accueative base, only the relation of the superstratumness conditioned by the effect and also the difference conditioned by the substratum of the action are held to be the meaning of the accusative case. However, in some instances, where the comprehension of the difference conditioned by the substratum of the action is impossible due to the identity of the object and also the agent, the

and so the special rule namely that which is intended to be the object of prevention is the ablation' would enjoin the name 'ablation' to the youth and the general rule namely that which is intended to be the substratum of the effect produced by the action is the object' would remain inapplicable.

accusative will be accepted to indicate only the superstratumness conditioned by the effect leaving out the aspect of the difference conditioned by the substratum of the action. For instance, consider the statement 'you know yourself through yourself' (*ātmānam ātmānā vetsi*). Here, since the difference conditioned by the substratum of the action of knowing is impossible to comprehend due to the identity of the self, the agent and also the self, the object, (i.e. since the same self functions as both the objects and also the agent of knowing), the accusative, occurring after the word '*ātmānam*', will be accepted to indicate only the non-contradictory aspect i.e. the superstratumness. And such a superstratumness in this context, is nothing but being the content of knowing occurring in the effect namely the contentness. Consequently, the self in the statement 'you know yourself' etc. can be explained to be the object since the same self is the abode of the effect, namely, the contentness, despite that the same lacks the difference conditioned by the substratum of the action of knowing. Thus, the objection of Khandadeva that "the individualized form of definition of the objectness by way of including individual actions such as the object is an entity which is the non-substratum of the individual action and also which (i.e. entity) is the possessor of the effect delimiting root-meaning by way of being produced by the same action is not tenable due to its impossibility of applying in the case of statements such as 'you know yourself through yourself' " stands refuted.

Really speaking, there is no harm even if the individualized theory of the definition of the objectness is regarded to be correct. For, suppose the objectness is defined generally as the state of being the abode of the effect, then even the region prior to the village, like the region covering the entire village, may also be claimed to be the object since the same is the abode of the contact, the effect.

Also, suppose the objectness is defined generally to be the state of being the abode of the effect delimiting the root-meaning, action, then the earlier difficulty may be avoided since the prior region is not the abode of the effect, contact that delimits the action of going. However, in that case, the incorrect statement such as 'Caitra goes to himself' cannot be avoided since

the same Caitra is both the abode of the effect, contact, delimiting the action of going, as well as the substratum of the action itself. In order to avoid this difficulty, it becomes necessary to assume that the object is also the non-substratum of the root-meaning, action. And consequently, Caitra, in statement 'Caitra goes (i.e. wrestles with) Maitra' involving a reference to the effect such as contact, produced by the actions of both Caitra and Maitra, would become liable to be considered the object since the same Caitra is also the abode of the contact produced by the action of wrestling occurring in Maitra. Thus, it may also be insisted that the objectness be defined only individually involving the individual actions in the body of the definition. For instance, the objectness may be defined individually as the state of being the abode of the particular effect of contact produced by the action of going (i.e. wrestling) of Caitra and also as the state of being the non-substratum of the action of going. And so, only Maitra, who is the abode of the effect, contact, produced by the action of going of Caitra, and also who is the non-substratum of the same going, can be considered to be the object of the going of Caitra. Thus, it could be concluded that whereas logicians attitude in generalizing the definition of the objectness is laudable and serves the useful purpose of providing a general view of what is an object, their individualized theory of the definition of the objectness is more practical and free from the defects as shown above. And keeping this practicality in mind some of the later logicians especially Gokulanantha and others, have proposed individualized theories of the objectness such as 'the objectness conditioned by the particular action of cooking is the state of being the abode of the effect of swelling produced by the particular action of cooking.'

Now, with regard to Khaṇḍadevas theory of the objectness. Khaṇḍadeva proposes that the accusative case ending itself can be accepted to refer to the objectness; and such an objectness is an indclinable property, co-existence in its occurrence with the state of being the substratum of the particular effect such as the contact produced by the action of going etc. This proposal is made with the intention of avoiding the heaviness inherent in the individualized theory of objectness of the

logicians. However, despite accepting the objectness to be the indivisible property, which can be common to all instances of objects, this theory is not free from the difficulty, of the individualized theory of the objectness since the indivisible property is to be accepted as co-extensive in its occurrence with the state of being the substratum of the particular effects such as the contact in the case of 'Caitra goes to the village' etc.

Now with regard to Nageshas alternative definition of the objectness : Nagesha proposes that 'object is the *kāraka* that possesses the power of the objectness'. This proposal is also logical in nature and covers all types of objects. Also, this definition is the most, basic one in the sense that it views the object what an object actually is, i.e. the possessor of the power of the objectness. However, an inherent flaw in this theory of the objectness, is that one is left to identify the object all by himself and the definition does not provide any clue whatsoever as to what an object is identified with. Suppose the object is identified with the abode of the effect produced by the action, then it would mean that understanding the object as the possessor of the power of objectness amounts to nothing but to mere tautology. Therefore, inspite of the fact that object, in reality, is the possessor of the power of objectness, scholars do not quite cherish the idea of defining the same as the possessor of the power of the objectness.

A grammatical object is both a semantical and a syntactical entity and therefore, its syntactical function is as important as its semantical function. And Khandadevas alternative proposal that the objectness is the state of being what fulfills the syntactical expectancy for an object such as 'what does one undertake etc.' is truly syntactical in nature and manifests the syntactical function of an object. From this point of view, Khandadevas theory of the objectness gains importance and he is the only important epistemologist to have defined the objectness from the syntactical point of view.

Really speaking, in accordance with certain other instances, Khandadeva's definition of the objectness needs slight modification : For instance, in the statement 'he stays for a month', the month, the object, fulfills the syntactical expectancy for only how long does one stay for' and not the expectancy for

'what does one undertake'. However, with the modification of the definition of the objectness as the state of being what fulfills the syntactical expectancy for, what does one undertake, 'how long does one stay' etc., Khandadevas theory of the objectness can be made applicable to all sorts of objects and hence credit is due to him for defining the object as a syntactical entity.

Finally, Jagadisha's theory of the objectness : This theory deserves the most important place in the history of the analysis of the theory of the objectness. For, it represents satisfactorily both the semantical and syntactical aspects of the grammatical object. When Jagadisha defines the objectness as 'whatever meaning expressed by the conjugational ending, such as the contact, is related with the action expressed by the passive verbal root, the same is the objectness with respect to the same action' or as 'whatever meaning of the accusative case is cognized to be the qualifier of whatever action expressed by whatever active verbal root in whatever sequence, the same is the objectness with respect to the same action', the two definitions represent the semantical aspect of the grammatical object i.e. that the object is the meaning of the conjugational ending (in the passive construction) and is the meaning of the accusative case ending (in the active construction) and also represent the syntactical aspect of grammatical object i.e. that the object is syntactically expected to be related with the action as the qualificand (in the passive construction) and as the qualifier of the action (in the active construction). Giridhara follows Jagdishsha in his definition : Consequently, his definition of the objectness, namely that 'the objectness is either the meaning of the accusative case ending or the meaning of the conjugational ending that has the syntactical expectancy for being construed with the root meaning, action, is a reiteration of the same fact that grammatical object is a syntactico-semantical entity. However, his definition generalizes the semantical function of the object as being either the meaning of the accusative or that of the conjugational ending and also the syntactical function of the object as having a syntactical expectancy for being construed with the root-meaning, action. Thus, Giridharas contribution to the analysis of the object is the generalization of the syntactical and semantical functions of the grammatical object in passive and active constructions.

Now, it can be said in favour of Jagadisha and his follower that they have adopted a syntactico-semantic approach towards the analysis of the grammatical object. They paid equal attention to both the semantic and syntactical functions of the grammatical object and did not neglect either of the functions by highlighting only one of the two functions. Whereas grammarians and other logicians were greatly influenced by the grammatical rule (i.4.49) and therefore, emphasized the logical role of the grammatical object, Khandadeva, in his alternative theory, was primarily concerned with only the syntactical function of the grammatical object and therefore, was not equally attentive of the fact that the grammatical object could be a semantic entity as well. So these scholars emphasize either the logical role or the syntactical function of the grammatical object and present only a one sided view by neglecting the syntactico-semantic aspect of the same.

CHAPTER X

THEORY OF THE EFFECTNESS

(*phlatvam*)

Introduction

The objectness¹ is analysed into three types : (i) semantical entity, (ii) a syntactico semantical entity and (iii) a logical entity. As a logical entity, the objectness is defined variously as (i) the abode of the effect produced by the action, (ii) the abode of the effect that delimits the root-meaning i.e. the action and (iii) the abode of the effect delimiting the action which does not share the locus with the meaning of the inflectional ending i.e. the effect. All those definitions of the objectness, though different in various respects, have one thing in common : that is all of them consider the grammatical object to be the abode of the effect. And thus, since, the knowledge of the effect is essential to the understanding of the real nature of the grammatical object, Indian epistemologists, especially, logicians, ritualists and grammarians, have shown a tremendous interest in the analysis of the nature of the effect.

Problem

However, the Nvyas and certain other epistemologists analyse the effectness syntactico-semantically as the state of being the root meaning that qualifies the root meaning, 'action'; and the Prācyas analyse the same logically as the state of being what is produced by the root-meaning, 'action'; whereas yet other such as Giridhara analyse the effectness both ways as the

1. On p. i.4.49.

state of being the root-meaning that qualifies another of the root-meanings and also the state of being what is produced. In the following pages, we shall discuss these various theories and provide a critical examination of the same so that the real nature of the effectness can be ascertained.

Grammatical convention

Kaiyata, while commenting on Mahābhāṣya (p i.4.49) has established a convention that the roots such as the 'cook' refer to two separate meanings i.e. an action and its effect'. What he meant by this convention is that verbal root itself refers to both an action and its effect. Consider, for instance, the root to 'cook' (*pac*). Here the root refers to an action such as cooking and its effect i.e. swelling.

This convention of Kaiyata is a general one and therefore, the root to 'cook' (*pac*) represents the verbal roots in general. Thus, the convention suggests that, in verbal cognition, all verbal roots refer to actions and their respective effects.

Navya theory

Navyas follow the grammatical convention that the verbal root itself refers to both the action and its effect and therefore, adopt a syntactico-semantical approach in defining the effectness. According to them, the effectness is the state of being the root-meaning that is perceived to be the qualifier of the root-meaning 'action'. For instance, consider the effect 'contact' between Caitra and the village in the context of 'Caitra goes to the village'. Here, the verbal cognition produced from such a statement is that Caitra, the agent, is the abode of the action of going that is conducive to the contact occurring in the village'. In such a cognition, the contact is perceived to be the qualifier of the action of going and so the same (contact) can be considered the effect in the same context.

Gokulanāth's explanation

Gokulanātha explains the Navya theory as follows² : In actuality, the root-meaning, which is referred to as the qualifi-

cand by the root is considered the action' and the root-meaning which is referred to as the qualifier is considered the effect. Consequently, it can be stated that what is the abode of the qualificerness conditioned by the qualificandness of the root-meaning, is the effect. For instance, consider the action of going and also the effect 'contact' in the context of 'Caitra goes to the village' (*caitro grāmam gacchati*). Here the root to 'go' (*gam*) refers to the action of going as delimited by the effect 'contact'. And, in such a reference, the action of going is perceived to be the qualificand and the effect 'contact' is perceived to be the qualifier. Therefore, the action of going becomes the abode of the qualificandness and the effect 'contact' becomes the abode of the qualificerness.

Jagadīśa's theory

Jagadīśa follows more or less the theory of the effectness as proposed by the Navyas. According to him, the effect should be defined as the state of being the root-meaning that directly qualifies the root meaning 'action'. He states that otherwise even the contact with the upper region, which is not an effect would also become an effect in the statement such as 'he tosses the stone up to the sky' (*gagane loṣṭham utkṣipati*), since the same is an indirect qualifier of the action of tossing up and the root refers to the action of tossing up analysable into the operation conducive to the contact with the upper region.

Jagadīśa holds that such a definition of the effectness is justified on the ground that Pāṇini has composed a separate rule such as "the object is also what is not enumerated among any other *kāraka*" (p. i.4 51) in order to cover the objects, which are actually non-objects but are accommodated as the objects, when the same are not intended to be any other *kāraka*. And therefore, the rule "the object is what the agent seeks most to reach through his actions" (p. i.4.49) should not cover any such accommodated objects'. However, suppose, the effectness is defined as the state of being the root-meaning which directly or indirectly qualifies the root-meaning 'action', then even the separation, which indirectly qualifies the root-meaning 'action of milking', would become the effect in the context of 'he milks the cow into milk' (*gām payo dogdhi*); and therefore, even such

accommodated objects as the 'cow' would get the name 'object' by the rule (p. i.4.49) itself and hence the rule (p. i.4.51) would become purposeless. On the contrary, suppose the effectness is defined as the state of being the root-meaning, which directly qualifies the root-meaning 'action', then the 'separation' would not become the effect in the same context as it does not directly qualify the action of milking; and therefore, the accommodated objects' 'cow', would not get the name 'object' and hence the rule (p. i.4.51) would become necessary.

It should be noted here that Jagadīśas statement that the effectness should be defined as the state of being the root-meaning which directly qualifies the root-meaning 'action', should be taken to suggest the definition of only the primary effectness. For, as will be shown by Gadādhara and others, the effects are of two types i.e. primary as well as secondary. And only the primary effect is perceived to qualify directly the root-meaning 'action'. Whereas the secondary effects such as the contact between the goat and the village in the context of 'he leads the goat to the village', etc. are perceived to be qualifying the root-meaning 'action of leading' only indirectly through the going. Therefore, the general definition of the effectness must be visualized only as the state of being the root-meaning that directly or indirectly qualifies the root-meaning 'action'.

Gadādhara's Modification

Gadādhara too supports the Navyas theory of the effectness. However, he proposes a certain modification in the definition as profounded by the Navyas. According to him, the phrase "the root-meaning that is perceived to be the qualifier of the root-meaning 'action' should be modified into "the root meaning that is perceived to be the direct or indirect qualifier of the root-meaning action". This modification is necessitated by the fact that otherwise the contact between the goat and the village in the context of 'he leads the goat to the village' becomes impossible to be considered as the effect. For, here the cognition is that Caitra is the abode of the causative action of leading which is conducive to the going of the goat which, in turn, is conducive to the contact occurring in the village. And in such a cognition, the contact is a qualifier of only the going and

not of the leading. However, suppose the phrase is modified as "the root-meaning that is perceived to be the direct or indirect qualifier of the root meaning 'action' ", then the contact can be considered to be the effect since the same indirectly qualifies the action of leading through the action of going. Thus, Gadādhara accepts the Navya theory with a significant modification.

It can be observed now, here as follows : The scholars such as Jagadīśa originally proposed the definition of the effectness as the state of being the root-meaning that is perceived to be the direct qualifier of the root-meaning 'action', in order that the non-effects such as the fire contact in the context of 'he offers ghee into the fire' (*agnau ghr̥tam juhōti*) is excluded from being considered the effect. In such cases, according to them, the root 'offer' (*hu*) refers to the action of offering analysable into the operation conducive to the pouring etc. delimited by the 'fire-contact'. And if the effect is held to be what directly or indirectly qualifies the root-meaning 'action', then, the fire-contact, since it is the indirect qualifier of the root meaning operation', would become the effect. However, this position is not tenable. Such a definition of the effectness would adversely affect the prospect of considering certain effects as effects. For instance, the contact between the goat and also the village in 'he leads the goat to the village' does not directly qualify the action of leading and therefore, gets excluded from being considered as the effect. It can be observed further that when the effectness is defined as the state of being the root-meaning that is perceived to be the direct or indirect qualifier of the root-meaning 'action', the problem of excluding the non-effect such as the fire-contact can be overcome by stipulating that the delimiting agent should, in turn, be non-delimited by its abode. And, since the fire-contact, which is the delimiting agent of the action of offering, which is in turn, delimited by its own abode (i.e. fire), the same gets excluded from being considered as the effect.

Two fold divisions of effects

Gadādhara divides the effects into two types : those that are primary and also those that are secondary. According to him, those effects, that directly qualify the action, are primary effects and those that indirectly qualify the action are secondary

effects. For instance, consider the effects', 'contact' and also the 'going' in the context of 'he leads the goat to the village' once again. Here the verbal cognition is that the person has the action of leading which is conducive to the going which in turn is conducive to the contact between itself and the village. The contact between the goat and also the village indirectly qualifies the action of leading analysable into the making the goat go. And therefore, the same (contact) is the secondary effect. Whereas the going occurring in the goat directly qualifies the action of leading. And therefore, the same going is the primary effect.

The division of the effects in to two types is a very important contribution to the theory of the effectness. For, it satisfactorily explains as to why in double accusative statements such as 'he leads the goat to the village' the village is the secondary object and also why the goat is the primary object. Now, one can state that since the village is the possessor (i.e. abode) of only the secondary effect (i.e. contact), the same is the secondary object; whereas since the goat is the possessor of the primary effect (i.e. the 'going'), the same is the primary object.

Prācyas theory

Prācyas do not follow the grammatical convention that the root itself refers to both the action and its effect. They deviate from Kaiyatas theory that the verbal roots such as to 'cook' refer to two separate meanings i.e. an action and its effect. According to Prācyas, the roots, in general, refer to the action alone; whereas the effect is understood by the inflectional affixes such as the accusative and other endings. They hold that the effect cannot be the meaning of the root itself since the finite verb is intended to be only an 'action-referring word' (*kriyāpaha*) and not an 'effect-referring word' (*phalapada*). However, they do accept that in the analysis of the syntactico-semantic relations involved in the verbal cognition of the effect, the same is perceived to be the qualifier of the action.

The Prācyas analyse the effect most logically as the product of the action. They visualize a produced and a producer relationship between the effect and the action. According to them, the most important characteristic of the effect is its

state of being produced by the action. Thus, they define the effectness as the state of being what is produced by the action and also what is the qualifier of the root-meaning 'action'. Consider, for instance, the 'contact' in the context of 'Caitra goes to the village'. Here, the contact between Caitra and the village is produced by the action of going, the root-meaning, and also the same (contact) is the qualifier of the action of going on account of its delimiting the same.

It should be noted here that such a definition of the effectness by the Prācyas can easily exclude the non-effects such as the effort (*vyāpāra*) from being considered as the effect. For, the effort, though is the qualifier of the action on account of its being the delimitor of the same, cannot be claimed to be what is produced by the action. For instance, consider the effort in the context of Caitra goes to the village. Here, the effort, found occurring in Caitra, is conducive to the action of going; but nevertheless, is not itself produced by the action of his going to the village. Thus, the definition proposed by the Prācyas serves the purpose of both covering the effects such as the contact and excluding the non effects such as the effort in the context of Caitra's going to the village.

Criticism of Prācyas theory

The definition of the effectness, as proposed by the Prācyas, is too narrow to cover such non-produced effects as the contentness of the pot etc. in the context of knowing, desiring etc. For instance, consider the contentness in the context of the statement 'Caitra knows the pot' (*ghaṭam jānāti caitraḥ*). Here, the contentness of the pot, the effect of Caitras knowing, may be claimed to be the qualifier of the root-meaning 'knowing' by virtue of its function of delimiting the same; however, the same (contentness) can never be claimed to be produced by the action of knowing as the same action does not produce any effect like the contentness of the pot. When one knows the pot, the pot becomes the content of one's knowing and this event can be analysed as the contentness occurring in the pot. However, this event cannot be analysed as the contentness being produced by the action of knowing. For, like Caitras action of going to the village, which produces the effect 'contact' between Caitra and

the village, Caitra's action of knowing the pot can not be producing any effect like contentness in the pot since the knowing is a non-productive i.e. intransitive action. Thus, it must be conceded that the definition of the effectness, as proposed by the Prācyaś, is deficient and too narrow to cover the non-produced types of effects. However, this is not to take away the credit from the Prācyaś that they have provided the most significant definition of the effectedness by analysing the effect and thereby bringing to the fore the most important aspects of the effect such as the state of being what is produced by the action concerned.

A Criticism of Navya Theory

The Navya theory is inspired from the grammatical convention that 'the roots such as to 'cook' refer to two separate meanings i.e. an action and also its effect'. However, the theory cannot be considered as an accurate definition of the effectness. For, such a theory is too narrow to include such effects as swelling produced by the effort of blowing and also too overlapping to exclude such non-effects as the effort of blowing leading to actions in the passive usages. For instance, consider the effect 'swelling' and also the non-effect 'blowing' in the context of the passive statement 'rice grain(s) is (are) cooked' (*taṇḍulaḥ pacyate*).

Here, the verbal cognition is that 'the rice grain(s) is (are) the abode of swelling, produced by the effort of blowing'. And, in such a cognition; the effort of blowing is the qualifier of the effect 'swelling' which, in turn, is the qualifier of the object i.e. the rice grain(s). However, since the swelling is not the abode of the qualierness, conditioned by the qualificandness of the root-meaning, 'action of cooking', the same cannot be the effect. On the contrary, since the effort of blowing is the abode of qualierness, the same would have to be considered the effect.

Giridhara's modification

The theory of the Navyas can be modified as follows : The effectness, (i) in the active construction, is the state of being the root-meaning perceived to be the qualifier of the root-meaning 'action', and the same (ii) in the passive construction, is the state

of being the root-meaning perceived to be the qualificand of the root-meaning 'action'. Since, in the active construction such as 'he goes to the village' (*grāmam gacchati*), the contact is one of the two root-meanings perceived to be the qualifier of the root-meaning, 'action of going', the same can be considered the effect. And also, since, in the passive construction 'the rice grain(s) is (are) cooked' (*pacyate taṇḍulah*), the effort of blowing is not one of the two root-meanings perceived to be the qualificand of the root-meaning 'action of cooking', the same need not be considered the effect. This is despite that the effort of blowing is perceived to be the qualifier of the root-meaning 'swelling'.

In this theory, the phrase 'perceived to be the qualifier' is meant to cover both direct and indirect qualifiers. Consequently the primitive effect 'contact' between the goat and the village', in the context of the accusative statement 'he leads the goat to the village' (*ajām grāmam nayati*), can be considered to be the effect of going. In such an instance, the root to 'lead' refers to the operation conducive to the action of going which is delimited by the contact. And the 'contact' is not the direct qualifier of the causative root-meaning 'the operation'. However, since the same contact is the indirect qualifier of the operation through the action of going, the same becomes the effect.

It should be noted here that since the definition of the effectness includes the phrase 'the state of being the root-meaning', the agentness and also the instrumentality of Rāma and the arrow respectively in the context of 'he is killed by Rāma with the arrow' (*rāmena bāṇena haṭaḥ*) need not be considered the effect'. This is so because, the agentness and also the instrumentality are never the meanings of any verbal root. This is despite that the same are the qualifiers of the meaning 'action of killing'.

The inclusion of the 'phrase the state of bring the root meaning' refutes further the objection raised by Khaṇḍadeva in his Bhāṭṭarahasya as well. According to him, since 'the action of cooking qualifies the causative operation in the causative statement 'he makes the assistant cook' (*pācayati*), the same could become the effect. However, now such a fault could not be imposed due to the fact that the same (action of cooking), is not the causative root meaning. It should be noted, however,

that there is no harm, in actuality, in considering the action of cooking as the effect of the causative operation of making the assistant to cook in the causative statement such as 'he makes the assistant to cook the rice' (*pācayaty odanam sahāyam*) since the assistant is optionally considered the object due to his possessing the effect, namely, the action of cooking.

Alternative theory

Giridhara explains an alternative theory as well. According to this theory, the verbal base refers to both an action and its effect and therefore, the effectness is the state of being what is the qualifier of the root-meaning 'action', and also the state of being what is produced by the action, the other meaning of the verbal base. And since the swelling occurring in the rice grains, is produced by the action of cooking and is one of the two meanings of the verbal base, the same can be considered as the effect in the context of 'rice grain(s) is (are) cooked'. Also, since the effort of blowing leading to the cooking is not produced by the root-meaning, (i.e. cooking), the same can be excluded from being considered as the effect in the same context.

Prakaśakāra's justification

The author of *prakāśa* justifies the inclusion of the two phrases in the alternative theory as follows. The effectness is defined as the state of being what is perceived to be the qualifier of the root-meaning 'action' and also as the state of being what is produced by the root meaning. And in such a definition, the phrase what is perceived to be the qualifier of the root-meaning 'action', becomes absolutely necessary on the ground that otherwise even the non-effects such as the separation from the region behind could be insisted to be the effect in the context of 'Caitra goes to the village'. This is so because, the separation from the region behind the village is also produced by the action of going just as the contact with the upper region of the village is produced by the same action of going. However, once such phrase is included, the separation from the region behind the village, can be avoided from being considered as the effect since the same is not perceived to be the qualifier of the root-meaning 'going'. Also the other phrase, namely, what is produced by the root

meaning 'action', becomes necessary on the ground that otherwise even the operation which produces the action of going etc. could be insisted to be the effect. This is so because, the operation too qualifies the action of going etc. in the cognition derived from the passive construction such as 'the village is gone to by Caitra'.

Grammarians theory

Grammarins obviously follows Kaiyata's convention that roots refer to two separate meanings. And accordingly, they perceive the effect as the root-meaning. However, they too have struck a compromise between the Navya and also the Prācya theories, like Giridhara earlier. Accordingly, they define the same (effectness) as the state of being what is directly or indirectly caused by the root-meaning 'action' and also as the state of being what is qualified by the qualificierness conditioned by the qualificandness occurring in the root-meaning, 'action'. Consider, for instance, the effect 'contact' in the statement 'Caitra goes to the village' (*caitra grāmam gacchati*). Here, since the root to 'go' (*gam*) itself refers to the action of going as delimited by its effect such as the contact (between Caitra and the village), the contact becomes qualified by the qualificierness which is conditioned by the qualificandness of the action of going. (That is to say that when the action of going, delimited by the contact, is the root-meaning, the contact is the qualifier and the action of going is the qualificand; and so the qualificierness of the contact is conditioned by the qualificandness of the going). Also, since the action of going produces the contact between Caitra and the village, the contact becomes directly caused by the root-meaning 'going'. Thus, the same contact becomes the 'effect' in the context of Caitra's going to the village.

It should be noted that this theory considers the effect to be directly or indirectly caused by the root-meaning, 'action'. Consequently, the secondary effect such as the contact in the causative statement 'Caitra makes Maitra go to the village' (*caitra maitram gamayati grāmam*) can also be considered to be the effect. This is so because, the secondary effect is indirectly caused by the causative action of making Maitra go. Thus, it does not matter now that such a secondary effect is not directly

caused by the causative action and therefore, the same is not really produced by the causative action. Also, it should be noted here that this theory stipulates that both the state of being what is qualified by the qualificierness conditioned by the qualificandness of the root-meaning 'action' and 'the state of being what is directly or indirectly caused by the root-meaning 'action' should have the same locus in the effect'. Consequently, the non-effect such as the 'separation' in the statement 'Caitra goes to the village' need not be considered to be the effect. This is so because, the non-effect (i.e. the separation) cannot be claimed to be the locus of the state of being what is qualified by the qualificierness conditioned by the qualificandness of the root-meaning. Thus, it does not matter that such a non-effect is the locus of the state of the being what is directly caused by the root-meaning 'action of going'.

Criticism

The above grammarian theory too faces the same difficulty which the Prācya theory faces. Contentness (*viśyatā*) must be considered to be the effect in the context of 'knowing', 'desiring' etc. since when one knows or desires something like a pot, the same becomes the object due to its becoming the content of knowing etc. Thus, contentness should be covered as the effect in the context of knowing etc. However, the grammarians theory does not cover the contentness since the same is not produced by the action of knowing etc.

It may be argued that the contentness etc. are non-effects (they are the meaning of the inflectional affixes such as accusative) and therefore, need not be covered. And the transitive use of the root to know etc. could be explained as only conventional or secondary. However, this argument is not correct. For, since here the contentness is proposed to be the meaning of the accusative, the same will have to be related with the effect, one of the root meanings. But since there is no effect as such in the context, such a relation becomes impossible. On the other hand, suppose the contentness is related with the action, the other meaning of the root, then the theory becomes practically identical with the Prācya theory.

Critical examination

Kaiyaṭas grammatical convention that roots refer to two separate meanings, namely, the action and also its effect can be said to have formed the very basis for the various theories of the effectness. We can broadly classify the various Indian epistemologists who have propounded the theory of the effectness in to the three basic types : (i) those who follow Kaiyatas grammatical convention of the root-meaning and analyse accordingly the effect as the root-meaning; (ii) those who do not follow the grammatical convention and therefore pursue an independent path in the analysis of the nature of the effect; and (iii) those who strike a right balance between the two contrasting theories and propose an alternative theory with the salient features of both the theories.

Among the epistemologists, the Navya logicians follow the grammatical convention established by Kaiyata and define the effectness as the state of being the root-meaning that is perceived to be the qualifier of the root-meaning 'action'. This definition is based on the fact that the effect, a root-meaning, is perceived to be the qualifier of the other root-meaning, namely, the 'action'. The most important aspect of this theory is that this considers the effect as a syntactico-semantic entity i.e. the root-meaning that qualifies the other root-meaning in the verbal cognition.

Almost all the Navyas, beginning from Jagadīśa to Gokulnātha, lay great emphasis on the fact that the effect is the qualifier of the root-meaning 'action'. They unanimously agree that the qualificity conditioned by the qualificandness of the 'action' is the determining factor as to whether an entity can be the effect or not. However, the Navyas disagree as to what sort of the qualificity should be considered as the determining factor of the effectness.

Jagadīśa, the most vocal of the Navyas, holds that only that which directly qualifies the 'action' is the effect. According to him, the entity that indirectly qualifies the action cannot be considered to be the effect since even the non-effects such as the contact, in the context of tossing up the stone, qualifies the action indirectly. However, this position of Jagadīśa should be understood only as intended to cover the primary effect such as

the contact in the context of 'Caitra goes to the village' etc. Otherwise, as explained earlier, the secondary effects such as the contact between the goat and also the village in the context of 'he leads the goat to the village etc. would be excluded from being considered the effect.

Gadādhara, on the other hand, modifies the Navyas theory as the root-meaning which is perceived to be the direct or indirect qualifier of the root-meaning 'action' to overcome precisely the difficulty of the exclusion of the secondary effects such as the 'contact' in he leads the goat to the village etc. And once the definition is modified even the secondary effects such as the contact can be included since the same indirectly qualifies the action of leading.

Gadādhara's main contribution to the theory of the effectness can be stated to be the two fold division of the effects. Such a step, has given a new dimension to the thinking of later epistemologists and has provided a radical explanation for the analysis of the primitive agent as the object in the causative and other double accusative statements. That is to say that the primitive agent such as Caitra in 'he makes Caitra go to the village' etc. becomes the primary object due to his possession of the primary effect, namely, the action of going, and the primitive object such as the goat become the secondary object due to its possession of the secondary effect, namely, the contact.

Prācya logician's analysis of the effectness as the state of being the product of the root-meaning 'action' is the most significant contribution to the theory of the effect. While the Navyas perceived the effect as one of the two meanings of the verbal root, and therefore, analysed the same syntactico-semantically as the qualifier of the root-meaning, the Prācya have visualized a produced and also a producer relationship between the effect and also the action and therefore, analysed the same logically as what is produced by the root-meaning, 'action'. And such a logical analysis of the nature of the effectness as the state of being what is produced can be stated to be the most fitting one since the word 'effect' (*phala*) itself indicates the fact that the effects are produced. A common criticism of the Prācya theory is that their analysis does not include the effects such as the contentness which are not produced. It could be stated in

response, nevertheless, that the *prācyas* analysis of the effectness should be taken for what actually it is, i.e. that it has perceived the effectness as the state of being what is produced because the effects are those that are actually produced. And if the non-produced entities such as the contentness are to be covered as the effects in the context of knowing etc., then the same should be covered by holding the effectness merely conventional and therefore, extending the same to even the non-produced effects.

The alternative theory proposed by Giridhara is obviously meant to incorporate the syntactico-semantic as well as the logical aspects into the analysis of the effectness. Since the effect is perceived, in verbal cognition, as the qualifier (or qualificand in the passive usage), the theory includes the phrase 'what is the qualifier of the root-meaning, 'action'. And also since the effect is produced almost every where, the theory includes the phrase 'what is produced'. Nāgeśa too has proposed his alternative theory with the same objective in mind; however, he has introduced the phrases 'what is directly or indirectly caused by the root-meaning, 'action' with the intention that even the secondary effects which are only indirectly caused should be covered. However, the difficulties associated with the *Prācyas* theory, namely the non-produced effects such as the contentness are not covered by the theory, are same here and they must be overcome by holding the effectness merely conventional like earlier.

Conclusion

The theory of the effectness is dealt with by Indian epistemologists only incidentally; i.e. since the understanding of the nature of the objectness is dependent on the understanding of the nature of the effectness, the epistemologists have taken up the analysis of the effectness.

The *Navya* and *Prācyas* analysis, though different in its own way, are really the two sides of the same coin. For, the effect, in actuality, is both a syntactico-semantic and a logical entity since the same is perceived as the qualifier in the verbal cognition and indeed produced by the action. Thus, the epistemologists can be stated to have taken a very judicious stand in the analysis of the effectness.

CHAPTER XI

THEORY OF NON-REFERENCE

(*anabhidhāna*)

Introduction

Pāṇini had clearly distinguished the syntactical relations of the surface structure from the syntactico-semantic relation or notion of the deep structure. He had visualized that the case and other derivative endings represent the syntactico-semantic relations at the surface level, whereas the *kāra*kas represent the syntactico-semantic notions at the deep structure level. This point is made clear from the analysis of his theory of *kāra*kas. An important aspect of the Paniniyan grammar is that it had already established almost one to one correspondance between the case and other derivative endings and also syntactico-semantic notions that they express. To establish this all important aspect of one to one correspondance between the case and other derivative endings and the syntactico-semantic notions, Pāṇini has come up with his theory of non-expression or non-reference (*anabhidhāna*).

Pāṇini rules that the accusative case ending is used in the sense of the syntactico-semantic notion of 'object' *kāra*ka (p.ii.3.2) and that the instrumental case ending is used in the sense of the syntactico-semantic notions of both the 'agent' and the 'instrument' (p.ii.3.18) etc. Consequently, the accusative case ending, after the word 'grāma' expressing the object 'village' in the active statement 'Caitra goes to the village' (*caitra grāmam gacchati*) and the instrumental case ending, after the word 'caitra' expressing the agent 'Caitra' in the passive statement 'village is gone to by caitra' (*caitreṇa grāmo gamyate*) can be explained as denoting the syntactico-semantic notion of

the village being the object and also denoting the same notion of Caitra being the agent respectively. However, the question of why the accusative and instrumental case endings are not used after the word '*grāma*', expressing the object 'village', and also the word '*caitra*', expressing the agent 'Caitra', respectively (actually the nominative case ending 's' is used after the words '*grāma*' and '*caitra*' in passive and active constructions respectively) remains to be explained; and also the question of how the syntactico-semantic notion of the village being the object and also the same notion of Caitra being the agent in the passive and active constructions (i.e. 'the village is gone to by Caitra' (*caitreṇa grāmo gamyate*) and 'Caitra goes to the village' (*caitro grāmam gacchati*) are expressed' remain to be explained. For, despite that the words '*grāma*' and '*caitra*', expressing the 'village' and 'Caitra', occur in the nominative in the passive and active constructions respectively, the village and Caitra cannot be denied from being the object and the agent of going at the deep structure level since the village remains to be that which the *kartr* seeks most to reach through his actions (*īpsitatama*) and Caitra remains to be that which is an independent *kāraka* (*svatantraḥ*).

To explain such usages, Pāṇini has enjoined the rule that 'when the *kāra*kas such as the object, agent, instrument etc., are not expressed or referred to by the conjugational ending etc., i.e. when the conjugational endings etc., do not agree syntactically with the object, agent etc., the accusative, the instrumental etc., are used after the words expressing the *kāra*kas such as the object, the agent and the instrument etc., *anabhite* (p. ii.3.1). The rule (p. ii.3.1) is a governing (*adhikāra*) rule and therefore all the other rules enumerated under the head of this rule are governed by the same. Thus, the rule should be construed as that (i) when the object is not referred to, the accusative is used, (ii) when the indirect object is not referred to, the dative is used, (iii) when the agent and the instrument are not referred to, the instrumental is used, (iv) when the ablation is not referred to, the ablative is used and (v) when the location is not referred to, the locative is used. For instance, consider the following statements : (i) '*caitro grāmam gacchati*, (Caitra goes to the village') (ii) '*caitreṇa gamyate grāmaḥ*, (the village is

gone to by Caitra), (iii) '*viprāya gām dadāti*' (he gives the cow to the Brahmin), (iv) '*dānīyo viprah*' ('the Brahmin is the recipient of the gift of cow'), (v) '*curṇena snāti*' ('he bathes with the powder'), (vi) '*snāniyam cūrṇam*' ('the powder is to be used as means of bathing'), (vii) '*parvatāt prapatati*' ('he falls from the mountain), '*prapotanaḥ parvataḥ*' (the mountain is the ablation of falling i.e., from which one falls) (ix) '*sthālyām dogdhi gām*' ('he milks milk in the vessel) and (x) '*godahanī sthālī*' (the vessel is the locus of milking the cow').

Here, in the first instance, the object village is not referred to by the conjugational ending (*ti*) and therefore, the word expressing the same, i.e. '*grāmam*' occurs in the accusative; whereas, in the second instance, the object is already referred to by the conjugational ending (*te*) and therefore, the word expressing the same object does not occur in the accusative. Again, in the second instance, the agent, Caitra, is not referred to by the conjugational ending (*te*) and therefore, the word expressing the agent, i.e. '*caitreṇa*' occurs in the instrumental; whereas, in the first instance, the agent is already referred to by the conjugational ending (*ti*) and therefore, the word expressing the same agent, i.e. '*caitrah*', does not occur in the instrumental. In the third instance, the indirect object, Brahmin, is not referred to by the grammatical element '*īya*' suffix and therefore the word expressing the same indirect object, i.e. '*viprāya*', occurs in the dative; whereas, in the fourth instance, the indirect object is already referred to by the suffix '*īya*' and therefore, the word expressing the same indirect object, i.e. '*viprah*', does not occur in the dative. In the fifth instance, the instrument, (powder) is not referred to by the grammatical element '*īya*' suffix and therefore, the word expressing the same instrument i.e. '*cūrṇena*', occurs in the instrumental; whereas, in the sixth instance, the instrument is already referred to by the suffix ('*īya*') and therefore, the word expressing the same instrument does not occur in the instrumental. In the seventh instance, the ablation (mountain) is not referred to by the grammatical element *lyut* suffix *ana*, and therefore, the word expressing the same, i.e. '*parvatāt*', occurs in the ablative; whereas, in the eighth instance, the ablation is already referred to by the '*lyut*' suffix, '*ana*', and therefore, the word expressing the ablation, i.e.

'*parvataḥ*', does not occur in the ablative. In the ninth instance, the locus, vessel, is not referred to by the grammatical element of 'lyut' suffix '*anī*', and therefore, the word expressing the same, i.e. '*sthālyām*', occurs in the locative; whereas, in the tenth instance, the locus is already referred to by the 'lyut' suffix '*anī*', and therefore, the word expressing the locus i.e. '*sthāli*', does not occur in the locative.

Here non-reference (*anabhidhāna*) means either not stating (*anukti*) or not specifying (*anirdeśa*) of the object etc. And non-reference is either by conjugational endings (*tiṅ*), primary derivative affixes (*kṛt*), secondary derivative suffixes (*taddhita*), compounds (*samāsa*) or sometimes by particles (*nipata*). Consider, for instance, following statements :

- | | |
|---|--|
| (i) ' <i>hariḥ sevyate</i> ' | (Hari is served), |
| (ii) ' <i>lakṣmyā hariḥ sevitaḥ</i> ' | (Hari is served by Lakṣmi), |
| (iii) ' <i>śatyaḥ paṭaḥ</i> ' | (A piece of clothing is to be cut), |
| (iv) ' <i>prāptanando devadattaḥ</i> ' | (Devadatta is one to whom the joy has accrued), |
| (v) ' <i>viṣa vṛkṣo'pi samvardhya
svayam chettum
asāmpratam</i> ' | (Even a poisonous tree, having raised is not proper to be cut off by himself). |

In the first instance, since the conjugational ending (*te*) refers to the object (Hari), (i.e. expresses that Hari is the object of serving), the word expressing the object, '*hari*', does not occur in the accusative. In the second instance, since the primary derivative affix (*tas*) expresses that Hari is the object of serving, the word expressing the object, '*hari*', does not occur in the accusative. In the third instance, since the secondary derivative affix (*ya*) expresses that the piece of clothing is the object of cutting, the word, expressing the object, '*paṭaḥ*', does not occur in the accusative. In the fourth instance, since the compound *prāptānanda* (analysed as *prāptaḥ ānandaḥ yam saḥ*) expresses¹ that Devadatta is the object of accruing, the word expressing

1. However, Giridhara does not accept that compound too refers to the *kāraka*. According to him, the word '*ānanda*' in the compound can be taken to have the indication in

the object, *devadatta*, does not occur in the accusative. And finally, in the fifth instance, since the particle (*api*) expresses that the poisonous tree is the object of raising, the word expressing the object, '*vrkṣa*', does not occur in the accusative.

It should be noted here that when the conjugational endings etc., refer to the *kāraḥ* such as the object, agent etc., the rule *prātipadikārtha*... (p. ii.3.46) becomes operative and governs only the nominative case endings agreeing syntactically with the verb or any other type of predicate used in the sentence. Therefore, since, the object *kāraḥ* is referred to by the conjugational ending etc., the word expressing the same object *kāraḥ* occurs in the nominative case ending 's', in the above statement '*hariḥ sevate*' agreeing in turn, with the verb '*sevate*' in number etc.

Thus, it can be stated now that Pāṇini had visualized that case and other derivative endings represent the syntactico-semantic relations at the surface level, whereas the *kāraḥ* represent the same at the deep structure level. Also, he had visualized that there is a one to one correspondence between the case and other derivative endings and also the syntactico-semantic relations that they express.

Problem

However, epistemologists differ widely amongst themselves as to what is the meaning of the word 'non-expression' or 'non-reference' (*anabhidhāna*) and how to interpret the rule. While Patañjali and his followers consider the non-reference to the number occurring in the *kāraḥ* such as the object, to be the governing factor of use of the case endings; Kātyāyana views the non-reference to the *kāraḥ* as particular *kāraḥ* to be the governing factor of the use of the case endings. And following him, Kaiyata, Bhartṛhari etc. interpret the rule as governing the accusative and other cases when the *kāraḥ*—powers such as the object power etc. are intended to be manifested. Also

the sense of the object of obtaining, conditioning the agentness occurring in the happiness. And hence, the compound need not refer to such an object.

Vibhaktyarthanirṇaya p. 73.

logicians, mainly Gadādhara and his followers, interpret the rule as governing the use of the case endings when that the objectness etc., are intended to be the qualificands of the base meaning; and ritualists, on the other hand, hold that the reference to the *kāraka*-ness as distinct from the objectness etc., is the governing factor of such a usage. In the following pages, we shall examine the various theories put forth by these epistemologists and the conclusion they lead to.

Kātyāyana's theory

Kātyāyana in *vārtika*. 1. under the rule p. ii.3.1 introduces *pūrvapakṣin's* doubt regarding the necessity of the rule. He states that the rule is not required because the principle that 'the meanings already conveyed are not to be expressed again' (*uktārthānām aprayogah*) can avoid the use of the accusative and other case endings when the sense of the *kāraḥ* such as 'object' (*karman*) etc. are referred to otherwise by other grammatical elements.

Kātyāyana, in reply to such a *pūrvapakṣin's* doubt, states as follows : The rule 'when not referred to' (*anabhihite*) has a reference to the meanings of the case endings (*vibhaktyartha*). And therefore, the rule means that 'when a particular syntactico-semantic notion (*kāraka*) such as the 'object' (*karman*) is not already referred to by some other grammatical element, the accusative and other case endings are used. Otherwise (i.e. suppose the rule is not stated, then) the accusative and other case endings can be applicable i.e. added in order to express the number which are not expressed already.

Kātyāyana, further, states (in *vārtika* regarding the use of the nominative case ending) that when the meanings of the case endings i.e. *kāraḥ* have already been expressed otherwise, the nominative case endings are used (*abhihite prathamābhāvah*).

From this it becomes clear that, according to Kātyāyana, the rule is meant to restrict the use of the accusative and other case endings in the sense of the *kāraḥ* such as the 'object' etc., only in the event when the same *kāraḥ* are not already expressed otherwise; and therefore, suppose the *kāraḥ* are already expressed otherwise, then only nominative is used.

Kātyāyana then limits the scope of the rule by stating that

the non-reference should be by *tiñ* (primary) suffix, a *taddhita* (secondary) suffix or by compound formation. Here, '*kriyate kaṭah*', '*kaṭah kṛtah*', '*aupagavah*', '*kāpaṭavah*', '*citraguh*' and '*śabalaguh*' are the examples. If this restriction is not imposed, then the rule p. ii.3.1. would prevent the addition of the case endings after words standing in syntactic agreement with a word whose case ending has already expressed the syntactico-semantic notion (*kāraka*) such as '*karman*'. For instance, the accusative ending would become difficult to be added after the word '*bhīṣma*' in '*bhīṣmam kaṭam karoti*' ('he makes a huge mat) because the meaning of *karman* has already been expressed by the accusative ending (*am*) occurring after the word *kaṭa*.

Another problem Kātyāyana discusses is that when the syntactico-semantic notion (*kāraka*) belonging to two verbs has already been expressed by a suffix added to one of them, the undesired consequence is that the relevant case ending would not be possible. The examples are '*prāsāda āste*' ('he sits on the raised seat') and '*śayana āste*' (he sits on the dais). Here, the locative case ending would not be possible after the words ('*prāsāda*' and '*śayana*') because the sense of location has already been referred to by the '*ghañ*' affix in the word '*prāsāda*' and '*śayana*'. Kātyāyana justifies the addition of the case endings on the ground that one out of the two suffixes namely '*te*' after '*ās*', has not expressed the same sense of location despite that '*ghañ*' affix has already expressed the sense of the location.

Finally Kātyāyana, states that the purpose of the rule (p. ii.3.1) is to avoid the *śeṣa saṣṭhī* (prescribed by the rule (p. ii.3.65) in the statements with *kṛt* derivatives. Suppose the rule p. ii.3.1 is not there then the rule p. ii.3.65 being later, would prevail over the rule p. ii.3.46 and thus would impose the genitive instead of nominative case endings in statements such as *kartavyah kaṭah* (a mat is to be made) after the *kṛt* derivative.

Khaṇḍadeva's interpretation of Kātyāyana's theory

Khaṇḍadev, the ritualist, interprets Kātyāyana's theory of non-reference as follows : Nominative case endings can not be considered to be referring to the nominal base-meanings (*prātipradikārtthāmatra*). In that case, since the case endings, on their own, can refer to the nominal base-meanings, the nominal

base would be reduced to the state of being merely suggestive of the speakers intention for the case endings in the sense of the base meanings; and hence could not be considered to be the cause of verbal cognition. Therefore, the nominative case endings must be regarded as referring to the state of being a *kāraka* such as the objectness, agentness etc., which are already referred to by other grammatical elements such as the conjugational ending etc.

It should be noted here that while the nominative case endings refer to the objectness, agentness etc., as occurring in particular *kārkas* such as the village, Caitra etc., the conjugational endings etc., refer to the same in a very general way i.e. as merely the objectness, agentness etc. Therefore, there is no difficulty of redundancy in reference.

Now, it cannot be claimed that the reference to the objectness, agentness etc., by the case endings as occurring in particular *kārkas* such as the village, Caitra etc., is alone enough to understand the *kārkas* as being the object, agent etc. and hence there is no need that the conjugational endings etc. should be accepted to refer to the same in general. For, in that case, nominative case ending(s) would become untenable after the word 'caitraḥ' in the active statement 'Caitra cooks' (*caitraḥ pacati*) since the reference to the agentness etc., by the conjugational ending etc., would not be the governing factor for the use of the nominative case ending after the words expressing the agent. Also, it cannot be claimed that the reference to the objectness, agentness etc., by the conjugational endings etc., is alone sufficient enough to govern the use of the nominative case endings after the words expressing the object, agent etc. For, in that case, the nominative case ending becomes impossible to avoid after the word *caitreṇa* in the *bhāve* statement 'it is slept by caitra' (*caitreṇa supyate*) since the conjugational ending (*te*) does refer to the agentness conditioned by sleeping in the explanation of the same statement such as 'sleeping is effected by Caitra' (*caitreṇa svāpaḥ kriyate*). Thus, it must be accepted that the reference to the objectness, agentness etc., by both the conjugational ending etc. and the case endings is the governing factor for the use of the nominative case endings.

It can be objected now as follows : Since the *kāraka*-hood,

that is already referred to by the conjugational endings, particles etc., is accepted to be the meaning of the nominative case endings, it would become necessary to frame the governing rule as that the nominative case endings are used when either the conjugational ending or the primary derivative affixes etc., refer to the *kāraka*-hood, and also as that the accusative and other case endings are used when neither the conjugational endings nor the primary derivative affixes etc. refer to the *kāraka*-hood. And therefore, the incorrect statements such as 'the cook is eaten by Caitra' (*caitrena pācako bhuñkte*) would become necessary when actually what is meant is that 'Caitra, the cook, eats' (*caitrah pācako bhuñkte*). This is so because, here the agentness of Caitra can be said to be conditioned by both the 'cooking' action expressed the primary derivative suffix ('*aka*' in *pācaka*), and also the 'eating' action expressed by the conjugational ending (*te* in *bhuñkte*). However, when the agentness of Caitra is considered to be conditioned by the cooking action, the same agentness becomes referred to by only the primary derivative suffix and not by the conjugational ending '*te*'. Thus, since the agentness of Caitra is not referred to by the conjugational ending (*te*), the instrumental case ending can be insisted to be used after the word '*caitra*' in the statement.

To such an objection Kātyāyana can be said to have formulated his theory of non-reference as follows : the non-reference to the agentness, objectness etc., by the conjugational endings, primary derivative affixes etc., governs the instrumental, accusative etc., provided that the same conjugational endings, primary derivative suffixes etc., occur respectively after the verb, primary derivative etc., which in turn, express the actions conditioning the agentness, objectness etc. And now, since in statements 'Caitra, the cook, eats' (*caitrah pācako bhuñkte*), the agentness of Caitra is conditioned by the 'cooking' action expressed by the primary derivative (*pācaka*) after which the derivative suffix (*aka*) occurs, the non-reference to the same agentness by the conjugational ending (*te*) occurring after the verb (*bhuñkte*) expressing the 'eating' action, cannot be considered to be the governing factor for the use of the instrumental case ending.

Observation

It should be observed now that the above interpretation of Katyayana's explanation of the rule p. ii.3.1 is based on the theory that the object such as the rice grains in active statements such as 'Caitra cooks the rice grains' (*caitraḥ taṇḍulam pacati*) and the agent such as Caitra in the passive statement such as 'rice grain(s) is (are) cooked by Caitra' (*caitreṇa pacyate taṇḍulah*) are indeed referred to by the accusative base word '*taṇḍula*' and the instrumental base-word '*Caitra*'. And hence, his explanation of the rule p. ii.3.1 cannot be taken literally i.e. that the accusative, instrumental etc. are used when the object, agent etc., are not referred to; for, in that case, the accusative and the instrumental case endings after the word (*taṇḍula*) expressing the object (i.e. the rice grains) and the word '*caitra*' expressing the agent (i.e. *caitra*) respectively would become impossible to justify since the object 'rice grains' and the agent 'Caitra' are already referred to by base-words themselves; and so no need to refer to them again through the accusative and the instrumental case endings. On the other hand, suppose the rule (p. ii.3.1) is interpreted to mean that the accusative etc., are used when the objectness etc., are not referred to, then the accusative case ending after the word '*taṇḍula*' and the instrumental case ending after the word '*caitra*' in those statements would become tenable since the objectness of rice grains and also the agentness of Caitra are not already referred to by the conjugational endings etc. This is in spite of the fact that the object and the agent are already referred to by the accusative and also the instrumental base words, namely, *taṇḍula* and '*caitra*' respectively.

Kaiyata's view

Kaiyata was greatly influenced by Kātyāyanas explanation of the rule p.ii.3.1. Nevertheless, he introduces the new accept of the *kāraka* power to explain the rule. According to him, the rule is meant to prevent the accusative and other case endings when the *kāraka* powers such as the object(ness) etc. are not manifest. This theory can be explained as follows : Base words (i.e. nominal stems) refer to (i) base meanings, (ii) substance, (iii) gender, (iv) number and (v) *kāraka*. Therefore, the base words such as *kaṭa* in the passive *kaṭah kriyate* (mat is made), can refer to the

object i.e. such as mat. However, since the *kāraka* power such as the object(ness) remains unmanifest, the accusative case ending becomes operative after the word expressing the object (i.e. *kaṭa*). In order that, the accusative be prevented, in such cases, from being used after the word such as '*kaṭa*' in '*kaṭaḥ kriyate*' etc., Pāṇini has composed the rule p. ii.3.1. Thus, the rule should be interpreted as that the accusative and other case endings are used after the words expressing the object *kāraka* etc., provided that the *kāraka* powers such as the object(ness) are intended to be manifest.

Observation

It may be observed, here, now that the difference between Kātyāyana's theory of non-reference and also Kaiyatas theory of non-reference is only in their perception of the objectness and other *kāraka* properties. For, whereas Kātyāyana interprets the rule p. ii.3.1 as governing the accusative and other case endings when the properties of *kāraka* such as the objectness is not referred to; the author of pradīpa interprets the same rule as governing the accusative and other case endings when the *kāraka* powers such as the objectness etc., are not intended to be manifest. Thus, accept for the difference in their perception of the objectness etc., as being either the properties of *kāraka*, or as *kāraka* powers, both the epistemologists follow almost identical path in thier interpretation of the rule p. ii.3.1.

Bhartṛhari's view

Bhartṛhari too accepts that the rule p. ii.3.1 is meant to prevent the use of the accusative and other *kāraka* case endings when the *kāraka* power such as the objectness etc. is referred to by the conjugational ending etc. However, he hold that the two separate *kāraka* powers such as the primary *kāraka* power and also the secondary *kāraka* power, which may co-exist in one and the same substance, need not be referred to separately by the conjugational endings etc. to prevent the accusative case ending etc., after the words expressing the object etc. According to him, the primary and secondary *kāraka* powers

occurring in a single substance may separately be conditioned by two distinct actions, i.e. primary action and also a secondary action. In such cases, the secondary *kāraka* power too becomes referred to by the conjugational affixes (or the primary derivative affix etc.,) that refer to the primary *kāraka* power. Consider for instance, the statement 'The rice, having been cooked, is eaten' (*paktvā odano bhujyate*). Here the primary *kāraka* power (i.e. the primary objectness), occurring in rice, is conditioned by the primary action, namely, the eating; and the secondary *kāraka* power, (i.e. the secondary objectness) also occurring in the same rice, is conditioned by the secondary action, namely, the cooking. And, since the conjugational affix, namely, (*te*), occurring after the verb '*bhuñj*', expressing the primary action (i.e. eating), refers to the primary *kāraka* power of the rice, the secondary *kāraka* power of the rice too becomes referred to by the same conjugational affix. However, in such cases, the primary *kāraka* power does not become referred to by the derivative affix occurring after the verb expressing the secondary action despite that the same derivative affix refers to the secondary *kāraka* power occurring in the rice. Consider, for instance, the statement 'he eats the cooked rice' (*pakvam odanam bhuñkte*). Here, the primary *kāraka* power (i.e. the primary objectness), occurring in the rice and conditioned by the primary action, namely, eating, is not referred to by the derivative affix, (*vam*), occurring after the verb '*pac*' expressing the secondary action, namely, cooking; despite that the same affix refers to the secondary *kāraka* power occurring in the rice. Thus, the objection that 'accusative case ending '*am*' should not be used after the word '*odānam*' expressing the object 'rice' in the statement '*pakvam odanam bhuñkte* since the secondary *kāraka* power occurring in the rice is already referred to by the derivative affix" stands refuted. This is so because, in spite of the fact that the secondary *kāraka* power, occurring in the rice, is referred to by the derivative affix (*vam*), the primary *kāraka* power occurring in the same rice, is not referred to by the same derivative affix; and unless, the primary *kāraka* power is referred to, the accusative and other *kāraka* cases cannot be dropped. Also, the

objection that the accusative and other *kāraka* case endings must be used after the word 'odanaḥ' expressing the object, 'rice', in the statement 'the rice, having been cooked, is eaten' (*paktvaudano bhujiyate*) since the secondary *kāraka* power occurring in the rice is not referred to by the derivative affix 'iva' stands refuted. This is so because, inspite of the fact that the secondary *kāraka* power, occurring in the rice, is not referred to by the derivative affix, the primary *kāraka* power, also occurring in the same rice, is referred to by the conjugational endings 'te' occurring after the verb 'bhujiya' expressing the primary action, eating; and hence the secondary *kāraka* power too becomes referred to by the conjugational ending 'te'.

Observation

It can be stated now that according to Bhartṛhari also, the rule p. ii.3.1 is meant to prevent the accusative and other *kāraka* case endings when the *kāraka* powers such as the objectness are already referred to; however, according to him, the non-reference to the secondary *kāraka* power is not the governing factor for the use of the accusative and other *kāraka* case endings, but rather, the non-reference to the primary *kāraka* power is the only governing factor for the use of such case endings.

Patañjali's explanation of the rule p. ii.3.1 and his theory of non-reference

According to Patanjali, the term 'anabhihite' means either 'not stated already' (*anukta*) or 'not specified already' (*anirdiṣṭa*) Patanjali, under vartika 1, of p. ii.2.1 introduces the Pūrvapakṣins doubt regarding the necessity of the rule as follows : The rule is not required because the principle of 'uktārthānām aprajogaḥ' (the meanings already conveyed need not be expressed again) can avoid the accusative and other case endings after the words expressing the object etc., when the sense of the *kāraṅgas* such as the 'object' (*kāraṅga*) are referred to already otherwise. For instance, in 'bhinatti' etc., the general suffix 'śap' etc. are not added because the meaning conveyed by such affixes is already conveyed by the special suffix 'śnam' etc.

Similarly, by the same principle, the addition of the accu-

sative and other case endings can also be avoided in the sense of the *kāraḥ*; and therefore, the rule is redundant.

Patañjali refutes the pūrvapakṣin's position by reasoning as follows : the rule is necessary to avoid the accusative and other case endings after the words expressing the object and other *kāraḥ* such as 'kaṭa' in 'kṛtaḥ kaṭaḥ' etc., when the 'object' and other *kāraḥ* are already expressed by the 'kṛt' suffix etc., but the number singularity etc., which are the meanings of case endings, are not expressed. (*ekatvādayo vibhaktya-rīṭāḥ teṣvanabhihiteṣu karmādayo'bhīhitā vibhaktinām utpattau nimittatvāya mā bhūvan*).

Patañjali⁵ differs from Vārtikākāra regarding the meaning of the case endings and also the use of the nominative case endings. According to him, the case endings convey two types of meanings, syntactico-semantic notions (*kāraḥ*) or number (*samkhyā*). However, here only the number is intended to be the meaning of the case endings. Thus, even when the syntactico-semantic notions like 'karmān' have already been conveyed; the notion of number would remain unexpressed. Therefore, the rule should be understood as governing the accusative and other *kāraḥ* case endings when the number belonging to the *kāraḥ* such as the 'object' etc., has not been already expressed.

Regarding the use of the nominative case endings, he states that the nominative case endings are not used when the notion of number has already been expressed (*abhihite prathamayāḥ abhāvah*). He explains that in 'vrkṣah', 'plakṣah' etc. the notion of the base-meaning (*prātipadikārtha*) has already been conveyed by the base (*prātipadika*) itself. Therefore, if nominative case endings convey any notion other than number (i.e. *kāraḥ* or *prātipadikārtha*), then the nominative ending could not be added because the *prātipadikārtha* is already conveyed. Thus, it should be accepted that the nominative case endings are added when the notion of number, belonging to the *prātipadikārtha*, is not conveyed already.

Another problem Patanjali discusses is the use of the relevant case ending when the syntactico-semantic notion

5. See the article on meaning of the nominative case ending for more detail.

(*kāraka*) belonging to two verbs has already been expressed by a suffix added to one of them.

Patanjali in this connection, states that in '*āsana āste*', '*śayane śete*' etc., the root *ās-* as it occurs in *āsana* or the root '*śi-*' as it occurs in *śayana*, is different from the root *ās-* as it occurs in '*āste*' or from the root '*śi-*' as it occurs in '*śete*'. For, in the word '*āsana*', the root *ās-* gives indication regarding the time element (*kāla*) or operator (*sādhana*), whereas the root *ās-* in *āste* does not give any indication regarding the present time and also the operator i.e. agent. Thus, they are different roots. And since the roots differ, the sense of location in connection with the actions signified by '*ās-*' and, '*śi-*' in *āste* and *śete* are also different; and hence not referred to. Thus, to convey such a sense of location the locative case ending is added after '*āsana*' and '*śayana*' in such statements.

In this connection Patanjali discusses the nature of *sādhana* or *kāraka*. According to him, suppose *sādhana* or *kāraka* is a substance (*dravya*) then, due to the fixed nature of a substance, one and the same thing would become difficult to be considered as different *kāraḥ* under different conditions or circumstances. On the other hand, suppose a *kāraka* is considered to be a *guṇa* or a referential quality, then, due to a varying nature of referential quality, one and the same thing can be considered to be different *kāraḥ* under different circumstances. Thus, tree becomes, an object of cutting somewhere, and the locus of standing elsewhere.

Observation

Patanjali opposes the pūrvapakṣin's position that in statements such as 'mat is made' (*kṛtaḥ kaṭaḥ*), the fact that the mat is the object (*kāraka*) of making is already referred to by the primary derivative suffix (*ta*); and therefore, the use of the accusative case ending after the word expressing the mat i.e. '*kaṭa*', can be prevented from the grammatical convention that 'the words, when their meanings are already conveyed through other means, are never used in a sentence again'; and thus, the rule p. ii.3.1 is unnecessary if meant to prevent such a use of the accusative and other case endings after the words expressing the *kāraḥ* such as object when the same has already been referred

to by the primary derivative etc. According to him, the rule p. ii.3.1 is meant to govern the use of the accusative and other case endings after the words expressing the *kāra*kas such as object, agent, etc., when the number singularity etc., is intended to be referred to by the accusative and other case endings as being related to the *kāra*kas such as the object, agent that are not already referred to by the primary derivative etc. And this fact can be explained as follows: Accusative and other case endings refer to the number singularity etc., which are present in the object and other *kāra*kas. And, the number singularity etc., are intended to be related to the object and other *kāra*kas as qualifiers. Hence, inspite of the fact that the primary derivative suffix (*ta*) has already referred to the *kāra*ka notion that the mat is the object (*kāra*ka) of making, the accusative ending can be insisted to be used with the intention that the same should refer to the number singularity in the statement 'mat is made' (*kṛtaḥ kaṭaḥ*). In order that such a use of the accusative etc. be prevented from being used Pāṇini has enjoined the rule '*anabhihite*' p. ii.3.1. Now, since in statement 'mat is made' (*kaṭaḥ kṛtaḥ*), the number singularity is not intended to be referred to by the accusative case ending as being related to the object (*kāra*ka), that is not already referred to by the primary derivative (*ta*), the accusative case ending cannot be insisted to be used after the word '*kaṭa*' in the statement.

View of Bhaṭṭoji and Nāgeśa

Both Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita and Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa closely follow Patanjali's interpretation of the rule p. ii.3.1 and hold the view that the rule has been composed to govern the accusative and other case endings when the same are intended to refer to the number singularity etc. However, Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa makes an interesting observation regarding the usefulness of such a rule. His observation can be summarized as follows: The rule 'accusative is used in the sense of the object' (*karmani dvitīyā* p. ii.3.2) etc. form a single sentence along with the rule 'singular and dual endings are used in the sense of singularity and duality' (*dvye-kayoh dvivacanaikavacane* p. i.4.22). Consequently, the rule p. ii.3.2 together with the rule i.4.22 means that the case endings such as the accusative singular and the accusative dual are used

in the sense of singular and dual object(s). However, the accusative singular, and other case endings can be held either to refer to the number(s) as qualifying the object and other *kāraḥ* or to refer to the object and other *kāraḥ* as qualifying the number(s). In the first instance, the object etc. would become the primary meaning of the case endings and the numbers mere subordinate to the same (object etc.). In the second instance, the number(s) would become the primary meaning of the case endings and the object etc. mere subordinate to the same number(s). Now, suppose the case endings are held to refer to the object etc. as primary meanings and to the number(s) as mere subordinate, then the rule 'when not referred to' (p. ii.3.1) becomes impossible to justify. This is so because, in that case, the rule (p. ii.3.2) would mean that the accusative singular and other case endings are used when the fact that something (mat) is the object *kāraḥ* etc. is intended to be understood. And since, in the statement such as 'mat is made' (*kṛtaḥ kaṭaḥ*), the primary meaning of the accusative case endings (i.e. the fact that mat is the object *kāraḥ*) is already understood by the primary derivative suffix (*ta*), the use of the accusative case endings gets prevented due to the grammatical convention that 'the words, when their meanings are already conveyed through other means, are never used again' itself. And thus, the rule 'when not referred to' (p. ii.3.1) would have no occasion to operate.

However, suppose the case endings are held to refer to the numbers, singularity etc. as the primary meaning(s), then the rule p. ii.3.2 can be justified. This is so because, in that case, the rule (p. ii.3.2) would mean that the accusative singular and other case endings are used when the numbers, singularity etc., occurring in the object etc., are intended to be understood. And, since, in the statement such as 'mat is made', only the subordinate (i.e. the object *kāraḥ*) is referred to by the primary derivative suffix (*ta*), the accusative case ending becomes necessary after the word expressing the mat (i.e. *kaṭa*) so that the number singularity etc., occurring in the mat, can be understood. Now,

6. Praudhamonoramā, p. 788.

* 7. Laghuśabdenduśekhara, p. 557.

to prevent such a non-grammatical usage of the accusative case ending after the word 'kaṭa', etc., the rule 'when not referred to' (p. ii.3.1) is necessary.

Observation

It must be noted here, that this observation of Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa further restricts the usefulness of the rule (p. ii.3.1) to the interpretation of the rule (p. iii.3.2) that the same rule forms singularity of sentence with the rule p. i.4.22. Thus, according to Nagesha the accusative singular and other case endings are used when the number(s) singularity etc., occurring in the object etc., are intended to be understood' only.

Gadādhara's critical examination of Patañjali's theory

Gadādhara makes a critical examination of the theory of Patañjali that non-reference to the number is the governing factor for the use of the accusative and other case endings. Following is an account of Gadādhara critical examination : For Patañjali, conjugational endings such as 'ti' in 'pacati' (he cooks) and 'te' in 'pacyate' (it is cooked) etc. must be accepted to be referring to the number occurring in the agent and object respectively. He holds that this is necessitated by the fact that otherwise the instrumental and accusative case-endings would become an impossibility after the words expressing the agent and the object (i.e. 'caitra' and 'taṇḍula') respectively in the passive and active statements such as 'rice grains are cooked by Caitra' (*caitrena pacyate taṇḍulaḥ*) and 'Caitra cooks rice grains' (*caitraḥ pacati taṇḍulam*). And since, the conjugational endings ('ti' and 'te') are not recognized to be referring to the agentness and the objectness, and hence non-reference to the same (agentness and objectness) cannot be considered to be the governing factor for the use of the instrumental and the accusative case-endings, the rule such as 'the instrumental and also accusative case-endings are used after the words expressing the agent and also the object' should be understood as assigning the instrumental and also the accusative case endings after the words expressing the agent and also the object respectively provided that the number singularity in them is not referred to

already. However, such a theory is not tenable : the non-reference to the number (singularity etc.) occurring in the agent etc. cannot be the governing factor for the use of the instrumental and other case endings after the words expressing the agent and others. For, despite that the conjugational endings such as 'te' refer to the singularity in the agent, namely, Caitra, the passive statement 'rice grain(s) is (are) cooked by Caitra' (*taṇḍulaḥ pacyate caitreṇa*) has the instrumental case-ending occurring after the word 'caitra' expressing the agent.

Patañjali may be taken to overcome the difficulty by holding as follows : The non-reference to the number by the conjugational ending etc., means that the conjugational endings etc. are not conducive to the cognition of the number as qualifying the agent, the qualificand. Thus, the rule that the instrumental etc. should be used after the word expressing the agent etc., means that 'the instruemntal case-ending etc. are used after the words expressing the agent etc. which (i.e. words) are associated with the conjugational ending that, in turn, is not conducive to the the verbal cognition of the number qualifying the agent, the qualificand.

In the passive statement '*caitreṇa pacyate taṇḍulaḥ*', the conjugational ending 'te', is not conducive to the verbal cognition wherein the number, singularity, is the qualifier of the agent 'Caitra'. This is so because, since in the cognition involving the relation of the productive activity, only the meaning, referred to by the nominative word such as '*taṇḍulaḥ*' (rice grains) in the passive statement and '*caitraḥ*'. (*Caitra*) in an active statement, is the substratum (i.e. chief qualificand), the passive conjugational ending (*te*) can refer to the number, relating to only the object 'rice grains' and the active conjugational ending (*ti*) can refer to the number relating to only the agent 'Caitra'. Thus, the non-reference to the number, singularity i.e. the passive conjugational ending being non-conducive to the generation of the cognition wherein the number (singularity) qualifies the agent (Caitra), can very well be established in the passive statement.

Refutation of Patañjalis theory

However, this theory of Patañjali is not tenable. In this theory, the non-reference to the number is viewed as the con-

jugational ending being non-conducive to the cognition wherein the number qualifies the agent etc. However; the fact is that such a non-conduciveness cannot be defined properly. Suppose it is defined as the being the possessor of the absence of the reference to the knowledge that produces the cognition of the number qualifying the agent etc., then the instrumental case-ending would become necessary after the word expressing the agent (Caitra) even in active statements provided that the knowledge of the particular conjugational ending associated with the same, does not produce the cognition of the number qualifying the agent in the absence of some other secondary cause. Also, suppose it is defined as the being the absence of the conjugational and other endings that are the objects of the knowledge of the potential ability to produce the cognition of the number, then it could be claimed that even the *ātmanepada* ending (*te*), associated with *yak* suffix, has the potential ability to produce such a cognition. And, thus, it would become impossible to establish a conjugational ending which is not an object of the knowledge of the potential ability to produce such a cognition. For instance, consider the following two statements 'Caitra will cook' (*caitrah pakṣyate*), and 'rice grains will be cooked' (*tanḍulah pakṣyate*). Here, the same conjugational ending '*te*' is known to produce the cognition of the singularity qualifying the 'agent', 'Caitra' and the object 'rice grains' in the first and the second statements respectively. Consequently, the same conjugational ending '*te*' does indeed possess the potentiality to produce the cognition of the singularity qualifying the agent in the passive statement as well and hence the instrumental after the word become difficult to explain. Thus, it is not correct to interpret that the non-reference is the being the absence of the conjugational and other endings that are objects of the knowledge of the potential ability to produce the cognition of the number.

Also, suppose the non-reference to the number is held to be the governing factor for the use of the instrumental case (after the word expressing the agent in the passive statement) and for the use of the accusative case (after the word expressing the object in the active statement), then the use of the instrumental and accusative case endings after the word expressing the agent

and also the object respectively in the statements 'Caitra's own-self is seen by Caitra' (*caitreṇa svam dṛśyate*) and 'Caitra sees himself' (*caitraḥ svam paśyati*) would become difficult to explain. For, in those cases, the conjugational endings in *dṛśyate* and *paśyati* do not refer to the number i.e. do not have the syntactical expectancy (i.e. sequence of words) that can produce the cognition of the number as qualifying both Caitra and rice grains.

It may be suggested here now as follows: That the convention is that only when a sequence of finite verb and a word expressing the agent, conditions the reference to the knowledge that produces the cognition of the number as qualifying the agent, the non-qualificand instrumental case ending is used after the word expressing the agent. Consequently, since, in the first statement (*caitreṇa dṛśyate svam*), the sequence of the finite verb *dṛśyate* and the word 'svam' can indeed produce the cognition of the number as qualifying Caitra himself, there is no occasion for considering the use of the instrumental case ending after the word 'caitra' as untenable. Also, since, in the second statement (*caitraḥ svam paśyati*), the sequence of the finite verb '*paśyati*' and the word '*caitraḥ*' can produce the verbal cognition of the number as qualifying Caitra, the qualificand, there is no occasion for considering the use of the accusative case-ending after the word 'svam' as untenable.

However, this suggestion is not correct. It is necessary to explain the purpose of the inclusion of the rule that the instrumental case ending is used after the words expressing both the 'agent' and the 'instrument' (*karṭṛ karaṇayos tṛtīyā*) under the head (*anabhihite*). Suppose it is stated that the purpose is to prevent the use of the instrumental and accusative case endings after the words '*caitra*' (Caitra) and '*taṇḍula*' (rice grains) respectively in the statements '*caitraḥ pacati*' (Caitra cooks) and '*taṇḍulaḥ pacyate*' 'rice grains are cooked', then it must also be explained as to how the rule prevents such a usage i.e. whether the rule prevents such a usage just like a magical stone prevents the power of burning in the fire etc. or it does so due to some syntactico-semantic relation being already referred to by other sources. And it is not simply possible to accept that the rule prevents such a usage just like a magical stone. Also if the same rule prevents the use of the instrumental and accusative cases due to

some syntacto-semantic relation being already referred to by other sources, then it is necessary to state such source clearly. Again, it may be suggested as follows : That the purpose of such a rule is to make one understand that it is grammatically incorrect to use the instrumental and also the accusative case endings after the words expressing the agent and the object in the active (*pacati*) and passive (*pacyate*) statements, since the syntactical expectation that is conducive to the cognition of the agentness and the objectness is lacking in such case endings. However, this suggestion is also incorrect : For, it is not possible to obtain the grammatical incorrectness of the usages of such case endings from the said interpretation of the rule '*kartī karaṇayoh*'. Also, the sequence of the active finite verb '*pacati*' and the instrumental, '*caitreṇa*' and also the sequence of the passive finite verb, '*pacyate*' and the accusative, *taṇḍulam* which constitute such incorrect statements as '*caitreṇa pacati*' (cooks by Caitra) and '*taṇḍulam pacyate*' (to rice grains is cooked), cannot be considered to be the cause of the cognition of the number qualifying the agent 'Caitra' and also the object 'rice grains' since only the sequence of the active finite verb '*pacati*' and the nominative of the word expressing the agent i.e. '*caitraḥ*' and also the sequence of the passive finite verb '*pacyate*' and the nominative of the word expressing the object i.e. '*taṇḍulaḥ*', is the cause of such a cognition. Consequently, the instrumental ending (*ṇa*) after the word expressing the agent (i.e. *caitra*) and also the accusative ending (*am*) after the word expressing the object (i.e. *taṇḍula*) cannot be avoided in the incorrect statements '*caitreṇa pacati*' and '*taṇḍulam pacyate*' since such sequences are not conducive to the cognition of number in the agent 'Caitra' and also the object 'rice grains'.

Thus, it is necessary to accept that what governs the use of instrumental, accusative and other case endings is the non-reference to the agentness, the objectness etc. which are common to both primary and secondary agents, objects etc., by the conjugational endings, primary and secondary affixes, compounds and particles in association with the words expressing the agent and the object etc. Raghunatha Shiromani, the author of *Didhiti*, too has placed a great emphasis in this interpretation of the rule only.

theory. The underlying reason for this alternative theory is that the nominal bases alone have the competency to denote all the senses and therefore case endings can be held to be suggestive of such senses i.e. to be determining factor as to what sense the bases should denote under what circumstances.

Prācya theory

Prācya logicians hold that the word 'object' (*karman*) in the rule '*karmaṇi dvitīyā*' (p. ii.3.2) is meant to convey the objectness (*karmatva*). And the locative case ending (*i*) occurring after the word '*karman*' means 'what refers to' (*vācaka*). Consequently, the rule means that the accusative case ending refers to the objectness.

They hold so because the word '*karman*' cannot be taken literally to mean the 'object'. For, despite that one can cognize the object as identical with the village, by relating the base-meaning 'village' (*grāma*) etc. to the 'object', the accusative meaning, through identity, in the statements such as 'he goes to the village' (*grāmam gacchati*), the same (object) cannot be directly related to the action of going etc. And suppose the object is related to the action of going etc. through the indirect relation of conditioning the objectness occurring in itself (*svaṇiṣṭha karmatā nirūpakatva*), then the heaviness would result in such an assumption. Thus, the word '*karman*' must be taken to mean the objectness.

Now, the objectness is analysed as the being the abode of the effect produced by the action of going etc. And in such an analysis, the action is obtained through the verbal root; whereas the relation of producing between the action and the effect is obtained through the principle of syntactico-semantic relations. Thus, only the effect such as 'contact' remains to be obtained as the meaning of the accusative case ending as the same is not obtained through otherwise.

According to this theory, the syntactico-semantic relations involved in an accusative statement such 'Caitra goes to the village' (*caitraḥ grāmam gacchati*) can be explained as follows : The accusative case ending (*am*) occurring after the word '*grāma*'

refers to the effect 'contact'. And the accusative base meaning, namely, the 'village' is related to such an effect through the relation of the superstratumness. The verbal root, namely, 'go' (*gam*) refers to the action of going. And the effect 'contact' relates to such an action of going through the relation of producing; whereas the action is related to the nominative meaning, namely, Caitra through the abodeness or substratumness. Thus, one cognizes, according to the Prācyas, that 'Caitra is the abode or substratum of the action of going that produces the effect 'contact' occurring in the 'village' from such a statement.

Observation

Prācyas theory is based on the ground that Pāṇini has prescribed the accusative case endings in the sense of the objectness (and not mere object). Prācyas argue that the objects like the village are already expressed by the accusative bases such as (*grāma*) and hence there is no need to express the same again. Also they justify their interpretation of the rule on the ground that Pāṇini has used the expression '*karmani*' instead of 'karmatve' for the sake of only economy; and therefore meant only 'karmatve'.

According to the Prācyas, only the effect ('contact' etc.), which is not expressed by any other word, should be considered to be the meaning of the accusative case endings since the objectness is to be analysed as the being the abode of the effect produced by the root meaning 'action'; and the abode i.e. the village and the action are already expressed by the accusative stem '*grāma*' and the verbal root '*gam*' respectively.

Difficulty in Prācyas theory

Jagadīśā points out an epistemological difficulty⁷ in the Prācyas theory as follows : Since the Prācyas hold that the verbal roots such as 'leave' (*tyaj*) and 'go' (*gam*) refer to mere action, both the roots would need to convey the sense of only movement or motion. And, thus, since no difference can be established between the senses conveyed by the two roots, both 'leave' and 'go' would become synonymous. Consequently, the established

statements like 'leaving is not going' (*tyāgo na gamanam*) would become untenable. Also, it is not possible to avoid such a difficulty by accepting that the roots 'leave' (*tyaj*) and 'go' (*gam*) have indications in two different senses, namely, the action of 'leaving' delimited by the 'effect separation' and the action of going delimited by the effect 'contact' respectively. For, in that case, although the difficulty of explaining the statement 'leaving is not going' can be overcome (i.e. the statement can be explained as tenable due to the fact that the root 'leave' conveys, by indication, the leaving delimited by separation and the root 'go' conveys, by indication, the 'going' delimited by contact'), the verbal cognition produced from the statements such as 'bird leaves the tree' (*vrkṣam tyajati*) etc. which involve such roots as 'leave' becomes untenable. This is so because, since the accusative case ending (*am*) refers to the effect such as separation and the root 'leave' conveys the sense of the leaving delimited by the effect 'separation', the verbal cognition would be that the bird is the abode of the action of leaving, delimited by the separation which i.e. the action produces the effect separation from the tree; and such a verbal cognition is not epistemologically tenable because the effect 'separation' is perceived twice in such a cognition : i.e. once as the meaning conveyed by the accusative case ending and again as the meaning conveyed by the verbal root.

Also, it is not possible to accept that one and the same meaning can be perceived twice in the verbal cognition; for, in that case, the statement such as 'the person has the pot-producing staff which produces the blue pot' (*nila ghaṭa janaka ghaṭa janaka daṇḍavān*) could also be insisted to produce a valid verbal cognition.

Avoidance of difficulty

Jagadīśa, however, suggests⁸ that the above epistemological difficulty in the Prācya theory can be avoided by assuming a

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8. It should be noted here that epistemologists like Jagadīśa accept the verbal cognition wherein the qualifier and the qualificand are essentially the same, but the qualifier is perceived to have a distinct quality. Thus, the cognition from

special cause and effect relationship. According to him, it should be assumed that only the reference to the action produced by a particular verbal root such as 'leave' (*tyaj*) or 'go' (*gam*) is the cause of the verbal cognition wherein a particular effect such as separation or contact is perceived as qualifying the action. Consequently, the verbal cognition, wherein the effect 'separation' qualifies the action, can be explained from the statement 'bird leaves the tree' since only the reference to the action produced by the root 'leave' (*tyaj*) can be found in such instances. Also, Jagadīśa points out that in the assumption of such a cause and effect relationship, the statement such as 'he goes to the village' (*grāmam gacchati*) can be avoided when Caitra has the action conducive to the separation from the village i.e. when Caitra leaves the village. This is so because such a statement cannot produce the verbal cognition, wherein the effect 'separation' qualifies the action, since the required cause namely, the reference to the action from the particular root 'leave' (*tyaj*) is absent there.

Navya's theory

Navyas strongly⁹ oppose the theory of the Prācyaś. According to them, the accusative case endings should be accepted to refer to only the syntactico-semantic relations such as the superstratumness (*ādheyatva*). They hold that verbal roots such as 'go' (*gam*) refer to the action such as going delimited by the effect such as contact. And thus, since both the action and its effect are obtained through the verbal root itself, only the syntactico-semantic relation such as the superstratumness is the meaning of the accusative case endings.

According to the Navyas theory, the syntactico-semantic relations involved in an accusative statement such as 'Caitra goes to the village' (*caitraḥ grāmam gacchati*) can be explained as follows. The accusative case ending (*am*) which occurs after the word '*grāma*' refers to the superstratumness (*ādheyatā*). And the

'staff holder is a red staff-holder' (*daṇḍavān raktadaṇḍavān*) is tenable because the qualifier, namely, 'red staff-holder' is perceived to have a distinct quality such as redness.

9. Vyutpattivāda, p. 215.

accusative base meaning, namely, the village, relates to the superstratumness through the conditioning (*nirūpītatā*). The root 'go' (*gam*) refers to the action of going as delimited by the effect 'contact'; whereas the verbal ending (*ti*) refers to the substratumness (*āśrayatā*) which is, identical with the agentness. The accusative meaning, namely the superstratumness, relates to the effect, contact, the delimiter of the root meaning, through the occurrence. Such an effect relates to the action of going through producing. The action, further, relates to the substratumness in turn, relating to Caitra, delimited by the singularity, the nominative-meaning, through the self-linking relation (*svarūpa*). Thus, the cognition, according to the Navyas, is that Caitra, delimited by singularity, has the substratumness (i.e. the agentness) which is conditioned by the action of going that produces the effect, the abode of the superstratumness in turn, conditioned by the village.

Observation

According to this theory, Pāṇini's rule (p. ii.3.2) should be interpreted to mean that the accusative case endings are used after such bases which are intended to refer to the village etc. that are related to the superstratumness occurring in the effect 'contact' etc. Consequently, the Prācya's interpretation of the same rule that the accusative case endings refer to the objectness becomes unnecessary. However, it must be noted here that the Navya's explanation of the rule namely that the accusative case endings are used after such bases which are intended to refer to the village etc., needs the supplying of words such as "after the bases which are intended to refer to the village etc." and such a supplying can be justified only when no other alternative is open.

Navyas, however, justify their explanation on the ground that the superstratumness (*ādheyatā*) must be conceded to be a separate entity on account of the common perception such as the superstratumness conditioned by such and such entity occurs in such and such entity (*ādheyatā iti pratīti sāksikam ādheyatva*). And once the superstratumness is conceded to be a separate entity, the same can be accepted to be the accusative meaning.

An epistemological problem encountered by the Navyas

in their theory of the accusative meaning is as follows : When the superstratumness is the accusative meaning, the same should be accepted to be relating to the effect, 'contact' etc. However, since, in this theory, the effect 'contact' etc. is the delimiter of the action of going etc. i.e. is only a part of the meaning expressed by the verbal root such as 'go' (*gam*) etc., the relation of the superstratumness to the effect violates the established convention that a meaning of a word relates to the independent meaning of another word and not to the part of the meaning of another word (*padārthaḥ padārthena anveti natu tadeka deśena*). However, Navyas overcome such a problem by suggesting that the application of the convention should be restricted to other instances only. That is to say that the epistemological convention is applicable to the instances wherein the superstratumness does not figure in as the qualifier of something.

It can be observed now that the Navyas have proposed that the superstratumness should be accepted as a separate entity since otherwise the perception such as the superstratumness occurs in such and such entity cannot be explained; and once the superstratumness is accepted, the same can be considered the accusative meaning as only such a sense is not obtained otherwise in the analysis of the objectness. Thus, whereas the superstratumness is perceived as only the syntactico-semantic relation between the accusative base-meaning such as the village and also the accusative case meaning such as the effect 'contact' in the *prācya* theory, the same is perceived as a referent qualifier (*prakāribhūta padārtha*) in the Navya theory.

Objection to Navya Logicians theory

Khaṇḍadeva objects to the Navya¹⁰ logicians theory of the accusative meaning on epistemological grounds. According to him, the logicians position that the superstratumness, which relates to the effect, delimiting the root meaning, 'action', is the accusative case meaning and the superstratumness, which relates to the root meaning 'action' is the locative case meaning, is not tenable. His arguments are as follows : Suppose the accusative case endings are accepted to refer to the superstra-

10. Bhāṭṭarāhasya, 56-62.

tumness, which relates to the effect, then the epistemological convention that a meaning of a word relates to the independent meaning of another word and not to the part of the meaning of another word (*padārthaḥ padārthena anveti na tu tadekadeśena*) gets violated. For, the effect such as the contact, being the delimiter of the action of a 'going' etc., forms only a part of the root-meaning and not the independent meaning.

Also, it cannot be argued, that the epistemological convention needs to be restricted any way in view of the statement such as 'Caitras descendant' (*caitrasya naptā*). For, in such cases too, the relation of Caitra, expressed by the genitive case ending (*sya*), is related to the descendant, the independent meaning of the word *napti*. Moreover, the basic theory of the Navyas that the effect is the delimiting property of the root-meaning 'action' is itself untenable. For, in causative usages such as 'Caitra makes Maitra go to the village' (*caitro maitram gamayati grāmam*), the action of going, which functions as the effect of the causative action of making some one go, cannot be claimed to be the delimiting property of the action of making some one go, the causative root-meaning. On the other hand, suppose the delimitership of the effect is considered to be a self-linking relation (*svarūpasambandharūpam*), then such a delimitership becomes impossible to explain as the same would be needed to be assumed in such properties (i.e. effects), the abode of which gets the accusative case endings. Thus, in view of all these difficulties, only the objectness, which is an indivisible property (*akhaṇḍopādhi*), should be accepted as the meaning of the accusative meaning.

It should also be noted that, in the Navya theory, the effect can be perceived to be either as an effect in general (*phalātvena bodhaḥ*) or as an individual effect such as contact (*samyogatvādinā vā*). However, both the alternatives are untenable. Suppose the first alternative is accepted, then the statement 'he goes to the earlier region' (*pūrvadeśam gacchati*) would become liable to be imposed while going to the village since the action of going produces the contact with the earlier region as well as the contact with the next region i.e. the village. Suppose the second alternative is accepted, then the statement such as 'the serpent goes to the tree' would become liable to be imposed

when the serpent goes to the top of the tree since, when the contact with the top of the tree is produced, the contact with the tree cannot be denied to have been produced.

Observation

It can be observed now as follows : In view of avoiding the difficulty of violating the epistemological convention that the meaning of a word relates to an independent meaning of another word and not to the part of that of another word, Gadāhara has stated in his Vyutpattivāda¹¹ that effect (contact etc.) and action (of going etc.) are two independent (separate) meanings of a root. Thus, Khaṇḍadevas objection that, 'accepting the superstratumness that relates to the effect as the accusative meaning violates the epistemological convention' can be overcome.

Also, in the Navya theory, "the effect is the delimiting property of the root-meaning 'action'," does not mean that the effect is the delimiting property of what is denoted by the verbal root (*phalasya dhātvarthatā vacchedakatvam na taddhātu śakya-tāvacchedakatvam*). What they mean to say, however, is that the effect is what directly or indirectly qualifies the root-meaning, namely, the action. Consequently, in causative usages such as 'Caitra makes Maitra go to the village' (*caitro maitram gamayati grāmam*), the action of going, which functions as the effect of the causative action of making some one go, can be considered to be the effect since the same directly qualifies the action of making some one go. Thus, Maitra, who is the abode of such an effect (i.e. the action of going), can be explained as the object of the causative action of making some one go. Nevertheless, it is not impossible to explain Caitra as the agent (*kartr*) of cooking in the causative statement such as 'he has Caitra cook the rice' (*caitreṇānnam pācayati*). This is despite that the action of cooking, in such statements, can be claimed to be the effect due to its qualifying nature of the the causative action of making some one cook. For, Caitra can have the name 'agent' (*kartr*) due to the fact that the action of cooking is the meaning expressed by the primitive root 'cook' (*pac-*) as

11. Vyutpattivāda, pp. 220-226.

well; and hence whoever possesses such an action becomes the agent alone. Now, when two names such 'object' (*karman*) and 'agent' (*kartr*) are simultaneously applicable to Caitra due to his possessing the action of cooking, the later name 'agent' (*kartr*) takes presedence over the former name 'object' (*karman*); and hence 'caitra' gets the agentive third case ending (*trīyā*). Thus, since all the objections raised by Khaṇḍadeva are effectively answered by Gadādhara, the Navya theory that the accusative refers to the superstratumness relating to the effect 'contact' etc. is justified on logical grounds.

Gokulanatha's theory

Gokulanātha, one of the later Navya logicians,¹² states that the accusative case endings should be accepted to refer to the syntactico-semantic relation such as the superstratumness (*ādheyatva*) or the substratumness (*adhikaraṇatva*) and the mutual absence (*bheda*). His theory can be summed up as follows : Since the other constituent parts in the analysis of the objectness, namely, the effect and the action, are already obtained through the verbal roots and also since the object such as the village is obtained through the accusative base; only the relation between the object such as village and also the effect such as the contact remains to be denoted. Consequently, the accusative case endings refer to only such a relation.

Now, since the object such as the village is the abode or substratum of the effect such as contact, the relation between them can be the substratumness; and such a substratumness occurs in the object village and is conditioned by effect 'contact'. However, since the effect such as the contact occurs in the object such as the village, the relation between them can be perceived to be the superstratumness as well; such a superstratumness occurs in the effect 'contact' and is conditioned by the object 'village'.

Also, since the incorrect statements such as 'Caitra goes to himself' (*caitraḥ svam gacchati*) etc. are to be avoided, the

12. *Karmatva ghaṭakā bhāgā labhyante parato yataḥ. Dvītiyārtha's tato bheda sambandhāvīti iārkikāḥ* Padavākhyaratnākara, p. 521.

accusative case endings can be accepted to refer to the mutual absence. And, such a mutual absence is qualified by the accusative base-meaning, such as village through the relation of either the counter positiveness or the substratumness and qualifies, further, the action such as the 'going' through the relation of delimiting the counter-positiveness. Since, the object 'village' has the mutual absence of what possesses the action of going, the mutual absence can be said to be relating to the action through the relation of delimiting the counter-positiveness (i.e. since the village has the mutual absence of what possesses the action, the mutual absence becomes the delimiter of the counter positiveness, conditioned by such an absence). Thus, the syntactico-semantic relation such as the substratumness or the superstratumness and the mutual absence are the accusative meanings.

Observation

Gokulanātha can be stated to have generalized the Navya theory of the accusative-meaning. He has perceived that merely the superstratumness leaving aside the substratumness, cannot be the accusative-meaning. For, since the object is the abode or substratum of the effect, the substratumness can also be the relation between the object and also the effect; and consequently, the same should be recognized to be the accusative meaning. Thus, he has generalized the accusative-meaning as the syntactico-semantic relation between the object and the effect which can be either the substratumness or the superstratumness. Offcourse, Raghunātha and other Navya logicians had already recognized the fact that the substratumness should also be considered to be the accusative-meaning; however, credit is due to Gokulanātha for generalizing the accusative meaning.

Now, as regards the mutual absence as the accusative meaning. The Navyas have accepted the sense of the mutual absence in one way or the other as the accusative-meaning. Therefore, Gokulanātha's suggestion that the mutual absence be accepted as the accusative-meaning is not entirely new. However, epistemologists, excepting Navya logician, do not accept such a mutual absence as the accusative meaning on the ground

that the incorrect¹³ statement can be avoided by grammatical convention that 'whatever name is later and without any other occasion for application, takes precedence over the earlier name' (*yā parā anyvakāśā ca*) and therefore, there is no need to assume any special meaning for the accusative which has no sanction from Pāṇini.

Giridhara's defence

Giridhara, one of the latest of Navya logicians, defends the Navya theory of accusative-meaning by refuting Bhartṛhari's theory that all the case endings are merely suggestive (*dyotaka*) and the nominal bases themselves denote all the meanings including the *kāraṇa* relations. Following is an outline of Giridhara's¹⁴ defence. The accusative case endings must be accepted to refer to the substratumness, delimited by the substratumness-hood or to the superstratumness delimited by superstratumness-hood. And it is not possible to accept that the accusative base itself refers to the object *kāraṇa* as such and the case endings, including the accusative case endings, are merely suggestive (*dyotaka*). For, in that case, the cognition from the statement such as 'he does not cook the water' (*jalam na pacati*) becomes untenable. This is so because, since the cooking, that conditions the objectness of the water, is not established, the absence of the same (cooking that conditions the objectness of the water) also becomes untenable. According to the epistemological convention, the establishment of the counter-positive is the cause of the establishment of the absence (*abhāva-prasiddhim prati pratiyogiprasiddhiḥ kāraṇam*).

On the other hand, when the accusative case endings are accepted to refer to the superstratumness, the cognition from the statement 'he does not cook the water' becomes tenable because the absence of the superstratumness, conditioned by the accusative base-meaning, namely, the water, can be related to the action of cooking through the relation of the occurrence,

13. See chapter on the avoidance of the incorrect statement such as '*svam gacchati*' for more detail.

14. *Vibhaktiyarthanirṇaya* p. 80.

which is an occurrence-exacting relation. In this case, it would not be necessary that the cooking, that conditions the objectness of water, be established because the absence of the cooking, that conditions the objectness of water, is not any way to be related to anything.

Thus, despite that the case endings are meaningless after the adjectives etc., the accusative case endings are not merely suggestive i.e. meaningless. Also, suppose the case endings are suggestive i.e. meaningless, then the cognition would become necessary from the statement such as 'he goes to the village' (*grāmam gacchati*) even while one knows that the accusative case endings do not refer to the objectness. Again, when the accusative and other case endings are merely suggestive i.e. meaningless, the accusative-base-meaning, namely, the object 'village' etc. would itself be needed to be related to the action of cooking etc.; and consequently, even the statement such as 'he goes to the object' (*karma gacchati*) would also become necessary if intended to mean that 'one goes to the village'. This is so because, the object, referred to by the word 'object' (*karma*), can be related to the going through the relation of the superstratumness. Finally, the superstratumness should be accepted to be the accusative meaning as delimited by the superstratumness-hood in general. And, in the association of the root 'go' (*gam*), the same superstratumness can be related to the effect 'contact' through the self linking relation (*svarūpa-sambandha*), identical with the superstratumness delimited by the inherence. Thus, the accusative-meaning becomes generalized. Also, this way, the incorrect statement such as 'he cooks the time' (*kālam pacati*), when intended to mean that 'he cooks now' (*adhunā pacati*), gets avoided. This, is so because the superstratumness has no potentially to be related to the effect 'swelling' etc. through the self linking relation identical with the superstratumness delimited by the element of time.

Observation

By the time Giridhara arrived on the epistemological stage, the superstratumness and the substratumness were established to be the accusative meanings by the Navyas. Therefore, he merely defends the Navya position of the accusative-meaning

by refuting the Bhartṛhari's theory of the suggestiveness (*doṣṭakatva*) i.e. meaninglessness of the case endings. Giridhara can be stated to have perceived two main difficulties in accepting the suggestiveness or meaninglessness for the case endings. For, when the accusative case endings do not convey any sense, the accusative and other base-meanings should themselves be related to the action expressed by the verbal root. And, this will lead to the untenability of the cognition in the negative statements such as 'he does not cook the water' (*jalam na pacati*). For, here the negative particle (*na*) should be accepted to refer to the absence of the action of cooking that is qualified by the accusative base-meaning 'object' i.e. that conditions the objectness of the object 'water'. However, such an absence of the action of cooking is not tenable since the action that conditions the objectness of the water itself is not established.

The second difficulty is that the cognition becomes necessary from the incorrect statement such as 'he goes to the object' (*karma gacchati*) since the accusative base-meaning, namely, 'the object' can be claimed to be competent to be related to the action through the relation of the superstratumness i.e. the objectness. Thus, Giridhara's contribution is not so much as establishing any new theory of the accusative-meaning; but defending the Navyas theory by refuting the Bhartṛhari's view of the suggestiveness or meaninglessness of the case-endings.

Kaundabhaṭṭa's theory

Kaundabhaṭṭa and another grammarians¹⁵ hold that the accusative case endings refer to the abode or the substratum (*āśraya*). According to them, since the grammatical object is analysable as the abode or the substratum of the effects, one of the two root-meanings, not sharing the same locus as that of the action, another of the two root meanings, (*kartṛgata prakṛta dhātvartha vyāpāra vyadhikaraṇa prakṛta dhātvartha phalāśrayatvam karmatvam*), only the abode or the substratum, that has not been expressed by any other parts of speech, should be

15. *āśrayāvadhīrduddheśyah sambādhaḥ śaktireva vā |
yathāyatham vibhaktyarthāḥ supām karṇeti bhāṣpataḥ ||*

considered as the accusative case-meaning. Here, the action and also the effect are expressed by the verbal root itself, and hence need not be considered as the accusative case-meaning.

Kaṇḍabhaṭṭa points out that the abode or substratum (*āśraya*) is generalized here by the unanalysable property of the abodeness or substratumness identified with the indivisible power (*mūrtika dharmarupākhaṇḍasakti*). Consequently, despite that the abodeness or substratumness can differ due to the difference of individual abodes or substratums, the lack of generality (in the form of different abodeness (es)) or substratumness (es)) cannot be an impediment to the acceptance of the abode or substratum as the accusative case-meaning.

According to this theory, syntactico-semantic relations involved in an accusative-statement such as 'Caitra goes to the village' (*caitraḥ grāmam gacchati*) can be explained as follows : The accusative case ending (*am*), refers to the abode or substratum. The base-meaning, namely, the village relates to such an abode through identity. The accusative case meaning, namely, the abode or substratum relates to the effect, 'contact', which in one of the two meanings of the root 'go' (*gam*), through the superstratumness. The effect 'contact' relates, further, to the action of going, another of the two meanings of the root, through the relation of producing. The verbal ending '*ti*', on the other hand, refers to the 'agent' and the number singularity; and the nominative base word '*caitra*' refers to Caitra, whereas the nominative case ending (*s*) refers to the number singularity. Such a nominative case meaning, singularity, relates to its base meaning, namely, Caitra through occurrence; and the same (base meaning, Caitra) relates to the 'agent' through identity or non difference, which i.e. the 'agent', in turn, relates to the action of going expressed by the root 'go' (*gam*) through the superstratumness. Thus, one cognizes from such a statement that the action of going, which produces the effect, contact, occurring in the abode, identical with the village, occurs itself in the agent, Caitra, the abode of singularity.

Objection to Kaṇḍabhaṭṭas theory

Both logicians and ritualists object to the grammarians theory of the accusative meaning supported by Kaṇḍabhaṭṭa.

Gokulanātha refutes grammarians theory most convincingly.¹⁶

According to him, suppose the accusative case endings, since they have natural denotations in the sense of the locus (*adhikaraṇa*), are accepted to convey the sense of the abode or substratum (*āśraya*), then all the individuals in the entire universe, which are the abode or substratum (of one thing or other), would become the accusative meanings. Also, then, the accusative base meaning such as the village would have to be related to such an accusative case meaning through identity. However, such a position is not tenable. For, despite that *Īśvara* can have the knowledge of all the individuals through his natural power and therefore, can desire that the accusative case endings should convey the sense of all the individuals in the universe, the ordinary mortals like us cannot perceive such an *Īśvara saṅketa* which has the reference to all the individual entities as the product of the accusative case endings. That is to say that *Īśvara*, being omniscient, can know all the individual entities personally and therefore, can have the desire that all the individuals should be conveyed by the accusative case endings; however, ordinary mortals, due to their limitations in understandings, cannot know all the individuals and therefore, cannot perceive *Īśvara's* desire. Thus, the position that the accusative case endings denote the abode or substratum is not tenable.

Among the logicians, Giridhara also refutes the grammarians theory quite convincingly.¹⁷ His arguments are as follows : The accusative case endings cannot be accepted to refer to the abode or the substratum (*āśraya*) which relates to the effect through the community of locus delimited by inherence (*samavāyaghaṭita sāmānādhikarāṇya sambandhena*) etc. For, in that case, the verbal cognition from the negative statement 'he does not cook water' (*jalam na pacati*) would become untenable. In such a negative statement, only the absence of the abode or substratum, which is identical with the water (*jalābhinnāśrayā-*

16. *Nimittam antarā śabdā pravṛttes sarvakarmasu nimittaikyā sambhavācca na dvitīyāśrayārthikā*. Padavākhyaratnākara, p. 538.

17. *Vibhaktyarthanirṇaya* p. 81.

bhāva), should be conceded, by the grammarians, as relating to the action of cooking through the relation of the superstratumness; however, since the superstratumness is not an occurrence-exacting relation (*vytyaniyāmaka*), such an abode or substratum cannot be said to relate to the action of cooking.

Also, it must be accepted that the delimiting relation of the counter positiveness of an absence is invariably an occurrence-exacting relation; for, otherwise the incorrect statement such as 'mūrta substance has sky' (*mūrtam gaganavat*) could become a necessity since the *mūrta* substance such as mind has the sky through the sky-contact a non occurrence-exacting relation. Thus, only an occurrence-exacting relation should be considered as the delimiting relation of the counter positiveness; and consequently the abode or the substratum would become untenable for being considered as the accusative case meaning since the verbal cognition from 'he does not cook the water' becomes impossible.

Also, it should be noted that the indivisible property such as the abodeness or the substratumness, which is considered as the delimiting property of the accusative meaning by the grammarians, needs further to be generalized as the being delimited by the abodeness-hood or substratumness-hood (*āśrayatātvāvacchinna*) and thus the heaviness results. And suppose, to avoid such a heaviness, even the abodeness or the substratumness, which is quite distinct from the indivisible property, is considered to be the delimiting property of the accusative meaning, then the state of possessing the touch (*sparsavatva*), would become untenable for being considered as the delimiting property of what originates i.e. produces the substance since the same state of possessing the touch is a heavy one.

Thus, it must be accepted that the abode or substratum cannot be the accusative meaning; rather, only the substratumness, which are necessary in any way to prove such perceptions as 'this is a superstratum' or 'this is a substratum', should be the accusative meaning.

Khaṇḍadeva,¹⁸ the ritualist, objects to the grammarians theory on the following grounds.

Nominal base meanings are accepted as qualifying the case meanings through a relation other than that of identity. Otherwise, in instances like 'he is a king's person' (*rājñāḥ puruṣaḥ*), the genitive base meaning, namely, the king cannot be related, as a qualifier, to the ownership (*svattva*) or mastership (*svāmītva*) through the superstratumness. And, suppose, the abode or substratum is accepted to be the accusative meaning, then the epistemological convention that the base meanings relate to the case meanings through a relation other than that of identity gets violated since the accusative base-meaning such as the village needs to be related to the abode or the substratum through identity.

Also, in instances like 'what belongs i.e. what is offered to the deity of Indra is curd' (*aindraṁ dadhi*), only the base meaning, namely, Indra is related to the material, qualified by the deity (*devatā viśiṣṭa dravya*), the *taddhita*-sense, through the relation of the superstratumness, a relation of non identity. Thus, the convention that the base meanings relate to the case and other derivative affix meanings through a relation other than that of identity is need not be violated.

Observation

Both logicians and ritualists oppose the grammarians theory. However, Gokulanātha's opposition is the most convincing. As he states, suppose the accusative case endings are accepted to refer to the abode or substratum, then all the individual entities in the universe would become the accusative meanings; however, no ordinary human being can ever perceive all such individual entities as accusative meanings. Therefore, Gokulanātha points out a genuine difficulty in the grammarians theory.

Now, as regards Giridhara's objection to the grammarians theory. Although his objections too are valid, his concerns are mostly epistemological difficulties like the that in explaining the negative statements such as 'he does not cook the water' (*jalam na pacati*) due to the untenability of the superstratumness as the delimiting relation of the counter positiveness conditioned by an absence of the abode. However, such epistemological difficulties can be overcome by the grammarians by allowing the superstra-

tumness, as an exception, to be the delimiting relation of the counter positiveness.

Also, Khaṇḍadeva's objection that such a theory violates the epistemological convention that the base meanings relate to the case-meanings through a relation other than that of identity can be set aside by restricting the epistemological convention. Logicians and other epistemologists too restrict such a convention in the case of the meanings of adjectival case endings i.e. identity etc. since the base meanings relate to the case-meanings in such cases through the self-linking relation (*svarūpataḥ*), a relation of identity.

Ritualists theory

Khaṇḍadeva¹⁹ holds that the accusative case endings should be accepted to denote the objectness which is an indivisible property (*akhaṇḍopādhi*). According to him, the Navya theory that the accusative case endings denote the superstratumness relating to the effect 'contact' etc. expressed by the verbal root is not tenable. His arguments are as follows : Since the objectness, as an indivisible property (*akhaṇḍopādhi*), is much more economical (*laghu*) than the superstratumness, the same objectness should be considered as the accusative meaning. Also, suppose the superstratumness is the accusative meaning, then, as stated earlier, the epistemological convention '*padārthah padarthena anveti na tu tadekadeśena*' gets violated. Therefore, by all means, only the objectness, which is an indivisible property, should be accepted as the accusative meaning.

Now, it should be noted that the verbal roots such as 'go' (*gam*) etc. too will be assumed to have denotations in the actions as goingness etc. and therefore, economy occurs in the assumption of the root-meanings as well. Thus, it is established that only the objectness, due to its economical nature, should be accepted as the accusative-meaning.

Observation

Ritualists, especially Khaṇḍadeva and others, were very particular about the economy of assumption. They have held

1. Bhāṭṭarahasya, pp. 56-62.

that only an economical property can be considered to be the meaning of grammatical elements. Consequently, they have accepted that only the objectness, which is an indivisible property and therefore, economical, can alone be the accusative-meaning.

However, a flaw in the ritualists theory is that the accusative case endings would need to produce the knowledge of the abode of the effect produced by the action such as going so that the objectness can be identified with the state of being in the abode the effect. Thus, the so called economy in the assumption of the denotation of the accusative case endings in such objectness becomes pointless.

Nevertheless, it must be noted that most of the grammarians and also the logicians adopt the principle of 'whatever is not already obtained otherwise is the word-meaning, in determining the meaning of the accusative case endings; but the ritualists, since do not resort to such a principle, consider the objectness as such as the accusative meaning. Thus, it was not necessary for them to analyse the objectness as the abode of the effect produced by the action etc. and then to consider only the senses, which are not obtained otherwise, as the accusative meaning.

An alternative theory

A section of the ritualists hold as follows :²⁰ Accusative case endings denote the state of being what is to be accomplished or effected (*sādhyaiva*) or the state of being what is to be refined or perfected (*samskāryatva*). For instance, consider the statement 'he pounds or threshes the rice grains' (*vṛhīṇ avahanti*). Here, the accusative case ending denotes the state of being what is to be accomplished or effected since the rice grains, being the materials used for the *purodāśa* cake, have the state of being what is to be accomplished or effected. However, in the case of the statements such as 'he offers the rice flour' (*saktūn juhoti*), the accusative case ending is used in the sense of the instrumentality '*vyatyayo bahulam*' (p. iii.1 85) and hence the accusative case ending denotes only the instrumen-

20. vide Laghumanjuṣā, p. 1208.

tality of the rice flour with respect to the activity conducive to the offering.

It should be noted here that, according to ritualists, the sense conveyed by the verbal roots functions as the object with respect to the activity (*bhāvanā*). Consider, for instance 'he cooks' (*pacati*). Here, the verb '*pacati*' refers to the activity leading to the 'cooking'. That is why such verbs are analysed as 'he does cooking' (*pākam karoti*) etc. wherein the cooking is the object to be accomplished through the activity doing and therefore, the word expressing such an action of cooking i.e. '*pāka*' has the accusative case ending.

Nevertheless, when an actual object such as 'rice' (*odana*) is expressed which has semantical competence to be the 'object' with respect to the activity, the root meaning functions as only the instrument. Thus, in the statement 'he cooks rice' (*odanam pacati*), the cooking is construed with the activity as the instrument so that a cognition such as 'he accomplishes the rice with the instrumentality of the cooking' (*pākena odanam bhāvayati*) can be obtained.

It should be noted here that the state of being what is to be accomplished or effected (*sādhyatva*) or the state of being what is to be refined or perfected (*samskāryatva*) is to be viewed as having semantical co-referentiality with the objectness (*karmatā samānādhikaraṇam*). Thus, despite such *sādhyatva* etc. differ in each case, the accusative can be said to refer to a generalized meaning, namely, notions that have semantical co-referentiality with the objectness.

Conclusion

Following Pāṇini's rule that the accusative case endings are used in the sense of the syntactico-semantic notion of the object (ii.3.2), Kātyāyana holds that the accusative case endings denote the sense of the 'object' '*kāraka*'. He maintains that the case endings are meant to denote the syntactico-semantic notions (*kārakas*); and therefore, the accusative case endings denote the sense of the 'object' *kāraka*.

However, Patañjali differs from Kātyāyana and prefers to consider the number (singularity, duality and plurality as belonging to the object) as the accusative meaning. He was

guided by the fact that the syntactico-semantic notion of the 'object' (*karman*) can be expressed otherwise (through other grammatical elements such as the accusative base) and hence the accusative case endings can be restricted to convey the sense of the number alone. Thus, according to Patañjali, the accusative case ending (*am*) in '*kaṭam karoti*' (he makes a mat), '*grāmam gacchati*', (he goes to the village) etc., denotes the sense of the singularity as belonging to the object' (mat and village).

Nevertheless, he has proposed, as an alternative that the accusative case endings denote the syntactico-semantic relation between the *kāraka* (i.e. *karman*) and also the action (*kriyākārayor abhisambandha*). This proposal is the most significant contribution to the analysis of sentence meaning since the accusative and other case endings, which are found in the surface structure of the sentence, represent the underlying syntactico-semantic relations or functions of *kāraḥ* such as the '*karman*' etc. with respect to the action at the deep structure level. That is to say that whereas the accusative and other case endings represent the syntactico-semantic relations of the 'object' and others at the surface level of the sentence, the *kāraḥ* represent the same relations at the underlying deep structure level. Thus, Patañjali can be stated to have presented the most important aspect of case and *kāraka* relations with respect to the action in this alternative theory of the accusative meaning.

Kaiyaṭa was greatly influenced by Kātyāyana's natural interpretation of the rule (p. ii.3.2); and therefore, holds that the accusative case endings denote *kāraka* power such as objectness. Consequently, he interprets Patañjali's statement that the accusative denotes the syntactico-semantic relation between the *kāraḥ* (i.e. *karman*) and also the action (*kriyā kārayor abhisambandhasya vācikā dvitīyā*) to mean that accusative case endings denote the power of the objectness. His interpretation is based on the reasoning that the accusative case endings must denote the power of the objectness since when the term '*kāraka*' means the substance associated with the power, the power i.e. ability of the objectness is manifested due to its relation with the action (*kriyā dravyayor abhisambandha nimittatvāt*) and since when the '*kāraka*' means the power itself, the relation can

be understood due to its intrinsic ability (*sāmarthyāt kriyā-kāraka sambandhasyāpy avagamāt*). Thus, both ways, the power or ability of the objectness which determines the syntactico-semantic relation between the object and also the action, is the accusative meaning.

Nāgesha, too was influenced by Kātyāyana. However, he maintains that the power as such need not be accepted to be the accusative meaning. According to him, it is sufficient that the accusative endings refer to the object as the abode of such power since the same is meant by the word '*karman*' in the rule which enjoins the accusative endings. Nevertheless, he has accepted the qualificity of the objectness and also the syntactico-semantic relation as two other meanings of the accusative as otherwise the Nirukta statement that 'the nominal base meanings are the qualificands of the *sattva*' (*sattva pradhānāni nāmāni*) and also the expectancy for the syntactico-semantic relation become untenable.

His alternative view, on the other hand, that all the three are the meanings of the accusative base itself and the accusative case endings are merely suggestive (*dyotaka*) is a reiteration of Bhartṛhari's view that nominal bases alone are competent to denote all the senses and case endings are merely suggestive i.e. used for the grammatical correctness.

Logicians adopt the principle of whatever is not obtained otherwise is the word 'meaning' (*ananya labhyaḥ śabdārthaḥ*) in determining the meaning of the accusative case endings.

The Prācyaś holds that Pāṇini has prescribed the accusative case endings in the sense of the objectness; and since except the effect, everything else, in the analysis of the objectness as the being abode of the effect produced by the root-meaning 'action', is already expressed otherwise, only the effect 'contact' etc. is the accusative meaning. However, since according to then, the accusative conveys the effect and the roots convey the action alone, the roots such as 'go' (*gam*) and 'leave' (*tyaj*), both of which convey the sense of movement or motion, become synonymous (*samānārthaka*), and thus the statement 'leaving is not going' (*tyāgo na gamanam*) would become untenable. Jagadīśa tries to avoid this difficulty by suggesting that the reference to the action produced by a particular verbal root

such as 'leave' (*tyaj*) or 'go' (*gam*) is the cause of the verbal cognition wherein a particular effect such as separation or contact is perceived to be qualifying the action. Nevertheless, in the absence the knowledge of such a cause and effect relationship, the statement would become untenable.

Navyas, on the other hand, propose that the accusative case endings are used in the sense of the superstratumness (*ādheyatā*). And the superstratumness must be accepted to explain the perception such as the superstratumness occurs in such and such place etc. Accordingly they understand that Pāṇini's rule enjoins the accusative case endings after a base which refer to the village etc. that are related to the superstratumness occurring in the effect.

An epistemological problem encountered by the Navyas in their theory is that the convention such as 'a meaning of a word relates to the independent meaning of another word and not to the part of the meaning of another word' gets violated since the superstratumness is related the effect 'contact' etc. which is only a part of the meaning of the verbal root such as 'go' (*gam*). However, since Gadādhara has stated that effect and action can be considered to be two independent i.e. separate meanings of the verbal roots, the problem can be overcome by relating the superstratumness to the effect, the independent meaning.

Gokulanātha and Giridhara do not propose any new theory of accusative meaning as such. They can be stated, however, to have generalized and defended the Navya theory respectively. Gokulanātha generalizes the Navya theory by proposing that the accusative case endings refer to the syntactico semantical relation between the object and also the effect which can be either the superstratumness or the substratumness. He perceived that the substratumness, like the superstratumness, can also be the accusative meaning since the object is the abode i.e. the substratum of the effect. And therefore, the accusative case endings must be accepted to denote the syntactico-semantical relation in general.

Giridhara defends Navya's theory by refuting Bhartṛhari's theory of suggestiveness. According to him, accusative and other case endings cannot be held to be merely suggestive i.e.

meaningless; for, in that case, the cognition from the negative statement 'he does not cook the water' (*jalam na pacati*) would become untenable as the absence of the cooking, that is qualified by the accusative base-meaning (namely the 'object' water), is not tenable due to the untenability of the counter positive i.e. the cooking qualified by the water. On the other hand, suppose the accusative case endings are accepted to denote the superstratumness, then the absence of the same conditioned by the 'object' water can be said to relate to the cooking which is tenable. Thus, Giridhara, while defending the Navya theory, echoes the most widely held view that despite the meaninglessness of the accusative case endings after adjectives and also despite their non-occurrence in few instances like '*daddhi paśyati*' ('he sees the curd') etc., the accusative and other case endings should not be held to be meaningless.

Kaṇḍabhaṭṭa too like logicians, has adopted the principle of '*ananyalabhyaḥ śabdārthah*' in determining the accusative meaning. However, since Pāṇini has prescribed the accusative case ending in the sense of the object and since the object is the abode or substratum (*āśraya*) of the effect produced, he has accepted the abode or the substratum as the accusative-meaning. This is more realistic than considering any part in the analysis of the objectness like the effect or superstratumness as the accusative meaning. This theory identifies the accusative meaning rightly as the abode of the effect. Nevertheless, as Gokulānātha points out, suppose the accusative case endings are accepted to denote the abode or the substratum, then all the individual entities which are the abode of something or other in the universe would become the accusative-meaning and no one can perceive all such entities as the accusative-meaning. Thus, Kaṇḍabhaṭṭa's proposal, despite its definite advantage over the logicians theory, has certain in built deficiency as well.

Now, finally as regards the ritualist's theory. Unlike Logicians etc., ritualists do not adopt the principle of '*ananyalabhyaḥ śabdārthah*' in determining the accusative meaning. They have considered the objectness as such as the accusative meaning. They were guided by the economy in the assumption of the denotation for the accusative case endings in the sense of the objectness which is common and one in all the objects. In

the alternative theory too, where the 'sādhyatva' or the 'samskāryatva' is held to be the accusative-meaning, such a 'sādhyatva' is viewed to have semantical coreferentiality with the objectness in general and therefore, accusative case endings are maintained to have a single denotation in the sense of the objectness.

Nevertheless, as pointed out earlier, ritualists need to accept that the accusative case endings produce the knowledge of the effect produced by the action so that the objectness can be identified. Thus, assuming a single denotation in the objectness does not really lessen the burden of assumptions.

Thus, it can be concluded that while Patanjali, Kaiyaṭa and Nāgesha, have proposed syntactico-semantical relation, the power of the objectness etc. as the accusative-meaning, the logicians and Kaṇḍabhaṭṭa adopted the principle of '*ananyalabhyaḥ śabdārthaḥ*' in determining the superstratumness etc. as the accusative meaning; and Khaṇḍadeva has held the objectness, an indivisible property, as the accusative-meaning.

